Target Capabilities List

A companion to the National Preparedness Goal

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

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Homeland Security

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PREFACE

The attacks on 9/11, the anthrax attacks, the devastation from Hurricane Katrina, and preparations for a possible pandemic illustrate the 21st century challenges the Nation faces. To meet these challenges, we must understand performance requirements for a major event at the task level and build and maintain the capabilities required to perform those tasks. Preparedness for major events assumes a coordinated and shared response that involves all levels of government, the private sector, non-government organizations, and citizens.

In December, 2003, the President issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-8 to establish national policy to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. HSPD-8 required the development of a National Preparedness Goal (the Goal). The Goal defines ***what*** it means for the Nation to be prepared by providing a vision for preparedness, establishing national priorities, and identifying target capabilities. The Goal adopts a Capabilities-Based Planning process supported by three planning tools: the National Planning Scenarios, Target Capabilities List (TCL), and Universal Task List (UTL). They can be viewed online at https://odp.esportals.com or https://www.llis.dhs.gov.

The Target Capabilities List describes and sets targets for the capabilities required to achieve the four homeland security mission areas: Prevent, Protect, Respond, and Recover. It defines and provides the basis for assessing preparedness. It also establishes national targets for the capabilities to prepare the Nation for major all-hazards events, such as those defined by the National Planning Scenarios. The current version of the TCL contains 37 core capabilities. When the additional capabilities that are under development are completed by the end of 2006, the TCL will provide a comprehensive set of capabilities required to support the Goal.

A "Consensus of the Community" approach was used to develop the Target Capabilities List. Stakeholders from Federal, State, local, territorial, and tribal governments, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations came together in four national workshops and capability working groups to define the desired outcome, critical tasks, preparedness and performance measures, resources, national targets, and assigned responsibilities for building and maintaining the capability.

The Goal will contribute to operational readiness, priority-setting, and program implementation at all levels of government. The Goal provides a call to action by all Americans as they consider their personal and shared responsibility to be part of *A Nation Prepared.* The Target Capabilities List provides guidance on building and maintaining capabilities needed to achieve the Goal.

Michael Chertoff
Secretary
Department of Homeland Security

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Target Capabilities List (TCL) supports the National Preparedness Goal by defining the capabilities needed to achieve national preparedness. The vision for the National Preparedness Goal is:

> ***A NATION PREPARED with coordinated capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from all hazards in a way that balances risk with resources.***

The Goal also establishes the following priorities to meet the Nation's most urgent needs and adopts a Capabilities-Based Planning process to define and build the capabilities required to achieve the Goal:

- Expand regional collaboration
- Implement the National Incident Management System and the National Response Plan
- Implement the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
- Strengthen information sharing and collaboration capabilities
- Strengthen communications capabilities
- Strengthen CBRNE detection, response, and decontamination capabilities
- Strengthen medical surge and mass prophylaxis capabilities
- Strengthen planning and citizen preparedness capabilities

The Target Capabilities List provides a guide to addressing the priorities and achieving the National Preparedness Goal. When fully developed the TCL will provide a comprehensive list of capabilities required to achieve the four Homeland Security Missions identified in the Goal: Prevent, Protect, Respond, and Recover. Capabilities provide the means to accomplish a mission or function and achieve desired outcomes by performing critical tasks, under specified conditions, to target levels of performance. Capabilities are delivered by appropriate combinations of properly planned, organized, equipped, trained, and exercised personnel. The TCL supports an all-hazards interchangeable approach to building capabilities that will be needed for terrorist attacks, natural disasters, health emergencies, and other major events. It currently identifies 37 capabilities that were developed with the active participation of stakeholders representing all levels of government, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. An additional set of capabilities is being developed to address principally Federal functions not found in the original set of capabilities.

The Underlying Assumption: Major Events Require Shared Responsibility

As was demonstrated with the events of 9/11 and more recently Hurricane Katrina, major events, whether man-made or naturally occurring, quickly exceed the capacity of local jurisdictions. The TCL establishes national target levels for the capabilities that will be required for such events, and spells out the responsibilities of various levels of government, non-governmental organizations, the private sector, and citizens as appropriate.

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Consensus of the Community Approach: Stakeholder Involvement

The National Preparedness Goal and TCL were developed with an unprecedented level of stakeholder involvement. The Department of Homeland Security adopted a "consensus of the community" approach, eliciting the active involvement of local, State, and Federal agencies, over 100 national associations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. Stakeholders participated through national stakeholder workshops, working groups, and broad national reviews.

The Approach to Defining Capabilities

The capability requirements were derived from a threat and mission analysis. The first step in defining capability requirements is to answer the question "How prepared do we need to be?" The threat analysis, reflected in the 15 National Planning Scenarios, illustrates the range, scope, magnitude, and complexity of major events, including terrorism, natural disasters, and other emergencies for which the Nation should prepare. The mission area analysis provides an overview of all of the major functions required to achieve the four missions. It helps to ensure that all preparedness activities are focused on achievement of the mission

The National Planning Scenarios serve as the basis for defining the tasks that must be performed to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from a wide range of threats and hazards, as well as the capabilities needed to perform the tasks. The Universal Task List (UTL) is the catalogue of tasks that need to be performed by someone or a team from a Federal, State, tribal, local agency, a non-governmental organization, a private-sector organization, or the general public. **No single jurisdiction or agency is expected to perform every task.** Rather, subsets of tasks will be selected based on specific roles, missions, and functions.

The Target Capabilities List provides a guide for development of a national network of capabilities that will be available when and where they are needed to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from major events. The capabilities define all-hazards preparedness and provide the basis for assessing preparedness and to improve decisions related to preparedness investments and strategies. They establish national targets to prepare the Nation for major all-hazards events such as those represented by the National Planning Scenarios.

Enhancements to Address Findings and Recommendations from Hurricane Katrina Reports

The planned release in December 2005, of the Target Capabilities List: Version 2.0, was postponed so that the findings and recommendations from the reports of the response to Hurricane Katrina could be addressed. Working groups met, in person and/or by conference call, during April and May of 2006 to review the reports and modify and/or enhance the capabilities to address relevant issues. Many had been deployed to the Gulf States to assist with the response and were able to share their personal experience working on a very large-scale incident.

Target Capabilities

The TCL is currently comprised of 37 capabilities which are listed in the chart on the next page. These capabilities address response capabilities, immediate recovery, selected prevention and protection mission capabilities, as well as common capabilities such as planning and communications that support all missions. Because the primary focus of the Phase I

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capabilities was response, local jurisdictions and States are generally the lead, with Federal and private sector support. During Phase II of the TCL development process, initiated in the summer of 2006, an additional set of capabilities will be developed that focuses primarily on new capabilities that support the prevention and protect missions and long-term recovery. The Federal Government and private sector have a higher level of responsibility for building and maintaining the majority of the Phase II capabilities.

A Capability Summary has been developed for each capability to describe and provide guidance on the major capability components. Each Capability Summary contains the following elements a definition and outcome, preparedness and performance tasks and measure, capability elements (resources), national targets, and assigned responsibility for building and maintaining the capability.

Phase I Capabilities (Included in this version of the TCL)

Common Capabilities

Planning
Communications
Community Preparedness and Participation
Risk Management

Prevent Mission Capabilities

Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warning
Intelligence Analysis and Production
Information Sharing and Dissemination
Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations
CBRNE Detection

Protect Mission Capabilities

Critical Infrastructure Protection
Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense
Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation
Public Health Laboratory Testing

Respond Mission Capabilities

Onsite Incident Management
Emergency Operations Center Management
Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution
Volunteer Management and Donations
Responder Safety and Health
Public Safety and Security
Animal Health Emergency Support
Environmental Health
Explosive Device Response Operations
Firefighting Operations/Support
WMD/ Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination
Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place
Isolation and Quarantine
Urban Search and Rescue
Emergency Public Information and Warning
Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment
Medical Surge
Medical Supplies Management and Distribution
Mass Prophylaxis
Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding and Related Services)
Fatality Management

Recover Mission Capabilities

Structural Damage and Mitigation Assessment
Restoration of Lifelines
Economic and Community Recovery

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Using the Target Capabilities List

The Target Capabilities List is a reference document that describes the capabilities and target levels for achieving national preparedness. The TCL also serves as a guide to enhance preparedness plans, enhance training programs and identify technology development priorities. Various implementation tools are being developed from the TCL to help decision-makers and managers at all levels to define their preparedness requirements and assess levels of preparedness. Some of the potential uses are briefly described below:

- **Enhance Plans:** The TCL includes a Planning Capability designed to establish and maintain the ability to develop, update, and test plans. In addition, each capability contains both preparedness and performance tasks and measures that support the capability outcome and serve as a guide for preparedness planning. The preparedness tasks and measures describe major elements or issues that should be addressed in plans, procedures, and systems, as well as authorities, relationships, and agreements that need to be in place to prepare to use the capability. The performance tasks and measures and the target levels also inform the planning process.

- **Enhance Strategies:** The common framework provided by the Goal, priorities, and capabilities serve as a guide to enhance homeland security strategies at all levels.

- **Assess Preparedness:** The TCL provides a basis for assessing preparedness to help jurisdictions and agencies to plan strategically, design appropriate program that meet proven needs, and evaluate the effectiveness of investments over time.

- **Focus Training on Task Performance:** Training programs at the Federal level are in the process of being modified as appropriate to ensure that they provide participants with the knowledge, skills, and abilities to perform the critical tasks defined by the TCL to the proficiency level required to achieve the capability outcomes.

- **Focus Exercise Evaluation on Task Performance and Outcomes:** Exercises provide a means to test and validate preparedness. The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) is designed to encourage a common exercise design, conduct, and evaluation methodology across al levels of government and the private sector. HSEEP exercises are designed and evaluated to demonstrate capability levels through the assessment of performance of critical tasks and achievement of outcomes, as defined by the TCL.

- **National Preparedness Information System:** A National Preparedness Information System (NPIS) is being developed to assess the Nation's level of preparedness and ability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from major events. It will provide a comprehensive picture of capability requirements, current levels, and gaps at the jurisdictional, regional, State, and national levels.

The TCL Going Forward

The current version of the TCL identifies a set of 37 core capabilities. The capability working groups will continue to work through the summer and fall of 2006 to assist with NIMS typing and credentialing of the resources identified in the TCL. Additional capabilities, that focus on requirements related primarily to the prevent, protect, and recover mission areas, are being developed during phase II of the capabilities development process. The TCL is a living document that will continue to be enhanced and refined over time.

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INTRODUCTION

Overview

The Target Capabilities List (TCL) supports the National Preparedness Goal by defining the capabilities needed to achieve national preparedness. The vision for the National Preparedness Goal is:

> *A **NATION PREPARED with coordinated capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from all hazards in a way that balances risk with resources.***

The Goal also establishes the following priorities to meet the Nation's most urgent needs and adopts a Capabilities-Based Planning process to define and build the capabilities required to achieve the Goal:

- Expand regional collaboration
- Implement the National Incident Management System and the National Response Plan
- Implement the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
- Strengthen information sharing and collaboration capabilities
- Strengthen communications capabilities
- Strengthen CBRNE detection, response, and decontamination capabilities
- Strengthen medical surge and mass prophylaxis capabilities
- Strengthen planning and citizen preparedness capabilities

The Target Capabilities List provides a guide to addressing the priorities and achieving the National Preparedness Goal. When fully developed, the TCL will provide a comprehensive list of capabilities required to achieve the four Homeland Security Missions identified in the Goal: Prevent, Protect, Respond, and Recover. Capabilities provide the means to accomplish a mission or function and achieve desired outcomes by performing critical tasks, under specified conditions, to target levels of performance. Capabilities are delivered by appropriate combinations of properly planned, organized, equipped, trained, and exercised personnel. The TCL assumes an all-hazards interchangeable approach to building capabilities that will be needed for terrorist attacks, natural disasters, health emergencies, and other major events. It currently identifies 37 capabilities that were developed with the active participation of stakeholders representing all levels of government, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. An additional set of capabilities is being developed to address principally Federal functions not found in the original set of capabilities.

Each capability includes a definition; outcome; preparedness and performance activities, tasks, and measures; and national target levels of capability. The TCL also identified roles for Federal, State, local and tribal governments, non-governmental organizations, the private sector, and citizens in building and maintaining capabilities. By doing so, it provides a basis for assessing preparedness and for setting priorities for the effective use of limited resources. The TCL serves as a valuable tool for guiding preparedness activities to include: planning, establishment of training requirements, and evaluation of performance through exercises and operations. Although the TCL should inform the establishment of resource priorities at all levels, it does not imply a commitment of Federal funding.

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The Underlying Assumption: Major Events Require Shared Responsibility

As was demonstrated with the events of 9/11 and more recently Hurricane Katrina, major events, whether man-made or naturally occurring, quickly exceed the capacity of local jurisdictions. The TCL establishes national target levels for the capabilities that will be required for such events, and spells out the responsibilities of various levels of government, non-governmental organizations, the private sector, and citizens as appropriate.

The planning assumptions for major events which were used to develop the TCL are found in the National Response Plan (NRP), which recognizes that such events will typically be managed at the lowest possible geographic, organizational, and jurisdictional level using the principles in the National Incident Management System (NIMS). The Catastrophic Incident Supplement to the NRP establishes a strategy for accelerating the delivery and application of Federal and Federally accessible resources and capabilities in support of a jurisdictional response to a no-notice or short-notice catastrophic mass victim/mass evacuation incident. Nonetheless, the scope of major events demands that the combined expertise and capabilities of government at all levels, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations be brought to bear as the Nation addresses the Homeland Security Missions.

Major Events

- Occur at any time with little or no warning
- Require significant information-sharing at the unclassified and classified levels across multiple jurisdictions and between the public and private sectors
- Involve single or multiple geographic areas
- Have significant international impact and/or require significant international information sharing, resource coordination, and/or assistance
- Span the spectrum of incident management to include prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery
- Involve multiple, highly varied hazards or threats
- Result in numerous casualties; fatalities; displaced people; property loss; disruption of normal life support systems, essential public services, and basic infrastructure; and significant damage to the environment
- Impact critical infrastructures across sectors
- Overwhelm capabilities of State, local, and Tribal governments, and private-sector infrastructure owners and operators
- Attract an influx of spontaneous volunteers and supplies
- Require short-notice asset coordination and response
- Require prolonged, sustained incident management activities

Note: *The assumptions for major events mirror those for Incidents of National Significance found in the National Response Plan*

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Consensus of the Community Approach: Stakeholder Involvement

The Target Capabilities List was developed with an unprecedented level of stakeholder involvement. The Department of Homeland Security adopted a "consensus of the community" approach, eliciting the active involvement of local, State, and Federal agencies, over 100 national associations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. Stakeholders participated through national stakeholder workshops, working groups, and broad national reviews.

The Approach to Defining Capabilities

The capability requirements were derived from a threat and mission area analysis. The threat analysis provides information on the range and scope of the types of incidents for which the Nation must prepare. The mission area analysis provides an overview of all of the major functions required to achieve the four missions. It helps to ensure that all preparedness activities are focused on achievement of the mission. The graphic below illustrates the process used to develop the capabilities.

Capabilities Development Process and Tools



Starting Point: Threat Analysis

The first step in developing the TCL is to answer the question "How prepared do we need to be?" To help answer that question, a Federal interagency working group led by the Homeland Security Council and the Department of Homeland Security developed a set of National Planning Scenarios. They illustrate the range, scope, magnitude, and complexity of major events for which the Nation should prepare.

15 National Planning Scenarios

1. Improvised Nuclear Device
2. Aerosol Anthrax
3. Pandemic Influenza
4. Plague
5. Blister Agent
6. Toxic Industrial Chemical
7. Nerve Agent
8. Chlorine Tank Explosion
9. Major Earthquake
10. Major Hurricane
11. Radiological Dispersal Device
12. Improvised Explosive Device
13. Food Contamination
14. Foreign Animal Disease
15. Cyber

The 15 National Planning Scenarios address terrorism, natural disasters, and health emergencies. Collectively, they represent a range of potential incidents, rather than every possible threat or hazard. Terrorism scenarios dominate because the U.S. has had less experience with terrorist events than with natural disasters. A preponderance of terrorist scenarios compensates for less operational experience with these types of events.

Focus on Achievement of Mission

A mission area analysis was conducted through a review of official documents and doctrine to identify the objectives and functional areas for each of the Homeland Security Missions. This included a review of the Homeland Security Strategy, legislation, the Presidential Directives, and related doctrine. The result is the all-hazards taxonomy, which shows the alignment of all homeland security activities toward mission achievement.



Task Analysis

The National Planning Scenarios serve as the basis for defining the tasks that must be performed to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from a wide range of threats and hazards, as well as the capabilities needed to perform the tasks. The Universal Task List (UTL) is the catalogue of tasks that need to be performed by someone or a team from a Federal, State, tribal, local agency, a non-governmental organization, a private-sector organization, or the general public. The UTL does not identify who will perform the task or how it should be performed. That is left to the implementing agencies. **No single jurisdiction or agency is expected to perform every task.** Rather, subsets of tasks will be selected based on specific roles, missions, and functions. The current version of the UTL is a catalogue of nearly 4,800 tasks across the four mission areas.

Target Capabilities

The Target Capabilities List provides a guide for development of a national network of capabilities that will be available when and where they are needed to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from major events. The capabilities define all-hazards preparedness and provide the basis for assessing preparedness and to improve decisions related to preparedness investments and strategies. They establish national targets to prepare the Nation for major all-hazards events such as those represented by the National Planning Scenarios.

The capabilities assume that local jurisdictions have an operational level of required capabilities to address most routine emergencies and disasters. For example, the TCL does not address capabilities for routine firefighting or law enforcement services, or seasonal flooding. The TCL addresses unique capabilities and incremental resources required to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorism, very large-scale disasters, pandemic health emergencies, or other major incidents. Establishing plans, procedures, systems, interagency relationships, training and exercise programs, and mutual aid agreements required for major events will enhance performance for all hazard response, regardless of incident size.

Enhancements to Address Findings and Recommendations from Hurricane Katrina Reports

The scheduled release in December 2005, of the Target Capabilities List: Version 2.0, was postponed so that the findings and recommendations from the reports of the response to Hurricane Katrina could be addressed. The major reports include:

- *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned* – White House
- *A Failure of Initiative* – The House of Representatives Select Committee
- *Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared* – The Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee

Working groups met, in person and/or by conference call, during April and May of 2006 to review the reports and modify and/or enhance the capabilities to address relevant issues. Many had been deployed to the Gulf States to assist with the response and were able to share their

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personal experience working on a very large-scale incident. Major changes or enhancements to a sample of the capabilities in greatest demand during the Katrina response are described below.

Citizen Preparedness and Participation defines the role of citizens in personal preparedness, exercises, and on-going and surge volunteer programs. It was enhanced to place greater emphasis on establishing collaborative structures and processes across all levels of government and with the private sector, education and training for the public in all mission areas, and providing volunteer opportunities for citizens.

Emergency Public Information and Warning is the capability to provide information, alerts, and warning to the public and responders for large all hazards events. The capability was enhanced to place greater emphasis on the importance of developing plans, procedures, protocols and systems prior to an event and to ensure that all affected populations are notified, including those with special needs.

Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place is the capability to immediately execute the sheltering-in-place of an at-risk population and/or the evacuation of the at-risk population to areas of safe refuge in response to a potential or actual dangerous environment. Revisions included the need to pre-identify evacuee collection points and staging/reception areas and to pre-arrange contracts and agreements to ensure the adequate provision of transportation vehicles and drivers. Much greater emphasis was placed on planning for an evacuation and on identification and provision of assistance to those who require evacuation assistance to include: non-institutionalized populations (e.g., the elderly, disabled), transient populations (e.g., tourists, homeless), institutionalized populations (e.g., nursing homes, hospitals, boarding schools), populations outside the home (e.g., students, workforce), and companion animals. New sections were added which focus on operation of staging/reception areas and management of the evacuee population by the host site.

Mass Care is the capability to provide immediate shelter, feeding centers, basic first aid, bulk distribution of needed items, and related services to persons affected by a large-scale incident. The capability was enhanced to place more emphasis on planning, coordination, and the pre-identification of shelter facilities. It also places greater emphasis on the need for accurate estimates for and tracking of those requiring sheltering, mass feeding, and bulk distribution of relief services. The Mass Care capability was also enhanced to place greater focus on assessments of needs (e.g., cultural, dietary, medical) to ensure appropriate shelter services are provided. The Department of Health and Human Services will convene a working group during Phase II to address the sheltering and medical needs of individuals who have physical or mental disabilities that require medical attention or personal care that exceeds basic first aid. This group will also address the need for medical supplies (e.g., wheel chairs, hearing aids, batteries) and/or pharmaceuticals required to enable individuals to be served in general population shelters. A new capability will be developed or an existing capability will be expanded to incorporate the work of this group.

Medical Surge is the capability to rapidly expand the capacity of the existing health care system in order to provide triage and medical care. This capability was enhanced to place more emphasis on planning to include preparing for the treatment and tracking of individuals during the mass movement of patients, as well as the care for affected persons who are already under medical care for chronic conditions or who develop a need for acute care.

Fatality Management is the capability to complete collection and recovery of the dead, victim's personal effects, and items of evidence; decontaminate remains and personal effects (if required); transportation, storage, documentation and recover of forensic and physical evidence;

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determination of the nature and extent of injuries; identification of the fatalities using scientific means; certification of the cause and manner of death; and processing and returning of human remains and personal effects to the authorized person(s) when possible. The capability was enhanced to place greater emphasis on planning for large-scale fatality management and includes enhanced analysis of requirements for different types of major events.

Communications is the fundamental capability within disciplines and jurisdictions that practitioners need to perform the most routine and basic elements of their job functions and talk within and across agencies and jurisdictions when needed. Enhancements include emphasis on planning for very large scale events with communications systems that incorporate redundancy and diversity and continuity of operations through backup systems. It also emphasizes formal interoperable communications agreements and regular exercises of the system.

Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution, the capability to identify, inventory, dispatch, mobilize, transport and demobilize human and material resources, was enhanced to emphasize pre-negotiated vendor contracts, pre-positioning of resources, establishment of staging areas, and managing and inventorying resources to ensure sustained operations.

Public Safety and Security Response, the capability to assess and secure the affected area, was enhanced to place more emphasis on maintaining public order, conducting law enforcement operations by arresting law breakers, and managing criminal justice populations to include establishing improvised holding cells and processing of detainees, and evacuation of prisoner populations.

Urban Search and Rescue Capability was enhanced to include search and rescue in affected areas that may not include building collapse (e.g., flooding, storm damage) and the rescue of both human and animal victims. A separate Water Rescue Capability is being developed during Phase II of the capability development process.

Volunteer and Unsolicited Donations Management is the capability to effectively coordinate the registration and management of unaffiliated volunteers and unsolicited donations in support of domestic incident management. The capability was enhanced to place more emphasis on the importance of planning and coordination for volunteer and donations management before an incident occurs, use of Volunteer and Donations Coordination Teams, establishment of a Volunteer and Donations Coordination Center, and dissemination of information to the public about appropriate ways to volunteer and donate.

Restoration of Critical Lifelines the capability to clear and restore essential lifelines to include: fuel, electric, communications, water, wastewater, transportation infrastructure, debris removal to establish access, was enhance to place greater emphasis on integration of the private sector into the response and the setting of priorities to ensure the immediate repair or replacement of critical lifelines.

Key Components of the Target Capabilities List

The TCL is currently comprised of 37 capabilities which are listed in the chart on the next page. These capabilities address response capabilities, immediate recovery, selected prevention and protection mission capabilities, as well as common capabilities such as planning and communications that support all missions. Because the primary focus of the Phase I capabilities

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was response, local jurisdictions and State are generally the lead, with Federal and private sector support. During Phase II of the TCL development process, initiated in the summer of 2006, an additional set of capabilities will be developed that focuses primarily on new capabilities that support the prevention and protect missions and long-term recovery. The Federal Government and private sector have a higher level of responsibility for building and maintaining the majority of the Phase II capabilities.

A Capability Summary has been developed for each capability to describe and provide guidance on the major capability components.

Definition, Outcome, Relationship

Each capability summary begins with a definition of the capability, and follows with an outcome statement that describes the expected results or effect to be achieved. The next section identifies the relationship of the capability to the emergency support function(s) described in the National Response Plan.

Major Activities and Critical Tasks

The capability includes a description of the major activities performed with the capability and the critical tasks and measures associated with the activity. They include both preparedness and performance activities, tasks, and measures. Preparedness activities and tasks are those things that should be done prior to employing the capability. Development of plans, procedures, protocols, and systems; establishment of mutual aid agreements and authorities; provision of training; and the conduct of exercises are all examples of preparedness tasks. Performance activities and measures are the actions taken to prevent, protect against, respond to, or recover from an actual event or demonstrated during an exercise. An Activity Process Flow Map shows the major activities that are performed with the capability and how the capability links to other capabilities.

Capability Summaries Include

- Definition
- Outcome
- Relationship to NRP Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex
- Major Activities
- Critical Tasks
- Preparedness Measures and Metrics
- Performance Measures and Metrics
- Activity Process Flow
- Capability Elements (Resources)
- Linked Capabilities
- Planning Assumptions
- Planning Factors
- National Target Levels and Assigned Responsibility
- References

Critical tasks are tasks that require coordination among Federal, State, local, tribal, private sector, and/or non-governmental entities during a major event in order to minimize the impact on lives, property, and the economy. They are essential to achieving the desired outcome and to the success of a homeland security mission. The critical tasks are derived from the tasks found in the Universal Task List.

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Phase I Capabilities (Included in this version of the TCL)

Common Capabilities
Planning
Communications
Community Preparedness and Participation
Risk Management

Prevention Mission Capabilities
Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warning
Intelligence Analysis and Production
Information Sharing and Dissemination
Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations
CBRNE Detection

Protection Mission Capabilities
Critical Infrastructure Protection
Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense
Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation
Public Health Laboratory Testing

Response Mission Capabilities
Onsite Incident Management
Emergency Operations Center Management
Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution
Volunteer Management and Donations

Response Mission Capabilities (Continued)
Responder Safety and Health
Public Safety and Security
Animal Health Emergency Support
Environmental Health
Explosive Device Response Operations
Firefighting Operations/Support
WMD/ Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination
Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place
Isolation and Quarantine
Urban Search and Rescue
Emergency Public Information and Warning
Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment
Medical Surge
Medical Supplies Management and Distribution
Mass Prophylaxis
Mass Care (Sheltering, Feeding and Related Services)
Fatality Management

Recovery Mission Capabilities
Structural Damage and Mitigation Assessment
Restoration of Lifelines
Economic and Community Recovery

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Phase II Capabilities (Under Development)

Prevention Mission Capabilities

Identification and tracking of suspected terrorists*
Identification and tracking of terrorist motivations*
Determination and tracking of terrorist support*
Recognition and tracking of extremism*
Determination of terrorist ability to execute threats*
Pre-entry detection
Port of entry inspection
Border control
Credentialing
Infrastructure/facility access screening
Transportation screening
Interdiction/seizure of materials
Interdiction/seizure of terrorist assets and weapons
Defeat weapons
Denial of access to materials which may be weaponized
Prosecution of suspects

Protection Mission Capabilities

Defense and devaluation of physical assets and systems

Protect Mission Capabilities (Continued)

Defense and devaluation of cyber assets and systems
Environmental monitoring
Natural hazard monitoring
Mitigation and Life safety protection

Response Mission Capabilities

Incident/Crime scene investigation
Water rescue

Recovery Mission Capabilities

Long-term healthcare
Long-term assistance of affected persons
Resettlement and repatriation of affected persons
Debris and hazardous waste management
Site remediation
Natural resource restoration
Reconstitution of government services
Restoration of economy and institutions

* Working groups will not formed for these capabilities which will be addressed by the National Implementation Plan being developed by the intelligence community.

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Preparedness and Performance Measures and Metrics

The TCL contains both preparedness and performance measures and metrics. Preparedness measures assess preparedness actions taken before an incident to build the capacity to achieve the capability outcome. These measures relate to the development of plans, procedures, protocols, authorities, training, specialized equipment and systems, and how often they are updated and exercised. The metrics for the preparedness measures in the TCL are generally shown as a Yes or No. As these measures are used in implementation tools such as for assessment purposes, the metrics will be converted to an appropriate scale that more accurately reflects varying levels of preparedness.

Performance measures are quantitative or qualitative levels against which achievement of a task or capability outcome can be assessed. Performance measures describe how much, how well and/or how quickly an action should be performed. Performance measures are typically expressed in ways that can be observed during an exercise or real event.

The measures and metrics are not standards. They serve as guides for planning, training, and exercise activities. However, nationally accepted standards of performance, benchmarks, and guidelines are reflected, if applicable, in the performance metrics.

Sample Preparedness and Performance Measures and Metrics *Example from Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-In-Place Capability*	
Preparedness Measure	**Metric**
Plans addressing authority and decision-making processes for shelter-in-place and/or evacuation are in place	Yes/No
Populations that may need assistance with evacuation/shelter-in-place have been identified	Yes/No
Plans to provide adequate services (e.g., gas, food, water, tow trucks, emergency medical services, etc.) along evacuation routes are in place	Yes/No
Performance Measure	**Metric**
Time to notify affected population of shelter-in-place order	Within 15 minutes of order to shelter-in-place
Time to complete the evacuation of affected general population for an event with advance warning	Within 24-72 hours of the order to evacuate or as conditions dictate
Evacuation staging/reception areas in the evacuating area have been coordinated with necessary sites and assisting agencies	Yes/No

Capability Elements (Resources)

A capability is provided with properly planned, trained, equipped, and exercised personnel. The capability elements define the resources required to perform the critical tasks to the specified levels of performance, with the recognition that there is rarely a single combination of capability elements that can be used to achieve a capability. The capability elements reflect resources required for a major event and many of them may already exist. They generally do not detail resources required to provide basic services on a day-to-day basis.

Where applicable, NIMS *Resource Typing Definitions* were used to define resource organizations or packages. Resource typing is the categorization and description of response resources that are commonly exchanged in disasters through mutual aid agreements. Use of these standard definitions enables emergency management personnel to identify, locate, request, order, and track outside resources quickly and effectively and facilitate the response of these resources to the requesting jurisdiction. Resources listed in the TCL that have not been typed will be typed and personnel positions will be credentialed under the direction of the NIMS Integration Center and with assistance of the capability working groups.

Consistent with NIMS, the elements of capability include personnel, planning, organization and leadership, equipment and systems, training, and exercises, evaluations, and corrective actions, as shown in the chart below.

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Capability Elements	
Planning	Collection and analysis of intelligence and information, and development of policies, plans, procedures, mutual aid agreements, strategies, and other publications that comply with relevant laws, regulations, and guidance necessary to perform assigned missions and tasks.
Organization and Leadership	Individual teams, an overall organizational structure, and leadership at each level in the structure that comply with relevant laws, regulations, and guidance necessary to perform assigned missions and tasks.
Personnel	Paid and volunteer staff who meet relevant qualification and certification standards necessary to perform assigned missions and tasks.
Equipment and Systems	Major items of equipment, supplies, facilities, and systems that comply with relevant standards necessary to perform assigned missions and tasks.
Training	Content and methods of delivery that comply with relevant training standards necessary to perform assigned missions and tasks.
Exercises, Evaluations, and Corrective Actions	Exercises, self-assessments, peer-assessments, outside review, compliance monitoring, and actual major events that provide opportunities to demonstrate, evaluate, and improve the combined capability and interoperability of the other elements to perform assigned missions and tasks to standards necessary to achieve successful outcomes.

Planning Assumptions and Planning Factors

The Working Groups developed planning assumptions to fill in data or details not provided by the National Planning Scenarios. Some apply to any scenario; others are scenario-specific. They also developed specific planning factors, which indicate the quantity of the capability elements required to address the demand for the capability defined by the scenario(s).

National Target Levels

Because major events will quickly exceed the capacity of any single jurisdiction or group of traditional mutual aid partners, a collaborative, national approach is required to plan and prepare for very large-scale incidents. The national targets define the level of capability required nationally to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from major events that demand a multi-level, multi-jurisdictional, multi-disciplinary response.

Stakeholder working groups specified national target levels of capabilities based on an analysis of the circumstances and consequences described in the national planning scenarios and the planning factors. They were instructed not to let their knowledge of current resources limit their thinking about requirements needed for major events. The target levels reflect the amount of the capability required nationally, taking into account adjustments to normal operating procedures that may need to be made during major events to ensure the best possible response given the circumstances. Such adjustments may include altering performance standards, drawing resources from many sources, making creative use of existing resources or relying on non-traditional resources (e.g., volunteers).

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National Target Levels for Capabilities

- The national targets define what is needed for major events, not what currently exists.
- The targets define the requirements for very large events that exceed the capacity of any single jurisdiction.
- Responsibility for meeting the requirements will be shared across levels of government and non-government entities.
- Many of the resource requirements are not standing requirements – they would be assembled when and where they are needed. For example, many personnel would be needed for days or weeks during a response and would then return to their regular activities.
- An assessment of current capabilities against the targets is a follow on effort to be implemented in 2006-2007.

Assignment of Roles in Achieving the National Target Levels

After establishing the national target levels, the TCL identifies the role of local, State and Federal governments, non-governmental organizations, the private sector, and citizens in achieving the national target level and ensuring that the capability is available when and where needed. The assignment is based on the assumption that no single jurisdiction would be expected to have all capabilities at sufficient levels to fully address its needs if faced with a major event. Some jurisdictions will possess the capability while others will access it through mutual aid if needed. During a major event, all jurisdictions regardless of size will call on support from other jurisdictions, the States, Federal agencies, and private resources.

Stakeholder working groups analyzed the requirements for each capability by criticality, risk, and demand to make recommendations regarding the assignment of roles and responsibilities and the distribution of the capability across the country.

Risk Factors Considered in Setting Capability Targets

All jurisdictions face some level of risk from natural disasters, terrorist attacks, infectious disease, or industrial accidents. Risk is a combination of threat, vulnerability, and consequence. Risk factors that affect capability need and placement include: population and population density, the presence of critical infrastructure and key resources, and location in high terrorist threat or high risk natural disaster areas. The relative importance of these risk factors in determining where or how much of a capability is needed varies by capability, as described below.

Population and Population Density

Population and/or population density are determining factors for the assignment of many of the capabilities. For example, the target levels and distribution of capabilities such as WMD Response and Decontamination, Medical Surge, Mass Prophylaxis, and Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-In-Place capabilities are directly related to population. Population density is a key factor in determining the location of some capability resources, such as those for the Firefighting Operations/Support and Explosive Device Response Operations capabilities.

The type and amount of resources needed are generally greater in high population, high-density areas. For example, Type I Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Task Forces, which can extricate victims from heavy construction, are needed in and assigned to urban areas with high-rise

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buildings. The TCL assigns Collapse Search and Rescue Teams and Heavy Rescue Strike Teams and Squads to less urban areas. However, the Type I USAR Task Forces located in large metropolitan areas, are available for deployment to jurisdictions in other geographic areas. For some capability resources, such as Animal Health and Safety, the highest risk is generally not in high population, high-density areas, but in areas where livestock is concentrated.

Critical Infrastructure

Most jurisdictions or geographic areas across the country have critical infrastructure or key resources (CI/KR) and needs to be considered in the determination of risk and distribution of capabilities. Because the Phase I capabilities are more focused on response activities and the presence of critical infrastructure and key resources are so widely distributed, this was less of a discriminating factor in capability requirements than population. However, critical infrastructure and key resources will be a major risk factor in determining capability requirements for Phase II capabilities which are more focused on prevention, protection, and recovery mission capabilities.

Threat

Threat is generally associated with population, population density, and critical infrastructure. Capability-Based Planning allows the flexibility to adjust capability requirements or target levels on a "by exception" basis. For example, a jurisdiction may have capability requirements disproportionate to its population and critical infrastructure based on its terrorist threat level or its location in an area particularly vulnerable to earthquakes or hurricanes.

The TCL as a Tool for Expanded Regional Collaboration

Expanded Regional Collaboration is identified as an overarching priority in the National Preparedness Goal in recognition that large scale events will require a shared response across jurisdictions, levels of government, and the public/private sectors. States are encouraged to define geographic areas or regions, in consultation with local and tribal governments that share risk and responsibility for a major event. The expanded region facilitates the strengthening of relationships among participants, regional preparedness planning and operations support, and joint implementation of a capabilities-based approach. Regions may be intra- or inter-State geographic areas, as appropriate, based on shared risk and the need for joint planning and operations. Standardization of geographic regions will enable the States, working with local and tribal government and other partners, to coordinate preparedness activities more effectively, spread costs, pool resources, share risk, and thereby increase the overall return on investment.

The Goal also encourages the establishment of multi-jurisdictional and multi-disciplinary working groups consisting of representatives from the entities located within the region. Through joint planning, the region will determine how best to achieve the capabilities, decide where the capabilities should be built and maintained, and establish priorities for the use of limited resources. The working groups will use the TCL as the basis to determine capability requirements; assess current capability levels and gaps; identify, analyze, and choose options; update strategies and plans; and assess preparedness.

The capability requirements for a region can be determined by identifying the requirements from the TCL target levels charts for the jurisdictions within the region. For example, based on its jurisdictions, a region may require one Type I Urban Search and Rescue Task Force, three Type

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II Collapse Search and Rescue Teams, and so forth. Through a collaborative, regional planning approach, the jurisdictions within the region will determine the most effective distribution and sharing of capability resources to ensure that they are available when and where they are needed and that all of the jurisdictions within the region have or have access to them as needed.

Resources (capability elements) to perform critical tasks are associated with the performance requirements. Some capabilities (and their resources) are required universally, such as Planning or Communications. For other capabilities, the resource target levels are directly related to size of the population. Teams with different levels of capability (e.g., Level I, II, and III Bomb Squads) are assigned to appropriate levels of government or local jurisdictions based on demand for the capability. Specialized teams or resources are generally assigned to larger jurisdictions where there is a greater demand for the resource and where a team with sufficient trained personnel and equipment has the opportunity to maintain proficiency through calls-for-service. Teams with more limited capabilities that require fewer personnel and equipment are assigned to smaller jurisdictions where they provide an immediate response and can request assistance from specialized teams, if needed.

The performance measures and metrics for each capability define how quickly and how effectively critical tasks need to be performed. Criticality (i.e., how quickly a specific capability is needed to prevent an incident, save lives, prevent suffering, or reduce major damage) is an important consideration in determining where a capability is needed. For example, decontamination of victims of a chemical attack must typically take place within a certain period of time in order to save lives. This does not vary by location. Since the time to act is very short, every jurisdiction that could have an attack or an accidental release of toxic chemicals should have a decontamination capability or have timely access to it. However, the numbers of victims requiring decontamination is likely to be significantly lower in a rural setting. For other capabilities, performance requirements do vary across jurisdictions. For example, the time for a bomb squad to arrive on-scene may be much shorter in a densely populated urban area than in a less populated area, where evacuation of an area may be the initial response.

National Targets Summary

The National Targets Summary Chart, following this Introduction, provides a summary of the capabilities, outcomes, resources, and roles assigned to level of government, non-governmental organizations, the private sector, and citizens, with population size as the primary risk factor. The user is referred to the full capability descriptions found in the TCL for information on the critical tasks that would be performed with the capability, the preparedness and performance measures and metrics required to achieve the outcome, and linked capabilities which identify points for coordination.

The chart assigns capabilities to the lowest level at which the capability would be built and maintained. However, as indicated above, States are expected to establish planning regions through which local jurisdictions can share resources on a regional basis. The TCL's assignment of capabilities to jurisdictions assumes those that were not assigned a capability will have access to it through mutual aid. Capabilities should be built and maintained in locations within the region that best ensure the preparedness of the region as a whole.

Using the Target Capabilities List

The Target Capabilities List is a reference document that describes the capabilities and target levels for achieving national preparedness. The TCL also serves as a guide to enhance

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preparedness plans, enhance training programs and identify technology development priorities. Various implementation tools are being developed from the TCL to help decision-makers and managers at all levels to define their preparedness requirements and assess levels of preparedness. Some of the potential uses are briefly described below:

Enhance Plans

A recently completed Nationwide Plan Review, that assessed the status of catastrophic planning for States and 75 of the Nation's largest urban areas, showed that the current status of plans and planning is not adequate for the 21st century homeland security challenges. The report identified the need for a significant increase in collaboration, plan specificity, and resource management.

The Nationwide Plan Review Report recommends that:

- Planning products, processes, tools, and technologies should be developed to facilitate a common nationwide approach to catastrophic planning in accordance with the National Preparedness Goal's National priority to strengthen Planning and Citizen Preparedness Capabilities.
- Critical tasks, target capabilities, and associated performance measures, such as those identified in the National Preparedness Goal should serve as the common reference system for planning and the language of synchronization.
- Regional planning capabilities, processes, and resources should be strengthened in accordance with the National Preparedness Goal's national priorities to expand regional collaboration and strengthen Planning and Citizen Preparedness Capabilities.

Capabilities-Based Planning allows for planning, under uncertainty, by developing capabilities suitable for a wide range of threats and hazards, when limited resources necessitate prioritization and choice among preparedness efforts. The TCL includes a Planning Capability designed to establish and maintain the ability to develop, update, and test preparedness plans. In addition, each capability contains both preparedness and performance tasks and measures that support the capability outcome and serve as a guide for preparedness planning. The preparedness tasks and measures describe major elements or issues that should be addressed in plans, procedures, and systems, as well as authorities, relationships, and agreements that need to be in place to prepare to use the capability. The performance tasks and measures and the target levels also inform the planning process.

As entities at all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector review and enhance their plans, procedures, and protocols, the TCL provides a valuable reference to ensure that they have identified the tasks and resources and built the capabilities necessary to assure preparedness. The TCL also provides a common structure to facilitate regional planning. This effort will contribute to review and modification, if needed, of mutual aid agreements to facilitate the sharing of capabilities across the region to provide all jurisdictions with access to needed capabilities.

Strategy Development

States and urban areas develop Homeland Security Strategies that provide a blueprint for comprehensive, enterprise-wide planning for homeland security efforts. They also provide a strategic plan for the use of Federal, State, local, and private resources to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist threats or attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. In the summer of 2005, States and urban areas updated their strategies to align their preparedness

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efforts to the National Preparedness Goal, the National Priorities established in the Goal, and the Target Capabilities which support the Goal and the priorities.

The Goal, priorities and capabilities help the Nation to manage risk. Because we cannot prepare for every eventuality, we must strategically allocate and apply limited resources to manage those risks that are critical to our national preparedness. Adopting a systems approach to preparedness enables us, through a shared vision and commitment, to build capabilities and programs that will achieve greater level of preparedness and adaptability against a range of threats.

At the core, success depends upon robust and adaptive collaboration between the public and private sector, among different levels of government, among multiple jurisdictions, and among departments and agencies within a single jurisdiction. Collaboration encompasses a wide range of activities (e.g., joint planning, training, operations) aimed at coordinating the capabilities and resources of various entities for the common purpose of preventing, protecting against, responding to, and recovering from major events. Each capability, as well as capabilities within and across missions, requires the integration of multiple agencies, disciplines, processes, and procedures. The common framework provided by the Goal, priorities, and capabilities serve as a guide to establish and enhance homeland security preparedness organizations, programs, and processes.

Assessment of Preparedness

The TCL provides a basis for assessing preparedness. The Department of Homeland Security, in collaboration with partner departments and agencies, is developing and piloting a Capabilities Assessment methodology to evaluate progress toward obtaining the capabilities. The assessment will help jurisdictions and agencies to plan strategically, design appropriate program that meet proven needs, and evaluate the effectiveness of investments over time.

The Target Capabilities List is the foundation for the Capabilities Assessment. The pilot assessment is testing and validating the effectiveness of the preparedness and performance measures and metrics in the TCL as a means of measuring preparedness. The objectives of the assessment are to:

- Facilitate State and local understanding of preparedness
- Gather data on the Nation's level of preparedness
- Partner with stakeholders to develop, assess, and refine a repeatable assessment methodology that bears relevant preparedness data

The pilot assessment consists of three stages: self assessment, on-site validation, and post assessment report and improvement. During the self-assessment, regional participants complete a questionnaire with approximately 10 questions for each of the 37 capabilities. An assessment team, consisting of subject matter experts, then visits the region for a 3-day on-site validation of the self assessment, including a roundtable activity with key stakeholders in the region. The roundtable discussion is driven by disaster scenarios that emphasize coordination between officials and the linkages between capabilities. The post assessment stage includes data analysis, production of a report, and identification of lessons learned. The purpose of the pilot is to develop and test a capabilities assessment methodology that will be an important component of the National Preparedness System and the National Preparedness Report.

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Focus Training on Task Performance

The Target Capabilities List defines the critical tasks that must be performed to prevent, protect against, respond to and recover from major events. Training programs at the Federal level are in the process of being modified as appropriate to ensure that they provide participants with the knowledge, skills, and abilities to perform the critical tasks defined by the TCL to the proficiency level required to achieve the capability outcomes.

States are encouraged to develop a Multi-year Training and Exercise Plan to build and assess capabilities. The State uses a combination of information from its capabilities assessment which identifies gaps, the State Strategy which provides a plan to increase preparedness through personnel, equipment, training, and exercises, and improvement plans from completed exercises to develop the Multi-year Training and Exercise Plan. The plan maps out the training courses and exercises that will be conducted over the next 2-3 years. The training should focus on building the knowledge, skills, and abilities to perform the critical tasks and should be completed prior to being tested through exercises.

Exercise Evaluation

Exercises provide a means to test and validate preparedness. The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) is designed to encourage a common exercise design, conduct, and evaluation methodology across al levels of government and the private sector. HSEEP exercises are designed and evaluated to demonstrate capability levels through the assessment of performance of critical tasks and achievement of outcomes, as defined by the TCL.

The exercise design process includes the following steps:

- Identify priority capabilities for improvement through exercises
- Select corresponding tasks for assessment
- Define exercise objectives based on capabilities, tasks, and jurisdiction needs
- Create a jurisdiction-specific scenario formulated specifically to meet exercise objectives

HSEEP includes common evaluation tools based on the critical tasks and measures from the TCL. The purpose of the evaluation approach is to encourage consistency and quality of data collection and information, support qualitative and quantitative exercise analysis and assessment, and increase usability. HSEEP also defines a standardized after action report (AAR) and improvement plan format. The AAR provides the assessment of performance of the tasks related to priority capabilities. The improvement plan is developed by the exercising entities and outlines specific actions and a timeline to enhance the capabilities.

National Preparedness System

A National Preparedness System (NPS) is being developed to assess the Nation's level of preparedness and ability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from major events. The intent is to provide a comprehensive picture of capability requirements, current levels, and gaps at the jurisdictional, regional, State, and national levels. NPS is being designed, with stakeholder input, as a planning and assessment tool to help policymakers and practitioners at all levels to:

- Identify capability requirements

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- Define responsibility for capability resources for a major event (e.g., through mutual aid partners, State, Federal agencies, private sector)
- Identify gaps in capabilities
- Track and improve readiness
- Make informed resource allocation decisions to manage risk

The TCL Going Forward

The current version of the TCL identifies a set of 37 core capabilities. The capability working groups will continue to work through the summer and fall of 2006 to assist with NIMS typing and credentialing of the resources identified in the TCL.

Capabilities not addressed in the initial set are being developed during phase II of the capabilities development process. The capabilities are being developed by stakeholders participating in capability working groups. The capabilities will be distributed for broad national review in the fall of 2006. When the Phase II capabilities are complete and added to the initial set of capabilities, the TCL will contain a comprehensive set of capabilities across the four homeland security missions.

The TCL is a living document that will continue to be enhanced and refined over time. As the TCL is used and implementation tools are developed, practitioners may find a need to add a task, modify a performance objective, specify different performance levels for different size jurisdictions, or make other recommendations. In addition, since the TCL was distributed for broad review in the fall of 2005, some of the capabilities were enhanced to address findings and recommendations from the Hurricane Katrina reports. Recommendations for changes to the TCL are welcome and will be reviewed and integrated into the TCL: Version 3.0, scheduled for release in December 2006, and at regular intervals thereafter. A change request form is posted on www.LLIS.gov.

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CAPABILITY SUMMARY CHART

The Chart provides a summary of the capabilities, outcomes, capability resources, and roles assigned to level of government, non-governmental organizations, the private sector, and citizens. The user is referred to the specific capability templates for information on the critical tasks that would be performed with the capability, the preparedness and performance measures and metrics to achieve the outcome, and linked capabilities which identify points for coordination.

COMMON CAPABILITIES			
Planning			
Outcome: Plans incorporate an accurate hazard analysis and risk assessment and ensure that capabilities required to prevent, protect and mitigate against, respond to, and recover from acts of all-hazards are available when and where they are needed. Plans are vertically and horizontally integrated with appropriate departments, agencies and jurisdictions. Where appropriate, plans incorporate a mechanism for requesting State and Federal assistance with a clearly delineated process for seeking and requesting assistance from appropriate agency(ies).			
Responsible	**Element Resource Unit**	**Number of Units**	**Capability Activity supported by Element**
State	Planner	1 per every 250k population in each State	All Activities
Territory	Planner	2 per territory	All Activities
Local	Planner	2 per UASI city, and Washington, DC	All Activities
All levels	Required training program	1 per planner	All Activities
All levels	Computer and software tools	1 per planner	All Activities
Communications			
Outcome: A continuous flow of critical information is maintained as needed among multi-jurisdictional and multi-disciplinary emergency responders, command posts, agencies, and the governmental officials for the duration of the emergency response operation in compliance with National Incident Management System (NIMS). To accomplish this, the jurisdiction has a continuity of operations plan for public safety communications to include the consideration of critical components, networks, support systems, personnel, and an appropriate level of redundant communications systems in the event of an emergency.			
Responsible	**Element Resource Unit**	**Number of Units**	**Capability Activity supported by Element**
State	Inter-operability Plan	1 per State/Territory	All Activities
Region	Inter-operability Plan	1 per Region	All Activities
City	Inter-operability Plan	1 per UASI city	All Activities
State	Governance	1 per State	All Activities

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Region	Governance	1 per Region	All Activities
State	Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)	1 per State	All Activities
Region	Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)	1 per Region	All Activities
Federal/State/Local	Technology—System of Systems	1 nationally	All Activities
Federal/State/Local	Communications Training	All personnel according to their role at an incident	All Activities
Federal/State/Local	General orientation on interoperability	All personnel who respond to an event	All Activities
Federal/State/Local	Table-top Exercise	1 per year	All Activities
Federal/State/Local	Full-scale Exercise	1 per 3 years	All Activities
DHS	Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program (ICTAP) Teams	20 nationally for all States and designated urban areas	All Activities
County	Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP)/Public Safety Communication Centers (PSCC) COOP Plan	1 per county	All Activities

Risk Management

Outcome: Federal, State, local, tribal and private sector entities identify and assess risks, prioritize and select appropriate protection, prevention, and mitigation solutions based on reduction of risk, monitor the outcomes of allocation decisions, and undertake corrective actions. Additionally, Risk Management is integrated as a planning construct for effective prioritization and oversight of all homeland security programming.

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Number of Units	Capability Activity supported by Element
Local	Local law enforcement Urban Area Working Groups	As needed	Develop Risk Framework Assess Critical Infrastructure Risks Manage Risk Conduct Risk Communication
Local	Urban Area Working Groups Asset Owners & Operators	As needed	Develop Risk Framework Assess Critical Infrastructure Risks Manage Risk Conduct Risk Communication

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Regional	Regional Transit Security Working Groups	As needed	Develop Risk Framework Assess Critical Infrastructure Risks Manage Risk Conduct Risk Communication
Regional	Area Maritime Security Committees	As needed	Develop Risk Framework Assess Critical Infrastructure Risks Manage Risk Conduct Risk Communication
State/Local/ Private Sector	Owners and Operators of critical infrastructure/key resources (CI/KR)	As needed	Develop Risk Framework Conduct Risk Communication Assess Critical Infrastructure Risks and Manage Risk Analyze Interdependencies of Assets (Functional, Spatial)
State	State Administrative Agencies	As needed	Assess Critical Infrastructure Risks Prioritize Risks Develop Business Case Manage Risk Conduct Risk Communication
DHS	Federal law enforcement and homeland security community	As needed	Develop Business Case Manage Risk Conduct Risk Communication
DOJ/ DHS	Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs)	As needed	Develop Business Case Manage Risk Conduct Risk Communication
Federal	National intelligence community	As needed	Develop Business Case Manage Risk Conduct Risk Communication
All levels	Risk analysis/risk management tools	As needed	Assess Risk

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All levels	Cost estimating tools	As needed	Develop Business Case Manage Risk
All levels	Geographical Information System (GIS) data collection tools	As needed	Assess Risk

Community Preparedness

Outcome: There is a structure and a process for ongoing collaboration between government and nongovernmental resources at all levels; volunteers and nongovernmental resources are incorporated in plans and exercises; the public is educated and trained in the four mission areas of preparedness; citizens participate in volunteer programs and provide surge capacity support; nongovernmental resources are managed effectively in disasters; and there is a process to evaluate progress.

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Number of Units	Capability Activity supported by Element
Federal	National Leadership for Community Preparedness and Participation	1 nationally	Establish Collaborative Structure and Process for Government and Nongovernmental Entities at All Levels Integrate Public Outreach and Nongovernmental Resources into Emergency Operations Plans and Exercises Provide Education and Training for the Public in All Mission Areas Provide Volunteer Opportunities: year round and in surge operations Incident Response
Federal	National Citizen Corps Council	1 nationally	All Activities
State	Citizen Corps Councils	1 per State or Territory	Integrate Public Outreach and Nongovernmental Resources into Emergency Operations Plans and Exercises Provide Education and Training for the Public in All Mission Areas Provide Volunteer Opportunities: year round and in surge operations Incident Response

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Local	Citizen Corps Councils	1 per jurisdiction sufficient number of Councils to serve 99% of state population	Integrate Public Outreach and Nongovernmental Resources into Emergency Operations Plans and Exercises Provide Education and Training for the Public in All Mission Areas Provide Volunteer Opportunities: year round and in surge operations Incident Response
Nationally	Public Education Specialists	20 nationally	Integrate Public Outreach and Nongovernmental Resources into Emergency Operations Plans and Exercises Provide Education and Training for the Public in All Mission Areas Incident Response
State/Territories	Public Education Specialists	Minimum of 3 per state; numbers per State based on population and could reach up to 20.	Integrate Public Outreach and Nongovernmental Resources into Emergency Operations Plans and Exercises Provide Education and Training for the Public in All Mission Areas Incident Response
Local	Public Education Specialists	Minimum of 1 per local jurisdiction; numbers per jurisdiction based on population and could reach up to 10.	Integrate Public Outreach and Nongovernmental Resources into Emergency Operations Plans and Exercises Provide Education and Training for the Public in All Mission Areas Incident Response
Federal	National Training Clearing House	1 nationally	All Activities
State/ Territories	State Training Specialists	5 – 20 per State; Numbers vary by State population	Provide Education and Training for the Public in All Mission Areas

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			Provide Volunteer Opportunities: year round and in surge operations
Local	Citizen Preparedness Team	1 per neighborhood, school, workplace, etc.	Provide Education and Training for the Public in All Mission Areas
Local	Ongoing Volunteer	70 million (each person volunteering an average of 12 hours per year ~ 840 million volunteer hours per year)	Provide Volunteer Opportunities: year round
Local	Surge Capacity Volunteers (will predominantly also be an Ongoing Volunteer)	560,000 nationally	Provide Volunteer Opportunities: surge Incident Response

PREVENT MISSION

Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings

Outcome: Locally generated threat and other criminal and/or terrorism-related information is identified, gathered, entered into an appropriate data/retrieval system, and provided to appropriate analysis centers.

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Number of Units	Capability Activity supported by Element
All levels of government and private sector	Information gathering personnel	As needed	Gather Information Screen Information Identify Suspicious Circumstances
All Levels	Information processing personnel	As needed	Gather Information Screen Information Identify Suspicious Circumstances
Federal	Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)	As needed	Gather Information Screen Information Identify Suspicious Circumstances
National	Public reporting System	As needed	Gather Information Screen Information Identify Suspicious Circumstances

Intelligence Analysis and Production

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Outcome: Timely, accurate, and actionable intelligence/information products are produced in support of prevention, awareness, deterrence, response, and continuity planning operations.			
Responsible	**Element Resource Unit**	**Number of Units**	**Capability Activity supported by Element**
Federal, State, Large Urban Areas, Intrastate regions, and Interstate regions	Fusion Centers/process	1 per jurisdiction/region	Establish Fusion Center Access Information Analyze Information/ Intelligence Develop Analytic Products
All Levels	Multi-discipline Analysts	As needed. Provided from appropriate agencies on a permanent or liaison basis	All Activities
All Levels	Intelligence personnel	As needed. Provided from law enforcement agencies on a permanent or liaison basis	All Activities
All Levels	Administrative and support personnel	As needed. Provided from appropriate agencies on a permanent or liaison basis	All Activities
All Levels	Public Health Analysts	As needed. Provided from public health agencies on a permanent or liaison basis	All Activities
All Levels	Cleared Personnel	As needed	All Activities
All Levels	Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs)	As needed	All Activities
Federal	National training standards for intelligence analysts	As needed. Set of standards	All Activities
All Levels	Hardware, software, and internet-based systems that allow for information exchange and dissemination	As needed	All Activities
All Levels	Terminals with network access to relevant systems (RISS/LEO, HSIN, etc.)	As needed per fusion center site	All Activities

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All Levels	Intelligence Analysis and Maintenance Tools	As needed per fusion center site	All Activities
Intelligence/Information Sharing and Dissemination			
Outcome: Effective and timely sharing of information and intelligence occurs across Federal, State, local, tribal, regional, and private sector entities to achieve coordinated awareness of, prevention of, protection against, and response to a threatened or actual domestic terrorist attack, major disaster, or other emergency.			
Responsible	**Element Resource Unit**	**Number of Units**	**Capability Activity supported by Element**
All Levels	Personnel for sharing operational information	As needed	Incorporate All Stakeholders in Information Flow Vertically Flow Information Horizontally Flow Information
All Levels	Personnel for sharing information on collaborative initiatives	As needed	All Activities
All Levels	Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs)	As needed	All Activities
All Levels	Fusion center/process personnel	As needed	All Activities
All Levels	Equipment and systems for information sharing and collaboration	As needed	All Activities
All Levels	Information Sharing Software	As needed	All Activities
Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations			
Outcome: Suspects involved in criminal activities related to homeland security are successfully deterred, detected, disrupted, investigated, and apprehended. All counterterrorism-related cases, including not only primary cases, but also secondary, tertiary, and obtusely-related cases are aggressively prosecuted.			
Responsible	**Element Resource Unit**	**Number of Units**	**Capability Activity supported by Element**
All Levels	Investigative personnel	Determined by agency	Conduct investigation Share Information Related to Investigations
FBI	Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs)	Determined by agency	Conduct investigation Share Information Related to Investigations Deploy Specially Trained Personnel
All Levels	Liaisons to JTTFs	Determined by agency	Conduct investigation Share Information Related to Investigations Deploy Specially Trained

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			Personnel
All Levels	Evidence collection personnel	Determined by agency	Conduct Investigation
All Levels	Forensic analysis personnel	Determined by agency	Conduct investigation
All Levels	Special Operations (e.g. SWAT teams)	Determined by agency	Deploy Specially Trained Personnel
All Levels	Terrorism Investigation Training plan	1 per agency	Conduct investigation Share Information Related to Investigations Deploy Specially Trained Personnel
Federal	"Train the trainer" programs	As needed	Conduct investigation Share Information Related to Investigations Deploy Specially Trained Personnel

CBRNE Detection			
Outcome: Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and/or explosive (CBRNE) materials are rapidly detected and characterized at borders, critical locations, events, and incidents.			
Responsible	**Element Resource Unit**	**Number of Units**	**Capability Activity supported by Element**
Federal, State, Local, Tribal	CBRNE detection operator personnel	Varies by Region	Detect
Federal	Explosive Detection Dog (EDD) Teams	Varies by Region	Detect
Federal, State, local, tribal	Laboratory staff for agent identification	Varies by Region	Characterize
Federal and State	Border control and other targeted `defense layers` personnel	Varies by Region	Detect
Private sector	Appropriate critical infrastructure personnel	Varies by Region	Detect
Local	Local emergency responders	Varies by Region	Detect Characterize
Federal	CBRNE detection technology R&D	Varies by Region	All Activities
Federal, State, Local, Tribal	Protocols to ensure coordination with intelligence community	Varies by Region	Warn
Federal, State, Local, Tribal	Public education program to help people recognize threats	Varies by Region	Detect
Federal, State, Local,	CBRNE detection and monitoring	Varies by Region	Detect

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Tribal	equipment		Characterize
Federal, State, Local, Tribal	Training for personnel at interdiction points	Varies by Region	Detect
Federal, Regional, State, and Local	Laboratory testing equipment	Varies by Region	Characterize
Federal, Regional, State, Local, Tribal, Private	Mutual aid agreements and/or memoranda of understanding (MAAs/MOUs), including protocols for coordination with intelligence community	Varies by Region	All Activities
Federal, Regional, State, Local, Tribal	CBRNE detection standard operating procedures, including regional coordination plans and protocols for resolving alarms	Varies by Region	Detect Characterize
Federal, Regional, State, Local, Tribal, Private	Facility response plans as required by law (SARA Title III)	Varies by Region	Detect

PROTECT MISSION

Critical Infrastructure Protection

Outcome: The risk to, vulnerability of, and consequence of attack to critical infrastructure are reduced through the identification of critical infrastructure; conduct, documentation, and standardization of risk assessments; prioritization of assets; decisions regarding protective and preventative programs; and implementation of protective and preventative plans.

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Number of Units	Capability Activity supported by Element
DHS	CIP planning personnel	As needed per agency	Develop and Maintain Plans Measure Effectiveness
Federal Sector Specific Agencies	CIP planning personnel	As needed per agency	Develop and Maintain Plans Measure Effectiveness
State	CIP planning personnel	As needed per State	Develop and Maintain Plans Measure Effectiveness
DHS	Public and private sector coordinators	As needed per agency	Coordinate
Federal Sector Specific Agencies	Public and private sector coordinators	As needed per agency	Coordinate
State	Public and private sector coordinators	As needed per State	Coordinate
DHS	Risk analysis personnel	As needed per	Assess Risk

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		agency	Prioritize
Federal Sector Specific Agencies	Risk analysis personnel	As needed per agency	Assess Risk Prioritize
State	Risk analysis personnel	As needed per State	Assess Risk Prioritize
DHS	Personnel for vulnerability assessments	As needed per agency	Assess Risk Prioritize
Federal Sector Specific Agencies	Personnel for vulnerability assessments	As needed per agency	Assess Risk Prioritize
State	Personnel for vulnerability assessments	As needed per State	Assess Risk Prioritize
DHS	Infrastructure security specialists	As needed per agency	Protect
Federal Sector Specific Agencies	Infrastructure security specialists	As needed per agency	Protect
State	Infrastructure security specialists	As needed per State	Protect
DHS	Infrastructure intelligence analysts	As needed per agency	Assess Risk
Federal Sector Specific Agencies	Infrastructure intelligence analysts	As needed per agency	Assess Risk
State	Infrastructure intelligence analysts	As needed per State	Assess Risk
Federal	National Infrastructure Protection Plan		All activities
Federal	CIP Research and Development Plan		All activities
State/Regional	CIP Plans		All activities
Federal	Risk assessment		Assess risk
All levels	Equipment for detection	As needed per asset	Protect
All Levels	Equipment for protection	As needed per asset	Protect
All levels	Equipment for mitigation	As needed per asset	Protect
Federal/State	Vulnerability assessment training		Assess Risk
Federal/State	Risk assessment training		Assess Risk
Federal	System to Red Team critical		All Activities

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	infrastructure protective measures and technology		
Federal (with State/local participation)	Critical Infrastructure prevention and protection attack exercises		All Activities

Food and Agricultural Safety and Defense			
Outcome: Threats to food and agriculture safety are prevented, mitigated, and eradicated; trade in agricultural products is restored; affected products are disposed of; affected facilities are decontaminated; public and plant health are protected, notification of the event and instructions of appropriate actions are effectively communicated with all stakeholders; and confidence in the U.S. food supply is maintained.			
Responsible	**Element Resource Unit**	**Number of Units**	**Capability Activity supported by Element**
State	Incident Command Center	2 per State (Central and Backup)	Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems Direct Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense Operations Implement Control Measures for Contaminated Products Conduct Product Disposal and Food Facility Decontamination
FDA	FDA Emergency Operations Center	1 nationally	Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems Direct Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense Operations Implement Control Measures for Contaminated Products
USDA	USDA Emergency Operations Center	1 nationally	Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems Direct Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense Operations Trace Suspect Products Implement Control Measures for Contaminated Products Conduct Product Disposal, Surface, and Food Facility

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			Decontamination
State	State Emergency Operations Center (EOC)	2 per State (Central and Backup)	Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems Direct Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense Operations Implement Control Measures for Contaminated Products Conduct Product Disposal, Surface, and Food Facility Decontamination
USDA/FSIS	USDA/FSIS Emergency Management Committee (EMC)	1 nationally	Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems Direct Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense Operations Trace Suspect Products Implement Control Measures for Contaminated Products
State	Human Disease Surveillance Team	1 per State	Surveillance
State	Food Investigation Team	25 per State	Surveillance Trace Suspect Products
State	Decontamination Team	10 per State	Implement Control Measures for Contaminated Products
State	Decontamination Supervisors	1 per 10 decontamination employees	Conduct Product Disposal, Surface, and Food Facility Decontamination
State	Decontamination SMEs	5 per State	Conduct Product Disposal, Surface, and Food Facility Decontamination
State	Disposal Team	50 teams per State	Conduct Product Disposal, Surface, and Food Facility Decontamination
State	Semi-tractor trailers for disposal	5 per affected facility	Conduct Product Disposal, Surface, and Food Facility Decontamination
State	Disposal Supervisors	1 per 10 disposal	Conduct Product Disposal,

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		employees	Surface, and Food Facility Decontamination
State	Disposal SMEs	5 per affected State	Conduct Product Disposal, Surface, and Food Facility Decontamination
State	Sample Analysis Laboratory Personnel	20 per State Lab	Surveillance
State	Sample Analysis Laboratory Supervisor	1 per 10 laboratory employees	Surveillance
State	Confirmatory Testing Laboratory Personnel	5 per State laboratory	Surveillance
State	Confirmatory Testing Laboratory Supervisor	1 per 10 laboratory employees	Surveillance
FDA, USDA	Risk Communication Team	5 per Federal agency involved	Implement Control Measures for Contaminated Products
State	Risk Communication Team	5 – 10 per State	Implement Control Measures for Contaminated Products
FDA, USDA	Embargo/Recall Staff	5 per affected State	Implement Control Measures for Contaminated Products
State	Embargo/Recall Staff	5 per affected State	Implement Control Measures for Contaminated Products
FDA, USDA	Embargo/Recall compliance officers	2 per affected State	Implement Control Measures for Contaminated Products
State	Embargo/Recall compliance officers	10 per affected State	Implement Control Measures for Contaminated Products
FDA, USDA	Public Information Staff	5 per Agency involved	Implement Control Measures for Contaminated Products
State	Public Information Staff	12 per affected State	Implement Control Measures for Contaminated Products
FBI	FBI	As needed	Implement Control Measures for Contaminated Products
State	Law Enforcement for security	2 per affected site	Implement Control Measures for

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			Contaminated Products
State	Law Enforcement for investigation	2 per affected site	Implement Control Measures for Contaminated Products
State	IT Support staff	1 per 20 staff deployed	All Activities
State	IT Equipment cache	1 per person deployed	All Activities
State	Additional Transportation Needs	1 per 2 people deployed	Trace Suspect Product Implement Control Measures for Infected and/or Contaminated Products Conduct Product Disposal, Surface, and Food Facility Decontamination

Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation

Outcome: Potential exposure and disease is identified rapidly (determine exposure, mode of transmission and agent, and interrupt transmission to contain the spread of the event and reduce number of cases). Confirmed cases are reported immediately to all relevant public health, food regulatory, environmental regulatory and law enforcement agencies. Suspected cases are investigated promptly, reported to relevant public health authorities, and accurately confirmed to ensure appropriate preventive or curative countermeasures are implemented. An outbreak is defined and characterized; new suspect cases are identified and characterized based on case definitions on an ongoing basis; relevant clinical specimens are obtained and transported for confirmatory laboratory testing; the source of exposure is tracked; methods of transmission identified; and effective mitigation measures are communicated to the public, providers and relevant agencies are recommended, as appropriate.

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Number of Units	Capability Activity supported by Element
Federal/State/Local	Local Health Department-based Surveillance Team	1 per affected county	Monitor Containment Surveillance and Detection
County	Investigation Team	1 per affected county	Conduct Epidemiological Investigation
County	Active Case Finding/ Surveillance Team	1 per affected county	Conduct Epidemiological Investigation Monitor Containment Surveillance and Detection
Federal/State/Local	Special Studies Team	As needed per incident	Conduct Epidemiological Investigation Monitor Containment Surveillance and Detection
CDC	CDC Department Emergency Operations Center (DEOC)	1 nationally	Direct Epidemiological Surveillance and

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			Investigation Operations
State	State/Local EOC	1 per State	Direct Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation Operations
Federal/State/Local	Equipment cache	1 per person	All Activities

Public Health Laboratory Testing

Outcome: Chemical, radiological, and biological agents causing, or having the potential to cause, widespread illness or death are rapidly detected and accurately identified by the public health laboratory within the jurisdiction or through network collaboration with other appropriate local, State, and Federal laboratories. The public health laboratory, working in close partnership with public health epidemiology, environmental health, law enforcement, agriculture, and veterinary officials, hospitals and other appropriate agencies, produces timely and accurate data to support ongoing public health investigations and the implementation of appropriate preventative or curative counter-measures.

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Number of Units	Capability Activity supported by Element
CDC	Federal Laboratory Response Network (LRN) Chemical Laboratory	1 nationally	Provide Surveillance Support Detection and Analysis Confirmation Testing Investigation and Follow-up Laboratory Support
CDC	Federal LRN Biological Laboratory	1 nationally	Provide Surveillance Support Detection and Analysis Confirmation Testing Investigation and Follow-up Laboratory Support
State/Federal	LRN Reference Level Laboratories	Minimum 1 per State (152 nationally)	Provide Surveillance Support Detection and Analysis
Federal	LRN Level 1 Chemistry Laboratories	10 nationally	Provide Surveillance Support Detection and Analysis
State/Local	LRN Level 2 Chemistry Laboratories	36 nationally	Provide Surveillance Support Detection and Analysis
State/Local	LRN Sentinel Clinical Labs	4,000 nationally	Sample and Specimen Management
State	Courier System for Sample Transport	1 per State	Sample and Specimen Management
Federal/State/Local	Reagents	As needed per laboratory	Sample and Specimen Provide Surveillance Support

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			Detection and Analysis Confirmation Testing Investigation and Follow-up Laboratory Support
Federal/State/Local	Laboratory Equipment and Supplies	As needed per laboratory	Sample and Specimen Provide Surveillance Support Detection and Analysis Confirmation Testing Investigation and Follow-up Laboratory Support
CDC	CDC Director's Emergency Operations Center (DEOC)		Direct Public Health Laboratory Testing
State/Local	State and Local EOC		Direct Public Health Laboratory Testing
RESPOND MISSION			
Onsite Incident Management			
Outcome: The incident is managed safely, effectively, and efficiently through the integration of facilities, resources (personnel, equipment, supplies, and communications), and procedures using a common organizational structure that is the ICS.			
Responsible	**Element Resource Unit**	**Number of Units**	**Capability Activity supported by Element**
Local	Type IV IMT*	1 per large cities, counties, or regions	All Activities
State/ Metropolitan	Type III IMT*	1 per State and UASI Regions	All Activities
State	Type II IMT*	1 per State with high occurrence, or per regional area available to multiple States	All Activities
Federal	Type I IMT*	6 nationally, strategically placed	All Activities
Federal	Federal Incident Response Support Team*		All Activities
Emergency Operations Center Management			
Outcome: The event is effectively managed through multi-agency coordination for a pre-planned or no-notice event.			
Responsible	**Element Resource Unit**	**Number of Units**	**Capability Activity**

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			supported by Element
City	Primary City EOC	1 per city with population ≥ 50k	All Activities
County	County EOC	2 per County (Primary and backup)	All Activities
State/Territorial	State EOC	2 per State/Territory (Primary and backup)	All Activities
Federal	Federal EOC	2 per designated Federal agency (Primary and backup)	All Activities
DHS/FEMA	U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) EOC	2 per DHS/FEMA Regional Office (Primary and backup)	All Activities

Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution

Outcome: Critical resources are available to incident managers and emergency responders upon request for proper distribution and to aid disaster victims in a cost-effective and timely manner.

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Number of Units	Capability Activity supported by Element
FEMA	Logistics planning manager	1 per FEMA Region	Direct Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution
State and Territories	Logistics planning manager	1 State and territory	Direct Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution
Local	Type IV Logistics planning manager	1 per jurisdiction	Direct Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution
National/State/ Local System	National tracking system	1 nationally	Conduct Needs Assessment
FEMA	Rapid Needs Assessment Team*	1 per FEMA Region	Conduct Needs Assessment
Federal	Logistics response system	1 nationally	All Activities
State and Territories	Logistics response system	1 per State and Territories	All Activities
Local	Logistics response system	1 per jurisdiction	All Activities
Federal/State/ Local	Transportation coordinator	1 per EOC	Mobilize and Track Resources
Local	Cargo transportation teams	1 per jurisdiction	Mobilize and Track Resources

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Federal	Federal mobilization base camp	Not pre-established	Mobilize and Track Resources
State and Territories	State staging area	2 per State and territory	Mobilize and Track Resources
Local	Interagency warehouse	1 per incident	Mobilize and Track Resources
Federal	Warehouse system for stockpiled resources	1 nationally	Mobilize and Track Resources
State and Territories	Warehouse system for stockpiled resources	1 per State and Territory	Mobilize and Track Resources
Non-Governmental Organization (NGO)	Warehouse system for stockpiled resources	1 per organization	Mobilize and Track Resources

Volunteer Management and Donations

Outcome: The positive effect of using unaffiliated volunteers and unsolicited donations is maximized and does not hinder response and recovery activities.

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Number of Units	Capability Activity supported by Element
Non-Government Organization	Volunteer/ Donations Coordination Center (VDCC)	1 per State	Organize and Assign Volunteers Collect and Manage Material Donations Collect and Manage Cash Donations
State/Local/ NGOs/Private	Transportation	As needed per incident	Collect and Manage Material Donations
Non-Government Organization	Warehousing	1 - 6 per incident	Collect and Manage Material Donations
Non-Government Organization	Volunteer/ Donations Coordinators	4 per region	All Activities

Responder Safety and Health

Outcome: No illnesses or injury to any first responder, first receiver, medical facility staff member, or other skilled support personnel as a result of preventable exposure to secondary trauma, chemical/radiological release, infectious disease, or physical and emotional stress after the initial incident or during decontamination and incident follow-up.

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Number of Units	Capability Activity supported by Element
Federal/ State/Local	Type 1 Safety Officer*	300 nationally	Activate Responder Health and Safety Identify Safety/PPE

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			Needs and Distribute PPE to responders Ongoing monitoring of Responder Health and Safety Demobilize
Federal/State/Local	Specialized Safety Officer	400 nationally	Identify Safety/PPE Needs and Distribute PPE to responders Ongoing monitoring of responder health and safety
Federal/State/Local	Specialized Subject Matter Expert (SME)	800 nationally	Identify Safety/PPE Needs and Distribute PPE to responders Ongoing Monitoring of Responder Health and Safety
Federal/State/ Local/Private/ Academic	Analytical laboratories	Nationally	Identify Safety/PPE Needs and Distribute PPE to responders Ongoing Monitoring of Responder Health and Safety
Federal/State/ Local/Private/ Academic	Training centers	750 nationally (25 per state)	Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs
Federal/State/ Local/Private/ Academic	Equipment caches		Identify Safety/PPE Needs and Distribute PPE to responders
Federal/State/Local/ Private	Medical Unit*	1 (Minimum of one per incident, increased by scope, complexity and uniqueness)	Ongoing Monitoring of Responder Health and Safety
Public Safety and Security Response			
Outcome: The incident scene is assessed and secured, access is controlled, security support is provided to other response operations (and related critical locations, facilities, and resources), emergency public information is provided, while protecting first responders and mitigating any further effect to the public at risk, and any crime/incident scene preservation issues have been addressed.			
Responsible	**Element Resource Unit**	**Number of Units**	**Capability Activity supported by Element**

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Local/State	Law Enforcement Officers for Crowd Control	Sufficient per 80% from local sources Sufficient per 20% from State sources	Secure Area Control traffic, crowd and scene
Local/State/NGO	Law enforcement officers for traffic control	Sufficient	Secure Area Control traffic, crowd and scene
State & Territory	National Guard Civil Support Teams	1 per State/territory	Secure Area Control traffic, crowd and scene

Animal Health Emergency Support

Outcome: Foreign animal disease is prevented from entering the U.S. by protecting the related critical infrastructure and key assets. In the event of an incident, animal disease is detected as early as possible, exposure of livestock to foreign diseases is reduced, immediate and humane actions to eradicate the outbreak are implemented, continuity of agriculture and related business is maintained, economic damage is limited, and public and animal health and the environment are protected. Trade in agriculture products and domestic and international confidence in the U.S. food supply are maintained and/or restored. Agricultural industries are returned to their prior productivity, to include replenishment of the domestic livestock and other domesticated animals.

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Number of Units	Capability Activity supported by Element
Federal/State/Local	Incident Command Post (ICP)	1 per 100 herds to be euthanized or vaccinated	Direct Tactical Operations
Federal/State/Local	Multiple Area Command (MAC)	15 nationally	Direct Tactical Operations
DHS	Homeland Security Operations Center	1 nationally	Direct Tactical Operations
USDA	Headquarters EOC	1 nationally	Direct Tactical Operations
USDA	Regional EOC	100 nationally	Direct Tactical Operations
APHIS	Headquarters EOC	1 nationally	Direct Tactical Operations
APHIS	Regional EOC	2 nationally	Direct Tactical Operations
APHIS	NRCC	3 nationally	Direct Tactical Operations
APHIS	RRCC	6 nationally	Direct Tactical Operations

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State	Multi-agency coordinating group	9 per State	Direct Tactical Operations
State	Emergency Response Team (ERT–A)	1 per State	Direct Tactical Operations
APHIS	APHIS Emergency Operations Center (AEOC)	1 nationally	Direct Tactical Operations
State	Agriculture EOC	2 per State	Direct Tactical Operations
APHIS/State	Technical specialist position	As needed per incident	Direct Tactical Operations
FEMA	Veterinary medical assistance team*	12 nationally	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
APHIS	Veterinary epidemiologist	750 nationally	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
State	Veterinary epidemiologist	15 per State (average)	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
APHIS, FEMA	Communications technicians	200 nationally	All Activities
State	Communications technicians	4 per State (average)	All Activities
Private	Communications technicians	4 per State (average)	All Activities
APHIS	Trade support personnel	As needed per incident	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
APHIS	Quarantine personnel	1 per ICP	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare
State	Quarantine personnel	3 per ICP	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare
Local/Private	Quarantine personnel	12,270 nationally	Implement Disease Containment Measures

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			Provide Animal Welfare
APHIS, DOJ	Bio-security personnel	2 per State	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
State	Bio-security personnel	4 per State	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
Local/Private	Bio-security personnel	30 per State	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
APHIS	Decontamination personnel	1 per Euthanasia ICP	Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
State	Decontamination personnel	60 per State	Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
Local/Private	Decontamination personnel	7,200 nationally, through just-in-time training	Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
State	Euthanasia personnel supervisors	3 per State (average)	Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
Local/Private	Euthanasia personnel	1,800 nationally, through just-in-time training	Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
APHIS, Animal Care	Animal welfare specialist	1 per ICP	Provide Animal Welfare
APHIS	Disposal personnel	1 per State	Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
State	Disposal personnel	2 per State	Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
Local/Private	Disposal personnel	90 per State	Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
APHIS	Livestock appraisal personnel	3 per State	Implement Disease Containment Measures

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State	Livestock appraisal personnel	9 per State	Implement Disease Containment Measures
APHIS	Surveillance personnel	1 per ICP	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
State	Surveillance personnel	25 per State	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
APHIS	CBRNE Personnel	1 per State	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
State	CBRNE Personnel	2 per State	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
Local/Private	CBRNE Personnel	12 per State	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
APHIS	Foreign animal disease personnel	30 per State	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
State	Foreign animal disease personnel	30 per State	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
Local/Private	Foreign animal disease personnel	60 per State	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
APHIS	Specialty Laboratory Technicians	25 nationally	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
State	Specialty Laboratory Technicians	18 per State (average)	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
APHIS	Highly Skilled Laboratory Technicians	50 nationally	Conduct Animal Health

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			Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
State	Highly Skilled Laboratory Technicians	18 per State (average)	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
APHIS	Admin Laboratory Support	25 nationally	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
State	Admin Laboratory Support	12 per State (average)	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
APHIS	Risk Communication Personnel	2 per State	Implement Disease Containment Measures
State	Risk Communication Personnel	5 per State	Implement Disease Containment Measures
Local/Private	Risk Communication Personnel	5 per State	Implement Disease Containment Measures
APHIS	Data entry supervisor	1 per State	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
State	Data entry supervisor	1 per State	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
APHIS	Data entry Technicians	3 per State	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
State	Data entry Technicians	3 per State	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
Local/Private	Data entry Technicians	43 per State	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
APHIS, FEMA/State/ Local	Equipment for trace-back and trace-forward investigations	±30,000 nationally	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and

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			Surveillance
APHIS/State/Local	Animal identification system (individual tagging element)	±85 million	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
APHIS	Identification officer	1 per State	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
State	Identification officer	1 per ICP	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
Local/Private	Identification officer	47 per State	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
APHIS/State/Local	Euthanasia systems	As needed	Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
APHIS/State/Local	Therapeutics	As needed	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare
APHIS	Dispensing personnel supervisors	60 nationally	Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
APHIS	Vaccine dosages	Up to 85 million nationally	Implement Disease Containment Measures
APHIS	Vaccinators	1 per State	Implement Disease Containment Measures
State	Vaccinators	1 per ICP	Implement Disease Containment Measures
Local/Private	Vaccinators	720 per State	Implement Disease Containment Measures
APHIS, FEMA/State/ Local	Warehousing and distribution systems	As needed per incident	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct

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			Euthanasia/Disposal
APHIS, DOT/State/ Local	Trucks/buses/minivans	2400 nationally	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
FBI	Law enforcement agent	1 per State	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
State	Law enforcement officer	1 per ICP	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
Local	Law enforcement officer	45 per State	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
USDA and DOI	Wildlife specialist	4 per State	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
State	Wildlife specialist supervisors	4 per State	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
Local/Private	Wildlife specialist (sample collectors)	180 per State	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
State	Veterinary response team—livestock	6 per State affected (1 in-state and 5 out of state)	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
Local	Veterinary response team—livestock	6 per county affected (1 county team and 5 out-of-county teams)	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct

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			Euthanasia/Disposal
State	Veterinary response team—companion animals	6 per State affected (1 in-state and 5 out of state)	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
Local	Veterinary response team—companion animals	1 per county affected (1 county team and 5 out-of-county teams)	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
FEMA, APHIS	Information technology support	50 nationally	All Activities
State	Information technology support	4 per State	All Activities
Local/Private	Information technology support	20 per State	All Activities
FEMA	Administrative Support Personnel	4 per State	All Activities
State	Administrative Support Personnel	20 per State	All Activities
Local/Private	Administrative Support Personnel	50 per State	All Activities
APHIS	Trainers	1 per State	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
State	Trainers	4 per State	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
Local/Private	Trainers	20 per State	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
Environmental Health			
Outcome: After the primary event, disease and injury are prevented through the quick identification of associated environmental hazards to include exposure to infectious diseases that are secondary to the primary event and secondary transmission modes. The at-risk population (e.g., exposed or potentially exposed) receives the appropriate treatment or protection (countermeasures) in a timely manner. The rebuilding of the public health infrastructure, removal of environmental hazards, and appropriate decontamination of the environment			

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enable the safe re-entry and re-occupancy of the impacted area. Continued monitoring occurs throughout the re-building process to identify hazards and reduce exposure.			
Responsible	**Element Resource Unit**	**Number of Units**	**Capability Activity supported by Element**
The National Targets table will be completed in the next version of the Target Capabilities List			
	Health physicists		
	Trained radiological monitoring personnel		
	Nuclear medicine technicians		
	Emergency department clinicians		
	Community Resilience Task Force		
	Commercial clinical laboratories (hematology)		
	Field personnel/first responders		
	Survey teams		
	Mobile analytical laboratories		
	Analytical laboratories		
	Public Health Planning and Forecasting Team		
	Environmental Epidemiologists		
	Sampling Advisory Workgroup		
	Sampling Teams		
	Environmental Health Scientists/health physicist		
	Environmental health scientists (specifically sanitarians and engineers)		
	Scientists to staff the Federal Advisory Team for Environment, Food, and Health		
	Environmental Health Technicians/health physicists		
	Registered Sanitarians		
	Vector control specialists		
	Public works personnel		
	Medical Entomologists		
	Air sampling equipment		
	Radiation Portal Monitors		

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	Portable radiation survey instruments		
	Other equipment		
	Drinking water sampling and testing equipment		

Explosive Device Response Operations

Outcome: Threat assessments are conducted, the explosive and/or hazardous devices are rendered safe, and the area is cleared of hazards. Measures are implemented in the following priority order: public safety; safeguard the officers on the scene (including the bomb technician), protect and preserve public and private property, collect and preserve evidence, and accommodate the public/restore services.

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Number of Units	Capability Activity supported by Element
State/Local	Accredited Bomb Squads (Type I, II, and III)*	458 nationally	All Activities
FBI	FBI Special Agent Bomb Technician	140 nationally, across 56 Field Offices	All Activities
ATF	Alcohol Tobacco & Firearms Explosive Enforcement Officers	30 nationally	All Activities
DHS	DHS Bombing Prevention Unit	1 nationally	All Activities
DHS	DHS/TSA Explosives Unit		All Activities
National Guard	National Guard EOD		All Activities
DoD	DoD/Military EOD		All Activities
DHS	DHS/ICE Explosives Division		All Activities

Firefighting Operations/Support

Outcome: Dispatch and safe arrival of the initial fire suppression resources occurs within jurisdictional response time objectives. The initial arriving unit initiates the incident command system (ICS), assesses the incident scene, communicates the situation, and requests appropriate resources. Firefighting activities are conducted safely and fires are contained, controlled, extinguished, investigated, and managed in accordance with emergency response plans and procedures.

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Number of Units	Capability Activity supported by Element

Firefighting operations support for a major event would be addressed with an appropriate combination of existing resources from multiple jurisdictions and levels of government sufficient to meet risk and threat assessment based needs.

WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination

Outcome: Hazardous materials release is rapidly identified and mitigated; victims exposed to the hazard are rescued, decontaminated, and treated; the impact of the release is limited; and responders and at-risk populations are effectively protected.

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Number of Units	Capability Activity supported by Element
City	Type I Hazmat Entry Team (extrication)*	20 per UASI Area	Identify and Evaluate On-Scene Conduct Rescue Operations
County	Type I Hazmat Entry Team (extrication)*	1 per county	Identify and Evaluate On-Scene Conduct Rescue Operations
City	Type I Hazmat Entry Team (decontamination)*	20 per UASI Area	Identify and Evaluate On-Scene Conduct On-site Gross Decontamination Conduct On-site Technical Decontamination
County	Type I Hazmat Entry Team (decontamination)*	1 per county	Identify and Evaluate On-Scene Conduct On-site Gross Decontamination Conduct On-site Technical Decontamination
City	Hazmat information/ research group/team	2 per UASI Area	Direct Tactical Operations
City	Hazmat medical group/team	2 per UASI Area	Conduct Rescue Operations
City	Hazmat resources group/team	2 per UASI Area	Direct Tactical Operations
City	Hazmat liaison officer	2 per UASI Area	Direct Tactical Operations
County	Hazmat specialist	1 per county	Identify and Evaluate On-Scene Conduct Mitigation Activities
EPA	EPA Radiological Emergency Response Team		Identify and Evaluate On-Scene Conduct Mitigation Activities
DOE	Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC)		Identify and Evaluate On-Scene Conduct Mitigation

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			Activities
Citizen Evacuation and/or Shelter-in-Place			
Outcome: Affected and at-risk populations (and companion animals) are safely sheltered-in-place and/or evacuated to safe refuge areas, in order to obtain access to medical care, physical assistance, shelter, and other essential services, and effectively and safely reentered into the affected area, if appropriate.			
Responsible	**Element Resource Unit**	**Number of Units**	**Capability Activity supported by Element**
Federal	Emergency Alert System (EAS)	1 nationally	Activate Evacuation and/or In Place Protection Re-Entry
State	Public Warning System	1 per State	Activate Evacuation and/or In Place Protection Re-Entry
Local	Public Warning System	1 per jurisdiction	Activate Evacuation and/or In Place Protection Re-Entry
Local	Evacuation Plan	1 per city/county	All Activities
Local	Local evacuation education program	1 per jurisdiction	All Activities
Local	Transportation Resources	17 per 100,000 population	Implement Evacuation Orders Implement In-Place Protection Procedures
State	Transportation Resources	17 per 100,000 population	Implement Evacuation Orders Implement In-Place Protection Procedures
Federal	Transportation Resources	17 per 100,000 population	Implement Evacuation Orders Implement In-Place Protection Procedures
Local	Traffic control package	In accordance with Evacuation Plans	Implement Evacuation Orders Implement In-Place Protection Procedures
State	Law Enforcement and Security	As required per incident	Implement Evacuation Orders

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			Implement In-Place Protection Procedures
Local	Fire/Emergency medical services (EMS)	As required per incident	Implement Evacuation Orders Implement In-Place Protection Procedures
Local	Tow trucks	As required per incident	Implement Evacuation Orders Implement In-Place Protection Procedures
Federal	Small Animal Transport Teams*	As required per incident	Implement Evacuation Orders Implement In-Place Protection Procedures
Federal	DOT Evacuation Coordination Team (Type I, II, and III)*	As required per incident	Implement Evacuation Orders Implement In-Place Protection Procedures
Federal	DOT Evacuation Liaison Team*	As required per incident	Implement Evacuation Orders Implement In-Place Protection Procedures
Isolation and Quarantine			
Outcome: Individuals who are ill, exposed, or likely to be exposed are separated, movement is restricted, basic necessities of life are available, and their health is monitored in order to limit the spread of a newly introduced contagious disease (e.g., pandemic influenza). Legal authority for these measures is clearly defined and communicated to the public. Logistical support is provided to maintain measures until danger of contagion has elapsed.			
Responsible	**Element Resource Unit**	**Number of Units**	**Capability Activity supported by Element**
Cities/Municipal	Community Isolation & Quarantine Team	1 per jurisdiction affected	All Activities
District/County	Community Isolation & Quarantine Team	1 per district/county affected	All Activities
Centers for Disease Control	Federal quarantine station	1 per Tier 1 City	Implement Travel Restrictions
World Health Organization (WHO)	Quarantine Station	1 per pandemic agent source country	Implement Travel Restrictions
Urban Search and Rescue			

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Outcome: The greatest numbers of victims (human and animal) are rescued and transferred to medical or mass care capabilities, in the shortest amount of time, while maintaining rescuer safety.			
Responsible	**Element Resource Unit**	**Number of Units**	**Capability Activity supported by Element**
DHS	Type 1 US&R Task Force (TF)*	1 per each pre-determined location	All Activities
City	Type II Collapse Search and Rescue Team*	1 per population > 100k	All Activities
City	Type II Heavy Rescue Squad	1 per population >25k but <100k	All Activities
Emergency Public Information and Warning			
Government agencies and public and private sectors receive and transmit coordinated, prompt, useful, and reliable information regarding threats to their health, safety, and property, through clear, consistent information delivery systems. This information is updated regularly and outlines protective measures that can be taken by individuals and their communities.			
Responsible	**Element Resource Unit**	**Number of Units**	**Capability Activity supported by Element**
All levels	Joint Information Center (JIC)*	1 per impacted jurisdiction	All Activities
All levels	Public Information Officer (PIO)	1 per central & backup EOC per 12 hour shift	All Activities
All levels	JIC/JFO Lead PAOs	1 per central & backup EOC per 12 hour shift per federal per state	All Activities
All levels	JIC/JFO Deputy Lead PAOs	1 per central & backup EOC per 12 hour shift per federal per state	All Activities
All levels	JIC - Research Team	1 per central & backup EOC per 12 hour shift	All Activities
All levels	JIC - Media Operations Team	1 per central & backup EOC per 12 hour	Conduct Media Relations

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		shift	
All levels	JIC - Logistics Team	1 per central & backup EOC per 12 hour shift	All Activities
All levels	Alert and Notification System	1 per central & backup EOC per 12 hour shift	Issue Emergency Warnings
All levels	JIC Meeting Space	1 per central & backup EOC	All Activities
All levels	JIC Media Briefing Room	1 per central & backup EOC	Conduct Media Relations
All levels	JIC Office Equipment (complete set)	1 per central & backup EOC	All Activities

Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment

Outcome: Emergency Medical Services (EMS) resources are effectively and appropriately dispatched and provide pre-hospital triage, treatment, transport, tracking of patients, and documentation of care appropriate for the incident, while maintaining the capabilities of the EMS system for continued operations.

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Number of Units	Capability Activity supported by Element
Federal	Command, Control and Communications Infrastructure	1 per Joint Field Office	Direct Operations Activate Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment Demobilize
State	Command, Control and Communications Infrastructure	1 per State	Direct Operations Activate Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment Demobilize
Jurisdictional	Command, Control and Communications Infrastructure	1 per Jurisdiction	Direct Operations Activate Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment Demobilize
State	Emergency Medical Services Communication System	1 per State	Direct Operations
State	Emergency Medical Task Force	1 Minimum per State	Triage Provide Treatment Transport
All levels	Emergency Medical Services preparedness assessment capability	As needed	Direct Operations

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Medical Surge			
Outcome: Injured or ill from the event are rapidly and appropriately cared for. Continuity of care is maintained for non-incident related illness or injury.			
Responsible	**Element Resource Unit**	**Number of Units**	**Capability Activity supported by Element**
Sub-state region, Federal, State, Tribal, City	Beds - Surge capacity for infectious disease treatment	500 per million population	Receive and Surge Treat Casualties
Sub-state region, Federal, State, Tribal, City	Beds - Surge capacity for other treatment	500 per million population	Receive and Surge Treat Casualties
Sub-State region	Surge Healthcare Staff Unit (Option 1 – for establishing acute care center)	2 per 50-bed unit	Receive and Surge Treat Casualties
Sub-State region	Surge Healthcare Staff Unit (Option 2 - for surge support to existing health care facility)	1 per surge bed assuming a 1:4 staff to patient ratio	Implement Surge Staffing Procedures Receive and Surge Treat Casualties
Sub-State region	Surge Healthcare Staff Unit (Option 2) - for surge support to existing health care facility	1.4 per surge bed assuming a 1:6 staff to patient ratio	Implement Surge Staffing Procedures Receive and Surge Treat Casualties
Sub-State region	Isolation capacity (1-person)	1 per Healthcare facility	Receive and Surge Treat Casualties
State	Isolation capacity (10-person)	1 per Regional healthcare facility	Receive and Surge Treat Casualties
State	Regional Pharmaceutical cache system	1 per Public health region	Receive and Surge Treat Casualties
State, City, Sub-State region, Tribal	Personal protective equipment (PPE)	1 per Healthcare provider (person)	Receive and Surge Treat Casualties

Medical Supplies Management and Distribution			
Outcome: Critical medical supplies and equipment are appropriately secured, managed, distributed, and restocked in a timeframe appropriate to the incident.			
Responsible	**Element Resource Unit**	**Number of Units**	**Capability Activity supported by Element**
Federal	SNS TARU	1 TARU per SNS push pack	Establish Security Repackage and Distribute
Federal	National Medical Equipment and	1 nationally	Develop and Maintain

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	Supplies Stockpile		Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems Repackage and Distribute
State	State Pharmaceutical and Supply Stockpiles	Depends on incident	Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems Repackage and Distribute
Local	Local Pharmaceutical and Supply Stockpiles	20% Increase over usual supply at local medical treatment facilities	Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems Repackage and Distribute
Federal	National Tracking System	1 nationally, including jurisdictional components	Direct Tactical Operations Recover Resources
Federal/State/Local	Transportation Coordinator	1 per EOC	Repackage and Distribute Recover Resources
Federal/State/Local	Transportation Vehicles	Depends on incident	Repackage and Distribute Recover Resources
Federal/State/Local	Transportation Personnel (drivers, pilots...)		Repackage and Distribute Recover Resources
Federal	Federal Staging Area	Not pre-established	Repackage and Distribute Establish Security
State	RSS	2 per State & territory (minimum)	Repackage and Distribute Establish Security
Local	Interagency warehouse	1 per incident	Repackage and Distribute Establish Security
Mass Prophylaxis			
Outcome: Appropriate drug prophylaxis and vaccination strategies are implemented in a timely manner upon the onset of an event to prevent the development of disease in exposed individuals. Public information strategies include recommendations on specific actions individuals can take to protect their family, friends, and themselves.			
Responsible	**Element Resource Unit**	**Number of Units**	**Capability Activity supported by Element**
State/Local	Dispensing/Vaccination Centers/Points of Distribution (DVC/PODs)	1 per population of 42,554 (47 DVC/PODs per 2 million people)	Establish POD Conduct Triage for Symptoms Conduct Medical Screening Conduct Mass Dispensing Conduct Adverse Events

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			Monitoring
Federal/State/ Local/Private	Prophylaxis supplies and materials		Conduct Mass Dispensing
Federal/State	Adverse event monitoring	1 per population of 25,000	Conduct Adverse Events Monitoring
Federal	SNS Coordination Center	1 per geographic unit receiving SNS	Activate Mass Prophylaxis Establish POD Demobilize

Mass Care			
Outcome: Mass Care services (sheltering, feeding, bulk distribution) are rapidly provided for the population and companion animals within the affected area.			
Responsible	**Element Resource Unit**	**Number of Units**	**Capability Activity supported by Element**
All agencies engaging in Mass Care working collaboratively to satisfy Mass Care need.	Volunteer agency shelter management team*	6 per jurisdiction with population ≤ 10K	Activate Mass Care Direct Mass Care Tactical Operations Establish Shelter Establish Feeding Operations Shelter General Population Close Shelter Demobilize
		15 per jurisdiction with population 10K - 25K	
		30 per jurisdiction with population 25K - 50K	
		60 per jurisdiction with population <50-100K	
		150 per jurisdiction with population <100-250K	
		300 per jurisdiction with population <250-500K	
All agencies engaging in Mass Care working collaboratively to satisfy Mass Care need.	Type 1 Small Animal Sheltering Team*	3 per jurisdiction with population ≤ 10K	Shelter companion animals coordinate with sheltering of people, as appropriate
		6 per jurisdiction with population 10K - 25K	
		12 per jurisdiction with population 25K - 50K	
		23 per jurisdiction with population <50-100K	

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		56 per jurisdiction with population <100-250K	
		111 per jurisdiction with population <250-500K	
All agencies engaging in Mass Care working collaboratively to satisfy Mass Care need.	Small Animal Transportation Team*	5 per jurisdiction with population ≤ 10K	Establish holding period, according to local regulations Organize and transport animals to other facilities Use tracking system and procedures for accountability
		12 per jurisdiction with population 10K - 25K	
		23 per jurisdiction with population 25K - 50K	
		45 per jurisdiction with population <50-100K	
		111 per jurisdiction with population <100-250K	
		222 per jurisdiction with population <250-500K	
All agencies engaging in Mass Care working collaboratively to satisfy Mass Care need.	Animal Incident Response Team*	9 per jurisdiction with population ≤ 10K	Area Command unit to manage and support shelters (5 -7 shelters per team, depending on geographic location and size of shelter
		23 per jurisdiction with population 10K - 25K	
		45 per jurisdiction with population 25K - 50K	
		89 per jurisdiction with population <50-100K	
		222 per jurisdiction with population <100-250K	
		444 per jurisdiction with population <250-500K	
All agencies engaging in Mass	Voluntary Agency Mobile Kitchen	1 per jurisdiction with population	Establish Feeding

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Care working collaboratively to satisfy Mass Care need.	Class A *	≤ 10K	Operations Prepare and Distribute Food
		2 per jurisdiction with population 10K - 25K	
		3 per jurisdiction with population 25K - 50K	
		6 per jurisdiction with population <50-100K	
		16 per jurisdiction with population <100-250K	
		30 per jurisdiction with population <250-500K	
All agencies engaging in Mass Care working collaboratively to satisfy Mass Care need.	Voluntary Agency Mobile Kitchen Class B*	1 per jurisdiction with population <10K - 25K	Establish Feeding Operations Prepare and Distribute Food
		2 per jurisdiction with population <25K - 50K	
		3 per jurisdiction with population <50-100K	
		8 per jurisdiction with population <100-250K	
		15 per jurisdiction with population <250-500K	
All agencies engaging in Mass Care working collaboratively to satisfy Mass Care need.	Voluntary Agency Mobile Kitchen Class C*	1 per jurisdiction with population <25K - 50K	Establish Feeding Operations Prepare and Distribute Food
		2 per jurisdiction with population <50-100K	
		4 per jurisdiction with population <100-250K	
		8 per jurisdiction with population <250-500K	
All agencies engaging in Mass Care working collaboratively to satisfy Mass Care	Voluntary Agency Mobile Kitchen/ Canteen*	4 per jurisdiction with population ≤ 10K	Establish Feeding Operations Prepare and Distribute Food
		10 per jurisdiction	

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need.		with population <10K - 25K	
		20 per jurisdiction with population <25K - 50K	
		38 per jurisdiction with population <50-100K	
		100 per jurisdiction with population <100-250K	
		188 per jurisdiction with population <250-500K	
All agencies engaging in Mass Care working collaboratively to satisfy Mass Care need.	Voluntary Agency Warehouse Team	1 per jurisdiction with population ≤ 10K – 50K	Establish Bulk Distribution Operations Conduct Bulk Distribution Operations
		2 per jurisdiction with population <50-250K	
		3 per jurisdiction with population <250-500K	
All agencies engaging in Mass Care working collaboratively to satisfy Mass Care need.	Voluntary Agency Drop Trailer Team	2 per jurisdiction with population ≤ 10K	Establish Bulk Distribution Operations Conduct Bulk Distribution Operations
		4 per jurisdiction with population <10K - 25K	
		8 per jurisdiction with population <25K - 50K	
		15 per jurisdiction with population <50-100K	
		38 per jurisdiction with population <100-250K	
		75 per jurisdiction with population <250-500K	
All agencies engaging in Mass	Prepackaged meals	3,000 per jurisdiction with	Prepare and Distribute Food

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Care working collaboratively to satisfy Mass Care need.		population ≤ 10K	
		7,500 per jurisdiction with population <10K - 25K	
		15,000 per jurisdiction with population <25K - 50K	
		30,000 per jurisdiction with population <50-100K	
		75,000 per jurisdiction with population <100-250K	
		150,000 per jurisdiction with population <250-500K	
All agencies engaging in Mass Care working collaboratively to satisfy Mass Care need.	Voluntary Agency Shelter Childcare Team	6 per jurisdiction with population ≤ 10K	Medical Shelters Shelter General Population
		15 per jurisdiction with population <10K - 25K	
		30 per jurisdiction with population <25K - 50K	
		60 per jurisdiction with population <50-100K	
		150 per jurisdiction with population <100-250K	
		300 per jurisdiction with population <250-500K	
All agencies engaging in Mass Care working collaboratively to satisfy Mass Care	Meals from contractors (e.g., vendors, caterers)	1.75 million nationally (1.5 Million plus 250,000 capacity needed to respond	Prepare and Distribute Food

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need.		to concurrent disasters)	

Fatality Management			
Outcome: Complete documentation and recovery of human remains, personal effects, and items of evidence is done (except in cases where the health risk posed to personnel outweigh the benefits of recovery of remains and personal effects). Remains receive surface decontamination (if indicated) and, unless catastrophic circumstances dictate otherwise, are examined and identified, and released to the next-of-kin's funeral home with a complete certified death certificate. Reports of missing persons and antemortem data are efficiently collected. Victims' family members receive updated information prior to the media release. All hazardous material regulations are reviewed and any restriction on the transportation and disposition of remains are made clear by those with the authority and responsibility to establish the standards. All personal effects are made safe to return to next-of-kin unless contraindicated by catastrophic circumstances. Law Enforcement agencies are given all the information needed to investigate and prosecute the case successfully. Families are provided incident specific support services.			
Responsible	**Element Resource Unit**	**Number of Units**	**Capability Activity supported by Element**
Federal	Department of Defense Mortuary	1 nationally	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct Morgue Operations Manage Antemortem Data Conduct Victim Identification Conduct Final Disposition Demobilize
Federal	Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team (DMORT) – Type 1*	Nationally (DHS FEMA NDMS)	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct On-scene Operations Conduct Morgue Operations Demobilize
Federal	DMORT – WMD*	Nationally (DHS FEMA NDMS)	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct On-scene Operations Demobilize
Federal	DMORT-Family Assistance Center (FAC)	Nationally (DHS FEMA NDMS)	Activate Fatality Management Operations Manage Antemortem Data Demobilize

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Federal	Portable Morgue (DPMU)*	3 nationally (DHS FEMA NDMS)	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct Morgue Operations Demobilize
State	Portable Morgue (DPMU)*	1 per every 5 States	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct Morgue Operations Demobilize
Federal	Morgue Operations Team	1 per Federal DPMU	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct Morgue Operations Demobilize
State	Morgue Operations Team per DPMU	1 per State DPMU	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct Morgue Operations Demobilize
State/Local	Morgue Security Team	1 per Federal or State DPMU	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct Morgue Operations Demobilize
Federal	DOJ/ FBI Evidence Response Team Unit		Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct On-scene Operations Demobilize
Federal/State	Body Recovery Unit	30 per Federal or State DPMU	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct On-scene Operations Demobilize
Federal/State	Medical Support Team	1 per Federal or State DPMU	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct On-scene Operations Demobilize
Federal/State	Field Investigative Unit	30 per Federal or State DPMU	Activate Fatality Management Operations

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			Conduct On-scene Operations Demobilize
Federal/State	Scene Logistics Unit	1 per Federal or State DPMU	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct On-scene Operations Demobilize
Federal/State	Escort Security Team	30 per Federal or State DPMU	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct On-scene Operations Demobilize
State/Local	Fatality Management Staging Security Team	1 per staging area (26)	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct On-scene Operations Demobilize
State	Incident Historian Team	1 per State	Direct Fatality Management Tactical Operations Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct On-scene Operations Conduct Morgue Operations Manage Antemortem Data Conduct Victim Identification Demobilize
State/Local	Remains Decontamination Team	16 per State DPMU	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct On-scene Operations Conduct Morgue Operations Demobilize
Federal	Dive (underwater) Recovery Team	28 nationally at pre-determined locations	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct On-scene Operations Demobilize

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State	Dive (underwater) Recovery Team	1 per State	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct On-scene Operations Demobilize
State	Medical Examiner/Coroner	1 per State	Direct Fatality Management Tactical Operations Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct On-scene Operations Conduct Morgue Operations Conduct Victim Identification Conduct Final Disposition Demobilize
Local	Medical Examiner/Coroner	1 per jurisdiction	Direct Fatality Management Tactical Operations Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct On-scene Operations Conduct Morgue Operations Conduct Victim Identification Conduct Final Disposition Demobilize
Federal	Refrigerated Storage (to accommodate 200 remains)	1 nationally	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct Morgue Operations Demobilize
State	Refrigerated Storage (to accommodate 100 remains)	1 per State	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct Morgue Operations Demobilize
Local	Refrigerated Storage (accommodate remains)	1 per 10% of local population	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct Morgue Operations

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			Demobilize
Federal/State/ Local	Mortuary Officers (Funeral Directors)		Direct Fatality Management Tactical Operations Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct Morgue Operations Conduct Victim Identification Conduct Final Disposition Demobilize
Federal	Antemortem Data Collection Team within Family Assistance Center	3 nationally	Activate Fatality Management Operations Manage Antemortem Data Demobilize
State	Antemortem Data Collection Team within Family Assistance Center	1 per State	Activate Fatality Management Operations Manage Antemortem Data Demobilize
Local	Antemortem Data Collection Team within Family Assistance Center	1 per UASI	Activate Fatality Management Operations Manage Antemortem Data Demobilize
Federal/State/ Local/Private	Transportation	As needed	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct On-scene Operations Conduct Morgue Operations Demobilize
RECOVER MISSION			
Structural Damage and Mitigation Assessment			
Outcome: Accurate situation needs and damage assessments occur. The full range of engineering, building inspection, and enforcement services are implemented, managed, and coordinated in a way that maximizes the use of resources, aids emergency response, implements recovery operations, and restores the affected area to pre-event conditions. Mitigation projects to lessen the impact of similar future events are identified and prioritized.			
Responsible	**Element Resource Unit**	**Number of Units**	**Capability Activity supported by Element**
Federal/State/Local	Public Assistance Teams: Buildings*	110 per incident (composition apportioned 80% Federal, 20%	Provide Mitigation and Technical Assistance

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		State/local reps)	
Federal/State/Local	Public Assistance Teams: Debris, emergency measures*	310 per incident (composition apportioned 80% Federal, 20% State/local reps)	Provide Mitigation and Technical Assistance
Federal/State/Local	Public Assistance Teams: Other permanent work*	102 per incident (composition apportioned 80% Federal, 20% State/local reps)	Provide Mitigation and Technical Assistance
Federal/State/Local	Rapid Needs Assessment Teams*	210 per incident (composition apportioned 33% Federal, 66% State/local reps)	Conduct Inspections and Assessments
State/Local/Private	Disaster Assessment Teams*	1,000 per incident (composition apportioned 78% State/local, 22% private reps)	Conduct Inspections and Assessments
Federal	Engineering Service Teams	112 per incident	Conduct Inspections and Assessments Provide Mitigation and Technical Assistance
Federal	Home and Business Assessment Staff – SBA Verifiers	3,000 per incident	Provide Mitigation and Technical Assistance
DOC/NIST	National Construction Safety Team		Conduct Inspections and Assessments
Restoration of Lifelines[1]			
Outcome: Lifelines to undertake sustainable emergency response and recovery activities are established.			
Responsible	**Element Resource Unit**	**Number of Units**	**Capability Activity supported by Element**
Federal/State/ Local partnership	Debris Management Team*	80 per affected region	Implement Reconstitution Procedures for Critical Facilities
Local (with private sector partnership)	Damage Assessment Team: Gas Distribution System*	25 per affected region	Re-Assess and Prioritize
Local (with private sector partnership)	Damage Assessment Team: Water and sewer*	40 per affected region	Re-Assess and Prioritize

[1] *The teams identified will be generated in response to a specific incident by assembling staff from various locations; they are not dedicated, standing organizations.*

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Local (with private sector partnership)	Damage Assessment Team: Electric Power*	2 per affected region	Re-Assess and Prioritize
Local (with private sector partnership)	Damage Assessment Team: Communications System*	400 per affected region	Re-Assess and Prioritize
Local (with private sector partnership)	Water and Sewer Restoration Team	100 per affected region	Implement Reconstitution Procedures for Critical Facilities
Local (with private sector partnership)	Gas Distribution System Restoration Team	143 per affected region	Implement Reconstitution Procedures for Critical Facilities
Local (with private sector partnership)	Communications System Restoration Team	300 per affected region	Implement Reconstitution Procedures for Critical Facilities
Local (with private sector partnership)	Electric Power Restoration Team	1200 per affected region	Implement Reconstitution Procedures for Critical Facilities
Local (with private sector partnership)	Transportation Assessment Team	1 per affected region	Re-Assess and Prioritize
Economic and Community Recovery[2]			
Outcome: Economic impact is estimated, priorities are set for recovery activities, business disruption is minimized and returned to operation, and individuals and families are provided with appropriate levels and types of relief with minimal delay.			
Responsible	**Element Resource Unit**	**Number of Units**	**Capability Activity supported by Element**
All levels	Community Planning and Development Officer	1 per jurisdiction	Assess and Prioritize Recovery Needs
National/ Regional	Damage Assessment Officer	5,000 per incident	Assess and Prioritize Recovery Needs
FEMA	Finance Officer	1 per incident	Provide Monetary Relief Provide Non-Monetary Relief
Federal	Technical support and computer infrastructure	1 per FEMA finance officer	Provide Monetary Relief Provide Non-Monetary Relief
National/ Regional	Loan officers	1,000 per incident	Provide Monetary Relief
Local	Economic Impact Community	10 per	Assess and Prioritize

[2] *Many of the staff "pools" identified below will be generated in response to a specific incident by assembling governmental and contract staff from various locations; they are not dedicated, standing organizations.*

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	Representatives	coordination team	Recovery Needs
Local	Essential Services Representatives Team	1 per Jurisdiction	Assess and Prioritize Recovery Needs
Federal/State/Local	Insurance community inspectors	260 per incident	Assess and Prioritize Recovery Needs
Federal/State/Local	Volunteer Organizations Active in Disasters (VOADs) and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)	Elastic – Surge capacity to fit incident needs	Assess and Prioritize Recovery Needs Provide Monetary Relief Provide Non-Monetary Relief
Federal/State/Local	Private sector, including construction, building supplies, transportation assets	Capacity is contingent on incident size as well as the availability of repair and reconstruction contractors and building supplies	Assess and Prioritize Recovery Needs
National/Regional	Personnel to implement disaster assistance programs	30,000 per incident	Provide Monetary Relief Provide Non-Monetary Relief

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Common Target Capabilities

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PLANNING

Capability Definition

Planning is the mechanism through which Federal, State, local and tribal governments, non-governmental organizations (NGO's), and the private sector develop, validate, and maintain plans, policies, and procedures describing how they will prioritize, coordinate, manage, and support personnel, information, equipment, and resources to prevent, protect and mitigate against, respond to, and recover from Incidents of National Significance. Preparedness plans are drafted by a litany of organizations, agencies and/or departments at all levels of government and within the private sector. Preparedness plans are not limited to those plans drafted by emergency management planners. The preparedness planning capability sets forth many of the activities and tasks undertaken by an Emergency Management planner when drafting (or updating) emergency management (preparedness) plans

Unlike the other target capabilities, the attributes of planning are difficult to quantify, as individual planners may have considerably varied education and experience, and still produce plans that lead to the successful implementation of a target capability. The focus of the Planning Capability should be on successful achievement of a plan's concept of operations using target capabilities and not the ability to plan as an end unto itself. Plans should be updated following major incidents and exercises to include lessons learned. The plans should form the basis of training and should be exercised periodically to ensure that responders are familiar with the plan and be able to execute their assigned role. Thus, it is essential that plans reflect the preparedness cycle of plan, train, exercise and incorporation of after action reviews and lesson's learned.

Outcome

Preparedness plans incorporate an accurate hazard analysis and risk assessment and ensure that capabilities required to prevent, protect and mitigate against, respond to, and recover from acts of all-hazards are available when and where they are needed. Plans are vertically and horizontally integrated with appropriate departments, agencies and jurisdictions. Where appropriate, plans incorporate a mechanism for requesting State and Federal assistance with a clearly delineated process for seeking and requesting assistance from appropriate agency(ies).

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

Planning supports all Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) and Annexes (support and incident) at the Federal, State, local, territorial, and tribal levels.

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Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: ***Conduct Strategic Planning***

Definition The art and science of developing and employing instruments of national and State/territorial power (information, technology, economic, intelligence, and military) in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve the objectives of the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the National Preparedness Goal, the National Response Plan, and supporting State/territorial, and local strategic direction and guidance. Strategic planning uses gap analysis to develop programmatic priorities that address the mission requirements, goals, objectives, milestones and resources to ensure interoperable and integrated synchronization throughout all levels of government and nongovernmental organizations for all hazards, incident-related prevent, protect, respond, and recover activities.

Critical Tasks	
ComA 1.1.3	Develop regional, and State/local Strategic Plans
ComA 2.9.2	Identify, develop, and convene local preparedness planning organization(s)
ComA 2.2	Define and implement the responsibilities for standardized emergency management system planning
ComA 2.2.2	Coordinate and integrate all response and recovery agencies/organizations in the planning process
ComA 2.2.3	Coordinate and integrate nongovernmental organizations and the private sector entities into the emergency management planning and decision-making processes
ComA 1.3.4	Conduct gap analysis to identify training, exercise needs and to facilitate investment and personnel decisions
ComA 1	Develop scalable strategic plans, based on normal response plans, to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from natural and man-made disasters as well as acts of terrorism
ComA 1.3.2	Develop a preparedness planning and review cycle that encompasses planning, training, exercising, evaluation and the incorporation of after action reviews (AAR) and lessons learned (LL)
ComA 1.3.2.1	Track implementation of after action reviews and lessons learned for improvement and corrective actions that enhance exercises and inform subsequent corrective training efforts

Preparedness Measures	**Metrics**
Regional and State/local strategic plans include, but are not limited to the national mission areas of prevent, protect against, respond to and recover from manmade and natural disasters, and acts of terrorism	Yes/No
The strategic plan defines the vision, mission, goals, and objectives of the jurisdiction	Yes/No
Strategic plan addresses protection against, response to, and recovery from natural and man-made disasters as well as acts of terrorism	Yes/No
Planners are trained and equipped	Yes/No
Plans are reviewed annually and updated in accordance with Federal, State, and local regulations and policies	Yes/No
Improvement actions from after action reports (AARs) and lessons learned are implemented according to the scale of disaster(s) and/or through defined Federal mandate for schedule for completion	Yes/No

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Activity: ***Develop/Revise Operational Plans***

Definition: Use priorities identified in the Strategic Planning process, as well as any recommendations/lessons learned, to guide the development of appropriate operational plans, such as: emergency operations plans (EOPs), comprehensive emergency management plans (CEMPs), recovery, hazard identification risk analysis (HIRA), mitigation, and continuity of operations. Operational plans identify the organizations and resources required to execute the four functional mission areas of prevent, prepare, respond and recover.

Critical Tasks	
ComA 2.1	Conduct a hazard analysis to identify threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences to be addressed by emergency management and/or preparedness plans
ComA 2.1.3	Develop and maintain Comprehensive Emergency Management Plans (CEMPs) or similar emergency management/preparedness plans
ComA 2.4	Develop emergency operations/response plans that describe how personnel, equipment, and other governmental, nongovernmental, and private resources will support and sustain incident management requirements
ComA 2.5	Develop and maintain Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) annexes for hazard specific response to include natural and man-made disasters as well as acts of terrorism, and other hazards
ComA 2.3	Develop and execute mutual aid assistance agreements and compacts
ComA 2.7	Develop National, State/Local, and Non-Governmental Continuity Plans. All-level Continuity Plans will describe how personnel, equipment, and other governmental, non-governmental, and private resources will support the sustainment and/or reestablishment of essential functions. Plans shall identify the critical and time sensitive applications, processes, and functions, to be recovered and continued, following an emergency or disaster, as well as the personnel and procedures necessary to do so, such as business impact analysis, business continuity management, vital records preservation and alternate operating facilities
ComA 2.3.3	Develop regional coordination plans or activities that involve all Federal, State, local, territorial, tribal, NGO, and private stakeholders

Preparedness Measures	**Metric**
Continuity of Operation (COOP) plans describe how personnel, equipment, and other resources support sustained response/survivability and recovery for all sectors	Yes/No
Continuity of Government (COG) plans describe the continued functioning of constitutional government under all circumstances	Yes/No
Emergency response plans are consistent with the National Response Plan (NRP) and National Incident Management System (NIMS)	Yes/No
Mutual aid assistance agreements are in place with contiguous jurisdictions	Yes/No
Preparedness plans are consistent with NRP and NIMS	Yes/No
Aid assistance agreements or contracts are in place with private organizations	Yes/No
Pre-identified mechanisms are in place to request assistance from counties, the State, or the Federal Government	Yes/No
Emergency response plans address substantial loss of public safety response capabilities during catastrophic events (to include special needs populations and people with disabilities)	Yes/No
Plans are reviewed and updated annually to ensure compliance with governmental regulations and policies (*Review requirements are intended to apply only when no pre-existing review cycle*	Yes/No

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has been established in Federal, State, or local requirements)	

Activity: ***Validate Plans***	
Definition: Evaluate operational plans through exercising, training, and real world events, and use after-action reports (AARs) to support validation and revision of operational and strategic plans.	
Critical Tasks	
ComA 3.6	Ensure that trained, exercised and equipped personnel are available to execute all planning requirements as determined by applicable standards of proficiency
ComA 3.1	Develop exercises/drills of sufficient intensity to challenge management and operations and to test the knowledge, skills, and abilities of individuals and organizations
ComA 3.2	Develop integrated national, regional, and State/local level exercises/drills
ComA 3.3	Develop regional, and State/local level exercises of sufficient intensity to challenge management and operations and test knowledge, skill and abilities of individuals and organizations
ComA 3.4	Develop lessons learned reports and procedures based on real world events and exercises
ComA 3.5	Develop, review, evaluate and update emergency management and/or preparedness plans based on lessons learned and/or AARs to address problems/gaps and needed corrective actions

Preparedness Measures	**Metric**
Plans are exercised and/or evaluated according to Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) requirements	Yes/No
Time in which record of deficiencies is generated from plan review process	Within consensual or mandated predetermined days for review
Time to develop improvement plan to address deficiencies	Within 30 days
Improvement plan actions are monitored for implementation	Quarterly

Linked Capabilities

Planning is the foundation on which all other capabilities are developed and enhanced, and is essential to their successful achievement. Therefore, this common capability is linked to all other capabilities.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
Planner	Planners dedicated to developing and maintaining homeland security, emergency management, and/or all-hazards plans. Setting qualifications for planner should be established by the jurisdiction.
Equipment	Includes computers with sufficient software tools to accomplish the specified tasks, such as geographic information system tools, decision modeling programs, relational databases, hazard modeling programs (i.e., computer-aided management of emergency operations [CAMEO], multihazard loss estimation methodology [HAZUS]) and consequence modeling tools.
Training	Training may include but is not limited to courses offered through Federal, State, local and private organizations, such as Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Emergency Management Institute (EMI), Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) Training Consortium, State training academies, and colleges and universities. Completion of one or more of the above may meet minimum requirements.

Planning Assumptions

- This capability applies to a wide range of incidents and emergencies including terrorist attacks, other manmade disasters, and natural disasters. It is intended to address deliberate planning coordination.
- A catastrophic incident will present a dynamic response and recovery environment requiring that response plans and strategies be flexible enough to effectively address emerging or transforming needs and requirements.
- A "dedicated planner" is one full-time equivalent (FTE) person whose work is focused exclusively ("dedicated") on the development and maintenance of homeland security, emergency management, and/or all-hazards plans.
- The human or physical resources identified in the response strategy may not be available for 24-48 hours of a catastrophic event due to jurisdiction-specific considerations of resource management in times of crisis(es) (e.g., resource needs at their home institutions, family requirements, over-extension, limits established in MOAs, etc.).
- A catastrophic incident may have significant international dimensions. These include potential impacts on the health and welfare of border community populations, cross-border trade, transit, law enforcement coordination, and other areas.
- Planning occurs with respect to the incident (strategic, operational, and tactical/incident) and according to the appropriate jurisdictional level (Federal, State, local, tribal).
- All operational personnel are trained on all appropriate plans and their role within those plans.
- Plans are validated through review, testing and exercises.
- Plans are written in accordance with NIMS.
- Planners have knowledge, experience, and/or training in subject areas.
- The planning process includes hazard analysis and risk assessment.
- The UTL is a menu of tasks that can be used in developing plans-to-task development.

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National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
State	Planner	Personnel	1	Per every 250k population in each State	All Activities
Territory	Planner	Personnel	2	Per territory	All Activities
Local	Planner	Personnel	2	Per UASI city, and Washington, DC	All Activities
All levels	Required training program	Training	1	Per planner	All Activities
All levels	Computer and software tools	Equipment	1	Per planner	All Activities

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COMMUNICATIONS

Capability Definition

Communications is the fundamental capability within disciplines and jurisdictions that practitioners need to perform the most routine and basic elements of their job functions. Agencies must be operable, meaning they must have sufficient wireless communications to meet their everyday internal and emergency communication requirements before they place value on being interoperable, meaning being able to work with other agencies.

Communications interoperability is the ability of public safety agencies (police, fire, EMS) and service agencies (public works, transportation, hospitals, etc.) to talk within and across agencies and jurisdictions via radio and associated communications systems, exchanging voice, data and/or video with one another on demand, in real time, when needed, and when authorized. It is essential that public safety has the intra-agency operability it needs, and that it builds its systems toward interoperability.

Outcome

A continuous flow of critical information is maintained as needed among multi-jurisdictional and multi-disciplinary emergency responders, command posts, agencies, and the governmental officials for the duration of the emergency response operation in compliance with National Incident Management System (NIMS). To accomplish this, the jurisdiction has a continuity of operations plan for public safety communications to include the consideration of critical components, networks, support systems, personnel, and an appropriate level of redundant communications systems in the event of an emergency.

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

This capability supports the following Emergency Support Functions (ESFs):

Primary: ESF#2: Communications
Communications support all ESFs at the Federal, State, local, and tribal levels.

Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Critical Tasks	
ComC 1	Develop communication plans, policies, procedures, and systems that support required communications with all Federal, regional, State, local and tribal governments and agencies as well as voluntary agencies
ComC 1.2.1	Develop procedures for the exchange of voice and data with Federal, regional, State, local and tribal agencies, as well as voluntary agencies
ComC 1.6	Develop supplemental and back-up communications and information technology plans, procedures, and systems
ComC 1.6.2	Identify emergency communications and data requirements for each stakeholder

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ComC 1.1.1	Develop a continuous improvement plan that enriches interoperable communications to provide advanced customer service, reliability, and operational effectiveness
ComC 1.6.5	Complete an assessment of standard communication capabilities for the Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs) and Public Safety Communication Centers to ensure an appropriate Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) is in place for public safety and service agencies' communications
ComC 1.7.3	Develop plans to provide telecommunication and information technology support to Federal, regional, State, tribal and local officials and the private sector
ComC 1.4	Design reliable, redundant, and robust communications systems for daily operations capable of quickly reconstituting normal operations in the event of disruption or destruction
ComC 1.7.2	Coordinate procurement and placement of technology communication systems based on a gap analysis of requirements versus existing capabilities

Preparedness Measures	**Metrics**
Operable communications systems, supported by redundancy and diversity, provide service across jurisdictions, which meets everyday internal agency requirements are in place	Yes/No
Documentation of system design is available	Yes/No
Assessment of standard communication capabilities for Public Safety Answering Points (PSAP)/Public Safety Communication Centers and Emergency Operations Centers (EOC) to ensure appropriate Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) for public safety and service agencies' communications has been completed	Yes/No
Documentation is available	Yes/No
Communications Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) that outlines back-up systems available at State and local levels, including protocols for use of systems, is in place	Yes/No
Copy is available and in the local SOP	Yes/No
Statewide set of communications standard operating procedures (SOPs) that conform to NIMS are in place and used in routine multiple jurisdictional responses	Yes/No
Copy is available and in the local SOP	Yes/No
A multi-agency and multi-jurisdictional governance structure to improve communications interoperability planning and coordination has been established	Yes/No
Copy of authorizing documents is available	Yes/No
Formal interoperable communications agreements have been established through the governance structure	Yes/No
Documentation is available	Yes/No
Interoperability communications plans have been developed through governance structure which include formal interoperable communications agreements have been established through the governance structure	Yes/No
Documentation is available	Yes/No
Interoperability policies and procedures to allow information sharing between levels of government and Federal installations involved in incident, as necessary and as possible, are in place	Yes/No
Documentation is available	Yes/No

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Redundant and diverse interoperable communication systems are available Descriptions are available	Yes/No Yes/No
Plans to acquire and influence sustained interoperability and systems maintenance funding have been developed	Yes/No

Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs	
Critical Tasks	
ComC 2.1.1	Develop and implement awareness training programs for response communications
ComC 2.1.2	Develop exercises/drills of sufficient intensity to challenge management and operations and to test the knowledge, skills, and abilities of individuals and organizations for response communications
ComC 2.2.1	Develop and conduct training to improve all-hazard incident management capability for response communications
ComC 2.2.2	Conduct an after action review to determine strengths and shortfalls and develop a corrective plan accordingly for response communications

Preparedness Measures	Metric
Plans, procedures, and use of all operable communications systems are regularly tested and/or exercised	Yes/No
All personnel including non traditional stakeholders have been trained to operate communications systems according to their incident role Documentation is available	Yes/No Yes/No
Plans, procedures, and use of all interoperable communications equipment are regularly reviewed tested and/or exercised Documentation is available	Yes/No Yes/No
Interoperability systems are used in pertinent everyday activities and emergency incidents to ensure familiarity with system and cooperation Documentation is available	Yes/No Yes/No

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Performance Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: ***Alert and Dispatch***

Definition: In response to an alert, make notification and provide communications management until the Incident Command (IC), Emergency Operations Center (EOC), and Emergency Management Agency (EMA) are stood-up.

Critical Tasks	
ComC 4.2	Implement response communications interoperability plans and protocols
ComC 4.2.1	Communicate internal incident response information
ComC 4.2.1.1	Use established common response communications language (i.e., plain English)
ComC 3.4	Request external resources using EMAC and other mutual aid/assistance processes (inter- and intra-state)
ComC 4.2.3	Report and document the incident by completing and submitting required forms, reports, documentation, and follow-up notations on immediate response communications
ComC 4.1.1	Verify immediately that critical communication links among first responders are functioning
ComC 4.3	Implement information systems protection procedures

Performance Measures	**Metric**
Time in which immediate dispatch information is provided to primary first responders during regular operations Policy and procedures are available	Within 60 seconds from call classification by dispatch Yes/No
Time in which Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), first responders, and special resources acknowledge receipt and understanding of radio communications information is Policy and procedures are available	Within 30 seconds from the end of transmission Yes/No
Percentage of communications sent and received that are completely understood without ambiguity by the sender or the intended receiver Policy and procedures are available	Minimum of 90% with dynamic error assessment Yes/No
Frequency of providing communications back-up during emergencies when the conventional mode of communications fail or become overloaded to assure continued service amidst incident Documentation is available	Continuous COOP and/or incident plan process Yes/No
Time in which alternate communications and/or dispatch center are staffed in the event of a catastrophic loss of the primary site COOP is activated based upon nature and disruption of failure Recovery time per classification of failure is realistic and alternative processes are in place for incident support	Within 1 hour of the loss of primary site Yes/No Yes/No

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Percentage of technical surge and back-up capabilities within communications and/or dispatch centers to process incoming calls effectively with the loss of any one communication or dispatch centers (assumes surge staffing will be available in 30 minutes)	Up to 200% above normal peak traffic
COOP allows for maximum response per incident type and duration	Yes/No
Documentation is available	Yes/No

Activity: ***Provide Incident Command/First Responder/First Receiver/Interoperable Communications***

Definition: In response to notification of an incident, go to the scene to provide and receive interoperable voice data and video communications.

Critical Tasks	
ComC 4.2	Implement response communications interoperability plans and protocols
ComC 4.2.1	Communicate internal incident response information
ComC 4.2.2	Coordinate incident site communications within a National Incident Management System (NIMS) compliant framework
ComC 4.2.1.1	Use established common response communications language (i.e., plain English)
ComC 4.2.3	Report and document the incident by completing and submitting required forms, reports, documentation, and follow-up notations on immediate response communications
ComC 4.1.1	Verify immediately that critical communication links among first responders are functioning
ComC 4.1	Establish and maintain response communications systems on-site
ComC 4.3	Implement information systems protection procedures

Performance Measures	Metric
Frequency with which local first responders are provided with tactical communications with approved local delivery process specified to incident	Continuous
Policy and procedures are available	Yes/No
Frequency the which tactical communications are provided between local disciplines (i.e., law enforcement, fire, and EMS) and among local fire units operating in the disaster site with approved delivery process specific to incident	Continuous
Percentage of communications sent and received that are completely understood without ambiguity by the sender or the intended receiver	No less than 90% with dynamic correction process
Copy of the SOP is available	Yes/No
Frequency with which communications back-up is provided during emergencies when the conventional mode of communications fail or become overloaded	Continuous
COOP and/or Incident Action Plan process assures continued service amidst incident	Yes/No
Documentation is available	Yes/No

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Time in which tactical communications are provided for regional first responders responding to the disaster site is within parameters of interoperability plans, as approved by governance structure/body Documentation available	Yes/No Yes/No
Percentage of mobile communications coverage provided in rural areas affected by disaster Documentation is available	Goal is to attain 95% Yes/No
Percentage of street-level hand-held communications coverage provided in urban/suburban areas affected by disaster Documentation is available	Goal is to attain 95% Yes/No
Percentage of in-building hand-held communications coverage provided in central areas affected by disaster Documentation is available	Goal is to attain 95% Yes/No
Time in which tactical communications are provided for large regional "task forces" providing recovery assistance to disasters and other emergencies Documentation is available	Within parameters of interoperability plan, as approved by the governance structure/body Yes/No

Activity: ***Provide Emergency Operations Center Communications Support***

Definition: Upon notification, initiate interoperable system operations, in addition to maintaining, managing, and assuring protection of the interoperable communications systems until the EOC is ordered deactivated.

Critical Tasks	
ComC 4.2	Implement response communications interoperability plans and protocols
ComC 4.2.1	Communicate internal incident response information
ComC 5.4.5	Provide direction, information and/or support as appropriate to incident command (IC) or unified command (UC) and/or joint field office(s)
ComC 5.3.1.2	Coordinate and provide telecommunications and information technology support to Federal, regional, State, tribal and local officials and the private sector(s)
ComC 5.2	Establish and maintain communications organization/operation with EOC/MACC
ComC 5.4	Coordinate communications policy and procedure across response entities
ComC 4.1	Establish and maintain response communications systems on-site
ComC 5.3	Establish and maintain interoperable information systems network within the EOC
ComC 5.3.1.1	Coordinate placement of latest technology that is available to agencies participating in response
ComC 5.3.3	Assure redundant communications circuits/channels are available for use
ComC 4.2.1.1	Use established common response communications language (i.e., plain English)
ComC 5.5	Maintain a common operating picture (COP) for real time sharing of information with all the participating entities to ensure all responder agencies are working from the same information

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ComC 4.2.3	Report and document the incident by completing and submitting required forms, reports, documentation, and follow-up notations on immediate response communications
ComC 4.3	Implement information systems protection procedures
ComC 5.3.1.3	Coordinate and open state communications support/channels to local and tribal government and the private-sector to assist in awareness, prevention, response, and recovery communications activities

Performance Measures	Metric
Percentage of communications sent and received that are completely understood without ambiguity by the sender or the intended receiver	Minimum of 90% with dynamic error assessment
Policy and procedures are available	Yes/No
Frequency with which communications back-up is provided during emergencies when the conventional mode of communications fail or become overloaded	Continuous
COOP and/or Incident Action Plan process in place to assure continued service amidst incident	Yes/No
Documentation is available	Yes/No

Activity: *Provide Federal Facilities, Task Force, and Recovery Assistance Interoperable Communications*

Definition: In response to an alert, make notification and provide communications management until the Incident Command and EOC are stood-up.

Critical Tasks	
ComC 4.2	Implement response communications interoperability plans and protocols
ComC 4.2.1.1	Use established common response communications language (i.e., plain English)
ComC 4.2.3	Report and document the incident by completing and submitting required forms, reports, documentation, and follow-up notations on immediate response communications
ComC 4.3	Implement information systems protection procedures

Performance Measures	Metric
Time and process in which tactical communications are provided for large regional "task forces" providing recovery assistance to disasters and other emergencies	Within the parameters of interoperability plans, as approved by governance structure/body
Documentation is available	Yes/No
Frequency in which communications back-up is provided during emergencies when the conventional mode of communications fail or become overloaded	Continuous
COOP and/or Incident Action Plan process assures continued service amidst incident	Yes/No
Documentation is available	Yes/No

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Percentage of communications sent and received that are completely understood without ambiguity by the sender or the intended receiver	Minimum of 90% with dynamic error assessment
Policy and procedures are followed	Yes/No

Activity: ***Return to Normal Operations***	
Definition: Initiate deactivation procedures for the interoperable communications system and return the system to a ready state.	
Critical Tasks	
ComC 4.2.1.1	Use established common response communications language (i.e., plain English)
ComC 4.2.3	Report and document the incident by completing and submitting required forms, reports, documentation, and follow-up notations on immediate response communications
ComC 7.1	Initiate interoperable deactivation procedures

Performance Measures	**Metric**
Percentage of communications sent and received that are completely understood without ambiguity by the sender or the intended receiver	Minimum of 90% with dynamic error assessment
Policy and procedures are available	Yes/No

Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship
All Response and Recovery Capabilities	Communications capability provides all response and recovery capabilities with operable and interoperable communications.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
Interoperability Plan	A plan for a designated area that includes governance, standard operating procedures, technology, training and exercises, and usage
Governance	Agreements between agencies and jurisdictions (i.e., memorandum of understanding/memorandum of agreement ([MOU/MOA]), and coordinated decision making across agencies and jurisdictions
Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)	The written processes and protocols that are necessary to follow to achieve interoperability during an incident
Technology—System of Systems	Operable communication systems for the disciplines and jurisdiction as defined by the local requirements that allows for mutual aid components to connect in when authorized and as necessary. System-of-systems consists of local, State, and Federal components that can be connected through common interface standards
Training and Exercises	Training -- general orientation and education on interoperability equipment for all personnel who respond to an event Exercises – communications-specific tabletop and operational exercises with multi-jurisdictional and multi-agency participants
Usage	Habitual use of interoperable equipment so participating area is accustomed with the equipment before an incident
Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program (ICTAP) Teams	Technical assistance program designed to enhance interoperable communications among local, State, and Federal emergency responders and public safety officials, and is associated with the Department of Homeland Security Office of Grants and Training's (G&T) Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grant program
Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP) and Public Safety Communications Center Continuity of Operations Plan	Plan that provides ability to have redundant and back-up systems in place during an emergency

Planning Assumptions

- This capability reaches across all 15 National Planning Scenarios and within each capability. All major incidents require communication and interoperability to facilitate management of an incident. Therefore, the target level of interoperability is independent of a specific scenario. Interoperability is a support function for all other responder capabilities, so this mission-critical capability must be in place to ensure the personnel who are providing the other capabilities have access to the information they need to respond appropriately.
- Interoperability is the communication between disciplines and jurisdictions that permit real time exchanges of information on demand, with whoever needs it, when properly authorized, in conformance with an Incident Command System.
- Communications is the transmission of thoughts, messages, or information. The ability to communicate is critical to effective emergency response and is one of the most difficult tasks that must be performed during an incident or event. Effective communications during an emergency requires a communications system that is both interoperable and redundant. The ability to transmit

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thoughts, messages, and information can be accomplished through a multitude of ways. In emergency response, the mechanisms that assist personnel in communications can vary, but are largely made up of wireless voice (radio), voice and data telephone (wireless and landline), wireless data, and internet voice/data.

- Communications interoperability is the ability of multiple entities to intermingle meaningful transmission of thoughts, messages, or information while using similar or dissimilar communications systems. A redundant communications system is a duplication of communications systems that can be accessed by personnel for the purpose of responding to, and/or mitigating and recovering from an incident or event.
- One of the major issues facing public safety and service agencies is the inability to communicate with one another when the need arises. Effective and efficient emergency response requires coordination, communication, and sharing of vital information among numerous public safety agencies. As the *National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets* observes, "most systems supporting emergency response personnel have been specifically developed and implemented with respect to the unique needs of each agency."
- Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP), Public Safety Communication Centers, and Emergency Operation Centers (EOCs) must be in place and competently operational with the resources, and operational integrity to perform during an incident.
- Agencies must be "operable," meaning they must have sufficient public safety and service agency communications capabilities to meet their everyday internal requirements before they place value on being "interoperable," meaning being able to work with other disciplines and agencies. They need to improve those systems first but this improvement planning needs to include a vision for improved interoperability with other disciplines and agencies. At a time when more attention is being paid to interoperability among different disciplines and jurisdictions within the community, there still exists fundamental communication deficiencies within disciplines and jurisdictions as practitioners strive to perform the most routine and basic elements of their job functions.
- These deficiencies result in daily communication challenges for those working on the front lines in public safety and service agencies. The Interoperability Continuum (see reference link below) outlines critical elements for the planning and implementation of successful public safety and service agencies' communications and interoperability solutions. These elements include governance, standard operating procedures, technology, training and exercises, and usage of interoperable communications. To drive progress along the five elements of the continuum and improve interoperability, public safety and service agency practitioners should observe the following principles:
  - Gain leadership commitment from all public safety and services agencies
  - Foster collaboration across all public safety and services agencies for planning and implementation
  - Work with policy makers to gain leadership commitment and resource support for interoperability
  - Plan and budget for ongoing updates to systems, procedures, and documentation
  - Use interoperability solutions on a regular basis
- Interoperability is a support function for all other responder capabilities, so this mission critical capability must be in place to ensure the other capabilities have access to the information they need to respond.
- Existing Continuity of Operations Plans (COOPs) for public safety and service agency communications systems are in place.
- Individual agencies and jurisdictional systems must be operable and functioning before mutual aid can come in and connect to interoperate.

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- Spectrum management should be coordinated to allow adequate allocation across all disciplines and jurisdictions.
- Critical infrastructure protective actions have been implemented to ensure communications systems remain operable.

Planning Factors from an In-Depth Analysis of a Scenario with Significant Demand for the Capability

Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Interoperability Communications Plan per designated participant area is created prior to an incident to include governance, standard operating procedures, technology, training and exercises, and usage	Effective plan with all necessary components outlined	All appropriate planning has been done prior to an incident	One per designated participant area
Governance Agreements between agencies and jurisdictions (i.e., Memorandum of Understanding/Memorandum of Agreement ([MOU/MOA]) Coordinated decision making across agencies & jurisdictions	Effective multi-jurisdictional, multi agency governance group is in place for each region as defined by local requirements	All appropriate interactions, decisions and agreements have been made prior to incident to ensure effective response at the incident	One governance group per participating area as designated by local responder requirements
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)	SOP that clearly articulates necessary processes and protocols to follow to achieve interoperability during an incident	All appropriate SOPs are in place prior to an incident and are executed as part of the response	One set of SOPs per participating area as designated by local responder requirements
Technology: ▪ Needs assessment ▪ Evaluate current capability ▪ Develop requirements ▪ Perform gap analysis ▪ System alternatives (with costs and types) ▪ Phase-in implementation ▪ Define spectrum needs ▪ Define security/encryption needs ▪ Develop future upgrade plan and budget process	Operable communication systems for the disciplines and jurisdiction as defined by the local requirements that allows for mutual aid components to connect in when authorized and as necessary	*Appropriate levels of the following have been done prior to an incident:* ▪ *Planning and building* public safety communication systems ▪ *Upgrading/enhancing* public safety communication systems and equipment ▪ *Replacing* public safety communication systems and equipment ▪ *Maintaining* public	Operable communication system for individual agencies that is appropriately connected to achieve interoperability when authorized and as necessary

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Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
		safety communication systems and equipment ▪ *Managing* public safety communications projects	
Training/Exercises: ▪ General orientation on equipment ▪ Communication tabletop exercise ▪ Operational exercise with all necessary communication components included during the event. Provide an observer specifically to monitor the communications piece to ensure there is adequate information to provide in the After Action Report (AAR) to correct any communication problems that occurred for the future	Trained personnel on the equipment, the policies and procedures, as well as the execution of interoperability to ensure they have the tools they need to respond during an incident	Appropriate levels of training have been conducted prior to an incident to ensure responders are equipped during the incident *Training* public safety staff on issues related to emergency response communications	General orientation on equipment for all appropriate personnel One tabletop exercise each year per participating area to include at least operations, technical, and dispatch participants One full-scale operational exercise each year per participating area
Usage of interoperable equipment: ▪ Maintenance ▪ Routine use for planned, special, and routine events when appropriate	Participating areas are familiar with the use of interoperable equipment	Habitual use of interoperable equipment so participating area is accustomed with the equipment before an incident	Routine use of interoperable communications for any appropriate event
DHS/Grants and Training Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program (ICTAP) Provides technical assistance in four phases: ▪ Phase 1: Define Technical Assistance Requirements ▪ Phase 2: Define Enhancements Needed ▪ Phase 3: Implementation ▪ Phase 4: Continued services as needed until local support is in place	Ability to assist localities by providing technical assistance	Needed prior to incident to ensure appropriate planning and engineering support is in place during an incident	20 ICTAP teams for technical engineering and planning as requested by the participating area
Public Safety Answering Point	Ability to have	Needed prior to incident	One plan per each

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Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
(PSAP) and Public Safety Communications Center Continuity of Operations Plan	redundant and back-up systems in place during an emergency	to ensure responders understand back-up capacity protocol and procedure for relocation	PSAP/PCC across the country--approximately 6,500

Approaches for Large-Scale Events

Because interoperability refers to the coordination and communication of command level or other authorized staff at the operational level, all large-scale events and the 15 Scenarios require plans that provide for established interoperability infrastructure before the incident occurs. Planning should include the ability to reconstitute normal communications systems that have been saturated, disrupted, or destroyed during an event.

National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
State	Inter-operability Plan	Plan	1	Per State/Territory	All Activities
Region	Inter-operability Plan	Plan	1	Per Region	All Activities
City	Inter-operability Plan	Plan	1	Per UASI city	All Activities
State	Governance	Organization and Leadership	1	Per State	All Activities
Region	Governance	Organization and Leadership	1	Per Region	All Activities
State	Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)	Plans	1	Per State	All Activities
Region	Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)	Plans	1	Per Region	All Activities

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
Federal/State/ Local	Technology—System of Systems	Resource Organization	1	Nationally	All Activities
Federal/State/ Local	Communications Training	Training and Exercise		All personnel according to their role at an incident	All Activities
Federal/State/ Local	General orientation on interoperability	Training and Exercise		All personnel who respond to an event	All Activities
Federal/State/ Local	Table-top Exercise	Training and Exercise	1	Annually	All Activities
Federal/State/ Local	Full-scale Exercise	Training and Exercise	1	Every 3 years	All Activities
DHS	Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program (ICTAP) Teams	Federal Resource Organization	20	Nationally for all States and designated urban areas	All Activities
County	Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP)/Public Safety Communication Centers (PSCC) COOP Plan	Plan	1	Per county	All Activities

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RISK MANAGEMENT

Capability Definition

Risk Management is defined by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) defines Risk Management as "A continuous process of managing—through a series of mitigating actions that permeate an entity's activities—the likelihood of an adverse event and its negative impact." Risk Management is founded in the capacity for all levels of government to identify and measure risk prior to an event, based on threats/hazards, vulnerabilities, and consequences, and to manage the exposure to that risk through the prioritization and implementation of risk-reduction strategies. The capability and actions to perform Risk Management may well vary between levels of government; however, the foundation of Risk Management is constant.

Outcome

Federal, State, local, tribal and private sector entities identify and assess risks, prioritize and select appropriate protection, prevention, and mitigation solutions based on reduction of risk, monitor the outcomes of allocation decisions, and undertake corrective actions. Additionally, Risk Management is integrated as a planning construct for effective prioritization and oversight of all homeland security programming.

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

This capability supports the following Emergency Support Functions (ESFs):

ESF #1: Transportation
ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering
ESF #4: Firefighting
ESF #5: Emergency Management
ESF #6: Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services
ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services
ESF #9: Urban Search and Rescue
ESF #10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Response
ESF #12: Energy
ESF #13: Public Safety and Security
ESF # 14: Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation

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Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: ***Develop Risk Framework***

Definition: Develop a framework for how risk assessments and risk analysis will serve the business process of managing "risks," and a process for stakeholder buy-in. Establish a comprehensive stakeholder governing process to oversee an all-encompassing ongoing perspective of the risks posed onto the respective community. This body should include public administrators, the owners and operators of critical infrastructure and key assets within the given community, as well as key stakeholders and decision makers. Furthermore, the "framework" must consider the functional as well as spatial relationships of assets as they are often interrelated.

Critical Tasks	
ComE 1.1	Ensure senior leadership communicates in writing the risk framework and intent to use risk analysis to all stakeholders

Preparedness Measures	**Metric**
Develop an actionable risk management strategy that includes short, medium, and long term objectives	Yes/No
Risk analysis and risk management plans are in place	Yes/No
A strategy has been implemented to mitigate current risk profile	Yes/No
Schedule and capability exists for updating risk analysis and risk management plans	Yes/No
State, local, and private entities have been trained to conduct risk analysis	Yes/No
Monitoring program has been established to detect changes in risk	Yes/No
Program has been established to assess program/security measures implementation	Yes/No

Activity: ***Assess Risks***

Definition: Assess potential targets within given system of governance as well as in relation to other systems based upon opportunity for first and second order events of an incident. Identify functional as well as spatial relationships of assets and systems infrastructure and assets. This activity may be applied to assets (power generation), systems (power supply grids), Sectors (power industry) and geographic areas (metropolitan areas). Risk management includes risks from both man made events and acts of nature.

Critical Tasks	
ComE 2.1	Conduct criticality analysis (also known as screening) to identify potential targets
ComE 2.2	Conduct vulnerability assessments to assess vulnerability of potential targets to identified threats
ComE 2.3	Conduct consequence analysis of critical assets
ComE 2.4	Conduct threat assessment of potential targets
ComE 2.4.1	Conduct or obtain intelligence community threat/hazard analysis through State or local Interagency Working Groups (Joint Terrorism Task Force) to identify threats to potential targets.

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ComE 2.4.2	Obtain intelligence reporting and the receipt of the threat data through the Department of Homeland Security's Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC)
ComE 2.5	Calculate risk to potential targets based on threat, vulnerability, and consequence
ComE 2.6	Establish relative order of priorities for risk mitigation among risk portfolio
ComE 2.7	Conduct response and recovery capabilities analysis to determine capability to respond to and recover from the occurrence of identified risks

Performance Measures	Metrics
Criticality results are used to identify potential targets	Yes/No
Threat, vulnerability, and consequence results are used to assess risk for potential targets	Yes/No
A comprehensive risk assessment has been completed for potential targets identified	Yes/No
Risk assessment plans and procedures implemented	Yes/No

Activity: ***Prioritize Risks***

Definition: Rate and/or rank criticality of potential targets to mitigate or transfer associated risk (if possible) as related to given target within a system of targets.

Critical Tasks

ComE 3.1	Identify potential protection, prevention, and mitigation strategies for high-risk targets
ComE 3.2	Prioritize identified strategies by risk reduction expected outcomes appreciating the various threat, vulnerabilities, and consequences that affect that community, system or asset

Performance Measures	Metrics
Risk and risk reduction results are used to prioritize risk-reduction strategies	Yes/No
Integration of a schedule and strategy to implement risk reduction strategies, including milestones, funding strategies, and opportunity costs where possible has been completed	Yes/No
Integration of a schedule and strategy for reducing the greatest risk posed onto the respective stakeholder has been completed	Yes/No

Activity: ***Develop Business Case***

Definition: Develop cost-benefit/cost-effectiveness analysis for consideration of applicable prescribed measures required to mitigate associated risks to an asset or system of assets; consider opportunity costs associated to one measure versus another.

Critical Tasks

ComE 4.1	Select risk reduction solutions for implementation based on risk reduction strategies

Performance Measures	Metrics
Funding priorities reflect risk assessment and prioritization of risk-reduction strategies	Yes/No

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Solutions are selected and resources allocated	Yes/No
Resources are allocated and measures established to shift to a new risk reduction target	Yes/No

Activity: *Manage Risk*

Definition: Manage and monitor risk through continued assessment and analysis. Continuous consideration should be given to refresh the given threat, emerging vulnerabilities, and changing consequences to the system or assets under consideration.

Critical Tasks	
ComE 5.1	Monitor the progress of solution implementation
ComE 5.1.1	Undertake corrective actions

Performance Measures	**Metrics**
Selected solutions have been verified as successfully implemented	Yes/No

Activity: *Conduct Risk Communication*

Definition: Develop understanding and appreciation of risk assessment, risk analysis, and risk management principles, and develop avenues for receiving information on threat, vulnerability, and consequence.

Critical Tasks	
ComE 6.1	Share the assessment of sector-specific infrastructure risk with interdependent entities within appropriate sectors

Preparedness Measures	**Metrics**
Risk management strategy is communicated regularly with stakeholders, (monthly or quarterly reporting)	Yes/No

Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship to Capability
CBRNE Detection	CBRNE Detection provides potential threat information used in the risk assessment process
Critical Infrastructure Protection	The Critical Infrastructure Protection capability uses the risk assessment process to prioritize protection decisions.
Emergency Operations Center Management	Risk analysis provides risk assessments to the Emergency Operations Center Management capability.
Planning	Risk analysis is a key step in the all-hazards planning process.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
Local law enforcement	Personnel with skills, ability and training to promulgate local risk assessment and risk management strategies, with a focus on risk management, and to participate in risk communication activities
Urban Area Working Groups	Personnel with skills, ability and training to promulgate local risk assessment and risk management strategies, with a focus on risk management, and to participate in risk communication activities
Regional Transit Security Working Groups	Personnel with skills, ability and training to promulgate local risk assessment and risk management strategies, with a focus on risk management, and to participate in risk communication activities
Area Maritime Security Committees	Personnel with skills, ability and training to promulgate local risk assessment and risk management strategies, with a focus on risk management, and to participate in risk communication activities
Owners and Operators of Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources (CI/KR)	Personnel with skills, ability and training to promulgate emergency operations plans (EOPs) as part of local and regional risk management strategies, and to participate in risk communication activities
State Administrative Agencies (SAAs)	Personnel with skills, ability and training to promulgate State-wide risk assessment and risk management strategies; to participate in risk communications activities; and to use risk reduction tools to evaluate alternate risk management strategies
Federal law enforcement and homeland security community	Personnel with skills, ability and training to promulgate national risk assessment and risk management strategies; to participate in risk communications activities; and to create, disseminate and use risk reduction tools to evaluate alternate risk management strategies
Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs)	Personnel with skills, ability and training to promulgate national risk assessment and risk management strategies; to participate in risk communications activities; and to use risk reduction tools to evaluate alternate risk management strategies
National intelligence community	Personnel with skills, ability and training to support national risk assessment and Risk Management strategies; to participate in risk communications activities. Training and formal education are keys to having a sound Risk Management background. Various levels of government will require varying levels of experience or capabilities
Risk analysis/risk management tools	
Cost estimating tools	
Geographical Information System (GIS) data collection tools	
Risk assessment standards and guidelines	
Prior risk assessments and risk management strategies	
Technical (e.g. modeling and analysis tool training)	

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Risk management training for security, response, and recovery managers	
System for collecting and sharing lessons learned	

* Note: Currently there are a variety of tools, processes, and offerings in practice and under development to serve the Capability of Risk Management. As with the distribution of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, the Department of Homeland Security has outlined core requirements for the management of risk, and will continue to serve this capability through additional technical assistance. As communities mature their Risk Management capability they are encouraged to look to DHS for continued guidance and updates to Threat information from the aforementioned Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) office as well as guidance on the further development of a risk analysis methodology for critical asset protection.

Planning Assumptions and Definitions

- Risk assessments can be conducted in a relative (preferably ordinal) manner. Calculated threat and risk ratings will not represent absolute probabilities, unless accurate probability data is readily available, but rather will be measured relative to other threats.
- Scenario-based risk assessment will be used to evaluate threat, vulnerability, and consequence. For purposes of consistency the National Planning Scenarios should be used.
- Input will be sought from the national intelligence community, including JTTFs to establish viable threats and the relative likelihood of those threats. To seek alignment with the National Infrastructure Protection Plan would be to use the threat analysis generated by DHS/ Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) in coordination with the intelligence community. This would provide a more authoritative and more consistent threat input.
- Scenario-specific threat assessments will include evaluation of target value, level of deterrence, weapon availability, attack simplicity, as well as past history and specific intelligence information. Target values will require expert opinion and should be coordinated with the intelligence community and/or Federal stakeholders. Furthermore "intent" and "capability" of the adversary must be applied to assess terrorist threat. This approach is consistent with the DHS/NIPP threat analysis approach.
- Vulnerability analysis will measure the likelihood that specific scenarios could be executed successfully based on an evaluation of physical features, security capabilities, and response capabilities that serve to prevent an attack from being successful.
- Consequence analysis will measure the expected outcome of specific scenarios based on analysis of the susceptibility of attack of the asset given the functional characteristics of the targets, and the availability of response and recovery capabilities.
- Prevention, response and recovery assessments will also be based on the same set of scenarios.
- Total systemic risk will be calculated as an integration of risk across all targets and scenarios within a jurisdiction.
- Appropriate protection, prevention, and mitigation solutions will be evaluated using risk-reduction tools. Threat, vulnerability, and consequence will be re-evaluated based upon implementation of solutions. Initial risk calculations serve as a benchmark against which risk reduction is measured.
- Criticality assessments will be based on critical target factors that represent the mission of targets to the Federal, State, local, and tribal entities. Considerations should be provided to the factors of human health impact, economic impact, national strategic mission impact, and psychological impact as aligned to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7.

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- Life cycle costs for identified solutions will be evaluated, including implementation costs such as training and recurring costs such as personnel and maintenance, and discounted to produce a net present cost. Where available and known costs to upgrade will be included.
- Resources will be allocated through cost-benefit analysis, comparing total risk reduction and costs.
- From an actionable perspective, all communities of interest are responsible for risk communication. Risk communication may include but should not be limited to intelligence data, potential terrorism target selection or infrastructure selection, and anomalies which may result in prevention and or deterrence. Furthermore, there are tactical, strategic, and operational responsibilities for each respective community of interest.
- Federal, State, and local governments and the private sector all have a role in managing risk. Each should develop an understanding and appreciation of the principles of risk assessment, analysis and management. Each should develop a framework that integrates risk management in their business, and include a process for stakeholder buy-in and governance.
- There are current departmental activities aligned to develop a national baseline for risk management architecture. The Department of Homeland Security has defined the framework as the appreciation for consequence, threat, and vulnerability. Given this foundation and the work of the Department, a target architecture should be forthcoming. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (to be released) provides a framework for the foundations of risk management. Specifically, Chapter 3 and Appendix 3 of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.
- The work within this target capability is focused on "terrorism risk" as it is that adversarial relationship that this target capability is designed for under the disciplines of homeland security. It is intended to establish the fundamental equations that define terrorism risk and to standardize terminology for conduct of a terrorism risk assessment. However the ability to plan for incidents of national significance such as natural disasters should be considered equally within the greater scheme of risk management.
- There are many potential benefits of performing risk assessments. A robust and repeatable risk assessment methodology can help entities better manage the risk; allowing them to identify targets that are potentially at risk, develop appropriate solutions, and, most importantly, allow them to measure the potential effectiveness of those solutions in terms of risk reduction.
- The primary difference between terrorism risk and some other types of risk is that terrorism is a human-caused event. Although estimates can be made as to the potential goals of terrorist groups, the targets that they might select, and the types of weapons that they might use, the actions of terrorists do not absolutely conform to any set of rules or statistics. Because relatively few attacks have occurred in the United States, historical data using trend analysis can not predict future events and may be of only limited use in predicting even the *type, time or location* of attack that might be launched.
- Because of the human element, there is a linkage between terrorism risks at different potential targets. Unlike most forms of risk, where the likelihood of the event occurring at any given location is independent, with terrorism the likelihood of the event occurring is very much dependent on actions that occur at other potential targets. If security measures are increased at one target (target hardening), the relative likelihood of attack can increase at other potential targets (soft targets). This happens because additional security measures could direct away from one target and towards others with lower levels of deterrence.
- Similarly, the relative value of a potential target can also have a major effect on the likelihood of attack. Terrorist target sites will meet certain goals for an attack, including: casualties, economic disruption, or symbolic importance. A larger relative value for one potential target over another makes it more likely that the site might be attacked. Changes in the relative value of other sites could

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have the effect of changing the risk of terrorism at a particular site, even if no change occurred at the site itself.

- Standard algorithms and terminology for evaluating risk must be modified to deal with the effects of the human-element and of the linkages between targets.
- Target attractiveness measures the features of a particular asset that may make it more or less likely to be targeted by terrorists for a particular form of attack. Evaluation of target attractiveness should include an evaluation of two sets of features; *target valu*e and *deterrence*. *Target value* evaluates those features of an asset that make it more likely that an asset will be attacked; features that make the asset attractive as a target. These may include: potential for casualties, potential for economic disruption, and symbolic importance. *Deterrence* evaluates those features that make a target less likely to be attacked. These features primarily include visible security and known response capabilities.
- In instances where frequency of attack can be reasonably evaluated using statistical analysis or some other direct form of estimate, then that metric can certainly be directly used for target attractiveness.
- The Consequence of a terrorist attack is a product of the *criticality* of the target and the *impact* that an attack would have on that *criticality*.
  - Consequence = (Criticality) X (Impact)
- *Criticality* is broadly defined as the particular aspects or features of an asset that would make someone want to protect the asset against an attack. Generally, *criticality* is defined using a set of 'Critical Asset Factors'. These factors define the specific features of an asset that could make it important to protect that asset from attack. Examples of typical critical asset factors include:
  - Loss of Life
  - Economic losses
  - Disruption of Government Services
  - Degradation of Critical Infrastructures and Key assets
  - Symbolic and Psychological Impact
- Once the risk has been determined, the likelihood of an attack being successful can be assessed. In determining the susceptibility of an attack or "vulnerability to attack" it is assumed that the asset has been targeted, the terrorists have the required weapon and equipment, and that the attack will take place. The susceptibility then measures the probability that that attack would achieve its desired result given the constraints that are in place at the target, including physical constraints, operational constraints, and security measures.
- There are a number of methods that can be used to calculate or estimate *susceptibilit*y. These range from simple ratings of security capabilities to complex, simulation-based evaluation of detailed attack scenarios. The most appropriate method will depend on the type of asset and the goals of the risk assessment. In general however, an appropriate assessment of susceptibility would include an evaluation of physical features, security capabilities, and response capabilities that serve to prevent an attack from being successful. These activities can also be categorized as those that serve to deny, detect, delay, or defend against the attack, and are addressed by other capabilities in the Target Capabilities List.

Planning Factors from an In-Depth Analysis of a Scenario with Significant Demand for the Capability

Risk assessment does not focus on single incidents but rather assesses risk across a number of viable threats and critical assets.

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National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
Local	Local law enforcement Urban Area Working Groups	Personnel	As Needed		Develop Risk Framework Assess Critical Infrastructure Risks Manage Risk Conduct Risk Communication
Local	Urban Area Working Groups Asset owners and operators	Personnel	As Needed		Develop Risk Framework Assess Critical Infrastructure Risks Manage Risk Conduct Risk Communication
Regional	Regional Transit Security Working Groups	Personnel	As Needed		Develop Risk Framework Assess Critical Infrastructure Risks Manage Risk Conduct Risk Communication
Regional	Area Maritime Security Committees	Personnel	As Needed		Develop Risk Framework Assess Critical Infrastructure Risks Manage Risk Conduct Risk Communication
State/Local/ Private Sector	Owners and operators of critical infrastructure/ key resources (CI/KR)	Personnel	As Needed		Develop Risk Framework Conduct Risk Communication Assess Critical Infrastructure Risks and Manage Risk Analyze Interdependencies of Assets (Functional, Spatial)
State	State Administrative Agencies	Personnel	As Needed		Assess Critical Infrastructure Risks

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
					Prioritize Risks Develop Business Case Manage Risk Conduct Risk Communication
Federal: Department of Homeland Security	Federal law enforcement and homeland security community	Personnel	As Needed		Develop Business Case Manage Risk Conduct Risk Communication
Federal: Department of Justice Department of Homeland Security	Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs)	Personnel	As Needed		Develop Business Case Manage Risk Conduct Risk Communication
Federal	National intelligence community	Personnel	As Needed		Develop Business Case Manage Risk Conduct Risk Communication
All levels	Risk analysis/risk management tools	Equipment	As Needed		Assess Risk
All levels	Cost estimating tools	Equipment	As Needed		Develop Business Case Manage Risk
All levels	Geographical Information System (GIS) data collection tools	Equipment	As Needed		Assess Risk

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References

1. National Infrastructure Protection Plan. Department of Homeland Security.
2. Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8, "National Preparedness". December 2003. http://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2003/12/20031217-6.html
3. National Response Plan (NRP). Department of Homeland Security, December 2004.
4. National Incident Management System (NIMS). Department of Homeland Security. March 2004. http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/NIMS-90-web.pdf
5. Walker, David M. "Strategic Budgeting: Risk Management Principles Can Help DHS Allocate Resources to Highest Priorities," United States Government Accountability Office, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Management, Integration, and Oversight, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, GAO-05-824T, June 29, 2005: http://www/gao.gov/new.items/d05824t.p

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COMMUNITY PREPAREDNESS AND PARTICIPATION

Capability Definition

Everyone in America is fully aware, trained, and practiced on how to prevent, protect/mitigate, prepare for, and respond to all threats and hazards. This requires a role for citizens in personal preparedness, exercises, ongoing volunteer programs, and surge capacity response.

Outcome

There is a structure and a process for ongoing collaboration between government and nongovernmental resources at all levels; volunteers and nongovernmental resources are incorporated in plans and exercises; the public is educated and trained in the four mission areas of preparedness; citizens participate in volunteer programs and provide surge capacity support; nongovernmental resources are managed effectively in disasters; and there is a process to evaluate progress.

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

This capability should play a role in ESFs and Annexes at the Federal, State, tribal, and local levels.

Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: ***Establish Collaborative Structure and Process for Government and Non-Governmental Entities at All Levels*** **Definition: Develop an organizational entity with member representation from emergency responder disciplines, elected officials, civic organizations, faith-based organizations, special needs advocacy groups, private sector, neighborhood associations, educational institutions, and critical infrastructure.**	
Critical Tasks	
Pro.B4a 1.1.1	Establish leadership support at the national, State, tribal, and local levels for Citizen Corps Councils
Pro.B4a 1.2	Establish and maintain Citizen Corps Councils at all levels of government: Federal, State, tribal, local
Pro.B4a 1.2.2	Establish a strategic plan for the Citizen Corps Council's jurisdiction to engage all residents in preparedness, training, and volunteer support taking into account the jurisdiction's potential threats, critical infrastructure, population density, and population composition
Pro.B4a 1.3	Develop all-hazards preparedness requirements and a process to sustain citizen capabilities at all levels of citizen engagement
Pro.B4a 1.2.3	Implement a process to count and assess membership of Citizen Corps Councils

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Preparedness Measures	Metrics
Number of local Citizen Corps Councils nationwide	2500
Percentage of population served by a Citizen Corps Council	99% total U.S. population
Membership of Citizen Corps Council includes representatives from government, civic organizations, faith-based organizations, special needs advocacy groups, private sector, critical infrastructure, education, and neighborhood associations	Yes/No

Activity: ***Integrate Public Outreach and Non-Governmental Resources into Emergency Operations Plans and Exercises***

Definition: Include sufficient planning for public warnings, emergency public education and information, evacuation, mass care, health and medical services, non-governmental resource management, and establish clear roles and protocols for volunteers for all ESFs and Annexes. Evaluate plans through exercises that include the general public and volunteer operations roles.

Critical Tasks	
Pro.B4a 2.1	Integrate citizen participation in the planning process at all levels
Pro.B4a 2.1.1	Incorporate, in all plans, procedures, and protocols (including outreach, training and exercises, and volunteer opportunities), consideration for individuals with disabilities and their care givers
Pro.B4a 2.1.2	Incorporate, in all plans, procedures, and protocols (including outreach, training and exercises, and volunteer opportunities), consideration for individuals who do not speak English
Pro.B4a 2.1.3	Incorporate in all plans, procedures, and protocols (including outreach, training and exercises, and volunteer opportunities), consideration for individuals with low income and limited resources
Pro.B4a 2.1.4	Incorporate in all plans, procedures and protocols (including outreach, training and exercises, and volunteer opportunities), consideration for age-related issues and concerns
Pro.B4a 2.1.5	Incorporate in all plans, procedures and protocols (including outreach, training and exercises, and volunteer opportunities), consideration for companion and service animals
Pro.B4a 2.3.1	Integrate citizens in all levels (national/international, regional, State, tribal, urban, local) and types of exercises (all hazards, terrorism, bioterrorism, natural disasters), to include citizen participation in exercise planning, implementation, and review
Pro.B4a 2.2.2	Establish and maintain a "skills and resources" database of the jurisdiction's non-governmental assets
Pro.B4a 2.2.3	Establish necessary stand-by contracts and MOUs with appropriate private sector and non-governmental organizations to augment government resources
Pro.B4a 2.4	Establish and maintain a process to evaluate citizen preparedness and participation and to recognize exemplary citizens in preparedness programs
Pro.B4a 2.4.1	Implement process to evaluate and periodically reassess citizen related component of Emergency Operations Plans, to include alerts and warnings, public education and emergency public information, evacuations, mass care, non-governmental resource management
Pro.B4a 2.4.2	Implement process to evaluate citizen participation in exercises at all levels of government

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Pro.B4a 2.5	Support community infrastructure to achieve appropriate levels of preparedness, to include developing community-wide automated alerts and warning systems

Preparedness Measures	Metrics
Number of State and urban area EOPs that address citizen preparedness and participation, establish a volunteer role for ESFs, and plan for use of non-governmental resources	All States and UASI jurisdictions, at a minimum
Number of exercises that engage the public and volunteer operations	All non-classified exercises
Citizens (i.e. non-emergency responders) participate in planning, implementing, and reviewing community emergency exercises at least once every 2 years	Yes/No

Performance Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: ***Provide Education and Training for the Public in All Mission Areas***

Definition: Ensure the public is educated and trained in prevention, protection, response, and recovery for all hazards, with specific consideration for high-threat hazards for the area in which they live, work, or attend school and for special needs.

Critical Tasks	
Pro.B4a 3.1	Plan, conduct, and evaluate public education programs for citizen prevention, protection/mitigation, response and recovery capabilities
Pro.B4a 3.1.2	Provide continuing education and training for the public on: prevention, protection/mitigation, emergency response plans, alerts and warnings (including threat levels), evacuation/in-place protection plans and exercises, participating in government-sponsored emergency exercises, volunteer opportunities and training for year round volunteer role or surge capacity role in response and recovery
Pro.B4a 2.1.1	Incorporate, in all plans, procedures, and protocols (including outreach, training and exercises, and volunteer opportunities), consideration for individuals with disabilities and their care givers
Pro.B4a 2.1.2	Incorporate, in all plans, procedures, and protocols (including outreach, training and exercises, and volunteer opportunities), consideration for individuals who do not speak English
Pro.B4a 2.1.3	Incorporate in all plans, procedures, and protocols (including outreach, training and exercises, and volunteer opportunities), consideration for individuals with low income and limited resources
Pro.B4a 2.1.4	Incorporate in all plans, procedures and protocols (including outreach, training and exercises, and volunteer opportunities), consideration for age-related issues and concerns
Pro.B4a 2.1.5	Incorporate in all plans, procedures and protocols (including outreach, training and exercises, and volunteer opportunities), consideration for companion and service animals
Pro.B4a 3.2.1	Train the public to be aware and to report suspicious items and behavior
Pro.B4a 3.2.2	Provide crime prevention, counter-terrorism and public education program materials in multiple languages
Pro.B4a 3.2.3	Assist owners of critical infrastructure in increasing security measures and strengthening

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	connection to local law enforcement through Citizen Corps Councils
Pro.B4a 3.2.4	Strengthen Community Oriented Policing philosophy by providing volunteer opportunities to support local law enforcement
Pro.B4a 3.3.1	Establish jurisdictional educational programs to encourage families to create disaster kits and communications plans
Pro.B4a 3.3.2	Develop and provide community preparedness public education program and materials for at risk populations
Pro.B4a 3.3.3	Develop and provide community preparedness public education program and materials for non-English speaking communities and special needs populations
Pro.B4a 3.3.4	Support education and training on automated alerts and warnings and related responses
Pro.B4a 3.1.3	Implement a periodic process to assess citizen preparedness

Performance Measures	Metrics
Percent of citizens educated and trained in UNIVERSAL all-hazards capabilities[3]	An annual increase of 5% until 80% of population is educated and trained
Percent of citizens who are aware of heightened jurisdictional threat levels	An annual increase of 5% until 80% of citizens maintain awareness
Percent of citizens who know the relevant immediate response for technological, natural and terrorist incidents	An annual increase of 5% until 80% of citizens maintain knowledge
Percent of citizens within the jurisdiction who are alert to unusual behavior in others that might indicate potential terrorist activity and understand appropriate reporting procedures	An annual increase of 5% until 80% of citizens maintain skills
Percent of privately held critical infrastructure computer owners who implement appropriate virus protections and act on virus alerts	5% annual increase until 80% of owners achieve implementation
Percent of households that conduct pre-incident preparation – to include maintaining a communication plan, disasters supplies, and a practicing evacuation/shelter-in-place	5% annual increase until 80% of households maintain pre-incident preparation
Percent of citizens prepared to evacuate or relocate to designated shelter	5% annual increase until 80% of population is prepared
Percent of jurisdiction's population knowledgeable of workplace, school, and community emergency plans	5% annual increase until 80% of population maintains knowledge

[3] Specific capabilities for UNIVERSAL all-hazards preparedness will be determined through a collaborative process with emergency responders; expected to be finalized by Dec 2006. Possible capabilities are included here.

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Percent of citizens prepared to shelter-in-place and have emergency supplies on hand as advised by local authorities	5% annual increase until 80% of population prepared to shelter in place
Percent of citizens trained in basic first aid	5% annual increase until 80% of population maintains skills
Percent of citizens educated and trained in RISK-BASED capabilities for high-threat incidents in their area, to include natural hazards, technological hazards, and terrorism[4]	An annual increase of 5% until 72%[5] of population (80% of those living in high-threat area) are educated and trained per appropriate hazard
Percent of citizens who know the appropriate detailed response for specific high-threat incidents in their area, to include multiple incidents where appropriate	An annual increase of 5% until 72% of population (80% of those living in high-threat area) have specialized awareness
Percent of population trained in CBRNE and decontamination procedures	5% annual increase until 46% of population (80% of those living in urban areas) maintain skills
Percent of population with risk-based life-saving skills	An annual increase of 5% until 72% of population (80% of those living in high-threat area) maintain specialized skills.
Percent of households, businesses, and schools that have implemented mitigation measures to protect property from specific high-threat	5% annual increase until 72% households, businesses, and schools (80% of those in high-risk areas) have implemented mitigation measures

[4] Specific capabilities for RISK-BASED, hazard-specific preparedness will be determined through a collaborative process with emergency responders; expected to be finalized by Dec 2006. Possible capabilities are included here.

[5] As stated in the planning assumptions, 90% of the U.S. population lives in area with high-risk for at least one major hazard/threat. Using a target of 80% of the population applied to this at-risk base of 90%, provides a target of 72% of the total population.

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Activity: ***Provide Volunteer Opportunities: year round and in surge operations***	
Definition: Develop and implement education, training, and exercises for ongoing volunteer programs and volunteer surge response and recovery activities.	
Critical Tasks	
Pro.B4a 4.1	Develop and sustain volunteer opportunities for citizens to support local emergency responders and community safety efforts year round, to include necessary training and equipment
Pro.B4a 4.2	Develop NIMS credentialing for volunteer surge capacity job functions to support all ESFs and annexes
Pro.B4a 4.3	Develop and implement training and exercise programs to enable citizens to support emergency response and recovery operations
Pro.B4a 4.4	Implement a process to track numbers of volunteers who participate in ongoing volunteer programs
Pro.B4a 4.5	Implement a process to track numbers of volunteers who participate in surge capacity roles
Pro.B4a 4.6	Implement liability coverage for volunteer activity for appropriate jurisdiction

Performance Measures	**Metrics**
Percent of population trained to provide volunteer support to local emergency responder disciplines (law enforcement, fire, emergency medical and public health services)	2% annual increase until 10% population volunteers an average of 20 hours per year = 560 million hours/yr
Percent of pre-trained and credentialed citizens prepared to augment and supplement official government emergency response with manpower and private sector in-kind resources for ESFs and annexes	20% surge capacity for any given emergency response function[6]

Activity: ***Incident Response***	
Definition: General public, volunteers, and non-governmental entities response according to plan and training.	
Critical Tasks	
Pro.B4a 5.1	Implement public, volunteers, and non-governmental entity roles in emergency operations plans

Performance Measures	**Metrics**
Population responded to official instructions and provided self care and by-stander care	Yes/No
Citizens with disabilities or special needs that require 24-hour care and/or equipment have access to life-sustaining resources during emergency situations	Yes/No
Public communications are accessible to all citizens in the jurisdiction, including people with disabilities and non-English speaking populations	Yes/No

[6] With approximately 2.8 million uniformed responders, 20% surge capacity represents 560,000 trained volunteers

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Evacuation assistance is provided for those who cannot evacuate on their own	Yes/No
Pre-identified shelters accommodate companion and service animals and people with disabilities	Yes/No
Volunteers provide surge capacity for ESFs and annexes, including Transportation, Communications, Mass Care, Resources Management, Public Health and Medical Services, Search and Rescue, Public Safety and Security, Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation, External Affairs, Unaffiliated Volunteers and Unsolicited Donations Management	Yes/No
Non-governmental resources are quickly deployed using stand-by contracts and MOUs	Yes/No
Jurisdictions outside of the incident impact area provide personnel/material support	Yes/No
Jurisdictions outside of the incident impact area provide mass care to evacuees	Yes/No

Linked Capabilities

This capability provides for citizen support in other capabilities across all four missions. It is principally linked to the Volunteer Management and Donations, Mass Care, Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-In-Place, and Medical Surge.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
National Leadership for Community Preparedness and Participation	National leaders from White House, Secretaries of key Federal agencies, State governors, military leadership, and congressional representation—organized to provide national voice to promote integration of citizens in homeland security mission.
National Citizen Corps Council	Approximately 50 national emergency responder discipline associations, NGOs, disability advocacy groups, faith-based organizations, private sector, and government agencies that collaborate to provide strategies, plans, and exercise guidance to foster collaboration at the State and local levels for citizen preparedness and participation.
Citizen Corps Councils	Each Citizen Corps Council is composed of representatives of the emergency responder disciplines, civic organizations, NGOs, private sector, faith-based, schools, elected leadership, and other community stakeholders. Local Councils (tribal, county, or city level) oversee local citizen opportunities for education, training/exercises, and volunteer support. Local Councils require adequate supplies and equipment and a minimum of one dedicated staff.
Public Education Specialists	Specialists to educate the public in the four mission areas of preparedness and to promote volunteer opportunities. At the local level, these specialists also ensure alerts/warning and crisis communications are adequate.
National Training Clearing House	Clearing house of citizen training courses.
State Training Team	Train-the-trainer instructors for pre-incident training and post incident just-in-time training.
Citizen Preparedness Team	Teams of individuals based in neighborhoods, workplaces, schools, faith based organizations, military, who prepare themselves with basic necessities—food, water, medicine, power, communications equipment, shelter, and emergency plans; adequate number of members also receive training in first aid and emergency response skills. Identified leader reports status up the organizational/community chain.
Volunteer Support: Year Round	Volunteer services coordinated through Citizen Corps Councils to support emergency responders, providing emergency responders with more time for primary professional duties. Example programs include: Volunteers in Police Service, Medical Reserve Corps, Fire Corps, Community Emergency Response Teams, and citizens Watch programs.
Volunteer Support: Surge	"NIMS credentialed" volunteers to support ESFs, emergency response and recovery, as needed. Volunteer roles include Transportation, Communications, Mass Care, Resources Management, Public Health and Medical Services, Search and Rescue, Public Safety and Security, Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation, External Affairs, Unaffiliated Volunteers and Unsolicited Donations Management.

Planning Assumptions

(Unless otherwise noted, all population data is from 2000 census)

- People with disabilities, the very young and the very old, people with language barriers, and low income populations are adversely affected in all incidents.

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- The medical community is functioning close to peak capacity at time of incident and will need surge capacity from trained volunteers.
- Emergency services will be overwhelmed and will need surge capacity from non-governmental resources.
- With the exception of hurricanes and early signs of biological infection, there will be no warning before incidents occur.
- Steps taken before an incident occurs (such as planning, training, exercises, and equipment) have a significant impact on reducing loss of life and property.
- Professional responders and volunteers may get ill or fail to participate as expected due to fear of getting sick, or perceived greater need to care for their own families.
- Alerts/warnings and emergency public information will need to be provided in multiple languages, multiple formats, and through multiple venues.
- The 2000 census estimated 280 million people and 109 million households in the U.S. (actual population now estimated at over 298 million.)
- 85% of the U.S. population is over 9 years of age and under 85 years of age.
- 90% of the total U.S. population lives in an area with high-risk for at least one major hazard/threat.
- 58% of the total U.S. population lives in metropolitan areas with 1 million or more residents.
- Civic organizations, places of worship, youth organizations, business associations, NGOs and other groups are willing to embrace hometown security and provide information and opportunities to get involved to their members.
- 25% of U.S. population aged 3 and older attended school in spring of 2002 (nursery school through grad school).
- 64% of the U.S. population aged 16 and over is in the labor force.
- 84% of the U.S. population self-identifies with a religious belief and 43% of this group report attending worship services “weekly or more,” representing over 100 million people attending worship services weekly or more (35% of the total U.S. population).
- 20% of the U.S. population self reports some type of long lasting condition or disability.
- 4.5% of the U.S. population is 75 years of age or older, over 12 million people.
- 12% of U.S. population reported 1999 family incomes below poverty threshold.
- 42% of households have at least one personal computer in the home.
- There are 800,000 sworn law enforcement officers in the U.S. or 1 officer for every 350 people.
- There are 1.1 million firefighters in the U.S. (73% are volunteer) or 1 firefighter for every 255 people.
- There are 860,000 personnel at all levels of pre-hospital service: basic EMT, intermediate EMT, and paramedics or 1 for every 325 people.
- There are approximately 2.76M “emergency responders (law, fire, EMT/paramedic” in the U.S. <1% of the total U.S. population.
- Liability concerns do not preclude volunteers from participating.
- Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) agreements include surge capacity personnel.

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Planning Factors from an In-Depth Analysis of a Scenario with Significant Demand for the Capability

Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
National Leadership for Community Preparedness and Participation	National leaders from White House, Secretaries of key Federal agencies, State governors, military leadership, and Congressional representation—organized to provide national voice to promote integration of citizens in homeland security mission	Awareness of and content for universal/risk-based capabilities disseminated to entire nation	As required to achieve national target capabilities
National Citizen Corps Council	Approximately 50 national emergency responder discipline associations and NGOs collaborate to provide strategies, plans, and exercise guidance to involve their membership in reaching out to citizens in prevent, protect, response and recovery roles. Foster collaboration at state and local level	All Hazards and Scenarios	1 National Council
Citizen Corps Councils	Each Citizen Corps Council is composed of representatives of the emergency responder disciplines, civic organizations, NGOs, private sector, faith-based, schools, elected leadership, and other community stakeholders. Local Councils (either tribal, county, or city level) oversee local citizen opportunities for education, training/exercises, and volunteer support.	Reach Entire Nation	56 State Councils tribal, county, local Councils that serve 99% of the U.S. population; estimated to be ~ 2500 Councils nationwide Council support includes adequate supplies and equipment and a minimum of one dedicated staff

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Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Public Education Specialists	20 specialists at the national level to coordinate relevant information by mission area, discipline, and outreach venue State teams package information for their State At a minimum each State has 3 education specialists who educate and support the public in developing knowledge, skills, and abilities (both universal and risk-based) to support four mission areas and to promote support volunteer opportunities Dedicated staff at local level for public education, alerts/warning, and crisis communications	Educate 80% of the population	20 Specialists at the national level 300 Specialists at the State level; number of specialists by State is weighted by State population Resources to develop and reproduce adequate numbers of outreach materials These numbers would surge to address crisis communications during an incident
National Training Clearing House	One national level clearing house of citizen training courses	Provide Training Materials for all States	1 National Clearing House to include classroom and online courses/resources
State Training Team	5-20 State train-the-trainer instructors for pre-incident training and post incident just-in-time training	To achieve stated training goals	Approximately 850 trained instructors; number of instructors per State is based on State population Online courses will also be available (see National Clearinghouse)

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Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Citizen Preparedness Team	Each team is composed of persons based in neighborhoods, workplaces, schools, faith based organizations, military, etc Members prepare themselves with basic necessities—food, water, medicine, power, communications equipment, shelter, and emergency plans; adequate number of members also receive training in first aid and emergency response skills. Their leader reports their status up the organizational or community chain	Each person in the high-threat areas participates on 2 teams (i.e. neighborhood and work/school/faith-based)	80% of 98 million households organized into citizen preparedness teams 80% of labor force and student populations organized into teams Team equipment, as applicable Supplies: emergency disaster kit for home, work and vehicle—sufficient food, water, medicine, etc
Support – Year Round	Providing services that free up first responders for primary professional duties (i.e. provide administrative support, patrolling, public education or as needed by the disciplines)	Year round volunteers are not scenario driven, but can take care of responder duties (i.e. the non emergency portion--administrative activities, office duties, research, etc.)	10% of U.S. population (28 million people) volunteer an average of 20 hours per year ~ 5600 million hours per year
Support - Surge Volunteers (to be "NIMS credentialed") Actual surge requirement to be identified by other capabilities.	Composed of volunteers to support ESFs and emergency response as needed. Volunteers are identified in advance of incidents and agree to perform pre-defined roles in accord with the certifications they receive ("NIMS credentialed") Ad hoc training for surge support is also anticipated	Up to 20% surge of current capacity	20% of uniformed emergency responders (2.8 million) represents 560 thousand trained volunteers
All resource organizations and activities include consideration and opportunities for participation for people with disabilities, non-English speaking populations, and those with low income			

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National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
Federal	National Leadership for Community Preparedness and Participation	Federal Resource Organization	1	Nationally	Establish Collaborative Structure and Process for Government and Nongovernmental Entities at All Levels Integrate Public Outreach and Nongovernmental Resources into Emergency Operations Plans and Exercises Provide Education and Training for the Public in All Mission Areas Provide Volunteer Opportunities: year round and in surge operations Incident Response
Federal	National Citizen Corps Council	Federal Resource Organization	1	Nationally	All Activities
State	Citizen Corps Councils	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	1	Per State or Territory	Integrate Public Outreach and Nongovernmental Resources into Emergency Operations Plans and Exercises Provide Education and Training for the Public in All Mission Areas Provide Volunteer Opportunities: year round and in surge operations Incident Response

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
Local	Citizen Corps Councils	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	1	Per jurisdiction sufficient number of Councils to serve 99% of State population	Integrate Public Outreach and Nongovernmental Resources into Emergency Operations Plans and Exercises Provide Education and Training for the Public in All Mission Areas Provide Volunteer Opportunities: year round and in surge operations Incident Response
Nationally	Public Education Specialists	Personnel	20	Nationally	Integrate Public Outreach and Nongovernmental Resources into Emergency Operations Plans and Exercises Provide Education and Training for the Public in All Mission Areas Incident Response
State/ Territories	Public Education Specialists	Personnel	3 – 20	Minimum of 3 per State; numbers per State based on population up to 20	Integrate Public Outreach and Nongovernmental Resources into Emergency Operations Plans and Exercises Provide Education and Training for the Public in All Mission Areas Incident Response
Local	Public Education Specialists	Personnel	1 – 10	Minimum of 1 per local jurisdiction; numbers per jurisdiction based on	Integrate Public Outreach and Nongovernmental Resources into Emergency Operations Plans and

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
				population up to 10	Exercises Provide Education and Training for the Public in All Mission Areas Incident Response
Federal	National Training Clearing House	Resource Organization	1	Nationally	All Activities
State/ Territories	State Training Specialists	Personnel	5 – 20	Per State; Numbers vary by State population	Provide Education and Training for the Public in All Mission Areas Provide Volunteer Opportunities: year round and in surge operations
Local	Citizen Preparedness Team	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	1	Per neighborhood, school, workplace, etc.	Provide Education and Training for the Public in All Mission Areas
Local	Ongoing Volunteer	Non-NIMS Resource	70 M	1 person volunteering an average of 12 per year ~ 840 M volunteer hours per year	Provide Volunteer Opportunities: year round
Local	Surge Capacity Volunteer (will predominantly also be an Ongoing Volunteer)	NIMS-credentialed	560,000	Nationally	Provide Volunteer Opportunities: surge Incident Response

References

1. Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD–8: National Preparedness. December 2003. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031217-6.html.
2. National Response Plan. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. December 2004
3. National Incident Management System. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. March 2004. http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/NIMS-90-web.pdf.
4. Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) Standards. September 2003. http://www.emaponline.org/index.cfm.
5. Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC).
6. Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP).

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7. Citizen preparedness, training, and volunteer program resources: Ready, Red Cross, FEMA public education materials; Citizen Corps Guide for Local Officials, CERT, Volunteers in Police Service, Medical Reserve Corps, Fire Corps, Neighborhood Watch program materials; Public Affairs Field Guide, Federal Emergency Management Agency. March 2004

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Prevent Mission Area Target Capabilities

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INFORMATION GATHERING AND RECOGNITION OF INDICATORS AND WARNINGS

Capability Definition

The Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warning Capability entails the gathering, consolidation, and retention of raw (analyzed) data and information from sources to include human sources, observation, technical sources and open (unclassified) materials. Unlike intelligence collection, information gathering is the continual gathering of only pure, unexamined data, not the targeted collection traditionally conducted by the intelligence community or targeted investigations. Recognition of indicators and warnings is the ability to see in this gathered data the potential trends, indications, and/or warnings of criminal and/or terrorist activities (including planning and surveillance) against U.S. citizens, government entities, critical infrastructure, and/or our allies.

Outcome

Locally generated threat and other criminal and/or terrorism-related information is identified, gathered, entered into an appropriate data/retrieval system, and provided to appropriate analysis centers.

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

This capability supports:

Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex

Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: Develop, Communicate, and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Critical Tasks	
Pre.A1b 1.1	Develop and maintain operationally sound policies to comply with regulatory, statutory, privacy, and other issues that may govern the gathering of information
Pre.A1b 1.2	Maintain procedures, systems, and/or technology to process the inflow of gathered information from all sources in a timely fashion
Pre.A1b 1.3	Develop and provide States and tribal authorities with information needs clearly defined by the Federal community based on the threat environment in a timely manner
Pre.A1b 1.4	Provide the Federal community with feedback on specificity and relevance of Federal information needs products defined by the State
Pre.A1b 1.5	Communicate information needs to local law enforcement, Tribal, private-sector, and other appropriate personnel as needed and in a timely manner
Pre.A1b 1.6	Provide the State with feedback on specificity and relevance of State information needs products
Pre.A1b 1.7	Develop and communicate baseline indicators and warnings sets to State and Tribal authorities

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Pre.A1b 1.8	Determine Essential Elements of Information (EEI) that can be used to identify terrorist operations

Preparedness Measures	**Metrics**
State, tribal, and local areas have a clearly defined process in their jurisdiction for requesting information from the Federal community, generally through their State's designated senior official The process has been implemented The process has been audited	Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No
Key stakeholders in the Federal community have developed clear and concise information needs based on the threat environment	Yes/No
The Federal community has delivered its information needs to each State's designated senior officials using a clearly defined process	Yes/No
Each State's designated senior officials can demonstrate receipt of information needs from the Federal community	Yes/No
Frequency with which the Federal community updates its information needs	Annually or as needed
Information needs products contain a feedback mechanism	Yes/No
The State, tribal, and local processes for requesting information from the Federal community has been established	Yes/No
The State's process for uniformly and consistently communicating information needs to the local level has been established	Yes/No
Regulatory, statutory, and/or privacy policies that govern the gathering of information are in place	Yes/No
There is a clearly defined process for passing information gathered by law enforcement and other agencies during routine day-to-day activities into the network	Yes/No
Feedback is provided to those responsible for gathering information during routine day-to-day activities	Yes/No
The process for passing information gathered by law enforcement and other agencies has been audited	Yes/No
Law enforcement and appropriate agencies have plans, processes, and technology in place to: ▪ Identify items and materials used by terrorist organizations and report suspicious activities related to them ▪ Gather information on critical infrastructure and other potentially high-risk locations and assets ▪ Increase information gathering activities regarding critical infrastructure and other potentially high-risk locations and assets, during an elevated threat level ▪ Coordinate information gathering operations across jurisdictions ▪ Process gathered information ▪ Provide all operational personnel with the most recent indicators and warnings to report ▪ Plans and processes have been audited	 Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No
All jurisdictions have a system for public reporting of suspicious activity (e.g., 911, tip lines)	▪ Yes/No

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Appropriate governmental entities operate or participate in public education programs to raise public awareness of suspicious activities and how to report them	▪ Yes/No
Content and template standards exist for reported information	▪ Yes/No
Processes, protocols, and technical capabilities exist to allow extraction of information from public, private, and law enforcement databases	▪ Yes/No

Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs	
Critical Tasks	
Pre.A1b 2.1.1	Develop and initiate terrorism indicator sets and relationships training programs
Pre.A1b 2.1.2	Develop and distribute information gathering and reporting programs
Pre.A1b 2.1.3	Create and offer advanced gathering and monitoring programs
Pre.A1b 2.1.4	Provide training feedback to Federal trainers

Preparedness Measures	**Metrics**
Appropriate law enforcement and public safety personnel have received: ▪ Training in recognizing terrorism indicators and warning ▪ Refresher training in indicators and warnings ▪ Advanced training programs	 Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No
Appropriate governmental entities conduct Federally developed training in recognizing and reporting indicators and warnings at identified businesses (via a train-the-trainer program)	Yes/No
Appropriate governmental entities, in collaboration with appropriate private-sector agencies, have determined which businesses in each jurisdiction should be targeted for training in indications and warnings	Yes/No
Appropriate government training entities review and update training materials on an annual basis	Yes/No
Appropriate government training entities conduct Federally developed training in recognizing indicators and warnings to appropriate State, tribal, and local entities	Yes/No

Performance Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: *Gather Information* **Definition: Gather information that could be used to identify terrorist operations from all sources (e.g., law enforcement, public health, public works, transportation, firefighting and emergency medical entities) through routine activities.**	
Critical Tasks	
Pre.A1b 3.1	Gather homeland security information during routine day-to-day activities and pass to appropriate authorities
Pre.A1b 3.1.1	Identify items and materials used by criminal and/or terrorist organizations to carry out attacks

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Pre.A1b 3.1.2	Catalog information provided by all sources and retain in a database to enable timely retrieval
Pre.A1b 3.2	Conduct information gathering operations on critical infrastructure and other potentially high-risk locations or assets
Pre.A1b 3.3	Coordinate information gathering activities with relevant local, tribal, State, and Federal entities on an ongoing basis, in particular with the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) in terrorism-related cases
Pre.A1b 3.3.1	Establish short, medium, and long term coordinated information gathering policies, procedures and systems

Performance Measures	**Metrics**
Information is organized, linked, searchable, and easily retrievable	Yes/No
Information provided by all sources met predefined standards for accuracy, completeness and consistency	Yes/No
The process for passing information gathered during routing activities has been implemented	Yes/No
Information is passed to appropriate authorities using a clearly defined process, utilizing predefined network channels	Yes/No
The effectiveness of this process is assessed by appropriate agencies	Yes/No
Feedback is provided to those responsible for gathering information	Yes/No

Activity*: Screen Information*

Definition: Receive, authenticate, and screen information for relevance, with the appropriate level of oversight/supervision and in a timely manner.

Critical Tasks	
Pre.A1b 4.1	Provide guidance to create linked, compatible national database architecture
Pre.A1b 4.2	Query databases or records to check for significance of information
Pre.A1b 4.3	Maintain and update procedures and/or systems to process the inflow of gathered information from all sources in a timely fashion

Performance Measures	**Metrics**
Relevant personnel have access to systems or technology to enter gathered information into the system	Yes/No
Database systems are linked and combatable allowing for rapid transmission and processing of pertinent information	Yes/No
Gathered information is processed using clearly defined procedures	Yes/No
Information is traceable, allowing for easy communication between disseminator and analyst	Yes/No
This procedure for tracking information is audited	Yes/No
All information is adequately cataloged and databased to enable timely retrieval	Yes/No
Intelligence related to high risk infrastructure or an acute threat was prioritized and	Yes/No

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reported as soon as it was observed	
Information provided by all sources was authenticated	Yes/No
The content of reported information is consistent with existing standards	Yes/No
Information is catalogued and files are maintained in accordance with standards in the *Fusion Center Guidelines*	Yes/No
Information is extracted in accordance with approved processes, protocols, and technical capabilities	Yes/No

Activity: *Identify Suspicious Circumstances*

Definition: Recognize and identify suspicious circumstances or indicators and warnings associated with planning, support, and operations related to potential criminal and/or terrorist-related activities.

Critical Tasks	
Pre.A1b 5.1	Recognize suspicious activities involving items and materials used by criminal and/or terrorist organizations
Pre.A1b 5.2	Recognize and identify suspicious circumstances or indicators and warnings that may be associated with planning, support, and operations related to potential criminal and/or terrorist-related activities
Pre.A1b 5.3	Utilize a predefined notification process to advise law enforcement of suspicious activity
Pre.A1b 5.4	Notify law enforcement of potential terrorist activities in/around or related to private sector businesses/operations

Performance Measures	**Metrics**
Law enforcement personnel followed-up with a reporting organization if more information was necessary	Yes/No
Law enforcement personnel acted on authenticated information	Yes/No
Law enforcement personnel used approved response protocols to dispatch the appropriate public or private sector personnel to the potential threat	Yes/No
Upon examination at the incident scene, law enforcement or related personnel were able to differentiate suspicious behaviors and activities from illegal or potentially threatening actions	Yes/No
Key private-sector businesses use an established communication avenue to report suspicious activities to appropriate Federal, State, local, or tribal law enforcement entities	Yes/No
The general public has been advised how to recognize suspicious activity (e.g., 911 tip lines, etc.)	Yes/No
The general public is familiar with and utilizes a predefined notification process to advise law enforcement of suspicious activity	Yes/No

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Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship to Capability
Animal Health Emergency Support	Animal Health monitoring activities may provide a source of data for the Information Gathering capability.
CBRNE Detection	Data from detection devices/processes may be a source of data for the Information Gathering capability.
Community Preparedness and Participation	Information provided by citizens via hot lines and other collection centers may be a source of data for the Information Gathering capability.
Food and Agricultural Safety and Defense	Food and Agricultural monitoring activities may provide a source of data for the Information Gathering capability.
Intelligence Analysis and Production	The Information Gathering capability provides the data used by the Intelligence Analysis and Production Capability.
Intelligence/Information Sharing and Dissemination	The Intelligence/Information Sharing Capability provides the means for collecting the data from various sources.
Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations	Data gathered through law enforcement investigations may provide a source of data for the Information Gathering capability.
Public Health Laboratory Testing	Laboratory analysis may provide a source of data for the Information Gathering capability.
Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation	Epidemiological surveillance may provide a source of data for the Information Gathering capability.
Critical Infrastructure Protection	Critical Infrastructure Protection is a source of data for the Information Gathering capability.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Detail

Capability Elements	Components and Description
Information gathering personnel	Multi-agency/discipline personnel at all levels to support information identification, gathering, and recognition (e.g., medical personnel, law enforcement, etc.)
Information processing personnel	Personnel at all levels to process (receive, authenticate, and screen) information
Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)	Task forces formed at the local level and composed of persons from various government and private elements (e.g., law enforcement, public health, local businesses, key infrastructure representatives, emergency management and other first responders).
Public reporting system	System for public reporting of suspicious activity (911, tip lines, etc.)
Information gathering systems and equipment	Surveillance and detection systems/equipment, data gathering and analyzing systems (dedicated software), access to early detection/alert programs and networks, and all-source information

Planning Assumptions

- Prevention consists of those activities that serve to detect, deter, and disrupt terrorist threats or actions against the United States and its interests. These activities decrease the perpetrators' chance of success, mitigate attack impact, minimize attack visibility, increase the chance of apprehension or detection, and obstruct perpetrators' access to resources. Tasks in this area are important regardless of a single type of threat, adversary capability, time or location of incident. Similarly, these capabilities reflect many tasks routinely undertaken by law enforcement and related organizations as they conduct traditional all-hazards, all-crimes activities.
- This capability applies to all potential terrorist incidents and is applicable to all 12 terrorism-related National Planning Scenarios. Initial planning, however, has been focused on bombings using improvised explosives device, chlorine tank explosion, aerosol anthrax, improvised nuclear device, and a radiological dispersal.
- Effective prevention depends on timely, accurate, and actionable information about the adversary, their operations, their support, potential targets, and methods of attack. Homeland security intelligence/information fusion is the overarching process of managing the development and flow of information and intelligence across all levels and sectors of government and the private sector on a continual basis. Although the primary emphasis of fusion is to identify, deter, and respond to emerging terrorism-related threats and risks, a collateral benefit to Federal, State, local, and tribal entities is that it will support ongoing efforts to address non-terrorism-related, all-hazards, all-crimes issues.
- Intelligence/information fusion is an ongoing, cyclical process that incorporates three primary capabilities: Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings; Intelligence Analysis and Production; and Intelligence/Information Sharing and Dissemination.
- All appropriate objectives and critical tasks will be exercised regularly at all levels in order to measure performance and demonstrate capability.
- Both the Planning Factors for a Single Incident section and the Approaches for Large-Scale Events section have been omitted because there is no incident or large-scale event that necessarily occurs before these capabilities come in to play.

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Planning Factors for a Single Incident

Not Applicable

Approaches for Large-Scale Events

Not Applicable

National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
All levels of government and private sector	Information gathering personnel	Personnel	As Needed		Gather Information Screen Information Identify Suspicious Circumstances
All levels	Information processing personnel	Personnel	As Needed		Gather Information Screen Information Identify Suspicious Circumstances
Federal	Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF)	Federal Resource Organization	As Needed		Gather Information Screen Information Identify Suspicious Circumstances
National	Public reporting system	System	As Needed		Gather Information Screen Information Identify Suspicious Circumstances

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INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION

Capability Definition

Intelligence Analysis and Production is the merging of data and information for the purpose of analyzing, linking, and disseminating timely and actionable intelligence with an emphasis on the larger public safety and homeland security threat picture. This process focuses on the consolidation of analytical products among the intelligence analysis units at the Federal, State, local, and tribal levels for tactical, operational, and strategic use. This capability also includes the examination of raw data to identify threat pictures, recognize potentially harmful patterns, or connect suspicious links to discern potential indications or warnings.

Outcome

Timely, accurate, and actionable intelligence/information products are produced in support of prevention, awareness, deterrence, response, and continuity planning operations.

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

This capability supports:

Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Incident Annex

Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Critical Tasks	
Pre.A1c 1.1.1	Provide terminology/lexicon glossary to all relevant fusion center/process entities to eliminate agency-to-agency terminology confusion
Pre.A1c 1.1.2	Use tear-line formats to ensure that State, local and/or tribal officials with varying levels of clearance have access to useful information
Pre.A1c 1.1.3	Develop a broad, national, uniform template for analytic products

Preparedness Measures	**Metrics**
A State fusion center strategy is in place that:	
▪ Conforms to *Fusion Center Guidelines*	Yes/No
▪ Provides for a coordinated interface to the Federal Government	Yes/No
Fusion center/process participants ensure that analysts understand the tailoring for the different audiences to which they provide information/intelligence	Yes/No
Memorandums of understanding define processes and responsibilities for information sharing and ensure de-confliction with other fusion centers/processes	Yes/No
Appropriate State and local entities provide personnel to the fusion center/process as required	Yes/No

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Analysts are granted appropriate clearances by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)	Yes/No
Job descriptions reflect the region's applicable risks, threats, and critical infrastructure	Yes/No
A procedure has been established for conducting annual performance reviews for staff	Yes/No
The individual performance review process identifies problems and develops career development plans	Yes/No
Federal standards have been established to pre-qualify the fusion center/process in physical and clearance requirements to receive, store, and control secret/secure information	Yes/No
State and local entities adhere to Federal standards for the fusion center/process in physical and clearance requirements to receive, store, and control secret/secure information	Yes/No
All State, local, and tribal law enforcement databases comply with national standards and are completely compatible for data transmission	Yes/No
A clearly defined process, consistent with established intelligence community standards exists to establish threat at the management level	Yes/No
A clearly defined process for developing an unclassified briefing has been established	Yes/No
An annual, standardized classified to unclassified information review process (including ratio) has been established	Yes/No
Unclassified briefings, reports, and alerts are used whenever possible to provide credible information that allows public safety, private-sector, and non-law enforcement agencies to develop intelligence- and information-driven prevention plans without compromising sources or collection methods	Yes/No
Analysts are able to understand and identify links between terrorism-related intelligence and information related to traditional criminal activity so they can identify activities that are indicative of an imminent or potential threat	Yes/No
All personnel demonstrate appropriate knowledge of the operating systems and intelligence processes required to perform intelligence functions	Yes/No
Participating agencies have been provided a glossary of terms, updated annually, to the center/process	Yes/No

Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs	
Critical Tasks	
Pre.A1c 2.1.1	Train permanent and assigned analytical staff
Pre.A1c 2.1.2	Develop national standard for training fusion center/process staff

Preparedness Measures	**Metric**
Each analyst has met a minimum standard for hours of training	Yes/No
Training has met International Association Law Enforcement Analytic Standards from	Yes/No

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Global Intelligence Working Group and International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts (GIWG/IALEIA) based standards (basic, intermediate, advanced)	
All personnel are trained in the intelligence cycle	Yes/No
Basic and advanced intelligence analysis training is provided for intelligence operations personnel (e.g., commanders/supervisors, officers, analysts)	Yes/No
All fusion center/process staff receive annual awareness training on relevant privacy and security rules, and regulations (28 CFR and any other relevant State statutes and regulations)	Yes/No
Center personnel are trained in promoting the fusion center ethos and mission	Yes/No
Analysts at relevant agencies and centers/processes are trained to identify precursors and links between crime and terrorism	Yes/No
Analytic staff are properly trained and/or experienced in relevant analytical methods and practices	Yes/No
All analysts at relevant agencies and centers/processes are trained in the use of analytic methods and tools	Yes/No
Participants have established procedures per the International Association of Law Enforcement Analytic Standards (GIWG/IALEIA) to benchmark analysts' capabilities	Yes/No
All personnel demonstrate appropriate knowledge of the operating systems and intelligence processes required to perform intelligence functions	Yes/No
Analytic staff are knowledgeable in the region's applicable risks, threats, and critical infrastructure	Yes/No
Permanent and assigned analytical staff are trained to meet their responsibilities	Yes/No

Performance Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: *Establish Fusion Center*

Definition: Establish and operate a multidisciplinary, all-source information/intelligence fusion center/process that undertakes an "all-hazards" and "all-crimes" approach.

Critical Tasks	
Pre.A1c 3.1	Establish and maintain a fusion center/process using the national guidelines and standards; co-locate with an existing entity if practicable/desirable
Pre.A1c 3.2	Sustain technical and procedural connectivity with critical intelligence and information streams
Pre.A1c 3.2.1	Access repositories at all levels of classification as necessary
Pre.A1c 3.2.2	Ensure appropriate technological redundancy
Pre.A1c 3.1	Incorporate the fusion center/process principles of the Criminal Intelligence Model Policy (International Association of Chiefs of Police [IACP])
Pre.A1c 3.3	Establish and maintain communications, including electronic connectivity with other region fusion center/processes
Pre.A1c 3.4	Relay/pass terrorist-related information to the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and FBI Field Intelligence Group (FIG)
Pre.A1c 3.6	Adhere to privacy and security rules in operating fusion center/process

Performance Measures	**Metrics**

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Key leaders have established and maintained a fusion center/process using the national guidelines and standards per the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative—Fusion Center Guidelines and Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) recommendations, (Fusion Center Resource CD)	Yes/No
The fusion center is staffed during all operational hours with individuals who have the appropriate training and expertise to handle the receipt, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence	Yes/No
Information is effectively shared and received using the fusion center technology	Yes/No
The center makes use of the relevant networks, classified and unclassified (e.g., Regional Information Sharing Systems/Law Enforcement Online (RISS/LEO), Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), and various public health networks)	Yes/No
Access to and from the fusion center/process by those responsible for gathering information is done in accordance with established procedures	Yes/No
Efficient connectivity exists with the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and Field Intelligence Guide (FIG))	Yes/No
Staffing of analysts is conducted in accordance with national standards outlined in the Law Enforcement Analytic Standards produced by the Global Intelligence Working Group and International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts (GIWG/IALEIA)	Yes/No
The fusion center/process is assigned personnel with diverse subject matter expertise from key departments, organizations, agencies or offices on a permanent, or liaison basis	Yes/No
The fusion center/process received, stored, and controlled secret/secure information	Yes/No
The center/process uses an accessible repository for analytic methods/tools/techniques	Yes/No
A clearly defined process or procedure is used to disseminate information and products	Yes/No

Activity: ***Access Information***

Definition: Obtain access to and receive collected information associated with the respective territory of the fusion center.

Critical Tasks	
Pre.A1c 4.1	Receive, extract, or collect information from all available sources, including all relevant databases and systems available to the State fusion center, on a continuous basis and with appropriate technological redundancy
Pre.A1c 4.2	Ensure that unclassified briefings, reports and alerts are used whenever possible to provide credible information that allows public safety, private sector and non-law enforcement agencies to develop intelligence- and information-driven prevention plans without compromising source or collection methods

Performance Measures	**Metrics**
Secret/secure information is received, stored, and controlled in accordance with Federal standards established to prequalify the fusion center/process in physical and clearance requirements	Yes/No
All State, tribal, and local law enforcement databases are Global Justice XML Data Model (JDXM)-compliant	Yes/No
Unclassified briefings are established using the established process	Yes/No
The standardized classified to unclassified information review process (including ratio)	Yes/No

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was used	
Feedback procedures were followed	Yes/No

Activity: *Analyze Information/Intelligence*

Definition: Integrate and analyze relevant information/intelligence

Critical Tasks	
Pre.A1c 5.1	Prioritize intelligence based on relevance of the information and the finished intelligence products to potential threat elements
Pre.A1c 5.2.1	Blend, reconcile, and de-conflict data, information, and intelligence received from multiple sources
Pre.A1c 5.2.2	Identify patterns and trends that may indicate emerging, immediate or long-term threat condition
Pre.A1c 5.2.3	Identify links between terrorism related intelligence and information related to traditional criminal activity so as to identify activities indicative of an imminent or potential threat
Pre.A1c 5.2.4	Utilize any and all relevant and useful analytic methodologies, tools, and technology to provide a more comprehensive and useful product

Performance Measures	Metrics
Audit standards are used to review work products	Yes/No
Analysts' capabilities are benchmarked using procedures per the International Association of Law Enforcement Analytic Standards (GIWG/IALEIA)	Yes/No
All participants have and use a national template for analytic products	Yes/No
The volume of transactions using information networks are recorded	Yes/No
Actions taken in light of transactions using information networks are tracked	Yes/No

Activity: *Develop Analytic Products*

Definition: Develop analytic products that are consumer-tailored, clear, and objective and support the development of performance-driven, risk-based prevention, protection, and response programs at all levels.

Critical Tasks	
Pre.A1c 6.1	Provide briefings, reports and/or alerts tailored to recipients with detailed, specific information on actions or activities that may be indicative of an emerging threat
Pre.A1c 6.2	Analyze information needs on a continuous basis for short- and long-term intelligence requirements
Pre.A1c 6.3	Archive information and intelligence in a searchable repository to support future efforts by all fusion analysts
Pre.A1c 6.4	Vet and review products prior to distribution

Performance Measures	Metrics
consumer satisfaction with the analytic product is monitored using an established producer-to-consumer feedback cycle	Yes/No
Analysts tailor requirements for the different audiences to which they provide	Yes/No

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information/intelligence	
The fusion center/process consults the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan and other relevant Federal guidelines for guidance on use of tear-line reports	Yes/No
Products are vetted prior to distribution using center/process procedures/mechanisms	Yes/No
Intelligence files are maintained using the standards in the *Fusion Center Guidelines*	Yes/No
The center/process has an information and intelligence archive	Yes/No
The process used follows the national analytic template in the International Association of Law Enforcement Analytic Standards (GIWG/IALEIA)	Yes/No

Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship to Capability
Animal Health Emergency Support	Intelligence products are provided to the Animal Health community.
CBRNE Detection	The data from CBRNE detection devices is one source of data analyzed by the Intelligence Analysis and Production capability.
Community Preparedness and Participation	The data from citizen reports of suspicious activities is one source of data analyzed by the Intelligence Analysis and Production capability.
Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings	The data collected from the Information Gathering capability is further analyzed and processed by the Intelligence Analysis and Production capability.
Intelligence/Information Sharing and Dissemination	The results of the analysis in the Intelligence Analysis and Production capability are disseminated using the Intelligence/Information Sharing capability. The Intelligence/Information Sharing capability then provides an additional linkage to all Protect and Response capability.
Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations	The data from law enforcement investigations is one source of data analyzed by the Intelligence Analysis and Production capability. The products of the Intelligence Analysis and Production capability may further inform the investigation.
Planning	Products that result from the Intelligence Analysis and Production capability are used to ensure that plans adequately address terrorist threats.
Risk Management	Products from the Intelligence Analysis and Production capability provide the threat, vulnerability, and consequence data used in risk management.
Critical Infrastructure Protection	Intelligence products are provided to Critical Infrastructure Protection, as appropriate.
Emergency Operations Center Management	Intelligence products are provided to Emergency Operations Center Management, as appropriate.
Emergency Public Information and Warning	Intelligence products are provided to Emergency Public Information and Warning, as appropriate.
Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation	Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation contributes data for analysis and is provided reports, as appropriate.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
Fusion Center/process	A multidisciplinary, all-source information/intelligence fusion center/process that undertakes an "all hazards" and "all crises" approach.
Multi-discipline Analysts	Analyst personnel for multiple disciplines (e.g., public health, HazMat, etc.) to support intelligence analysis
Intelligence personnel	Personnel involved in intelligence analysis at various levels within the organization (e.g. analysts, supervisors, officers, etc.).
Administrative and support personnel	Personnel who perform administrative and support functions (e.g., information technology/communications, fusion center staff, security, etc.).
Public Health Analysts	Federal, regional, State, local, tribal, and other appropriate agency public health personnel involved in intelligence analysis.
Cleared personnel	Personnel possessing valid and current security clearances
Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs)	Task forces formed at the local level and composed of persons from various government and private elements (e.g., law enforcement, public health, local businesses, key infrastructure representatives, emergency management and other first responders).
National training standards	National training for intelligence analysts.
Hardware, software, and internet-based systems	Hardware, software, and internet-based systems that allow for information exchange and dissemination.
Terminals with access to information sharing networks and early detection/alert programs and networks	Information sharing network architecture (e.g., Regional Information Sharing System (RISS)/Law Enforcement Online (LEO), Joint Regional Exchange System (JRIES), National Law Enforcement Telecommunication System (NLETS), FBI Criminal Justice Information Services/National Crime Information Center (CJIS/NCIC) networks). Access to early detection/alert programs and networks and all-source information (i.e., Public Health Information Network, Biosense, Homeland Security Information Network, Information Sharing and Analysis Centers, etc.)
Intelligence analysis and maintenance tools	Software and equipment to include surveillance systems/equipment, recording systems/equipment analyzing software/systems, data synthesis software, data storage.
Data synthesis software	Hazard prediction, assessment, and threat modeling software.

Planning Assumptions

- Prevention consists of those activities that serve to detect, deter, and disrupt terrorist threats or actions against the United States and its interests. These activities decrease the perpetrators' chance of success, mitigate attack impact, minimize attack visibility, increase the chance of apprehension or detection, and obstruct perpetrators' access to resources. Tasks in this area are important regardless of a single type of threat, adversary capability, time or location of incident. Similarly, these capabilities reflect many tasks routinely undertaken by law enforcement and related organizations as they conduct traditional all-hazards, all-crimes activities.
- This capability applies to all potential terrorist incidents and is applicable to all 12 terrorism-related National Planning Scenarios. The analysis of national targets focused on bombing using improvised

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explosives device, chlorine tank explosion, aerosol anthrax, improvised nuclear device, and a radiological dispersal.

- Effective prevention depends on timely, accurate, and actionable information about the adversary, their operations, their support, potential targets, and methods of attack. Homeland security intelligence/information fusion is the overarching process of managing the development and flow of information and intelligence across all levels and sectors of government and the private sector on a continual basis. Although the primary emphasis of fusion is to identify, deter, and respond to emerging terrorism-related threats and risks, a collateral benefit to Federal, State, local, and tribal entities is that it will support ongoing efforts to address non-terrorism-related, all-hazards, all-crimes issues.
- The Planning Factors for A Single Incident section and the Approaches for Large-Scale Events section do not apply because there is no incident or large-scale event that necessarily occurs before these capabilities come in to play.
- Intelligence/information fusion is an ongoing, cyclical process that incorporates three primary capabilities: Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings; Intelligence Analysis and Production; and Intelligence/Information Sharing and Dissemination.
- All appropriate objectives and critical tasks will be exercised regularly at all levels in order to measure performance and demonstrate capability.

Planning Factors for a Single Incident

Not Applicable

Approaches for Large-Scale Events

Not Applicable

National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
Federal, State, Large Urban Areas, Intrastate regions, and Interstate regions	Fusion Centers/process	Personnel	1	Per jurisdiction/ region	Establish Fusion Center Analyze Information Analyze Information/ Intelligence Develop Analytic Products
All Levels	Multi-discipline Analysts	Personnel	As Needed	Provided from appropriate agencies on a permanent or liaison basis	All Activities

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
All levels	Intelligence personnel	Personnel	As Needed	Provided from law enforcement agencies on a permanent or liaison basis	All Activities
All levels	Administrative and support personnel	Personnel	As Needed	Provided from appropriate agencies on a permanent or liaison basis	All Activities
All levels	Public Health Analysts	Personnel	As Needed	Provided from public health agencies on a permanent or liaison basis	All Activities
All levels	Cleared personnel	Personnel	As Needed		All Activities
All levels	Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs)	Personnel	As Needed		All Activities
Federal	National training standards for intelligence analysts	Training	As Needed	Set of standards	All Activities
All Levels	Hardware, software, and internet-based systems that allow for information exchange and dissemination	Systems	As Needed		All Activities
All Levels	Terminals with network access to relevant systems (RISS/LEO, HSIN, etc.)	Equipment	As Needed	Per fusion center site	All Activities
All Levels	Intelligence analysis and maintenance tools	Systems	As Needed	Per fusion center site	All Activities

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INTELLIGENCE/INFORMATION SHARING AND DISSEMINATION

Capability Description

The Intelligence/Information Sharing and Dissemination capability provides necessary tools to enable efficient prevention, protection, response, and recovery activities. Intelligence/Information Sharing and Dissemination is the multi-jurisdictional, multidisciplinary exchange and dissemination of information and intelligence among the Federal, State, local, and tribal layers of government, the private sector, and citizens. The goal of sharing and dissemination is to facilitate the distribution of relevant, actionable, timely, and preferably declassified or unclassified information and/or intelligence that is updated frequently to the consumers who need it. More simply, the goal is to get the right information to the right people at the right time.

An effective intelligence/information sharing and dissemination system will provide durable, reliable, and effective information exchanges (both horizontally and vertically) between those responsible for gathering information and the analysts and consumers of threat-related information. It will also allow for feedback and other necessary communications in addition to the regular flow of information and intelligence.

Outcome

Effective and timely sharing of information and intelligence occurs across Federal, State, local, tribal, regional, and private sector entities to achieve coordinated awareness of, prevention of, protection against, and response to a threatened or actual domestic terrorist attack, major disaster, or other emergency.

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

This capability supports the following Emergency Support Functions (ESFs)/Annexes:

ESF #1: Transportation
ESF #2: Communications
ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering
ESF #4: Firefighting
ESF #5: Emergency Management
ESF #6: Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services
ESF #7: Resource Support
ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services
ESF #9: Urban Search and Rescue
ESF #10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Response
ESF #11: Agriculture and Natural Resources
ESF #12: Energy
ESF #13: Public Safety and Security
ESF #14: Long-Term Recovery and Mitigation
Biological Incident Annex

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Cyber Incident Annex

Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex

Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Critical Tasks	
Pre.A1d 1.1.1	Identify all Federal, State, regional, tribal and local stakeholders for inclusion in the information sharing framework
Pre.A1d 1.1.2	Identify non-law enforcement governmental entities and officials for inclusion in the information sharing framework
Pre.A1d 1.1.3	Identify appropriate law enforcement and other enforcement governmental personnel for receipt of security clearances at an appropriate level to ensure effective dissemination of critical information
Pre.A1d 1.2.1	Develop information sharing network standards: survivable; interoperable; compatible; secure; accessible
Pre.A1d 1.2.2	Develop alternate, supplemental, and back-up routing procedures
Pre.A1d 1.4	Develop regulatory, statutory, and/or privacy policies
Pre.A1d 1.4.1	Develop a clearly defined process for preventing, reporting, and addressing the inappropriate disclosure of information and/or intelligence
Pre.A1d 1.4.2	Develop a clearly defined mechanism/process (reduced to a single pipeline wherever possible or prudent) for sharing information/intelligence between Federal and State sources
Pre.A1d 1.4.3	Establish alternative, supplemental, and back-up mechanisms for routing information and/or intelligence to the necessary agencies

Preparedness Measures	**Metrics**
Distribution lists are up-to-date with points of contact verified on a periodic basis	Yes/No
Relevant entities have been identified and have access to relevant systems	Yes/No
Memoranda of understanding (MOU) or similar agreements between appropriate entities exist and are on file	Yes/No
Federal agencies have a process in place to declassify or provide tear lines for relevant information and/or intelligence	Yes/No
The number of law enforcement and other governmental personnel identified to receive security clearances meets jurisdictional requirements	Yes/No
Appropriate law enforcement and other governmental personnel receive security clearances at an appropriate level of classification	Yes/No
Regulatory, statutory, and/or privacy policies are in place	Yes/No
Appropriate entities have a clearly defined process for preventing, reporting, and addressing the inappropriate disclosure of information and/or intelligence	Yes/No
The process has been implemented	Yes/No

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The process has been audited	Yes/No
There are clearly defined mechanisms/processes (reduced to a single pipeline wherever possible and prudent) for sharing information/intelligence between Federal and State sources ▪ The process is clearly-defined and documented ▪ The process is technologically proficient for the entities involved	Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No
Alternative, supplemental, and back-up mechanisms for routing information and/or intelligence to the necessary agencies are available and routinely evaluated	Yes/No
Mechanisms exist to provide feedback and/or follow-up information as needed	Yes/No
Local agencies have an established procedure/protocol for providing intelligence products or relevant information to street-level law enforcement personnel	Yes/No
Fusion Centers/processes and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) program for critical infrastructure ensure the participation of appropriate private-sector entities	Yes/No
Joint Terrorism Task Forces have a process for sharing relevant information with the private sector in a timely manner	Yes/No
Access to early detection/alert programs and networks and all-source information is available (e.g., Public Health Information Network, BioSense, Homeland Security Information Network, Information Sharing and Analysis Centers, etc.)	Yes/No

Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs	
Critical Tasks	
Pre.A1d 2.2.1	Design and conduct exercises to test Intelligence/Information Sharing and Dissemination tasks within a single unit and jointly with other jurisdictions and levels of government
Pre.A1d 2.1.1	Train appropriate personnel on intelligence/information sharing and disseminate processes and procedures

Preparedness Measures	**Metrics**
There are adequate numbers of trained personnel at all levels (especially at dispatch or communications centers) to process and disseminate information	Yes/No
Personnel are aware of and trained to adhere to pre-defined security clearances and need-to-know parameters	Yes/No
Appropriate personnel are trained in processing and disseminating information and intelligence	Yes/No
Personnel are trained in the process for preventing, reporting, and addressing the inappropriate disclosure of information and/or intelligence	Yes/No
Exercises test the process for preventing, reporting, and addressing the inappropriate disclosure of information and/or intelligence	Yes/No
All appropriate law enforcement personnel have received the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC) Outreach Package promoting the concept of intelligence-led policing	Yes/No

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Training and exercise programs include interaction with the private sector operators of critical infrastructure	Yes/No

Performance Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: *Incorporate All Stakeholders in Information Flow*

Definition: Identify and share information with all pertinent stakeholders across all disciplines through a clearly defined information sharing system.

Critical Tasks	
Pre.A1d 3.1	Share information and/or intelligence between Federal, State, local, and tribal levels by using clearly defined mechanisms/processes
Pre.A1d 3.1.1	Adhere to predefined security clearances and need-to-know parameters when disseminating information and intelligence
Pre.A1d 3.1.2	Comply with regulatory, statutory, privacy-related, and other issues that may govern the sharing of information
Pre.A1d 3.1.3	Prevent, report, and/or address inappropriate disclosures of information and/or intelligence

Performance Measures	Metrics
Compliance with regulatory, statutory, privacy-related, and other issues that govern the sharing of information was audited	Yes/No
A record of inappropriate disclosures of information and/or intelligence is maintained and all such incidents are reported and resolved according to established processes	Yes/No

Activity: *Vertically Flow Information*

Definition: Share information vertically (up and down from the Federal level) within law enforcement and other appropriate agencies in a timely and effective manner.

Critical Tasks	
Pre.A1d 4.1	Share intelligence and information systematically between Federal, State, local and regional entities in a timely manner
Pre.A1d 4.1.1	Disseminate relevant intelligence and/or information from Federal or State entities to local authorities in a usable format and in a timely manner
Pre.A1d 4.1.3	Disseminate relevant information and/or intelligence products to street-level law enforcement personnel
Pre.A1d 4.1.2	Provide relevant intelligence and/or information from local authorities to Federal or State entities in a usable format and in a timely manner
Pre.A1d 4.2.2	Declassify or provide tear lines for relevant information and/or intelligence

Performance Measures	Metrics
Time for relevant information received from the fusion center to be disseminated to street level personnel	Within 12 hours of receipt
Law enforcement intelligence/information passed to local authorities is deemed useful or	Yes/No

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actionable	

Activity: *Horizontally Flow Information*	
Definition: Share information across disciplines (among fire departments, EMS units, public works, the private sector, and so forth) at all levels and across jurisdictions in a timely and efficient manner.	
Critical Tasks	
Pre.A1d 5.1	Adhere to horizontal coordination across jurisdictions among law enforcement and other appropriate agencies at all levels through effective and timely information sharing
Pre.A1d 5.1.1	Share intelligence and/or information across disciplines in a timely and effective manner
Pre.A1d 5.2	Structure dissemination and information sharing mechanisms so that private-sector entities receive accurate, timely, and unclassified information that is updated frequently and is consistent with their formal intelligence requirements

Performance Measures	**Metrics**
A clearly defined process or procedure was used to disseminate information and products	Yes/No
Intelligence and/or information is shared across disciplines in a timely manner	Yes/No

Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship to Capability
CBRNE Detection	Information on detection of CBRNE is transferred to the appropriate parties through the Intelligence/Information Sharing and Dissemination Capability.
Communications	The Communications Capability provides the necessary structure and systems for implementing Intelligence/Information Sharing and Dissemination.
Community Preparedness and Participation	Community participation in awareness is one means by which information to be shared is generated.
Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings	The data gathered through the Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings capability is communicated through the Intelligence/Information Sharing and Dissemination capability.
Intelligence Analysis and Production	Intelligence/Information Sharing and Dissemination provides the means for communicating data that is gathered to those that analyze it in the Intelligence Analysis and Production Capability.
Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations	Information needed by law enforcement to conduct investigations is provided through the Intelligence/Information Sharing and Dissemination capability.
Planning	Information provided via the Intelligence/Information Sharing and Dissemination capability is used to ensure that plans adequately address terrorist threats.
Risk Management	Intelligence/Information Sharing and Dissemination provides the means for sharing threat, vulnerability, and consequence data used in risk

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Linked Capability	Relationship to Capability
	management.
All Protection Capabilities	Intelligence/Information Sharing and Dissemination provides the means for sharing data on suspected and actual threats, which prompts additional monitoring and the implementation of specific protection activities. Monitoring results from the Protection Capabilities is further shared as needed through this Capability.
All Response Capabilities	Intelligence/Information Sharing and Dissemination provides the means for sharing data needed to carry out response activities effectively. Results of response actions are then further shared as needed through this Capability.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
Personnel for sharing operational information	Personnel involved in the operational aspects of information sharing (e.g., information technology (IT) personnel, law enforcement, public health, fire, emergency medical service (EMS), transportation, and other non-law enforcement personnel).
Personnel for sharing information on collaborative initiatives	Federal, State, local, tribal, private sector personnel, and other key stakeholders involved in information sharing and collaboration initiatives.
Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs)	Task forces composed of persons from various government and private elements (e.g., law enforcement, public health, local businesses, key infrastructure representatives, emergency management and other first responders).
Fusion center/process personnel	Supervisors and other management personnel within fusions centers involved in the oversight and execution of defined processes and procedures.
Equipment and systems for information sharing and collaboration	Information sharing network architecture (e.g., Regional Information Sharing System (RISS)/Law Enforcement Online (LEO), Joint Regional Information Exchange System (JRIES), National Law Enforcement Telecommunication System (NLETS), FBI Criminal Justice Information System/National Crime Information Center (CJIS/NCIC) networks), including hardware and software physical and network security.
Information sharing software	Data synthesis software (hazard prediction, assessment, and threat modeling software); Data collection/information gathering software.

Planning Assumptions

- Prevention consists of those activities that serve to detect, deter, and disrupt terrorist threats or actions against the United States and its interests. These activities decrease the perpetrators' chance of success, mitigate attack impact, minimize attack visibility, increase the chance of apprehension or detection, and obstruct perpetrators' access to resources. Tasks in this area are important regardless of a single type of threat, adversary capability, time or location of incident. Similarly, these capabilities reflect many tasks routinely undertaken by law enforcement and related organizations as they conduct traditional all-hazards, all-crimes activities.
- This capability applies to all potential terrorist incidents and is applicable to all 12 terrorism-related National Planning Scenarios. Initial planning, however, has been focused on bombing using improvised explosives device, chlorine tank explosion, aerosol anthrax, improvised nuclear device, and a radiological dispersal.
- Effective prevention depends on timely, accurate, and actionable information about the adversary, their operations, their support, potential targets, and methods of attack. Homeland security intelligence/information fusion is the overarching process of managing the development and flow of information and intelligence across all levels and sectors of government and the private sector on a continual basis. Although the primary emphasis of fusion is to identify, deter, and respond to emerging terrorism-related threats and risks, a collateral benefit to Federal, State, local, and tribal entities is that it will support ongoing efforts to address non-terrorism-related, all-hazards, all-crimes issues.

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- Intelligence/information fusion is an ongoing, cyclical process that incorporates three primary capabilities: Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings; Intelligence Analysis and Production; and Intelligence/Information Sharing and Dissemination.
- All appropriate objectives and critical tasks will be exercised regularly at all levels in order to measure performance and demonstrate capability.
- Both the Planning Factors for a Single Incident section and the Approaches for Large-Scale Events section have been omitted because there is no incident or large-scale event that necessarily occurs before these capabilities come in to play.

Planning Factors for a Single Incident

Not Applicable

Approaches for Large-Scale Events

Not Applicable

National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
All Levels	Personnel for sharing operational information	Personnel	As Needed		Incorporate All Stakeholders in Information Flow Vertically Flow Information Horizontally Flow Information
All levels	Personnel for sharing information on collaborative initiatives	Personnel	As Needed		All Activities
All levels	Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs)	Personnel	As Needed		All Activities
All levels	Fusion center/process personnel	Personnel	As Needed		All Activities
All levels	Equipment and systems for information sharing and collaboration	Equipment	As Needed		All Activities

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
All levels	Information Sharing Software	Equipment	As Needed		All Activities

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LAW ENFORCEMENT INVESTIGATION AND OPERATIONS

Capability Description

Law Enforcement Investigations and Operations is the capability that includes the broad range of activities undertaken by law enforcement and related entities to detect, examine, probe, investigate, and conduct operations related to potential terrorist activities. Current and emerging investigative techniques are used, with an emphasis on training, legal frameworks, recognition of indications and warnings, source development, interdiction, and related issues specific to antiterrorism activities.

Outcome

Suspects involved in criminal activities related to homeland security are successfully deterred, detected, disrupted, investigated, and apprehended. All counterterrorism-related cases, including not only primary cases, but also secondary, tertiary, and obtusely-related cases are aggressively prosecuted.

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

This capability supports:

Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex

ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services

ESF #9: Urban Search and Rescue

Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: ***Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems***	
Critical Tasks	
Pre.C1a 1.3	Develop, implement, and maintain an interagency or multi-jurisdictional training plan that ensures commonality in terrorism investigation subject matter being presented to law enforcement (State, local, tribal) and non-law enforcement [e.g., Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV)], public health and safety) personnel
Pre.C1a 1.6	Develop, implement, and maintain a plan for using Federal specialized units or personnel in conjunction with an active investigation of a critical event
Pre.C1a 1.5	Develop a government-wide program to ensure that the armed forces (particularly maritime forces) and appropriate law enforcement agencies have the capability to operate together in a mutually supportive and complementary role

Preparedness Measures	**Metrics**
All Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement entities have established connections with appropriate Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) field offices to establish routine and appropriate communications for all personnel:	Yes/No
Larger jurisdictions or entities have identified a designated liaison with the JTTF	Yes/No

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Smaller jurisdictions have a procedure in place to communicate with the JTTF, as needed	Yes/No
All Federal and tribal entities have established appropriate relationships (e.g., designated liaison, part-time liaison) with all JTTF offices	Yes/No
State and local law enforcement know how to contact the JTTF for any potential terrorism threat or activity	Yes/No
Processes and procedures are in place for law enforcement at all levels to:	
Identify and respond to suspicious activities and persons through the appropriate channels	Yes/No
Identify individuals planning and coordinating terrorist-related activities	
Apprehend and interdict terrorist suspects	Yes/No
Gather, catalogue, and preserve evidence for prosecutorial purposes and attribution	Yes/No Yes/No
Federal entities have established standard procedures and processes for conducting terrorism-related investigations	Yes/No
Law enforcement at all levels use memorandums of understanding (MOUs) to facilitate the conduct of an ongoing investigation	Yes/No
Investigative policies, procedures, and processes are reviewed on a periodic basis	Yes/No
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Justice (DOJ/FBI) provides a comprehensive list of Federal, State, local, and tribal resources available to all law enforcement entities and provide updates as appropriate	Yes/No
An investigative liaison or mechanism is in place to communicate targeted information needs/requirements to information collectors	Yes/No
Notification processes and procedures are in place to share information to/from Federal, State, local, and tribal and local officials regarding an on-going investigation	Yes/No
A mechanism for tracking leads from Federal, State, local, and tribal officials has been developed and is maintained so that all entities can view where the information is being taken for action	Yes/No
State, local, and tribal plans have been revised to include all required changes from the NIMS and National Response Plan (NRP)	Yes/No
Investigative personnel are familiar with the Terrorist Incident Annex to the NRP	Yes/No
Plans and protocols are in place for sharing incident-specific information from Federal partners with State, local, and tribal authorities, Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), and other pertinent entities	Yes/No
A mechanism is in place for conveying among entities the prevention efforts taken by Federal, State, local, and tribal officials	Yes/No
State, local, and tribal law enforcement either possess or have access to special operations teams (e.g., SWAT teams)	Yes/No
Standard policies and procedures exist for deploying special operations teams	Yes/No
Sufficient specialized units or personnel exist within the State, local, and/or tribal	Yes/No

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jurisdiction to ensure coverage of at least two simultaneous contingencies	
State, local, and/or tribal jurisdictions develop and maintain formal MOUs, policies, or procedures for accessing specialized units or personnel in an emergency	Yes/No
Formal MOUs, policies, or procedures exist that clearly define the duties and responsibilities of Federal specialized units/personnel	Yes/No
A mechanism is in place for State, local, and tribal law enforcement entities to request/authorize that specific Federal specialized unites or personnel be assigned to conduct joint operations	Yes/No
DHS/DOJ/DOD develops and maintains a U.S. Government plan to attain and maintain USG counterterrorism capabilities in a maritime environment	Yes/No
DHS/DOJ/DOD identifies and implements common doctrine and equipment for the maritime environment	Yes/No
Designated personnel have an identified source for and access to basic personal protection equipment (e.g., Chem/Bio protective mask, protective over-garments)	Yes/No
Appropriate processes, procedures and plans are in place for notifying proper authorities in the event of CBRNE hazards/threats	Yes/No
Procedures/protocols are in place for relaying CBRNE-related lab analysis (e.g., type, quantity, lethality) to FBI laboratory entities	Yes/No
Information flow plans/process for onsite personnel and detection capabilities are developed for relaying investigative information rapidly	Yes/No

Activity: ***Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs***	
Critical Tasks	
Pre.C1a 2.1.1	Train appropriate investigative personnel in the proper use of personal protective equipment
Pre.C1a 2.1.2	Provide training in general safety procedures for a variety of potentially hazardous environments
Pre.C1a 2.2.2	Design and conduct exercises to test Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations tasks within a single unit and jointly with other jurisdictions and levels of government

Preparedness Measures	**Metric**
Federal entities identify and/or develop training and education courses that they will make available for all State, local, and tribal entities in the areas of interviewing techniques and cultural awareness training	Yes/No
Appropriate law enforcement personnel are trained in the FBI 12-step process of evidence collection/preservation	Yes/No
State, local, and tribal personnel are trained and educated regarding the Federal assets that are available to them	Yes/No
State, local, and tribal personnel are trained in appropriate Federal responsibilities in prevention and investigation matters	Yes/No

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Training is tailored to address regional trends/issues by State, local, and tribal officials	Yes/No
Training is repeated/updated at least on a periodic basis	Yes/No
Appropriate personnel are trained in cultural awareness as it relates to terrorism	Yes/No
Appropriate personnel are trained in source recruitment and development	Yes/No
All law enforcement personnel are educated and trained to recognize terrorist techniques and procedures, including suspicious criminal and non-criminal activity and indicators	Yes/No
Designated personnel are trained to recognize indicators of a hazardous or contaminated environment	Yes/No
Designated personnel are trained in the proper use of personal protective equipment	Yes/No
All personnel receive safety awareness training from appropriate agencies or units (e.g., HazMat, bomb squad, military EOD unit)	Yes/No
Appropriate personnel are trained and educated on the National Incident Management System (NIMS)	Yes/No
Communication mechanisms are routinely tested via tabletop exercise (TTX) and functional exercise (FX) to ensure they are operating effectively	Yes/No
DHS/DOJ/DOD develops and test interoperability capabilities in the maritime environment through joint training and exercises	Yes/No
Training plans have been developed independently or in cooperation with other jurisdictions, per Federally defined guidelines	Yes/No
All jurisdictional training plans designate a centralized training facility and/or lead agency responsible for joint training programs	Yes/No
All jurisdictional training plans establish a mechanism for notifying/updating participating agencies of training opportunities and scheduling	Yes/No
Federally sponsored training programs utilize train-the-trainer methods as appropriate to enable the broadest possible reach to all levels of government	Yes/No
Federally developed awareness training requirements are offered to non-law enforcement (public safety, code enforcement, public health and private sector security) relating to legal responsibilities and limitations, preservation of potential or suspected crime scenes, and maintaining control/custody of evidence (videotapes, documents, etc.)	Yes/No
Agencies adhere to established policies regarding training intervals and requirements	Yes/No
All State, local, and tribal jurisdictions provide DHS with a list of their cultural awareness training needs, in order by priority	Yes/No

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Performance Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: *Conduct Investigations*	
Definition: Carry out effective investigations of criminal/suspicious activities potentially related to terrorism.	
Critical Tasks	
Pre.C1a 1.3.5	Recognize indications and warnings of terrorism that arise in the investigations that are conducted
Pre.C1a 3.6	Conduct targeted outreach with private businesses related to an investigation
Pre.C1a 3.7	Engage in effective source development activities, including maintaining source confidentiality
Pre.C1a 3.9	Implement proper procedures and processes when conducting terrorism-related investigations
Pre.C1a 3.9.1	Follow standard crime-scene procedures
Pre.C1a 3.5.2	Recognize and address onsite CBRNE hazards
Pre.C1a 3.9.2	Gather, catalogue, and preserve evidence for prosecutorial purposes and attribution
Pre.C1a 3.2.1.2	Coordinate with critical resource infrastructure, key resource and private-sector officials to facilitate an investigation
Pre.C1a 3.5.1	Recognize indicators and warnings of potential terrorist-related activity during criminal investigations

Performance Measures	**Metrics**
Intelligence related to high risk infrastructure or an acute threat was prioritized and reported as soon as it was observed during the course of an investigation	Yes/No
Investigators are able to recognize and address onsite CBRNE hazards	Yes/No
FBI Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU) collects evidence, processes material/evidence, and identifies the source or precursors of CBRNE	Yes/No
Law enforcement notified industry/facilities of the process to identify and report suspicious material, activity, or personnel related to the ongoing investigation	Yes/No
Law enforcement personnel coordinate with critical resource infrastructure, key resource and private-sector officials to facilitate an investigation	Yes/No
Law enforcement personnel followed-up with a reporting organization if more information was necessary	Yes/No
Law enforcement investigators receive timely threat and intelligence information	Yes/No
Law enforcement used investigative information to identify potential vulnerabilities/target lists	Yes/No
Law enforcement notified Federal, State, local, and tribal governments of how to identify and report suspicious material, activity, or personnel related to the ongoing investigation	Yes/No
All appropriate entities ensure that sources remain confidential throughout the	Yes/No

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investigative process	

Activity: *Share Information Related to Investigations*

Definition: Receive, develop, and share information to aid in an investigation.

Critical Tasks	
Pre.C1a 4.1	Identify and maintain liaisons with appropriate lead Federal terrorism investigation entities. (i.e. JTTF)
Pre.C1a 4.2	Conduct outreach with targeted industries/facilities related to an investigation.
Pre.C1a 4.2.1	Conduct targeted outreach with Federal, State, local, and tribal governments related to an investigation, including law enforcement if incidents raise the index of suspicion
Pre.C1a 4.3	Establish and maintain a clear line of reporting for ongoing investigation information
Pre.C1a 4.1.1	Contact JTTF in a timely fashion when any nexus with terrorism is discovered
Pre.C1a 4.3.1	Share investigation-related information across jurisdictions and among law enforcement and other appropriate agencies as appropriate
Pre.C1a 4.3.2	Deliver investigation-related information through pre-established channels appropriate for the originating source
Pre.C1a 4.3.3	Follow up with reporting entity if more information is necessary
Pre.C1a 4.4	Provide investigators with timely threat and intelligence information
Pre.C1a 4.5	Follow legal protocols on handling and disseminating information related to an ongoing investigation

Performance Measures	Metrics
Information provided by all sources is delivered through pre-established channels appropriate for the originating source	Yes/No
Time in which information is relayed to the JTTF	Within 24 hours
Information provided by all sources met predefined standards for accuracy, completeness and consistency	Yes/No
All appropriate entities follow legal protocols on handling and disseminating information related to an ongoing investigation	Yes/No

Activity: *Deploy Specially Trained Personnel*

Definition: Deploy and use specialized units/duly authorized and specially trained personnel for search, seizure, and/or intervention/interdiction operations.

Critical Tasks	
Pre.C1a 5.1	Maintain access to special operations teams (e.g., SWAT teams)
Pre.C1a 5.1.1	Dispatch special operations teams according to standard policies and procedures

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Pre.C1a 5.2	Conduct tactical deployment
Pre.C1a 5.3	Conduct surveillance of suspects
Pre.C1a 5.4	Secure incident scene
Pre.C1a 5.5	Assess incident and develop action plan
Pre.C1a 5.6	Conduct hostage negotiations
Pre.C1a 5.7	Determine and don appropriate PPE
Pre.C1a 5.8	Conduct tactical entry to disarm, detain, or otherwise render harmless the suspects in accordance with the use of force policy/rules of engagement
Pre.C1a 5.9	Execute search and seizure procedures
Pre.C1a 5.9.1	Apprehend suspects

Performance Measures	Metrics
Personnel demonstrate basic knowledge of minimum safe distances and of how to establish adequate perimeter, containment and decontamination procedures	Yes/No
State, local, and tribal law enforcement deployed special operations teams	Yes/No
Time in which specialized units or personnel were deployed	Within 24 hours of authorization to deploy

Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship to Capability
All Prevention Capabilities	Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations and the remaining Prevention Capabilities provide each other with investigative support dependent on the nature of the investigation.
All Protection Capabilities	Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations and the Protection Capabilities provide each other with investigative support dependent on the nature of the investigation.
Animal Health Emergency Support	Animal Health Emergency Support provides Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations with investigation leads and evidence.
Emergency Operations Center Management	Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations requests resources from Emergency Operations Center Management. Emergency Operations Center Management provides Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations with resources.
Environmental Health	Environmental Health provides Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations with investigation leads and evidence.
Explosive Device Response Operations	Explosive Device Response Operations provides Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations with investigation leads and evidence.

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Linked Capability	Relationship to Capability
Firefighting Operations and Support	Firefighting Operations and Support provides Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations with investigation leads and evidence.
Onsite Incident Management	Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations and Onsite Incident Management provide each other with situation reports.
Public Safety and Security Response	Public Safety and Security Response provide Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations with crowd and traffic control.
Urban Search and Rescue	Urban Search and Rescue provides Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations with investigation leads and evidence.
WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination	WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination provides Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations with investigation leads and evidence.
Communications	Communications are an integral part of all Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations activities.
Emergency Public Information and Warning	The need to activate the Emergency Public Information and Warning capability may result from Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations activities.
Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation	Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation provides Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations with investigation leads and evidence.
Fatality Management	Fatality Management provides Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations with investigation leads and evidence.
Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense	Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense provides Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations with investigation leads and evidence.
Planning	Planning is an integral part of all Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations activities.
Restoration of Lifelines	Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations activities need to be completed prior to beginning Restoration of Lifelines activities.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
Investigative personnel	Law enforcement personnel involved in the conduct of investigations of criminal/suspicious activities.
Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs)	Task forces formed at the local level and composed of persons from various government and private elements (e.g., law enforcement, public health, local businesses, key infrastructure representatives, emergency management and other first responders).
Liaisons to JTTFs	A government person, designated by larger jurisdictions, to liaise with the community's JTTF.
Evidence collection personnel and equipment	Law enforcement personnel trained in the FBI 12-step process of evidence collection/preservation.
Forensic analysis personnel and equipment	Personnel and equipment at all levels of government involved in the analysis of evidence collected from a crime scene or elsewhere.
Terrorism Investigation Training Plan	Interagency and multi-jurisdictional training plan that ensures commonality in terrorism investigation
"Train the trainer" programs	Programs to train on Federal assets and roles and responsibilities, terrorism indications and warning in criminal investigations, and recognition of hazardous materials/threats

Planning Assumptions

- Prevention consists of those activities that serve to detect, deter, and disrupt terrorist threats or actions against the United States and its interests. These activities decrease the perpetrators' chance of success, mitigate attack impact, minimize attack visibility, increase the chance of apprehension or detection, and obstruct perpetrators' access to resources. Tasks in this area are important regardless of a single type of threat, adversary capability, time or location of incident. Similarly, these capabilities reflect many tasks routinely undertaken by law enforcement and related organizations as they conduct traditional all-hazards, all-crimes activities.
- This capability applies to all potential terrorist incidents and is applicable to all 12 terrorism-related National Planning Scenarios. Initial planning, however, has been focused on bombing using improvised explosives device, chlorine tank explosion, aerosol anthrax, improvised nuclear device, and a radiological dispersal.
- Effective prevention depends on timely, accurate, and actionable information about the adversary, their operations, their support, potential targets, and methods of attack. Homeland security intelligence/information fusion is the overarching process of managing the development and flow of information and intelligence across all levels and sectors of government and the private sector on a continual basis. Although the primary emphasis of fusion is to identify, deter, and respond to emerging terrorism-related threats and risks, a collateral benefit to Federal, State, local, and tribal entities is that it will support ongoing efforts to address non-terrorism-related, all-hazards, all-crimes issues.
- Both the Planning Factors for a Single Incident section and the Approaches for Large-Scale Events section have been omitted because there is no incident or large-scale event that necessarily occurs before these capabilities come in to play.

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Planning Factor Assumptions

- Intelligence/information fusion is an ongoing, cyclical process that incorporates three primary capabilities: Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings; Intelligence Analysis and Production; and Intelligence/Information Sharing and Dissemination.
- All appropriate objectives and critical tasks will be exercised regularly at all levels in order to measure performance and demonstrate capability.

Planning Factors for a Single Incident

Not Applicable

Approaches for Large-Scale Events

Not Applicable

National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
All Levels	Investigative personnel	Personnel	Determined by Agency		Conduct investigation Share Information Related to Investigations
FBI	Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs)	Personnel	Determined by Agency		Conduct investigation Share Information Related to Investigations Deploy Specially Trained Personnel
All Levels	Liaisons to JTTFs	Personnel	Determined by Agency		Conduct investigation Share Information Related to Investigations Deploy Specially Trained Personnel
All Levels	Evidence collection personnel	Personnel	Determined by Agency		Conduct Investigation
All Levels	Forensic analysis personnel	Personnel	Determined by Agency		Conduct investigation
All Levels	Special Operations (e.g. SWAT teams)	Personnel	Determined by Agency		Deploy Specially Trained Personnel

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
All Levels	Terrorism Investigation Training plan	Training	1	Per Agency	Conduct investigation Share Information Related to Investigations Deploy Specially Trained Personnel
Federal	"Train the trainer" programs	Training	As Needed	N/A	Conduct investigation Share Information Related to Investigations Deploy Specially Trained Personnel

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CBRNE DETECTION

Capability Definition

The Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE) Detection capability provides the ability to detect CBRNE materials at points of manufacture, transportation, and use. This capability includes the detection of CBRNE material through area monitoring, but not by their effects (i.e., signs or symptoms) on humans and animals which is addressed through the public and animal health capabilities. The CBRNE Detection capability does not include actions taken to respond to the consequences of a release or activities to render any CBRNE device safe.

The CBRNE Detection capability is not only about technology, but rather the ability to recognize potential CBRNE threats through equipment, education, and effective protocols. The importance of training, communication, and close coordination with key partners, including intelligence, law enforcement, public safety, public health, and international partners, is recognized as a critical enabler for this capability. However, only the CBRNE detection specific tasks to these cross-cutting elements have been identified in this capability.

Definitions are as follows:

Manufacture: The illegal production of CBRNE material within the borders of the U.S. and its territories.

Transport: The movement of CBRNE material outside, across, and within the borders of the U.S. and its territories.

Use: The deployment, emplacement, or employment of CBRNE material within the U.S. and its territories.

Outcome

Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and/or explosive (CBRNE) materials are rapidly detected and characterized at borders, critical locations, events, and incidents.

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

This capability supports the following Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) and Annex:

ESF #1: Transportation

ESF #2: Communications

ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering

ESF #5: Emergency Management

ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services

ESF#10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Response

ESF #11: Agriculture and Natural Resources

ESF #12: Energy

ESF #13: Public Safety and Security

Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex

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Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Although the tables below use the term "CBRNE" generically, the process should be applied separately for each chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive threat category.

Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Critical Tasks	
Pre.A1e 1.7	Develop procedures to facilitate the exchange of information and data among Federal, State, local and tribal agencies
Pre.A1e 1.8	Establish policies and procedures for communications and warnings pertaining to CBRNE
Pre.A1e 1.9	Establish and maintain interoperable information network
Pre.A1e 1.5	Establish coordination and/or mutual aid agreements with external CBRNE detection and alarm resolution capabilities
Pre.A1e 1.10	Conduct CBRNE detection requirements analysis for critical infrastructure/key resources (CI/KR)
Pre.A1e 1.11	Develop regional CBRNE coordination plans or activities that involve all Federal, State, local, tribal and private stakeholders
Pre.A1e 1.12	Research and develop technologies for detecting chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive material
Pre.A1e 1.13	Develop and implement equipment acquisition and certification standards
Pre.A1e 1.14	Develop technology standards for government and private sector
Pre.A1e 1.1	Develop standards for CBRNE detection technologies, including sensitivity and selectivity standards
Pre.A1e 1.6	Establish key personnel training standards for CBRNE detection
Pre.A1e 1.2	Develop and implement global standards for cargo screening for CBRNE material
Pre.A1e 1.15	Validate analytical methods to detect chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive material
Pre.A1e 1.16	Assess prioritized critical infrastructure/key resources (CI/KR) for CBRNE detection requirement

Preparedness Measures	**Metrics**
Technological shortfalls in CBRNE detection have been identified	Yes/No
A research and development program is in place to address the CBRNE detection technological shortfalls	Yes/No
There is a program for the timely development of standards for emerging technology	Yes/No
A process has been developed to identify and integrate appropriate technology in operational environments	Yes/No
Appropriate personnel have been identified for CBRNE detection training, to include:	
▪ Law enforcement personnel	Yes/No
▪ Transit police and security	Yes/No
▪ Fire personnel, HazMat personnel	Yes/No
▪ Public health professionals	Yes/No

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▪ Private sector security ▪ Critical infrastructure employees ▪ Others as deemed appropriate	Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No
CBRNE technical support is available (on-site or through "reach back")	Yes/No
A standard list of CBRNE threats of concern has been developed	Yes/No
Appropriate levels of CBRNE detection sensitivity have been identified for the identified threats of concern	Yes/No
CBRNE detection sensitivity thresholds comply with appropriate international, national, State, and local standards	Yes/No
Detection/surveillance thresholds have been set to the specified level of sensitivity	Yes/No
Key CBRNE detection interdiction points have been identified	Yes/No
Frequency with which key interdiction points are assessed and updated	Annually
A regional CBRNE detection plan has been developed and coordinated	Yes/No
Protocols exist for resolving CBRNE detection alarms	Yes/No
Protocols have been developed and incorporated in plans to communicate CBRNE detection activities, locations, anomalies and their resolution to appropriate personnel (e.g., intelligence, law enforcement, and public health communities)	Yes/No
Frequency at which protocols have been exercised and evaluated	Annually
Frequency at which CBRNE detection plans are updated to reflect current critical infrastructure/key resources (CI/KR) assessments	Annually
Appropriate procedures exist for detection capabilities at critical infrastructure/key resources (CI/KR) for specific CBRNE threat conditions	Yes/No
Integrated CBRNE detection architectures exist for all levels of government (Federal, State, local, tribal)	Yes/No
CBRNE detection interdiction sites have been assessed for potential circumvention	Yes/No

Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs	
Critical Tasks	
Pre.A1e 2.1.1	Develop and implement training to enable personnel to recognize the presence of CBRNE material (e.g., first responders, law enforcement, intelligence, and medical community)
Pre.A1e 2.1.3	Provide CBRNE support equipment and threat device handling training to operations and investigation personnel
Pre.A1e 2.2.1	Test and exercise CBRNE detection and resolution protocols regularly

Preparedness Measures	**Metric**
Awareness level training has been provided for first responders	Yes/No
A program is in place to test and evaluate new technology in the appropriate operational environment	Yes/No
CBRNE detection training materials have been developed and validated	Yes/No

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Percent of required personnel trained to meet jurisdictional CBRNE detection requirements	100%
Public education campaigns exist for CBRNE detection	Yes/No
The regional CBRNE detection plan has been exercised in accordance to the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) guidance	Yes/No
Frequency CBRNE detection notification plan is exercised	Quarterly

Performance Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: *Detect*	
Definition: Detect CBRNE material at points of manufacture, transportation, and use	
Critical Tasks	
Pre.A1e 3.1	Publish and distribute CBRNE detection awareness material
Pre.A1e 3.1.3	Identify CBRNE material at points of illegal manufacture, transportation, or use within and across the borders of the U.S. and its Territories
Pre.A1e 3.2.2.4	Detect the use of CBRNE material in a community and/or venue
Pre.A1e 3.2.2.2	Conduct ad hoc CBRNE material detection in a community and/or venue
Pre.A1e 3.2.2.3	Conduct continuous CBRNE material detection in a community and/or venue
Pre.A1e 3.2.2.5	Detect illegal manufacturing of CBRNE material at potential manufacturing sites
Pre.A1e 3.2.2.6	Detect CBRNE material on personnel or items entering/boarding events, aircraft, mass transit, or other high impact targets
Pre.A1e 3.1.4	Identify material at key interdiction points requiring further inspection
Pre.A1e 3.2.2.7	Detect the ground, air, and sea transport and/or deployment of CBRNE material into and within the U.S. and its Territories
Pre.A1e 3.3.2	Provide stand-off detection technologies
Pre.A1e 3.3.3	Provide point detection technologies
Pre.A1e 3.1.1	Implement CBRNE detection and awareness programs for the public, private sector and key personnel (to include: safety and security personnel, law enforcement personnel, first response personnel, and the intelligence community)
Pre.A1e 3.2.1.5	Inspect and monitor cargo at key interdiction points for potential CBRNE material
Pre.A1e 3.2.1	Investigate a venue for the possible emplacement of a CBRNE device
Pre.A1e 3.2.1.2	Use intelligence information to focus CBRNE material searches and surveillance activities
Pre.A1e 3.2.1.3	Use medical information (e.g., syndromic surveillance and medical diagnostic tests) to focus CBRNE detection capabilities
Pre.A1e 3.4.1.1	Screen people to detect CBRNE material at all ports of entry and at all critical infrastructure/key resources (CI/KR)
Pre.A1e 3.3.1	Prioritize CBRNE detection technology solution standards
Pre.A1e 3.2.2.1	Implement protocols for resolving CBRNE alarms and the detection of suspect material
Pre.A1e 3.4.1.1	Screen material (e.g., baggage, mail, etc.) to detect CBRNE material at all ports of entry (e.g., sea and airports, border crossing points, etc.) and critical infrastructure/key resources (CI/KR)
Pre.A1e 3.2.1.1	Use intelligence information to target suspect containers or shipments

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Performance Measures	Metrics
Illicit chemical, biological, radiological, or explosive material are detected at borders, inspection points, or during routine law enforcement investigations	Yes/No
Surveillance systems provide early detection of a chemical, biological, or radiological release that would facilitate limiting the spread and effect of that release	Yes/No
Checked baggage and cargo entering/boarding events, aircraft, mass transit, or other potential targets are screened	Yes/No
Passengers and event attendees entering/boarding events, aircraft, mass transit, or other potential targets are screened	Yes/No
CBRNE detection interdiction sites have been assessed for potential circumvention	Yes/No
CBRNE detection efforts are informed by intelligence, public safety, and public health information	Yes/No
Venues are inspected for potential CBRNE threats prior to major events	Yes/No
Ad hoc CBRNE surveillance capabilities are deployed in response to potential threats	Yes/No

Activity: *Confirm and Characterize*

Definition: Describe or portray the qualities of detected CBRNE material

Critical Tasks	
Pre.A1e 4.1	Confirm and characterize CBRNE material used in a community and/or venue
Pre.A1e 4.2	Provide CBRNE material detection information that can be used for attribution efforts to appropriate personnel to include: law enforcement and intelligence community personnel

Performance Measures	Metrics
Accurate records are kept of all suspect issues or alarms and their resolution	Yes/No
Suspicious material is analyzed (either on-site or via laboratory support)	Yes/No
Percent of CBRNE alarms, or suspect material discoveries, at interdiction points that are resolved	100%

Activity: *Communicate CBRNE Detection Incidents*

Definition: Provide CBRNE warning information to appropriate capabilities.

Critical Tasks	
Pre.A1e 5.1.1	Coordinate CBRNE material threat and discovery information with intelligence, public safety, public health and other appropriate agencies
Pre.A1e 5.2	Provide CBRNE data to appropriate personnel, to include: intelligence community, law enforcement personnel, first responders, and the general public

Performance Measures	Metrics
Disseminated information in event of CBRNE detection follows established protocol	Yes/No

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CBRNE detection notification was done in accordance with plan	Yes/No

Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship to Capability
Animal Health Emergency Support	Data on detection and characterization of CBRNE may inform animal health monitoring and/or protection activities
Communications	As with all capabilities, linkage with communications is critical component for dissemination of information
Community Preparedness and Participation	Public awareness is a critical part of any CBRNE detection effort
Critical Infrastructure Protection	Data on detection and characterization of CBRNE may inform critical infrastructure protection activities
Economic and Community Recovery	Monitoring programs are linked to mitigation measures that limit economic and community impact
Environmental Health	CBRNE Detection provides material characterization to Environmental Health
Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation	Data on potential CBRNE threats and characterization may inform epidemiological monitoring activities; similarly, results of epidemiological monitoring may indicate a CBRNE threat
Explosive Device Response Operations	Detection of CBRNE provides material characterization and may trigger the need for Explosive Device Response Operations
Fatality Management	Timely detection and characterization of material and effective information sharing aids Fatality Management planning and operations
Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense	Data on detection and characterization of CBRNE threats may inform food safety monitoring and/or protection activities, similarly, results of food and agricultural monitoring may indicate a CBRNE threat
Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings	CBRNE detection data is one source of raw information collected by the Information Gathering capability
Intelligence/Information Sharing and Dissemination	CBRNE detection may occur through the information sharing mechanisms established by the Intelligence/Information sharing capability
Intelligence Analysis and Production	CBRNE detection data is one source of information collected and analyzed by the Intelligence Analysis and Production Capability
Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations	Detection of CBRNE may trigger the need for a law enforcement investigation, and affect how it is conducted
Medical Surge	Timely detection and characterization of material and effective information sharing aids Medical Surge planning and operations
Planning	Creation of Incident Action Plans for immediate implementation that enable closer coordination
Public Health Laboratory Testing	Results from laboratory testing may indicate potential CBRNE threats. CBRNE Detection may receive assistance in characterizing

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Linked Capability	Relationship to Capability
	the detected material from Public Health Laboratory Testing
Public Safety and Security Response	Evidence of CBRNE may trigger the need for public safety and security response for site control. CBRNE Detection receives perimeter and crowd control from Public Safety and Security Response
Restoration of Lifelines	CBRNE Detection may provide information on the hazard encountered and lifelines affected. Lifelines enables the CBRNE Detection Capability to function
Risk Management	Timely detection and characterization of material and effective information sharing aids Risk Management planning and operations
Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment	Timely detection and characterization of material and effective information sharing aids Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment planning and operations
WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination	Detection of CBRNE materials may trigger the need for WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
CBRNE detection operator personnel	Specially trained and equipped personnel with the ability to recognize potential CBRNE threats through equipment, education, and effective protocols
Explosive Detection Dog (EDD) Teams	A canine and handler, working as a team to perform explosive detection searches of building and office areas, vehicles, packages, materials and persons
Laboratory staff for agent identification	Personnel specially trained and equipped to analyze suspicious materials in support of criminal investigations
Border control and other targeted `defense layers` personnel	Personnel involved in screening materials (e.g., baggage, mail, etc.) to detect CBRNE material at all ports of entry (e.g., sea and airports, border crossing points, etc.) and critical infrastructure/key resources (CI/KR)
Appropriate critical infrastructure personnel	Critical infrastructure employees who have been identified for CBRNE detection training
Local emergency responders	Personnel from law enforcement, fire services, medical communities and other disciplines involved in responding to an incident
CBRNE detection technology R&D	
Protocols to ensure coordination with intelligence community	
Public education program to help people recognize threats	
CBRNE detection and monitoring equipment	
Training for personnel at interdiction points	
Laboratory testing equipment	
Mutual aid agreements and/or memoranda of understanding (MAAs/MOUs), including protocols for coordination with intelligence community	
CBRNE detection standard operating procedures, including regional coordination plans and protocols for resolving alarms	
Facility response plans as required by law (SARA Title III)	

Planning Assumptions

- Although applicable to several of the 15 National Planning Scenarios, the capability planning factors were developed from an in-depth analysis of the scenarios featuring an improvised explosives device, a chlorine tank explosion, aerosol anthrax, an improvised nuclear device, and a radiological dispersal. Other scenarios were reviewed to identify required adjustments or additions to the planning factors and national targets.

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- CBRNE detection activities apply to the U.S. and its territories.
- The CBRNE detection capability addresses biological agents outside of the body (human and animal), and does not include medical or plant samples (i.e., blood and medical tests). Medical and syndromic surveillance detection of biological agents is addressed in the public health and food and agriculture safety capabilities and close integration of these capabilities must occur.
- Prevention consists of those activities that serve to detect, deter, and disrupt terrorist threats or actions against the United States and its interests. These activities decrease the perpetrators' chance of success, mitigate attack impact, minimize attack visibility, increase the chance of apprehension or detection, and obstruct perpetrators' access to resources. Tasks in this area are important regardless of a single type of threat, adversary capability, time or location of incident. Similarly, these capabilities reflect many tasks routinely undertaken by law enforcement and related organizations as they conduct traditional all-hazards, all-crimes activities.
- Effective prevention depends on timely, accurate, and actionable information about the adversary, their operations, their support, potential targets, and methods of attack. Homeland security intelligence/information fusion is the overarching process of managing the development and flow of information and intelligence across all levels and sectors of government and the private sector on a continual basis. Although the primary emphasis of fusion is to identify, deter, and respond to emerging terrorism-related threats and risks, a collateral benefit to Federal, State, local, and tribal entities is that it will support ongoing efforts to address non-terrorism-related, all-hazards, all-crimes issues.
- Both the Planning Factors from an In-Depth Analysis of a Scenario with Significant Demand for the capability section and the Approaches for Large-Scale Events section have been omitted because there is no incident or large-scale event that necessarily occurs before these capabilities come in to play.
- Intelligence/information fusion is an ongoing, cyclical process that incorporates three primary capabilities: Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings; Intelligence Analysis and Production; and Intelligence/Information Sharing and Dissemination. The CBRNE Detection capability relates closely to all three stages of this process.
- All appropriate objectives and critical tasks will be exercised regularly at all levels in order to measure performance and demonstrate capability.

Planning Factors from an In-Depth Analysis of a Scenario with Significant Demand for the Capability

Not Applicable

National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
Federal, State, Local, Tribal	CBRNE detection operator personnel	Personnel	Varies by Region	Varies by Region	Detect

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
Federal	Explosive Detection Dog (EDD) Teams	Personnel and canine	Varies by Region	Varies by Region	Detect
Federal, State, Local, Tribal	Laboratory staff for agent identification	Personnel	Varies by Region	Varies by Region	Characterize
Federal and State	Border control and other targeted `defense layers` personnel	Personnel	Varies by Region	Varies by Region	Detect
Private Sector	Appropriate critical infrastructure personnel	Personnel	Varies by Region	Varies by Region	Detect
Local	Local emergency responders	Personnel	Varies by Region	Varies by Region	Detect Characterize
Federal	CBRNE detection technology R&D	Organization and Leadership	Varies by Region	Varies by Region	All Activities
Federal, State, Local, Tribal	Protocols to ensure coordination with intelligence community	Planning	Varies by Region	Varies by Region	Warn
Federal, State, Local, Tribal	Public education program to help people recognize threats	Training	Varies by Region	Varies by Region	Detect
Federal, State, Local, Tribal	CBRNE detection and monitoring equipment	Equipment	Varies by Region	Varies by Region	Detect Characterize
Federal, State, Local, Tribal	Training for personnel at interdiction points	Training	Varies by Region	Varies by Region	Detect
Federal, Regional, State, and Local	Laboratory testing equipment	Equipment	Varies by Region	Varies by Region	Characterize

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
Federal, Regional, State, Local, tribal, Private	Mutual aid agreements and/or memoranda of understanding (MAAs/MOUs), including protocols for coordination with intelligence community	Planning	Varies by Region	Varies by Region	All Activities
Federal, Regional, State, Local, Tribal	CBRNE detection standard operating procedures, including regional coordination plans and protocols for resolving alarms	Planning	Varies by Region	Varies by Region	Detect Characterize
Federal, Regional, State, Local, Tribal, Private	Facility response plans as required by law (SARA Title III)	Planning	Varies by Region	Varies by Region	Detect

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Protect Mission Area Target Capabilities

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CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

Capability Definition

The Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) capability enables public and private entities to identify, assess, prioritize, and protect critical infrastructure and key resources so they can detect, prevent, deter, degrade, and mitigate deliberate efforts to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit the Nation's critical infrastructure and key resources.

Outcome

The risk to, vulnerability of, and consequence of attack to critical infrastructure are reduced through the identification of critical infrastructure; conduct, documentation, and standardization of risk assessments; prioritization of assets; decisions regarding protective and preventative programs; and implementation of protective and preventative plans.

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

This capability supports the following Emergency Support Functions (ESFs)/Annexes:

ESF #1: Transportation
ESF #2: Communications
ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering
ESF #4: Firefighting
ESF #5: Emergency Management
ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services
ESF #10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Response
ESF #11: Agriculture and Natural Resources
ESF #12: Energy
ESF #13: Public Safety and Security
ESF #14: Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation
Cyber Incident Annex
Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex

Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Critical Tasks	
Pro.A1a 1.1.1	Develop National Infrastructure Protection Plan
Pro.A1a 1.5	Establish a national critical infrastructure protection (CIP) research and development program
Pro.A1a 1.1.2	Develop sector-specific infrastructure protection plans

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Pro.A1a 1.1.3	Develop State and/or regional CIP Plans
Pro.A1a 1.45	Develop national risk assessment methodology and standards for critical infrastructure/key resources (CI/KR)
Pro.A1a 1.4.1	Develop risk assessment tools
Pro.A1a 1.3.1	Establish Government Coordinating Councils for each sector
Pro.A1a 1.3.2	Establish Sector Coordinating Councils for each sector
Pro.A2a 1.1.2	Coordinate development of standard guidelines for physical security programs
Pro.A3a 1.3	Develop strategies and guidelines for cyber infrastructure protection
Pro.A2a 1.6	Develop strategies and guidelines for protection of infrastructure personnel
Pro.A1a 4.1	Define sector-specific universe of infrastructure assets and systems
Pro.A1a 3.1	Develop sector-specific security goals
Pro.A1a 1.2.1	Develop national metrics to measure progress and assess effectiveness of the national CI/KR protection program
Pro.A1a 1.2.2	Develop sector-specific metrics to measure progress and assess effectiveness of the sector-specific CI/KR protection program

Preparedness Measures	Metrics
National Infrastructure Protection Plan and Sector-Specific Plans are in place	Yes/No
State and/or regional CIP Plans are developed and in place	Yes/No
Appropriate risk methodology (i.e., takes into account the threats, consequences, and vulnerabilities) have been developed and approved by the Federal Government for critical infrastructure protection	Yes/No
Vulnerability assessment tool has been developed	Yes/No
Government Coordinating Councils are established for each sector	Yes/No
Sector-specific CIP plans are reviewed by appropriate Government Coordinating Council	Yes/No
Sector Coordinating Councils are established for each sector	Yes/No
Sector-specific CIP Plan is reviewed by appropriate Sector Coordinating Council	Yes/No
A mechanism for coordinating CIP efforts has been established for Federal and State authorities	Yes/No
National CIP Research and Development Plan has been established	Yes/No
CIP information-sharing mechanism has been established	Yes/No
Sector security goals are established for each sector in partnership with security partners	Yes/No
Sector security goals support the goal of the NIPP	Yes/No
Sector security goals yield specific, measurable outcomes that allow security partners to allocate security resources and track progress	Yes/No

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Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs	
Critical Tasks	
Pro.A1a 2.1.1	Develop and implement risk and vulnerability assessment training
Pro.A1a 2.2.1	Develop a system to "Red Team" CIP measures and technology
Pro.A2a 2.2	Develop and conduct exercise programs to test critical infrastructure security plans

Preparedness Measures	Metrics
Frequency of exercises to test the effectiveness of protective measures	Annually
Vulnerability assessment training program is developed and implemented	Yes/No
Risk assessment training program is developed and implemented	Yes/No
System to "Red Team" CIP measures and technology is in place	Yes/No

Performance Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: *Coordinate and Manage Critical Infrastructure Protection* Definition: Partner/coordinate with Federal, State, local, and tribal entities, the private sector, and the international community.	
Critical Tasks	
Pro.A1a 3.3.1	Operate public-private partnerships for critical infrastructure protection (CIP) activities
Pro.A1a 3.3.2	Operate sector-specific Government Coordinating Councils

Performance Measures	Metrics
Time in which memoranda of understanding (MOUs) to ensure cooperation with respect to CIP is signed by all relevant parties	Within one year of official Target Capabilities List (TCL) publication

Activity: *Identify Critical infrastructure/key resources* Definition: Develop an inventory of the individual assets and systems that make up the Nation's CI/KR, some of which may be located outside the U.S., and collect information on them, including dependencies, interdependencies, and reliance on cyber systems.	
Critical Tasks	
Pro.A1a 4.1.1	Develop selection criteria to identify critical infrastructure/key resources
Pro.A1a 4	Identify critical infrastructure and key assets within the Nation, region, State, or local area

Performance Measures	Metrics

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Sector-specific agencies have identified assets of potential national-, regional-, or sector-level importance	Yes/No
Data have been collected on assets and systems is relevant to risk assessment efforts	Yes/No
Data have been collected on assets and systems addresses dependencies and interdependencies that affect functionality and performance	Yes/No
Data have been verified for accuracy	Yes/No
Frequency with which data is updated and provided to DHS	Annually

Activity: *Assess Risks*

Definition: Determine which assets and systems are critical by calculating risk, combining potential direct and indirect consequences of an attack (including dependencies and interdependencies associated with each identified asset), known vulnerabilities to various potential attack vectors, and general or specific threat information.

Critical Tasks	
Pro.A1a 5.1	Conduct a "top-screen" consequence analysis to determine which assets and systems are high consequence and therefore require risk assessment
Pro.A1a 5.3	Conduct vulnerability assessments on high-consequence critical infrastructure/key resources
Pro.A1a 5.4	Conduct detailed threat assessments on high-consequence critical infrastructure/key resources
Pro.A1a 5.5	Determine risk profiles of high-consequence critical infrastructure/key resources
Pro.A1a 5.6	Conduct an interdependency analysis to determine the relationship of risks within and across sectors
Pro.A1a 5.7	Share the assessment of sector-specific infrastructure risk with interdependent entities within appropriate sectors

Performance Measures	Metrics
Procedures for analyzing threats, vulnerabilities, consequences, and risks are implemented	Yes/No
Consequence or "top-screen" analysis is performed	Yes/No
Potential threats to critical infrastructure/key resources and high consequence systems have been identified	Yes/No
Percentage of high-consequence assets that have completed vulnerability assessments	100%
Percentage of high-consequence assets that have completed a risk assessment	100%
Risk analysis results were disseminated to the proper authorities	Yes/No

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Activity: *Prioritize*	
Definition: Aggregate and order assessment results to present a comprehensive picture of national CI/KR risk in order to establish protection priorities and provide the basis for planning and the informed allocation of resources.	
Critical Tasks	
Pro.A1a 6.1	Prioritize high-risk critical infrastructure/key resources for consideration of protective measures
Performance Measures	
Critical infrastructure/key resources and high consequence systems are normalized and prioritized for consideration of protective programs	Yes/No

Activity: *Protect*	
Definition: Select appropriate protective measures or programs and allocate resources to address targeted priorities.	
Critical Tasks	
Pro.A2a 1.1.4	Develop and implement surge capacity plans to increase critical infrastructure protection (CIP) capacity during a crisis
Pro.A2a 1.1	Develop protective programs and plans to reduce the general level of risk for the highest risk critical infrastructure/key resources
Pro.A2a 1.2	Develop protective programs and plans to respond to and recover from specific threat-initiated actions
Pro.A2a 5	Implement programs to defend and devalue physical critical infrastructure/key resources
Pro.A3a 5	Implement programs to defend and devalue critical cyber assets
Pro.A3a 4.1.1	Implement detection measures such as inspection surveillance, employee monitoring, and security counterintelligence
Performance Measures	**Metrics**
Percentage of high-risk assets and systems for which protective programs and/or mitigation strategies have been developed	100%
Percentage of high-risk assets and systems for which protective programs and/or mitigation strategies have been implemented	100%
Percentage of high-risk assets that have active protective programs to measurably reduce risk	100%
Percentage of high-risk assets for which risk has been measurably reduced	100%
Percentage of high-risk assets and systems for which plans for surge capacity during a crisis have been developed	100%

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Percentage of high-risk assets and systems for which continuity of operations plans have been developed	100%

Activity: *Measure Effectiveness*

Definition: Incorporate metrics and other evaluation procedures at the national and sector levels to measure progress and assess effectiveness of the national CI/KR protection program.

Critical Tasks	
Pro.A1a 7.1	Collect and analyze national metrics data
Pro.A1a 7.2	Collect and analyze sector-specific metrics data

Performance Measures	**Metrics**
Frequency with which national metrics data is collected and reported	Annually
Frequency with which sector-specific metrics data is collected and reported	Annually

Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship to Capability
CBRNE Detection	The CBRNE Detection capability may deter attacks on critical infrastructure or may result in the need for specific protective actions.
Economic and Community Recovery	The Economic and Community Recovery capability includes recovery and re-building of critical infrastructure, to include greater protection.
Explosive Device Response Operations	The Explosive Device Response Operations capability may involve the prevention of an explosive device at a critical asset location.
Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense	Because Food and Agriculture is one of the 17 critical infrastructure sectors, the CIP capability provides the initial line of protection for this industry.
Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings	Locally generated threat and other criminal and/or terrorism-related information that results from this capability is used to establish the threat picture that forms the basis for risk in the CIP Capability
Intelligence Analysis and Production	The actionable intelligence/information products produced by this capability can indicate the need for specific protective measures in the CIP capability.
Intelligence/Information Sharing and Dissemination	Intelligence/information sharing mechanisms support the coordination among security partners in the CIP capability.
Law Enforcement Investigations and Operations	Law enforcement investigations and operations are one method of deterring and thus preventing attacks on critical infrastructure.
Planning	Emergency plans developed under this capability will be coordinated with sector-specific CIP plans.
Public Safety and Security Response	Use of law enforcement for public safety and security is one form of protection for critical infrastructure assets.
Restoration of Lifelines	Restoration of Lifelines addresses the immediate restoration of critical infrastructure (e.g., water, power, etc).

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Linked Capability	Relationship to Capability
Risk Management	Risk Management involves the processes used to prioritize CI/KR for protection.
Structural Damage and Mitigation Assessment	Structural Damage and Mitigation Assessment addresses the structural inspection of critical infrastructure to inform and prioritize mitigation resources.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) planning personnel	
Public and private sector coordinators	
Risk analysis personnel	
Personnel to complete vulnerability assessments	
Infrastructure Security Specialists	
Infrastructure Intelligence Analysts	
National Infrastructure Protection Plan	Per Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 7
CIP Research and Development Plan	Per HSPD 7
CIP Plans	Per HSPD 7
Risk assessment standards	
Equipment for detection	
Equipment for protection	
Equipment for mitigation	
Vulnerability assessment training	National training program for Federal, State, and local personnel
Risk assessment training	National training program for Federal, State, and local personnel
System to "red team" critical infrastructure protective measures and technology	
Critical infrastructure prevention/protection attack exercises	Exercise programs compliant with Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

Planning Assumptions

- Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) may be applicable to any of the 15 National Planning Scenarios, as any terrorist, accidental, or natural catastrophic event could disrupt or destroy critical infrastructure assets or key resources in one or more critical infrastructure/key resource (CI/KR) sectors. However, for purposes of determining National Targets, no scenarios were specifically considered, because much of the CIP activities take place on an ongoing basis between incidents. Although protective activities are also implemented in response to particular threats or events,

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information regarding whether an affected assets is considered "critical" needs to be provided before any implementation can occur.

- Under the CIP process defined in the Interim NIPP, protection of CI/KR requires an initial determination of whether the asset/system in question is "critical" and the risks being posed. Therefore, protection activities are conducted on a case-by-case basis.
- Resource needs at the State and local level may be determined through the development of a model that takes into account the presence and density of CI/KR assets in various geographic areas.
- The understanding of criticality related to interdependent systems continues to evolve. Additional guidance will be provided as it is developed.
- State and local law enforcement is available to support CI/KR protection efforts, as required.
- Critical infrastructure information is able to be shared between Federal and State authorities and the private sector in a protected and secure way.

National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
DHS	CIP planning personnel	Personnel	As needed	Per agency	Develop and Maintain Plans Measure Effectiveness
Federal Sector Specific Agencies	CIP planning personnel	Personnel	As needed	Per agency	Develop and Maintain Plans Measure Effectiveness
State	CIP planning personnel	Personnel	As needed	Per State	Develop and Maintain Plans Measure Effectiveness
DHS	Public and Private Sector Coordinators	Personnel	As needed	Per agency	Coordinate
Federal Sector Specific Agencies	Public and Private Sector Coordinators	Personnel	As needed	Per agency	Coordinate
State	Public and Private Sector Coordinators	Personnel	As needed	Per State	Coordinate
DHS	Risk analysis personnel	Personnel	As needed	Per agency	Assess Risk Prioritize
Federal Sector Specific	Risk analysis personnel	Personnel	As needed	Per agency	Assess Risk Prioritize

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
Agencies					
State	Risk analysis personnel	Personnel	As needed	Per State	Assess Risk Prioritize
DHS	Personnel for vulnerability assessments	Personnel	As needed	Per agency	Assess Risk Prioritize
Federal Sector Specific Agencies	Personnel for vulnerability assessments	Personnel	As needed	Per agency	Assess Risk Prioritize
State	Personnel for vulnerability assessments	Personnel	As needed	Per State	Assess Risk Prioritize
DHS	Infrastructure Security Specialists	Personnel	As needed	Per agency	Protect
Federal Sector Specific Agencies	Infrastructure Security Specialists	Personnel	As needed	Per agency	Protect
State	Infrastructure Security Specialists	Personnel	As needed	Per State	Protect
DHS	Infrastructure Intelligence Analysts	Personnel	As needed	Per agency	Assess Risk
Federal Sector Specific Agencies	Infrastructure Intelligence Analysts	Personnel	As needed	Per agency	Assess Risk
State	Infrastructure Intelligence Analysts	Personnel	As needed	Per State	Assess Risk
Federal	National Infrastructure Protection Plan	Planning			All activities
Federal	CIP Research and Development Plan	Planning			All activities
State/Regional	CIP Plans	Planning			All activities
Federal	Risk assessment	Planning			Assess risk
All levels	Equipment for	Equipment	As needed	Per asset	Protect

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
	detection				
All Levels	Equipment for protection	Equipment	As needed	Per asset	Protect
All levels	Equipment for mitigation	Equipment	As needed	Per asset	Protect
Federal/State	Vulnerability assessment training	Training			Assess Risk
Federal/State	Risk assessment training	Training			Assess Risk
Federal	System to Red Team critical infrastructure protective measures and technology	Exercises			All Activities
Federal (with State/local participation)	Critical Infrastructure prevention and protection attack exercises	Exercises			All Activities

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FOOD AND AGRICULTURE SAFETY AND DEFENSE

Capability Definition

Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense is the capability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from chemical, biological and radiological contaminants, and other hazards that affect the safety of food and agricultural products. This includes the timely eradication of outbreaks of crop diseases/pests, assessments of the integrity of the food producing industry, the removal and disposal of potentially compromised materials from the U.S. food supply, and decontamination of affected food manufacturing facilities or retail points of purchase or service. This also includes appropriate laboratory surveillance to detect human foodborne illness or food product contamination. It is accomplished concurrent to protecting public health and maintaining domestic and international confidence in the U.S. commercial food supply. Additionally, the public is provided with accurate and timely notification and instructions related to an event and appropriate steps to follow with regard to disposal of affected food or agricultural products and appropriate decontamination procedures.

Outcome

Threats to food and agriculture safety are prevented, mitigated, and eradicated; trade in agricultural products is restored; affected products are disposed of; affected facilities are decontaminated; public and plant health are protected, notification of the event and instructions of appropriate actions are effectively communicated with all stakeholders; and confidence in the U.S. food supply is maintained.

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

This capability supports the following Emergency Support Functions (ESFs)/Annexes:

ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services
ESF #11: Agriculture and Natural Resources
Biological Incident Annex
Interim Draft Food and Agriculture Incident Annex
Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex

Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Critical Tasks	
Pro.A1a 5.2	Conduct vulnerability assessments of sector-specific critical infrastructure and key resources
Pro.B1b 1.3	Develop methods for emergency assessment of firms that manufacture, prepare, and hold U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) regulated commodities
Pro.B1b 1.4	Develop methods for emergency assessment of firms that manufacture, prepare, and hold U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-regulated commodities
Pro.B1b 1.5.2	Create emergency response plan for response to all food operations for retail, food service, mass feeding, and food processing facilities

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Pro.B1b 1.2.2	Develop emergency guidelines and operation criteria for retail food, wholesale, and processing during disasters
Pro.B1b 1.3	Develop communications plan for food safety for regulated facilities and the general public
Pro.B1b 1.4.1	Develop guidelines or procedures for properly conducting a coordinated outbreak investigation of food and agricultural events
Pro.B1b 1.5	Develop, adapt, or implement plans to support incident command (IC), unified command (UC), or other agencies as needed for food and agricultural safety response
Pro.B1b 1.4	Develop plans, procedures, and programs for responding to an agricultural disease event
Pro.B1b 1.6.1	Prepare food and agriculture emergency public information plans
Pro.B1b 1.6.2	Develop a food and agriculture crisis communications plan
Res.B1b 1	Develop plans, policies, procedures, and systems for responder safety and health
Pro.B1b 1.3	Develop plans, procedures, and policies for coordinating, managing, and disseminating public information regarding food and agricultural safety
Res.B1f 1.3	Plan and provide for external media support and operations
Res.B1f 1.1.5	Develop and maintain emergency declaration protocols and template
Res.B1f 1.2.4	Develop a communications network with State homeland security departments

Preparedness Measures	**Metrics**
Procedures in place for:	
▪ Sample collection	Yes/No
▪ Maintaining chain of custody of laboratory samples	Yes/No
▪ After hours receipt of samples	Yes/No
▪ Triaging samples dependent on priority	Yes/No
▪ Traceback/trace forward investigations	Yes/No
▪ Rapidly informing the public once the contaminated food has been identified	Yes/No
▪ Coordinating public communications between government, academia, and the private sector	Yes/No
▪ Controlling contaminated products (i.e. seizure, embargo, condemnation, administrative detention)	Yes/No
▪ Appropriate disposal of affected food and/or agricultural products	Yes/No
▪ Appropriate decontamination of affected food facilities	Yes/No
▪ Quick recall of affected food or agricultural products from the marketplace	Yes/No
▪ Verifying effectiveness and timeliness of food and agricultural product recalls	Yes/No
Memoranda of agreements are in place to facilitate response	Yes/No
Field staff or other designated first responders are appropriately qualified	Yes/No
Field staff or other designated first responders have hazard awareness training	Yes/No
Redundant emergency communication capabilities are in place	Yes/No

Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs	
Critical Tasks	
Pro.B1b 2.1.1	Develop and conduct emergency food safety response training to field staff and managers of State/local food programs having responsibility for food safety response (training should include appropriate job safety training)

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Pro.B1b 2.1.2	Provide food safety training to responders and volunteers

Preparedness Measures	Metric
Field staff or other designated first responders have:	
▪ Hazard awareness training	Yes/No
▪ NIMS Training	Yes/No

Performance Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: *Direct Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense Operations*

Definition: In response to a notification of an existing threat of food contamination or crop disease, provide the management and coordination of the epidemiological and food establishment investigations as well as appropriate food and crop control measures to stop further cases of illness or disease.

Critical Tasks	
Pro.B1b 3.3.2	Dispatch food and agriculture personnel to location of suspected contamination
Res.B1a 4	Activate the on-site incident command system
Pro.B1b 3.4.4	Request food and agriculture resources needed for response to field operations
Pro.B1b 3.1.2	Coordinate with Federal, State, and local agencies to ensure the safety and security of meat, poultry, and egg products in retail groceries and food service establishments and institutions
Pro.B1b 3.1.3	Coordinate with Federal, State, and local agencies to ensure the safety and security of products in retail and food service establishments and institutions
Pro.B1b 3.4.1	Coordinate food and agriculture emergency management plans at the local, State, and national levels
Res.B1f 5.1.1	Coordinate the provision of timely and accurate emergency public information through the Joint Information System (JIS)
Res.B1c 8.1.1	Provide direction, information, and support as appropriate to Incident Command (IC) or unified command (UC) and joint field offices
Res.B1c 4	Activate the Emergency Operations Center
Res.B1c 3	Direct and coordinate EOC operations
Pro.B1b 3.4.4	Establish and maintain food and agricultural safety response communication systems
Pro.B1b 3.4	Coordinate food and agricultural safety response operations and support
Pro.B1b 3.2	Manage surveillance activities for agriculture and natural resources
Pro.B1b 3.3	Coordinate food and agriculture investigation activities
Pro.B1b 3.3.4	Coordinate food and agriculture evidence preservation procedures
Pro.B1b 3.5.1	Coordinate food recovery programs
Pro.B1b 3.5.2	Coordinate food facility decontamination
Pro.B1b 3.5.2.1	Coordinate cleaning and decontamination of affected food facilities
Pro.B1b 3.5.3	Coordinate the disposal of contaminated food
Pro.B1b 3.5.4	Coordinate agricultural recovery programs
Pro.B1b 3.1.6	Ensure the safety, efficacy, and security of regulated foods, the blood supply, drugs, medical devices, and other U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)-regulated products

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Pro.B1b 3.1	Ensure the Nation's commercial supply of food is safe and secure following an incident of national significance
Pro.B1b 3.3.1	Implement guidelines or procedures for properly conducting a coordinated outbreak investigation of food and agricultural events
Pro.B1b 3.4.1.1	Ensure close coordination and cooperation among regional, State, Federal, and international agencies and with the private sector and nongovernmental associations to facilitate food and agriculture response efforts
Pro.B1b 3.2.1	Direct agricultural processes for surveillance and testing and isolation or quarantine for threats to agricultural assets and the food supply
Pro.B1b 3.3.3	Provide food and agriculture laboratory and diagnostic support, subject matter expertise, and technical assistance
Pro.B1b 3.4.3	Ensure the adequacy of food and agriculture resources
Pro.B1b 3.4.3.2	Request subject matter expertise from supporting agencies to assist in the response and recovery effort
Pro.B1b 3.4.3.3	Establish regional and State plans and protocols for food and agricultural safety response and requests for assistance
Pro.B1b 3.4.2	Activate food and agriculture safety and defense personnel

Performance Measures	Metric
Appropriate numbers of trained personnel have been identified to respond to the State or local EOC and possibly the Joint Operations Center	Yes/No
Boilerplate consumer messages have been developed	Yes/No
Assets for decontamination procedures have been identified	Yes/No
Decontamination is conducted in accordance with local protocol for all contaminated personnel, equipment, and animals	Yes/No
Determination of quantity of food product returned has been made	Percentage of product returned
Protective gear is available for field staff or other designated first responders	Yes/No

Activity: *Conduct Surveillance*

Definition: In response to a notification that food products are contaminated or that crops are diseased, establish and implement a plan to expand on-going surveillance activities to focus on additional food products, crops, and facilities that might be affected.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B2e 5.1	Conduct epidemiological investigations as surveillance reports warrants, and coordinate federal, state, and local veterinary assistance assets/services
Pro.B1b 4.2	Search actively for food and agriculture cases
Pro.B1b 4.2.2.2	Initiate food and agriculture database and data management
Pro.B1a 4.3.1	Develop basic case descriptions by conducting interviews and reviewing medical records
Pro.B1b 4.3	Conduct food and agriculture laboratory detection and confirmation
Pro.B1b 4.3.3	Disseminate food and agriculture laboratory testing results to appropriate stakeholders/partners
Pro.B1b 4.3.2	Maintain chain-of-custody of all food and agriculture evidence
Pro.B1b 4.2.2.1	Integrate surveillance findings related to food and agriculture
Pro.B1b 4.2.2	Compile information about threats to food.

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Pro.B1b 4.3.1	Use the results from a food sample analysis to determine the breadth of contamination.

Performance Measures	Metric
Time to implementation of a surveillance plan upon determination of a specific food product associated with illness or the presence of a diseased crop	Within 24 hours of confirmed food product association or crop disease
Time to initiate individual or joint USDA/FDA-DOJ investigation into source of contamination of identified food product or diseased crop	Within 24 hours of confirmed food product association or crop disease
Frequency of inspection for surveillance of food products at manufacturing, distribution, retail, or food service facilities	In accordance with Federal and State protocol
Federal/State authorities had access to laboratories with validated methods for detection/identification of pathogens, chemical, biological, and radiological contaminants	Yes/No

Activity: *Trace Suspect Products*

Definition: Conduct investigations to determine the source(s) of contamination and identify other products, crops, and facilities that could be contaminated.

Critical Tasks	
Pro.B1b 5.1.1	Collect and preserve contaminated food and agriculture evidence
Pro.B1b 5.1.2	Collect and preserve non-contaminated food and agriculture evidence
Pro.B1b 5.2	Inspect the safety and security of the food infrastructure in the affected area
Pro.B1b 5.3	Inspect the safety and security of the agricultural infrastructure in the affected area
Pro.B1b 5.2.3	Inspect and monitor meat, poultry, and egg establishments that can continue to operate in the affected area
Pro.B1b 5.2.2	Inspect food facilities that can continue to operate in the affected area
Pro.B1b 5.2.4	Use laboratory testing and field investigations to identify products that are safe and fit for human consumption
Pro.B1b 5.1.4	Conduct product tracing to determine the source, destination, and disposition of adulterated or contaminated products
Pro.B1b 5.2.1	Conduct inspection and monitoring of food products and establishments in affected areas.
Pro.B1b 5.3.1	Conduct inspection and monitoring of agriculture products and establishments in affected areas.
Pro.B1b 5.1.3	Generate possible associations of transmission, exposure, and source of food and agriculture events
Pro.B1b 5.1.5	Identify possible sources of food and agricultural safety event
Pro.B1b 5.4	Identify populations and locations at risk from food and/or agricultural safety event

Performance Measures	Metric
Time to initiate trace back investigation once notified of contaminated food product involved	Within 1 hour after notification
Time to initiate trace forward investigation once notified of contaminated food product involved	Within 1 hour after notification
Time to begin epidemiological investigation from time reported to health department	3 hours

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Time to conduct epidemiological investigation from time reported to health department	2-3 days
Time to begin analysis after samples reach the lab	1 hour
Time for laboratory samples to be analyzed	Dependent on type of contaminant and whether screening and/or confirmatory analysis conducted
Food facilities potentially affected were identified	Yes/No
Time for FBI to be notified if the event appeared to be due to intentional contamination	6-12 hours after notification

Activity: ***Implement Control Measures for Contaminated Food Products or Diseased Crops***

Definition: Implement product recalls/embargoes, alert the public about the situation, and take control of contaminated facilities and products or diseased crops to ensure contaminated products do not enter the food supply and diseased crops are not further distributed.

Critical Tasks	
Pro.B1b 6.3	Secure the contamination source and affected areas during a food and agriculture event
Pro.B1b 6.4.7	Provide appropriate information to the public regarding disposal of potentially contaminated food
Pro.B1b 6.2.1	Determine the need for a food embargo or detention
Pro.B1b 6.2.2	Determine the need for food condemnation, retention, or seizure
Pro.B1b 6.2.3	Determine the need to stop the movement of food
Pro.B1b 6.4.2	Control all identified food safety and inspection service-inspected products at inspected establishments that are suspected of being contaminated through product recall, administrative detention, and plant closures
Pro.B1b 6.4.3	Control any foodstuffs or other HHS-regulated products suspected of being contaminated following an establishment's inspections through product recall, administrative detention, and plant closures
Pro.B1b 6.4.4	Control all identified products at inspected facilities suspected of being contaminated through product recall and administrative detention
Pro.B1b 6.4.5	Stop all interstate movement of regulated plant articles and means of conveyance as needed
Pro.B1b 6.4.6	Provide for embargoed food storage

Performance Measures	**Metric**
Food recall was issued	Yes/No
Recalls are announced to the public	Yes/No
Potentially affected locations are secured to prevent spread of contamination	Yes/No

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Activity: *Conduct Product Disposal and Surface and Food Facility Decontamination* Definition: Dispose of contaminated food products or diseased crops in an environmentally safe manner that prevents its use as a food or food product as well as utilize appropriate procedures for surface and facility decontamination.	
Critical Tasks	
Pro.B1b 7.1.1	Identify assets for food and agriculture decontamination activities
Pro.B1b 7.1	Implement food and agriculture hazardous material disposal plan
Pro.B1b 7.1.2	Conduct surface and facility decontamination
Pro.B1b 7.1.3	Perform food and agriculture clean-up operations
Pro.B1b 7.1.4	Dispose of contaminated food

Performance Measures:	Metric
Hazardous Material Disposal Plan was implemented	Yes/No

Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship
Public Health Laboratory Testing	Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense provide samples to Public Health Laboratory Testing and State Agriculture Departments for testing
Public Health Epidemiological Investigation	Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense will receive epidemiological information to implicate a food product associated with illness
WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination	Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense receives technical decontamination from WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination.
Emergency Public Information and Warning	Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense develops control measures for Emergency Public Information and Warning, which will be released to the public.
Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation	Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation provides information to Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense on the food product associated with illness.
Animal Health and Emergency Support	Animal Health and Emergency Support will provide information to Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense if contaminated animals are associated with human illness.
Economic and Community Recovery	Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense conducts damage assessments for Economic and Community Recovery.
Emergency Operations Center Management	Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense requests resources from Emergency Operations Center Management, who then in turn provides the requested resources. Emergency Operations Center Management and Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense both provide situational reports to each other.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
Incident Command	Fully expanded incident command system (ICS), including subject matter experts (SMEs) (4 – 6 per 24 hours) and policy staff (4 – 6 per 24 hours). SMES include microbiologists, toxicologists, food technologists, veterinarians, epidemiologists, etc.
FDA Emergency Operations Center	To include 24 – 30 support staff, in addition to normal EOC staffing (8 – 10). Includes SMEs
USDA Emergency Operations Center	To include 21 additional staff (from normal operations), including 7 subject matter experts per 8-hour shift
USDA/FSIS Emergency Management Committee (EMC)	EMC composed of the most senior managers from all program areas. Operations of EMC managed by the Biosurveillance and Emergency Response Staff (9 staff members)
State Emergency Operations Centers	With 60 staff
Human Disease Surveillance Team	Team of experts to track all reportable disease and specified syndromes within a defined area; includes 1 supervisor (MD, PhD, or Doctor of Veterinary Medicine (DVM)), 2 epidemiologists, 1 IT staff per, and 1 statistician per 8 hour shift per team
Food Investigation Team	Field teams of 4 people to collect food samples and trace back and trace forward information at food facilities
Decontamination Team	Field teams of 4 people to decontaminate affected food facilities. Requires additional supervisor and SMEs
Disposal Team	Field teams of 4 people to dispose of affected food products. Requires additional supervisor and SMEs
Laboratory personnel (sample analysis)	Laboratory analysts capable of analyzing 200 samples/ lab/ week
Laboratory personnel (confirmatory testing)	Laboratory analysis capable of analyzing 50 confirmatory samples/ lab/ week
Risk Communication Team	Coordinated Federal/State response
Embargo/Recall Team	Coordinated Federal/State/local response; includes compliance officers and recall staff
Public information staff	Coordinated Federal/State/local response
Law enforcement – secure scene	Coordinated Federal/State/local response
Law enforcement – investigate event	Coordinated Federal/State/local response
IT support	One Blackberry, one cell phone, one laptop, and one portable printer for each person deployed
Additional transportation	Vehicles to transport personnel

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Planning Assumptions

Scenario-Specific

- Although applicable to several of the 15 National Planning Scenarios except for blister agents and nerve agents, the capability planning factors were developed from an in-depth analysis of the Food Contamination scenario. Other scenarios were reviewed to identify required adjustments or additions to the planning factors and national targets.
- The capability applies to a wide range of incidents and emergencies including accidental or deliberate disease outbreaks, natural disasters, nuclear and conventional events with potential for contamination of the food supply.
- The identification of an intentional contamination incident involving a food product in the U.S. would have national implications. Because of the movement of food products around the US, it is highly probable that multiple food facilities in multiple States would be contaminated. Even States that eventually are found to have no contaminated product will initially require a stepped up effort to ensure that no contaminated product is in their State. If terrorists were to introduce a chemical or biological agent into a food product at multiple sites simultaneously, the requirements for resources would increase proportionately and exist in many States simultaneously. The requirements for tactical (incident command) resources will increase proportionately with the amount of product/products contaminated.
- It is likely that States would share resources, yet States would have to balance the sharing of resources with their need to protect public health within their State. The amount of tactical resource requirements would vary depending on the concentration of food facilities. In high concentration areas, the spread may be rapid and many food facilities that purchased contaminated food may be affected. In areas with low concentration of food facilities/people, logistical obstacles such as driving time or distance between involved locations may present additional challenges. The multiplication factors used to gear up from a single point introduction incident to a multiple (national) site introduction assumes resource requirements to increase proportionately with the number of introductions. In estimating national resource requirements, it was assumed the scenario would affect 25 States directly, but all 50 States would have increased workload. The time to resolve the scenario would vary depending on number of site introductions and multiple different food items contaminated.
- This scenario is very limited in scope and only lists a food commodity regulated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (ground beef). The Food and Drug Administration regulates 80 percent of the nation's food supply – everything except meat, poultry, and egg products which are regulated by USDA. Other scenarios could have potentially more far reaching effects. This is based on vulnerability assessments conducted by FDA and USDA.
- Assume all response personnel in key positions are able to respond to their respective response positions after the contaminant has been introduced and they respond as expected.
- Assume that sector partners are connected to an information sharing and analysis or fusion system concept where preventative and protective measure information is proactively being shared.
- Lack of infrastructure – electricity, phones, transportation, etc., will affect the ability to effectively communicate and will significantly affect the ability to plan appropriately or to respond to an incident. For example, if the roads are non-passable due to a natural disaster, this will affect the ability to get to the affected area and ensure the safety and security of the food supply.
- Assume that Multi-Agency Coordination is adequately being addressed at the State, Federal and local levels and the agencies are coordinating as expected.
- The following information is needed to effectively detect/respond to/recover from to an event:
  - Quantity of product affected.
  - Distribution of product.

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- Product type or types contaminated.
- Laboratory capability.
- Ability to determine the cause of illness.
- Ability to determine the food item associated with illness or to rule out certain food items.
- Ability to trace back product.
- Ability to trace forward product.
- Ability to effectively recall all affected product.
- Appropriate disposal of recalled product.
- Appropriate decontamination of food facility or other locations where food was available for purchase.
- Risk communication to consumers about appropriate food disposal instructions.
- Communication with international partners.
- Recovery Timeline could potentially be months due to the breadth of the event.

Planning Factors from an In-Depth Analysis of a Scenario with Significant Demand for the Capability (Food Contamination)

Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Incident Command	Fully Expanded incident command system (ICS)	Federal Sufficient numbers to respond to 25 State incident State Sufficient numbers to respond to 25 State incident. Additional staff 4-6 SME* per 24 hours 4-6 policy staff per 24 hours *SMEs are microbiologists, toxicologists, food technologists, veterinarians, epidemiologists, etc.	Assume normal staffing for activation of all appropriate emergency operation centers (EOCs) in place In addition to normal staffing, Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) and policy staff needed to support the response Additional staff 4-6 SME* per 24 hours 4-6 policy staff per 24 hours
FDA Emergency Operations Center	To manage the FDA Emergency Operations Center facility	Based on staffing for a one month period In additional to normal staffing, the EOC would need 8-10 people/8 hour shift	24-30 additional staff
USDA Emergency Operations Center	To mange the USDA Emergency Operations Facility	Based on staffing for a one month period In additional to normal staffing, the EOC would need 7 SMEs/8 hour shift	21 additional staff

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Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
USDA/FSIS Emergency Management Committee (EMC)	To manage large-scale food emergencies and non-routine incidents in an established Situation Room.	Composed of the most senior representatives of all program areas. Can be activated 24/7	
State Emergency Operations Centers	To manage the response within each State	60 Staff is the normal operating number In addition to normal staffing, 6-8 SMEs and policy staff would be needed/ 8 hour shift	18-24 additional staff
Local Emergency Operations Centers	To manage the response within each locality	5 - 20 staff This is entirely dependent on the size of the locality	5 - 20 staff
Human disease surveillance personnel	Track all reportable disease and specified syndromes within a defined area	1 supervisor (MD, PhD, or Doctor of Veterinary Medicine (DVM)) per 8 hour shift, 2 epidemiologists per 8 hour shift, 1 IT staff per 8 hour shift per team, 1 statistician per 8 hour shift per team	Assume 100% staff needs for 30 days at 25 locations All 30 days: 20 supervisors 40 epidemiologists 20 IT staff 20 statisticians
Food Investigation Team	Coordinated Federal/State/local response to food facilities, conduct investigations, and collect samples at food facilities in all 50 States Initially all 50 states will be on heightened alert and will be investigating food facilities in each State	25 field teams of 4 people per food facility for 2 days to collect traceback and trace forward information and take product samples, teams may be split in order to cover a larger number of facilities Assume 1000 food facilities per State are potentially contaminated	100 staff/State x 50 States = 5000 staff
Decontamination Team	Coordinated Federal/State/local response at all affected food facilities in 25 States	Field team of 4 people per affected facility. Assume 10 teams/State. Assume that decontamination takes 2 days per facility Assume 100 food facilities per State are contaminated Assume 5 SMEs per State Assume 1 supervisor per 10	40 staff/State x 25 States = 1000 staff 5 SME/State x 25 States = 125 staff 112 supervisors

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Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
		employees	
Disposal Team	Coordinated Federal/State/local response to dispose of affected food products in 25 States	Field team of 4 people per disposal site: assume 50 sites per State Also assume 5 semi-tractor trailers are needed per affected facility Assume 100 facilities per state have product that needs to be properly disposed Assume 5 SME per State Assume 1 supervisor per 10 employees	200 staff/State x 25 States = 5000 staff 500 semi-tractor trailers are needed 5 SME x 25 States = 125 staff 512 supervisors
Laboratory Personnel (Sample Analysis)	Capability to analyze 200 samples/lab/week in each of 50 states	20 lab analysts/State lab Assume at least one Food Emergency Response Network lab per State Assume 1 supervisor per 10 employees	1000 laboratory analysts 100 supervisors
Laboratory Personnel (Confirmatory Testing) PulseNet, etc	Capability to analyze 50 confirmatory samples/lab/week in each of 50 States	5 lab analysts/State lab Assume 1 supervisor per 10 employees	250 laboratory analysts 25 supervisors
Risk Communication Team	Coordinated Federal/State response in 50 states	5-10/State 5 per Federal agency involved (Assume 5 Federal agencies are involved)	5-10/State x 50 States = 250-500 staff at State level 5/Federal agency x 5 Federal agencies = 25 staff at Federal level
Embargo/Recall Team	Coordinated Federal/State/local response in 25 States	10 compliance officers/State 5 recall staff/State 5 recall staff at Federal level at HQ 6-10 Federal compliance officers (FDA and USDA)/State	10 compliance officers/State x 25 States =250 compliance officers at the State level 5 x 25 = 125 recall staff/State 5 x 25 = 125 recall staff at Federal level 6-10 x 25 = 150-250 Federal compliance officers participating at the State level

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Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Public information staff	Coordinated Federal/State/local response in 50 States	4 staff /8 hour shift at State level 5 staff per Federal agency (Assume 5 Federal agencies are involved)	12 staff/24 hours for each state = 600 staff total 25 staff at Federal level
Law enforcement – secure scene	Coordinated Federal/State/local response in 25 States	2 staff per contaminated facility Assume 100 facilities are contaminated per State	2 staff x 100 facilities x 25 States = 500 personnel
Law enforcement – investigate event	Coordinated Federal/State/local response in 25 States	2 staff per contaminated facility Assume 100 facilities are contaminated per State	2 staff x 100 facilities x 25 States = 500 personnel
IT support	25 States	One per 20 staff One Blackberry, one cell phone, one laptop, and one portable printer for each person deployed	700 IT support staff 12,000 blackberries 12,000 cell phones 12,000 laptops 12,000 portable printers
Additional transportation	Vehicles to transport personnel within 25 States	One vehicle per two people deployed	6,000 vehicles

National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
State	Incident Command Center	Resource Organization	2	Central and backup per State	Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems Direct Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense Operations Implement Control Measures for Contaminated Products Conduct Product

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
					Disposal and Food Facility Decontamination
FDA	FDA Emergency Operations Center	Federal Resource Organization	1	Nationally	Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems Direct Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense Operations Implement Control Measures for Contaminated Products
USDA	USDA Emergency Operations Center	Federal Resource Organization	1	Nationally	Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems Direct Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense Operations Trace Suspect Products Implement Control Measures for Contaminated Products Conduct Product Disposal, Surface, and Food Facility Decontamination
State	State Emergency Operations Center (EOC)	Resource Organization	2	Central and backup per	Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems Direct Food and Agriculture Safety and

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
					Defense Operations Implement Control Measures for Contaminated Products Conduct Product Disposal, Surface, and Food Facility Decontamination
USDA/FSIS	USDA/FSIS Emergency Management Committee (EMC)	Federal Resource Organization	1	Nationally	Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs, and Systems Direct Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense Operations Trace Suspect Products Implement Control Measures for Contaminated Products
State	Human Disease Surveillance Team	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	1	Per State	Surveillance
State	Food Investigation Team	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	25	Per State	Surveillance Trace Suspect Products
State	Decontamination Team	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	10	Per State	Implement Control Measures for Contaminated Products
State	Decontamination Supervisors	Personnel	1	Per 10 decontamination employees	Conduct Product Disposal, Surface, and Food Facility Decontamination
State	Decontamination SMEs	Personnel	5	Per affected State	Conduct Product Disposal, Surface, and Food Facility Decontamination

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
State	Disposal Team	Resource Organization	50	Teams per State	Conduct Product Disposal, Surface, and Food Facility Decontamination
State	Semi-tractor trailers for disposal	Equipment	5	Per affected facility	Conduct Product Disposal, Surface, and Food Facility Decontamination
State	Disposal Supervisors	Personnel	1	Per 10 disposal employees	Conduct Product Disposal, Surface, and Food Facility Decontamination
State	Disposal SMEs	Personnel	5	Per affected State	Conduct Product Disposal, Surface, and Food Facility Decontamination
State	Sample Analysis Laboratory Personnel	Personnel	20	Per State Lab	Surveillance
State	Sample Analysis Laboratory Supervisor	Personnel	1	Per 10 laboratory employees	Surveillance
State	Confirmatory Testing Laboratory Personnel	Personnel	5	Per State laboratory	Surveillance
State	Confirmatory Testing Laboratory Supervisor	Personnel	1	Per 10 laboratory employees	Surveillance
Federal FDA USDA	Risk Communication Team	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	5	Per Federal agency involved	Implement Control Measures for Contaminated Products
States	Risk Communication Team	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	5 - 10	Per State	Implement Control Measures for Contaminated Products
Federal FDA USDA	Embargo/recall staff	Personnel	5	Per affected State	Implement Control Measures for Contaminated Products
State	Embargo/recall staff	Personnel	5	Per affected State	Implement Control Measures for Contaminated Products
Federal FDA USDA	Embargo/recall compliance officers	personnel	2	Per affected State	Implement Control Measures for Contaminated Products
State	Embargo/recall	personnel	10	Per affected	Implement Control

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
	compliance officers			State	Measures for Contaminated Products
Federal FDA USDA	Public information staff	Resource Organization	5	Per Agency involved	Implement Control Measures for Contaminated Products
State	Public information staff	Personnel	12	Per affected State	Implement Control Measures for Contaminated Products
Federal FBI	FBI	Personnel	As needed	Per incident	Implement Control Measures for Contaminated Products
State	Law enforcement for security	Personnel	2	Per affected site	Implement Control Measures for Contaminated Products
State	Law enforcement – for investigation	Personnel	2	Per affected site	Implement Control Measures for Contaminated Products
State	IT support staff	Personnel	1	Per 20 staff deployed	All Activities
State	IT equipment cache	Equipment	1	Per person deployed	All Activities
State	Additional transportation	Vehicles	1	Per 2 people deployed	Trace Suspect Product Implement Control Measures for Infected and/or Contaminated Products Conduct Product Disposal, Surface, and Food Facility Decontamination

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EPIDEMIOLOGICAL SURVEILLANCE AND INVESTIGATION

Capability Definition

The Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation capability is the capacity to rapidly conduct epidemiological investigations. It includes exposure and disease (both deliberate release and naturally occurring) detection, rapid implementation of active surveillance, maintenance of ongoing surveillance activities, epidemiological investigation, analysis, and communicating with the public and providers about case definitions, disease risk and mitigation, and recommendation for the implementation of control measures.

Outcome

Potential exposure and disease is identified rapidly (determine exposure, mode of transmission and agent, and interrupt transmission to contain the spread of the event and reduce number of cases). Confirmed cases are reported immediately to all relevant public health, food regulatory, environmental regulatory and law enforcement agencies. Suspected cases are investigated promptly, reported to relevant public health authorities, and accurately confirmed to ensure appropriate preventive or curative countermeasures are implemented. An outbreak is defined and characterized; new suspect cases are identified and characterized based on case definitions on an ongoing basis; relevant clinical specimens are obtained and transported for confirmatory laboratory testing; the source of exposure is tracked; methods of transmission identified; and effective mitigation measures are communicated to the public, providers and relevant agencies are recommended, as appropriate.

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

This capability supports the following Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annexes:

ESF#8: Public Health and Medical Services
Biological Incident Annex
Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex

Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Critical Tasks	
Pro.B1a 1.1.4	Develop and maintain efficient surveillance systems supported by information systems that comply with PHIN functional requirements for *Early Event Detection, Outbreak Management* and *Countermeasure and Response Administration* to facilitate early detection, mitigation and evaluation of expected and unexpected public health conditions
Pro.B1a 1.1.5	Distinguish on the State list of notifiable conditions between select conditions that require immediate reporting to the public health agency (at a minimum, Cat A agents), and conditions for which a delay in reporting is acceptable
Pro.B1a 1.2.1.1	Describe time frames for notification for conditions where a delay in reporting is acceptable,

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Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Preparedness Measures	**Metrics**
Epidemiological and laboratory emergency plans in place	Yes/No
Epidemiological emergency response plans delineate the epidemiological investigation steps and include:	
Surveillance – ongoing and event-specific collection of health data	Yes/No
Compare cases to the baseline and confirm diagnosis	Yes/No
Case finding – actively search for cases	Yes/No
Conduct contact tracing	Yes/No
Identify/develop information systems to support the epidemiological investigation that comply with PHIN functional requirements for *Outbreak Management* and *Countermeasure and Response Administration* including a protocol for management/flow of data	Yes/No
Develop description of cases through interviews, medical record review and other mechanisms (person, place and time)	Yes/No
Generate possible associations of transmission, exposure and source	Yes/No
Identify population at risk	Yes/No
Coordinate with environmental investigation	Yes/No
Perform and analyze definitive studies	Yes/No
Report appropriate information to partners	Yes/No
Evaluate therapeutic outcome	Yes/No
Monitor adverse reactions to public health interventions	Yes/No
Chain of evidence and chain of custody protocols are followed according to SOP – zero loss of evidence or specimens	Yes/No
State notifiable conditions list distinguishes between select conditions that require immediate reporting to the public health agency (at a minimum, Cat A agents), and conditions for which a delay in reporting is acceptable	Yes/No

Performance Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: *Direct Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation Operations* Definition: Coordinate, maintain, enhance, analyze, and provide efficient surveillance and information systems to facilitate early detection and mitigation of disease.	
Critical Tasks	
Pro.B1a 3.3.2	Identify applicable laws, policies, and implementation procedures for public health reporting and notification
Pro.B1a 3.3.1	Maintain public health communication channels supported by information systems that comply with the PHIIN functional requirements for *Partner Communications and Alerting*
Pro.B1a 3.3.3	Provide Public Health information to emergency public information for release
Pro.B1a 3.2.3	Coordinate resources needed to respond to public health concern
Pro.B1a 3.1	Lead public health investigations to determine source of disease in collaboration with law enforcement

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Pro.B1a 3.2.2	Identify all stakeholders and agency representatives or liaisons for public health response
Pro.B1a 4.5.1	Report instances of disease that raise the index of suspicion of terrorist or criminal involvement to FBI Headquarters (National Response Plan)
Pro.B1a 3.3.4	Make public health recommendations for prophylaxis and other interventions
Pro.B1a 3.2.4	Coordinate examination of deceased suspect patients with the medical examiner and/or coroner

Performance Measures	Metric
Time for State to notify local or local to notify State of receipt of notice of a case with a high index of suspicion of an immediately notifiable condition	Within 1 hour of receipt
Time to issue information to the public that acknowledges the event, provides status, and commits to continued communication once a response plan is activated	Within 60 minutes of implementing response plan
Time from case definition to dissemination of case finding and public health instruction to all hospitals in jurisdiction through the Health Alert Network (HAN) whose supporting information systems comply with the PHIN functional requirements for *Partner Communications and Alerting.*	Within 12 hours of case definition
Percent of public health epidemiological staff with sufficient equipment (e.g., PPE, IT, communication, clinical sampling equipment, specimen collection material) to conduct investigation	100%
Time to have a knowledgeable public health professional answer a call of urgent public health consequence 24/7/365	15 minutes or less
Time to obtain message approval and authorization for distribution of public health and medical information to clinicians and other responders once message has been finalized	Within 60 minutes

Activity: *Surveillance and Detection*

Definition: Collect ongoing and event-specific health data to recognize events of public health significance.

Critical Tasks	
Pro.B1a 4.5.4	Facilitate reporting consistent with disease reporting laws or regulations
Pro.B1a 4.3	Compile surveillance data
Pro.B1a 4.4	Analyze surveillance data
Pro.B1a 4.2.1	Detect suspected outbreak through pattern recognition
Pro.B1a 4.3.3	Maintain chain of custody
Pro.B1a 4.3.2	Have or have access to PHIN compliant information systems to support detecting events of public health significance and tracking of chain of custody

Performance Measures	Metric
Ability exists to receive, review, and analyze data warranting public health attention	Yes/No

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Activity: *Conduct Epidemiological Investigation*

Definition: Investigate a disease and its determinants in a population; characterize and classify a case; identify the source of the public health event; and define the population at risk.

Critical Tasks	
Pro.B1a 5	Conduct epidemiological investigations
Pro.B1a 5.3	Confirm the outbreak using lab data and disease tracking data
Pro.B1a 5.2.1	Define case characteristics
Pro.B1a 5.3.1	Search actively for cases (case finding)
Pro.B1a 5.3.2	Create registries of ill, exposed, and potentially exposed persons
Pro.B1a 5.4	Conduct contact tracing
Pro.B1a 5.4.1	Analyze and interpret epidemiological investigation data in coordination with data from law enforcement investigation
Pro.B1a 5.4.2	Analyze and confirm origin of outbreak
Pro.B1a 5.5.1	Recommend control measures for outbreak
Pro.B1a 5.6	Draft and disseminate initial report of epidemiological investigation
Pro.B1a 5.6.1	Have or have access to information systems to support investigating, describing and understanding events of public health significance that comply with the PHIN Functional Area *Outbreak Management*

Performance Measures	Metric
Time from initial notification to public health epidemiologist to initiate initial investigation	Within 3 hours of initial notification
Time from first identification of agent to first recommendation for public health intervention	Within 6 hours of identification of agent
Time to identify suspect case and send to key Federal, State, and local public health partners (e.g., CDC, FBI, law enforcement, State, and local)	Within 3 hours
Time from laboratory confirmation of index case(s)/agent to creation of case definitions	Within 12 hours of confirmation of index case
Time for a health alert that describes the initial report of an indexed case along with known cases, possible risk factors, and initial public health interventions to be distributed via Epi-X, Health Alert Network (HAN), fax, and e-mail	Within 12 hours of initiation of case investigation
Time for active case findings in all affected States to be initiated	Within 24 hours of established working case definition.
Time from initial laboratory confirmation of high priority diseases or events with suspicion of terrorism to notification of law enforcement	Within one hour of confirmation.
Time from epidemiologist acquisition of clinical diagnostic specimens/samples to receipt at the laboratory response network (LRN)	Within 6 hours of acquisition

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Time for 75 percent of known suspected cases (or proxies) to be contacted/interviewed for more detailed epidemiologic follow-up	Within 48 hours of identification of the index case
Time for an initial report to be produced describing all suspected cases by person, place, and time	Within 60 hours of identification of the index case

Activity: *Monitor Containment*

Definition: Based upon the extent of the population at risk and recommendations for outbreak control, assess the effectiveness of disease containment measures.

Critical Tasks	
Pro.B1a 6.1.1	Monitor the course and population characteristics of a recognized outbreak
Pro.B1a 6.2	Have or have access to information systems that support administration of outbreak control and that comply with the PHIN functional requirements for *Countermeasure and Response Administration*.
Pro.B1a 6.1	Monitor effectiveness of mitigation steps
Pro.B1a 6.4	Conduct an after action debriefing (hotwash) to identify deficiencies that require corrective actions in areas such as personnel, training, equipment, and organizational structure
Pro.B1a 6.3.2	Conduct special studies of critical public health issues.

Performance Measures	Metric
Percentage of known cases and exposed successfully tracked from identification through disposition to enable follow-up	100%

Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship
Emergency Public Information and Warning	Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation provides information for release to Emergency Public Information and Warning.
Emergency Operations Center Management	Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation and Emergency Operations Center Management both contribute to situation reports.
Public Health Laboratory Testing	Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation receives lab results from Public Health Laboratory Testing.
Mass Prophylaxis	Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation provides outbreak notification to Mass Prophylaxis.
Isolation and Quarantine	Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation provides investigation results to Isolation and Quarantine, while Isolation and Quarantine provides containment updates to Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
Local Health Department-based Surveillance Team (staff may be drawn from local, State or Federal resources)	Team to track suspect case reports within their jurisdiction; personnel (per 12-hour shift) consists of 1 supervisor (MD, DVM, or PhD level), 2 epidemiologists, 1 IT staff , and 1 statistician
Investigation Personnel/Team	Epidemiologist (or public health nurse or public health advisor) to interview cases and perform investigation
Active Surveillance/Case Finding Team	Epidemiologist (or public health nurse or public health advisor) to find cases in hospitals and the community
Special Studies Team	Team to undertake focused scientific investigations of interest; personnel consist of 1 epidemiology supervisor (MD, DVM, or PhD), 5 epidemiologists or scientists, 1 public health advisor, 1 subject matter expert, 1 interviewer per 10 persons, and 1 statistician
CDC Department Emergency Operations Center (DEOC)	Team to coordinate CDC response to an incident ; personnel consists of 1 senior epidemiology supervisor, 1 Federal-State liaison epidemiologist per affected State, 5 support epidemiologists, 1 public health advisor (PHA), 1 data entry manager, 10 data entry staff
State/Local EOC	Personnel consists of 1 epidemiology incident commander, 1 BT coordinator per State, 1 senior epidemiology supervisor per 12 hour shift, 5 support epidemiologists per 12 hour shift, 1 PHA per 12 hour shift, 1 Database manager, 1 programmer, 2 analysts, 2 transport teams (each with 1 driver), 1 clerical staff member, 1 IT person
Equipment	Laptops, Blackberry/cell phone, portable printers, PPE, and appropriate equipment cache per person

Planning Assumptions

Scenario-Specific

- Although applicable to several of the 15 National Planning Scenarios, the capability planning factors were developed from an in-depth analysis of the Anthrax and Pandemic Influenza scenarios. Other scenarios were reviewed to identify required adjustments or additions to the planning factors and national targets.
- Estimates are made of the needs for communities to respond to this emergency once identified and for baseline resources needed for timely initial detection
- *B. anthracis* spores added directly to product without aerosolization
- Ground beef was sent to San Diego, Seattle, and Phoenix
- Orange juice was sent to Albuquerque, Las Vegas, and Palm Springs
- Patient presentations involved gastrointestinal, oropharyngeal, and cutaneous forms of anthrax.
- Clinical and laboratory confirmation (LRN) occurred between days 2 and 5 after index case presentation
- Production facilities and distribution system mechanisms will be contaminated until formally decontaminated
- Cases will continue sporadically following public health intervention due to consumers and retailers failing to discard/return/destroy contaminated product

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- No simultaneous disasters are occurring during the same time
- There will be an unprecedented level of public concern, anxiety, and fear as a result of this incident
- Assume field investigation will last 10 days at full personnel strength and then another 20 days at 50 percent personnel strength.
- Assume a concurrent law enforcement investigation
- Assume health departments and Emergency Operation Centers (EOC) will require 100 percent surge staffing for 30 days in 10 cities (6 affected cities and 4 neighboring areas that have high levels of anxiety/concern) and at CDC.
- Staff requirements, detailed in this worksheet, represent existing local, State, and Federal resources that are devoted to routine (baseline) public health activities.
- Assume that staff at the local level may include Federal or State employees; assume that staff at the State level may include Federal employees.
- Assume that for every case interviewed, 10 ill persons with diseases other than anthrax will need to be interviewed in a more abbreviated manner. Assume these "non-case" interviews will take half the time of a case interview. Given that 2,300 cases are indicated in the scenario, this means that 25,300 total interviews will need to be conducted.
- Assume 100 percent of cases and 50 percent of non cases will be interviewed during first 10 days. The remaining 50 percent of non-cases will be interviewed during the next 20 days.
- Assume there will be 100 facilities (hospital emergency departments) requiring active surveillance in 10 locations.
- Assume 10 special studies will be conducted. Each study will require 50 interviews.
- The food contamination scenario explored would be considered a national response that involves local, State and Federal resources.
- To provide 24 hour coverage for the first 10 days, the national response described in this scenario would require a staff of 110 epidemiology supervisors, 451 epidemiologists, 60 data entry staff, 40 IT staff, 30 statisticians, 60 public health advisors, 10 occupational/environmental epidemiologists, 50 non-epidemiologist interviewers, 10 subject matter experts and 10 State bioterrorism coordinators.
- Over the next 20 days of the investigation, staffing could be reduced to 70 epidemiology supervisors, 270 epidemiologists, 31 data entry staff, 30 IT staff, 30 statisticians, 40 public health advisors, 10 occupational/environmental epidemiologists, 50 non-epidemiologist interviewers, 10 subject matter experts and 10 State BT coordinators.
- The percent of staff contributions to the investigation from the State and local levels is dependent on baseline availability of resources. It should be noted that the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) *2004 National Assessment of Epidemiology Capacity: Findings and Recommendations* sites a 40 percent deficiency of trained public health epidemiologists nationally.
- Due to potentially unforeseen delays in the identification of a non-naturally occurring epidemiological event, detection of disease outbreaks may not occur until large numbers of victims are affected, particularly when the agent has a long incubation period.

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Planning Factors from an In-Depth Analysis of a Scenario with Significant Demand for the Capability (Anthrax and Pandemic Influenza)

Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Local Health Department-based Surveillance Team (staff may be drawn from local, State or Federal resources)	Track all reportable diseases within the defined area	Per 12 hour shift 1 supervisor (MD, DVM, or PhD level) and 2 epidemiologists. 1 IT staff 1 statistician	Assume 100% staff needs for 30 days at 10 locations. All 30 days: 20 supervisors 40 epidemiologists 20 IT staff 20 statisticians
Active Surveillance/Case Finding Team	Find cases in local hospitals and emergency departments	One epidemiologist (or public health nurse or public health advisor) per 12 hour shift per facility (e.g. hospital ER in affected region).	Assume 100% staff needs for first 10 days, and 50% staffing for next 20 days at 100 facilities in 10 cities First 10 days: 200 epidemiologists per day Next 20 days: 100 epidemiologists per day
Special Studies Team	Undertake focused scientific investigations of interest	Personnel per study: 1 epidemiology supervisor (MD, DVM, or PhD) 5 epidemiologists or scientists 1 public health advisor 1 subject matter expert 1 interviewer per 10 persons 1 statistician	Assume 10 studies conducted, 500 interviews All 30 days: 10 epidemiology supervisors 50 epidemiologists or scientists 10 public health advisors 10 subject matter experts 50 interviewers 10 statisticians

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Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
CDC Department Emergency Operations Center (DEOC)	Coordinate CDC response to incident	Personnel per 12 hour shift: 1 senior epidemiology supervisor 1 Federal-State liaison epidemiologist per affected State 5 support epidemiologists 1 public health advisor (PHA) 1 data entry manager 10 data entry staff	Assume 100% staff needs for first 10 days, and 50% staffing for next 20 days First 10 days (per day): 20 epidemiology incident commanders 20 senior epidemiology supervisors 20 Federal State-liaison epidemiologists 10 support epidemiologists 20 public health advisors (PHA) 20 data entry staff Next 20 Days: 10 senior epidemiology supervisors per day 10 Federal State-liaison epidemiologists per day 5 support epidemiologists per day 10 public health advisors (PHAs) per day 10 data entry staff per day

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Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
State/Local EOC	Coordinate State response to incident	1 epidemiology incident commander; 1 BT coordinator per State; 1 senior epidemiology supervisor per 12 hour shift; 5 support epidemiologists per 12 hour shift; 1 PHA per 12 hour shift. 1 database manager 1 programmer 2 analysts 2 transport teams: each with 1 driver 1 clerical staff member 1 IT person	Assume 100% staff needs for first 10 days, and 50% staffing for next 20 days. Assume 10 affected States (6 with cases + 4 additional) First 10 Days (per day): 10 epidemiology incident commanders per day 10 BT coordinators 20 senior epidemiology supervisors 50 support epidemiologists 20 PHAs Next 20 Days: 10 epidemiology incident commanders 10 BT coordinators 10 senior epidemiology supervisors per day 25 support epidemiologists per day 10 PHAs per day
Equipment		Laptops – 1 per 2 persons deployed; Blackberry/cell phone – 1 per person deployed; portable printers – 1 per 10 laptops; PPE and appropriate equipment cache per person	First 10 Days: 256 laptops, 511 Blackberry/cell phones, 26 portable printers, 511 PPE, 511 appropriate equipment cache Next 20 Days: 171 laptops, 341 Blackberry/cell phones, 17 portable printers, 341 PPE, 341 appropriate equipment cache

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Approaches for Large-Scale Events

Pandemic Flu – For all teams, the work force will be diminished by one-third. The need for epidemiologic investigation will be far reduced relative to surveillance needs. Resource needs for pandemic flu are orders of magnitude greater.

National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
Federal/ State/ Local	Local Health Department-based Surveillance Team	Personnel	1	Per affected county	Monitor Containment Surveillance and Detection
County	Investigation Team	Personnel	1	Per affected county	Conduct Epidemiological Investigation
County	Active Case Finding/ Surveillance Team	Personnel	1	Per affected county	Conduct Epidemiological Investigation Monitor Containment Surveillance and Detection
Federal/ State/ Local	Special Studies Team	Personnel	As needed	Per incident	Conduct Epidemiological Investigation Monitor Containment Surveillance and Detection
CDC	CDC Department Emergency Operations Center (DEOC)	Federal Resource Organization	1	Nationally	Direct Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation Operations
State	State/Local EOC	Resource Organization	1	Per state	Direct Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation Operations
Federal/ State/ Local	Equipment cache	Equipment	1	Per person	All Activities

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PUBLIC HEALTH LABORATORY TESTING

Capability Definition

The Public Health Laboratory Testing capability is the ongoing surveillance, rapid detection, confirmatory testing, data reporting, investigative support, and laboratory networking to address potential exposure, or exposure, to all-hazards which include chemical, radiological, and biological agents in all matrices including clinical specimens, food and environmental samples, (e.g., water, air, soil). Such all-hazard threats include those deliberately released with criminal intent, as well as those that may be present as a result of unintentional or natural occurrences.

Outcome

Chemical, radiological, and biological agents causing, or having the potential to cause, widespread illness or death are rapidly detected and accurately identified by the public health laboratory within the jurisdiction or through network collaboration with other appropriate local, State, and Federal laboratories. The public health laboratory, working in close partnership with public health epidemiology, environmental health, law enforcement, agriculture and veterinary officials, hospitals and other appropriate agencies, produces timely and accurate data to support ongoing public health investigations and the implementation of appropriate preventative or curative counter-measures.

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

This capability supports the following Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annexes:

ESF#8: Public Health and Medical Services
Biological Incident Annex
Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex

Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Critical Tasks	
Pro.B1e 1.1.1	Identify, establish and maintain working collaboration with all LRN Sentinel and LRN Clinical Chemistry laboratories within the jurisdiction
Pro.B1e 1.1.1.1	Develop and maintain an accurate and current database of contact information and capability for all the LRN Sentinel and LRN Clinical Chemistry laboratories
Pro.B1e 1.1.1.2	Provide all the LRN Sentinel and LRN Clinical Chemistry laboratories with updated LRN Reference laboratory contact information
Pro.B1e 1.1.3	Establish and maintain collaborative linkages with other State laboratories, e.g., environmental, agriculture, veterinary, and university, as well as the jurisdiction's National Guard Civil Support Team (CST) and other first responders

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Pro.B1e 1.1.4	Establish and maintain linkages with Federal laboratory networks and member laboratories within the jurisdiction, e.g., the Food Emergency Response Network (FERN), National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN), and the EPA
Pro.B1e 1.1.5	Establish and maintain a sentinel laboratory advisory committee or equivalent that meets at least annually and includes representatives from clinical microbiology, clinical chemistry, veterinary, food, and environmental laboratories in your jurisdiction
Pro.B1e 1.3.3	Establish and utilize a State and local health alert network that complies with the PHIN Functional Area *Partner Communication and Alerting* for electronic connectivity with all LRN Sentinel laboratories
Pro.B1e 1.3.4	Establish and maintain connectivity with the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) and other official components of the State and local emergency response, including the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)
Pro.B1e 1.3.5	Establish and maintain communication linkages with local, State, and Federal (e.g., CDC DEOC and LRN) public safety and law enforcement entities, e.g., police, fire, emergency management, and the FBI
Pro.B1e 1.5.1	Hire and/or maintain a biosafety officer for each facility
Pro.B1e 1.5.2	Develop a contingency plan for a breach in biosafety
Pro.B1e 1.6.4	Provide a ready supply of the reagents required for rapid testing of biological threat agents by LRN Reference laboratories
Pro.B1e 1.6.5	Maintain a ready supply of the reagents and materials, not supplied by CDC, required for rapid testing of biological and chemical threat agents at the reference level
Pro.B1e 1.6.6	Maintain an accurate inventory of reagents and supplies in their respective laboratories.
Pro.B1e 1.7.1	Develop and validate, in partnership with LRN Reference and LRN Chemical laboratories, standard laboratory methods to test for chemical and biological threat agents
Pro.B1e 1.7.2	Transfer standardized technology and laboratory methods from the CDC to State and local LRN Reference and LRN Chemical laboratories
Pro.B1e 1.7.3	Develop, in collaboration with CDC, e.g., EPA, FDA, USDA, and DOD, additional standardized and validated methods for testing for chemical and biological agents in non-clinical samples
Pro.B1e 1.7.4	Integrate new advanced biological and chemical rapid identification methods, as they are developed and approved by the LRN, into the current laboratory testing algorithm for human, environmental, animal, or food specimens

Preparedness Measures	**Metrics**
LRN Reference and LRN Chemical laboratories have internal competency training program for LRN methods	Yes/No
LRN Reference laboratory offers training to LRN Sentinel laboratories	Annually
Percent of participating LRN Reference laboratories and Level-1 and Level-2 LRN chemical laboratories that pass their proficiency tests according to CDC criteria	100%
Percent of LRN Sentinel laboratories that participate in State-developed training programs, *i.e., by LRN Reference laboratories* (responsibility aligns with HRSA)	100%
The Public Health Laboratory has or has access to information systems that comply with the PHIN Functional Area *Connecting Laboratory Systems* to send and receive laboratory test	Yes/No

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orders and results	
LRN reference laboratory has a system to maintain an inventory of reagents and supplies to support LRN testing	Yes/No
CDC (BPRP) produces and/or acquires sufficient reagents to maintain LRN reference testing of biological threat agents	Yes/No
Percentage of Health Resources & Services Administration (HRSA) funded hospitals that have PHIN compliant IT systems that are interoperable with their jurisdictional public health agency and that transmit clinical and/or hospital utilization data in near real-time to a PHIN-compliant early-event detection information systems. (responsibility aligns with HRSA and interface with Interoperable Communications, Epidemiology and Medical Surge TCLs) *(Reference National Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program FY2005 Continuation Guidance HRSA Announcement number 5-U3R-05-001)*	100%
Tests are conducted of select LRN Sentinel laboratories laboratory to reach a knowledgeable public health laboratory professional at the jurisdictional confirmatory LRN Reference and LRN Chemical laboratories 24/7/365 by landline phone	At least annually
Time to reach public health laboratory professionals by landline phone	Within 15 minutes
Percentage of LRN Sentinel laboratories within the LRN jurisdiction that successfully acknowledge receipt of health alerts. Testing must be at least annually and include at least one priority category (i.e., alert, advisory, update, etc.) *Note: Reference PHIN Preparedness Functional Area Partner Communication and Alerting*	100% (# of successful acknowledgements/# of Sentinel laboratories within jurisdiction)
The laboratory has a primary system that ensures delivery of specimens/samples 24/7/365	Yes/No
The laboratory has a secondary courier (e.g., State patrol helicopter) system that ensures rapid delivery in an emergency situation	Yes/No
At least one operational Biosafety Level Three (BSL-3) facility is available within jurisdiction for testing for biological agents, *or* if not immediately possible, BSL-3 practices, as outlined in the CDC-NIH publication "Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories, 4th Edition" (BMBL), used (see www.cdc.gov/od/ohs) or formal arrangements (i.e., MOU) established with a neighboring jurisdiction to provide this capability. At least one laboratory exists within jurisdiction for testing of chemical agents or formal arrangements (i.e., MOU) established with a neighboring jurisdiction to provide this capability	Yes/No
Laboratory registration, operations, safety, and security are consistent with both the minimum requirements set forth in Select Agent Regulation (42 CFR 73) and the USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001(P.L. 107-56) and subsequent updates	Yes/No
Public health laboratory website is in place that includes, at a minimum: ▪ Information about protocol updates for rule-out testing ▪ Department of Transportation (DOT) compliant packaging and shipping ▪ Chain-of-custody guidelines ▪ CDC endorsed material on referral of clinical human and Veterinary specimens ▪ Environmental samples ▪ Suspect bioterrorism (BT) isolates ▪ Bacterial and viral food borne pathogens Public health laboratory website is in place that includes, at a minimum:	Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No

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▪ Information about protocol updates for rule-out testing ▪ Department of Transportation (DOT) compliant packaging and shipping ▪ Chain-of-custody guidelines ▪ CDC endorsed material on referral of clinical human and veterinary specimens ▪ Environmental samples ▪ Suspect bioterrorism (BT) isolates ▪ Bacterial and viral food borne pathogens	
A ready supply of the reagents, not supplied by CDC, required for rapid testing of biological threat agents at the reference level is maintained by LRN Reference laboratories	Yes/No
Adequate amounts of required test reagents and materials are maintained by and immediately available to LRN Reference and LRN Chemical laboratories during an emergency event	Yes/No
Materials for chemical methods are available through commercial vendors and stocked by chemical laboratories for use in an emergency	Yes/No
Laboratory system is in place to receive and triage specimens and samples	Yes/No
All-hazards team includes: ▪ Chemical terrorism (CT) laboratory coordinator (chemist or medical technologist) ▪ Assistant CT laboratory coordinator ▪ Bioterrorism laboratory coordinator ▪ Biologic sentinel network liaison who is available 24/7/365 to advise public health agencies, hospitals, private laboratories, first responders, HazMat teams, local, State, and Federal law enforcement, the Army National Guard (WMD-CST), and poison control Team is capable of: ▪ Proper triage screening ▪ Collection, packaging, labeling, and shipping of: ▪ Biological/environmental sample ▪ Biological/clinical specimen ▪ Biological/food sample ▪ Chemical/environmental sample ▪ Chemical/clinical specimen ▪ Chemical/food sample ▪ Radiological/environmental sample ▪ Radiological/clinical specimen ▪ Radiological/food sample	Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No

Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs	
Critical Tasks	
Pro.B1e 2.1.3	Participate in a CDC-approved proficiency testing program to assure laboratory competency
Pro.B1e 2.1.4	Participate in training provided by other Federal partners for the use of standardized methods to detect and identify chemical and biological agents

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Pro.B1e 2.1.5	Provide information and training on the use of appropriate safety and security equipment and procedures
Pro.B1e 2.1.6	Train all LRN Sentinel laboratories in the use of LRN biological agent rule-out protocols, specimen or isolate referral responsibilities and notification algorithms
Pro.B1e 2.1.7	Participate in CDC training to use standardized protocols to detect biological agents
Pro.B1e 2.1.8	Participate in CDC training as required for designated levels of chemical preparedness, e.g., LRN Level-1, 2, or 3
Pro.B1e 2.2.5	Coordinate response planning, drills and exercises for the laboratory with all relevant partners

Preparedness Measures	Metric
LRN Reference and LRN Chemical laboratories have internal competency training program for LRN methods	Yes/No
Frequency with which LRN Reference laboratory offers training to LRN Sentinel laboratories	Annually
Percentage of participating LRN Reference laboratories and Level-1 and Level-2 LRN chemical laboratories that pass their proficiency tests according to CDC criteria	100%
Percentage of LRN Sentinel and LRN Clinical Chemistry laboratories that participate in State-developed training programs, *i.e., by LRN Reference laboratories* (responsibility aligns with HRSA)	100%
Percentage of participating LRN Level 1, 2, or 3 chemical laboratories that successfully complete packaging and shipping exercises	100%
Frequency with which tests are conducted of select LRN Sentinel and LRN Clinical Chemistry laboratory to reach a knowledgeable public health laboratory professional at the jurisdictional confirmatory LRN Reference and LRN Chemical laboratories 24/7/365 by landline phone	At least annually
Frequency with which tests are conducted of select LRN sentinel and LRN clinical chemistry laboratory to reach a knowledgeable public health laboratory professional at jurisdictional confirmatory LRN laboratory 24/7/365 by redundant means not dependent on electricity, cellular/landline phone service, internet (e.g., radio/satellite phone)	At least annually
Percentage of LRN Sentinel laboratories within the LRN jurisdiction that successfully acknowledge receipt of health alerts. Testing must be at least annually and include at least one priority category (i.e., alert, advisory, update, etc.) *Note: Reference PHIN Preparedness Functional Area Partner Communication and Alerting*	100%
LRN Sentinel and LRN Clinical Chemistry laboratory staff are trained in the use of standardized procedures for collecting and shipping clinical specimens.	Yes/No
Training includes International Air Transport Association (IATA), and US Department of Transportation (DOT) packaging and shipping of infectious agents regulations	Yes/No

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Performance Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: *Direct Public Health Laboratory Testing*

Definition: Direct and coordinate local, State, and Federal public health, food testing, veterinary diagnostic, and environmental testing laboratory efforts in response to biological and chemical terrorism.

Critical Tasks	
Pro.B1e 3.1.1	Function as the gatekeeper for the Laboratory Response Network (LRN) within the jurisdiction
Pro.B1e 3.1.2	Function as Laboratory Response Network (LRN) Sentinel laboratories
Pro.B1e 3.1.3	Function as Laboratory Response Network (LRN) Chemical laboratories
Pro.B1e 3.2.2	Work in close partnership with public health epidemiology and environmental health, and poison control to provide timely data to assure implementation of effective prevention, detection, and control measures, including treatment
Pro.B1e 3.2.3	Report surveillance results suggestive of an outbreak immediately to public health epidemiology
Pro.B1e 3.2.4	Report results of CDC chemical or biological testing to submitting LRN Reference and Chemical laboratories through the secure LRN website
Pro.B1e 3.2.5	Notify appropriate public health, public safety, and law enforcement officials immediately (24/7) of presumptive and confirmed laboratory results of a chemical and biological threat agent
Pro.B1e 3.2.6	Report confirmed laboratory results to all submitters in a timely manner using PHIN-compliant Laboratory Information Management Systems (LIMS)

Performance Measures	Metric
Percent of calls/inquiries received by the CDC LRN Coordinating Office for which a response is initiated within 2 hours during an emergency	100%
Percent of calls/inquiries received by the CDC LRN Coordinating Office for which a response is initiated within 24 hours on a routine basis	100%
Time from *high-level* threat credibility assessment of suspicious agent to notification of public health department and other State and Federal partners	Within 2 hours
Time from presumptive identification of potential bioterrorism agent or communication that signals a high index of suspicion to sending notification to key Federal , State, and local health partners (e.g. CDC, FBI)	Within 3 hours

Activity: *Sample and Specimen Management*

Definition: Implement LRN established protocols /procedures for specimen collection, transport, and testing.

Critical Tasks	
Pro.B1e 4.1	Establish and maintain a jurisdiction-wide transport system to assure timely receipt of samples or specimens for laboratory testing
Pro.B1e 4.2	Perform triage screening on environmental samples per Department of Homeland Security and Environmental Protection Agency protocols

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Pro.B1e 4.3	Communicate requirements for all-hazard specimen or sample collection, packaging, and shipping to submitters, e.g., FBI, CST, first responders, HazMat Teams, and LRN Sentinel and Clinical Chemistry Laboratories
Pro.B1e 4.4	Provide consultation to all submitters regarding appropriate collection and shipment of specimens or samples for testing

Performance Measures	Metric
Time for designated *State LRN-1 Level 1* Chemical Laboratories to accept clinical specimens to begin analysis	Within 24 hours of receiving the call for assistance from CDC
Time from distribution of health alert by agency epidemiologist, environmental health, or relevant partner via HAN to distribution of laboratory health alert detailing laboratory related information including specimen collection, packaging, and shipping guidelines	Within 12 hours
Time from presumptive identification to 1) shipment to an LRN reference laboratory with relevant confirmatory capabilities 2) confirmatory identification of agent by LRN reference laboratory	Within 2 hours Within 48 hours for laboratories that have appropriate confirmatory capabilities
Percent of LRN reference laboratories that provide technical assistance to submitters on errors within 3 business days of receipt of mislabeled, mis-packaged, and mis-shipped packages	100%

Activity: *Provide Surveillance Support*

Definition: Provide support to agencies in chemical, biological, and radiological agent and public health disease surveillance by testing and analyzing samples.

Critical Tasks	
Pro.B1e 5.3.1	Acquire timely isolates of selected enteric and invasive biological agents from all LRN Sentinel laboratories
Pro.B1e 5.3.2	Analyze quickly the isolates submitted by LRN Sentinel laboratories using advanced technologies to rapidly identify and subtype isolates
Pro.B1e 5.3.3	Provide reference analysis and identification of unusual or emerging biological agents present in communities
Pro.B1e 5.2	Perform analyses for BioWatch 24/7/365
Pro.B1e 5.1.1	Enhance, in coordination with public health epidemiology partners, the capacity to apply standardized molecular methods (e.g., DNA sequencing) in real-time to support surveillance and outbreak investigations as appropriate

Performance Measures	Metric

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Proportion of isolates for which pulse-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) testing and analysis of data is completed within 3 working days of receipt in the laboratory (or within 3 working days of organism isolated in pure culture, if lab processes clinical specimen) *E. coli* O157:H7 *Listeria monocytogenes*	100% (# of isolates that have PFGE patterns analyzed within 3 working days of identification/denominator = # of isolates identified in lab) Start time: Date and time isolate identified in lab Stop time: Date and time PFGE sub-typing pattern analysis complete
Proportion of PFGE patterns submitted to the National PulseNet Server (or the PulseNet Database Team at CDC) that are designated with an official PulseNet pattern name within 3 working days of submission. *E. coli* O157:H7 *Listeria monocytogenes*	100% # of isolate patterns in the National PulseNet database that are given an official PulseNet pattern name within 3 working days of submission/# of isolate patterns submitted to the National PulseNet Server/database team Start time: Date and time PFGE isolate pattern submitted to National PulseNet Server/database team Stop time: Date and time official PulseNet name assigned to the submitted isolate pattern
Proportion of PFGE patterns and associated data submitted to the National PulseNet Server (or the PulseNet Database Team at CDC) within one (1) working day of PFGE pattern analysis. *E. coli* O157:H7 *Listeria monocytogenes*	100% (numerator = # of patterns submitted to PulseNet within 1 working day) (denominator = # of isolates PFGE pattern-analyzed) Start time: Date and time PFGE sub-type/pattern analysis complete Stop time: Date and PFGE sub-type/pattern submitted to PulseNet server/team

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Activity: *Detection Testing and Analysis*	
Definition: Test and analyze initial chemical, biological, and radiological samples to provide presumptive agent identification or diagnosis.	
Critical Tasks	
Pro.B1e 6.2.5	Evaluate clinical specimens from patients exposed to chemical or radiochemical agents, e.g., tests for blood gases, CBC analysis, and enzyme levels (link with HRSA)
Pro.B1e 6.2.3	Test initial 20-40 clinical specimens to assess human exposure by measuring metabolites of chemical agents (e.g., of nerve agents)
Pro.B1e 6.3	Provide surge capacity for CDC to measure metabolites (e.g., of nerve agents, in clinical specimens)
Pro.B1e 6.2.4	Test environmental samples for toxic industrial chemicals and materials
Pro.B1e 6.4	Contact the nearest LRN Reference laboratory when unable to identify or rule-out emerging infectious agents or possible bioterrorism agents
Pro.B1e 6.2.6	Identify all emerging infectious agents or possible bioterrorism agents using available LRN protocols

Performance Measures	**Metric**
Time from *high-level* threat credibility assessment of suspicious agent to specimen/sample receipt at the public health laboratory	Within 6 hours of identifying a suspicious agent
Time from receiving a specimen/sample in the LRN Reference Laboratory to presumptive identification of agent by rapid biological assays	Within 8 hours of sample receipt
Time for CDC Chemical laboratory to conduct Rapid Toxic Screen on initial 20-40 specimens analyzed for 150 chemical agents (including nerve agents)	Within 36 hours of receipt of specimens (surge)

Activity: *Confirmation Testing*	
Definition: Test and analyze chemical, biological, and radiological samples to provide confirmation agent identification or diagnosis.	
Critical Tasks	
Pro.B1e 7.2.3	Confirm results using CDC clinical chemical detection methods
Pro.B1e 7.1.1	Use standardized, Laboratory Response Network (LRN) protocols to detect emerging infectious agents or possible bioterrorism agents in clinical specimens, food, or environmental samples
Pro.B1e 7.4	Verify reactive BioWatch samples
Pro.B1e 7.4.1	Verify reactive samples from the Biohazard Detection Systems (BDS) located in facilities of the U.S. Postal Service (USPS)

Performance Measures	**Metric**

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Time from confirmatory identification (positive or negative) to initiate notification of appropriate Federal, State, and local officials, also including the specimen/sample submitter	Within 1 hour of confirmatory identification

Activity: *Investigation and Follow-Up Laboratory Support*

Definition: Provide follow-up analytical and investigative support to epidemiologists, law enforcement, and environmental health and/or poison control efforts to test additional specimens, determine cause and origin of an event, definitively characterize an agent, and genotype disease strains through LRN member labs.

Critical Tasks	
Pro.B1e 3.2.2	Work in close partnership with public health epidemiology and environmental health, and poison control to provide timely data to assure implementation of effective prevention, detection, and control measures, including treatment
Pro.B1e 8.3.2	Collaborate with law enforcement and perform testing of evidentiary samples (link to law enforcement)
Pro.B1e 8.3.3	Test additional clinical specimens by CDC or another qualified select Laboratory Response Network (LRN) Reference lab for retrospective assessment of chemical exposure following an event
Pro.B1e 8.3.4	Coordinate testing of environmental samples for assessment and remediation
Pro.B1e 8.6	Isolate emerging infectious or biological threat agents tested by CDC and qualified select Laboratory Response Network (LRN) reference laboratories using Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act (CLIA) approved methods to determine the agent's susceptibility to antimicrobial drugs used for prevention and control
Pro.B1e 8.5	Use Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act (CLIA) approved methods for antimicrobial susceptibility testing
Pro.B1e 8.7	Determine whether an emerging infectious disease agent or a biological threat agent consists of single or multiple strains

Performance Measures	Metric

Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship
Emergency Public Information and Warning	Public Health Laboratory Testing provides information for release to Emergency Public Information and Warning.
Emergency Operations Center Management	Public Health Laboratory Testing provides situation reports to Emergency Operations Center Management. Emergency Operations Center Management provides situation reports and resources to Public Health Laboratory Testing.
WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination	WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination provides samples for testing to Public Health Laboratory Testing.

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Linked Capability	Relationship
Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation	Public Health Laboratory Testing provides lab results to Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation.
Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense	Public Health Laboratory Testing provides lab results to Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
Laboratory Response Network (LRN) National Level Laboratories	Laboratories in the Laboratory Response Network (LRN) that have unique resources to handle highly infectious agents and the ability to identify specific agent strains. These include labs at CDC, the US Department of Agriculture, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and other facilities run by Federal agencies. National Laboratory at National Center for Environmental Health capable of 24/7 coverage
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) Chemical Laboratory	LRN Chemical Laboratory capable of advanced testing located in the National Center for Environmental Health's (NCEH's) Division of Laboratory Sciences.
CDC Biological Laboratory	LRN National Level Laboratory at Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program (RRAT Lab) capable of 24/7 coverage
State Public Health Laboratory	State laboratory that performs testing and other laboratory services on behalf of the entire jurisdiction, scanning the horizon for anything suspicious.
LRN Reference Level Laboratories	Laboratories that can perform rapid tests to detect and confirm the presence of a threat agent. These labs ensure a timely local response in the event of a terrorist incident or other public health emergencies.
LRN Chemistry Laboratories	Public health laboratories that comprise the chemical component of the LRN; they are designated as Level 3, 2, or 1, with increasing technical expertise. Level 3 laboratories work with hospitals in clinical specimen collection/storage/shipment and also work to help develop a coordinated response plan for their State and/or geographical area. Level 2 laboratory personnel are trained to detect exposure to a limited number of toxic chemical agents in human blood or urine; Level 1 laboratory personnel are trained to detect exposure to an expanded number of chemicals in human blood or urine, including all Level 2 laboratory analyses, plus analyses for mustard agents, nerve agents, and other toxic chemicals.
LRN Sentinel Clinical Labs	Hospital-based laboratories that can perform rule-out or refer testing to LRN Reference Level Laboratory
Courier system for sample transport	System or contract to ensure secure transport of samples
Reagents	A rapidly deployable repository of LRN reagents sufficient to meet current needs and potential emergency surge needs Reagents for biological agent testing and materials for chemical methods
Laboratory equipment and supplies	Sufficient instrumentation and adequate supplies
CDC Directors Emergency Operations Center (DEOC)	
State and Local EOC	
Laboratory equipment	Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) = Smart Cycler, Light Cycler, ABI 7500, or ABI 7000 Time-resolved fluorescence (TRF) = Victor
LRN and biosafety training	TRF Training – 2 day course provided by CDC (Atlanta); Conventional Microbiology train-the-trainer one week course provided by CDC (location varies); PCR Training

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Planning Assumptions

- Plans to augment the capacity of public health laboratories should include having or having access to information systems that electronically send and receive test orders and results in compliance with PHIN Functional Area for *Connecting Laboratory Systems*

Scenario-Specific

Public Health Laboratory Testing (Chemical Nerve Agent):

- Assume 10,000 worried well; assume that 2,500 worried well population will require testing. Scenario does not state exact number of worried well. Difficult to determine exactly what proportion of the downwind population would fall in this category but assumed 80 percent for purposes of this effort. Of these, assume 25 percent will require/request testing for exposure to nerve agents.
- 40 analyses per day per instrument.
- 13 instruments within Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and seven instruments within States can perform analysis of nerve agent metabolites.
- CDC stockpiles enough standards/materials to analyze 5,000 samples. Each of seven States stockpiles enough standards/materials to analyze 500 samples. Total for CDC and States are 8,500 samples. Conducting additional analyses requires additional materials/standards.
- Depending on how urgently results are needed, along with involving the States, additional instruments in CDC's laboratory can be ramped up quickly.
- Currently, analytic resources are located at CDC (Atlanta) and 7 State health departments (California, Florida, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, New York and Virginia). Given the nature of the need and this resource, a centralized/regionalized approach is acceptable.

Public Health Laboratory Testing (Biological)

- Estimates address needs for communities to respond to this emergency once identified. Estimate does not include needs for baseline resources needed for timely initial detection.
- *B. anthracis* spores added directly to product without aerosolization.
- Ground beef was sent San Diego, Seattle, and Phoenix.
- Orange juice was sent to Albuquerque, Las Vegas and Palm Springs.
- Patient presentations involved gastrointestinal, oropharyngeal and cutaneous forms of anthrax.
- Laboratory confirmation by the Laboratory Response Network (LRN) occurred between days 2 and 5 after index case presentation.
- Production facilities and distribution system mechanisms will be contaminated until formally decontaminated.
- Cases will continue sporadically following public health intervention due to consumers and retailers failing to discard/return/destroy contaminated product.
- No simultaneous disasters are occurring during the same time.
- Assume multi-agency coordination is adequately being addressed at Federal (CDC, Food and Drug Administration [FDA], USDA/APHIS [United States Department of Agriculture/Animal and Plan Health Inspection Service, FBI), State, and local levels and the agencies are coordinating as expected. Overall assumptions for LRN testing of specimens/samples: 1. All Reference LRN laboratories in the affected jurisdictions have the testing capability for the agent. 2. For planning purposes, throughput for four types of equipment available in the LRN Reference laboratory was provided. 3. There are a sufficient number of trained personnel to operate the equipment. 4. There is sufficient availability of reagents.
- Factors that could affect the number of specimens/samples calculated assuming laboratorians perform three runs in each shift include time involved to set up the assay, machine capacity, personnel shift duration, condition specimen/sample arrived in, physical working space, individual pace of laboratorian.

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- For LRN Sentinel laboratories, the first 1,000 patients are distributed evenly among the six affected cities resulting in an even distribution of laboratory rule-out tests (approximately 167 per city), which would result in approximately 16 tests per Emergency Room. The burden on the LRN Sentinel laboratories for foodborne anthrax is inconsequential.
- Case definition by epidemiologists will be created within the first 10 days resulting in no further rule-out testing at the LRN Sentinel laboratories following the first 1,000 patients.
- Assume a concurrent Law Enforcement Investigation.

Planning Factors from an In-Depth Analysis of a Scenario with Significant Demand for the Capability

Capability Element	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Public Health Laboratory Testing (Chem Lab)			
Centers for Disease Control (CDC)	Days 1-5: 80 samples/day using 2 instruments (1 instrument can process 40 samples/day) Days 6-10: 320 samples/day using an additional 6 instruments (8 instruments total, so 8*40=320) 520 samples/day using all instruments available (13 instruments total, so 13*40=520)	Testing for 350 injured people (assume testing 2 samples per person) = 700 2500 tests performed for worried well. Total = 3200	1 resource organization (either CDC alone or CDC and affiliated State chemical laboratories) Based on urgency: Approximately 4 weeks if only CDC is involved. With involvement of State public health laboratories, priority analysis of the first 350 samples (one sample from each of the injured people) could be completed in a matter of days
State public health laboratories	40 samples/day/State 5 States currently capable to perform nerve agent analysis = 200 samples/day	See above	Depends on how quickly analyses need to be completed (See above)
Bio Lab: Laboratory Response Network (LRN) National	3 National laboratories (CDC, DOD), 15 CDC laboratorians	CDC would accept specimens/samples for susceptibility testing and genotyping	
LRN reference laboratories	152 Reference laboratories for biological agents (105 public health, 15 military, 9 veterinary, 12 food, 8 international, 5 other Federal laboratories)	LRN reference laboratories in the affected cities would handle test volume (for planning purposes 8235 specimens)	For this scenario, we assume a 12-hour shift and a 30-day time period If Victor equipment = 14 pieces of equipment needed If ABI 7000 = 3 machines needed If Light Cycler = 11 machines needed If Smart Cycler = 23

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Capability Element	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
			instruments needed
LRN Sentinel	4,500 laboratories that can perform rule out or refer testing (majority are in-hospital laboratories)	LRN Sentinel laboratories will perform rule-out or referral tests for all cases LRN Reference laboratories will perform rapid tests and traditional confirmatory tests	Existing Sentinel lab personnel will support the required testing
CDC (e.g., subject matter expert [SME], Scientific Resources Program / Biologics Branch, Coordinating Office for LRN)	Coordinating Office for LRN = 1 LRN Coordinator, 1 Program Manager, 1 Help Desk Support, 1 Technical Officer, 1 Communication Officer (technical writing, interface with CDC Office of Emergency Communication) Scientific Resources Program/Biologics Branch = 6 – production, 2 – shipping, 6 inventory management CDC SMEs = < 1 per agent Bioterrorism Rapid Response and Advanced Technology Laboratory = (Existing) 9 CDC laboratorians for short-term biological response		Coordinating Office for LRN = 1 LRN Coordinator, 3 Program Managers, 4 Help Desk Support on 12-hour shifts, 2 Technical Officers, 1 Communication Officer (technical writing, interface with CDC Office of Emergency Communication) Scientific Resources Program/Biologics Branch = 12 – production, 4 – shipping, 12 inventory management CDC SMEs = 2 per agent Bioterrorism Rapid Response and Advanced Technology Laboratory = 15 CDC laboratorians
LRN Partner Organizations (e.g., APHL, DOD, ASM, FBI, EPA, FDA, USDA/APHIS, DHS)	1 APHL Gatekeeper, 1 DOD Gatekeeper, and 1 FDA Gatekeeper All other organization involvement is scenario specific		
Reagents (CDC)	(Food borne/Plague) -- One specimen per suspected case will be sent to the LRN for testing; additional 15% of tests will be conducted for quality control; polymerase chain reaction (PCR) kits can complete 500 tests per kit using smart cycler or light cycler; PCR kits can complete 1,000 tests per kit using ABI 7000 equipment; TRF kits can complete 60 tests per kit using Victor equipment	(Aerosolized Anthrax) Cannot determine lab requirements because scenario involves undetermined environmental exposure which will require extensive sampling for source identification and decontamination efforts (Foodborne) Approximately 7000 suspected cases will result in 7000 specimens and 1235 controls for a total of	(Aerosolized Anthrax) In Anthrax event of 2001, 125,000 environmental samples for less than 10 victims (Pandemic Flu) Cannot determine because assays under development (Foodborne) Assuming all tests are conducted at one LRN, the lab would need 16 PCR kits if at same LRN using smart cycler or light cycler equipment; 9 PCR kits if at same LRN using

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Capability Element	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
		approximately 8235 tests; does not include food samples that would also be tested at LRN laboratory in response to this event (Plague) Dependent on Epi calculations, not yet complete	ABI7000 equipment; 138 TRF kits if at same LRN using TRF equipment; does not include reagents needed for food samples that would also be tested at LRN laboratory in response to this event (Plague) Dependent on Epi calculations, not yet complete
Laboratory equipment	Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) = smart cycler, light cycler, or ABI 7000 Time-resolved fluorometer (TRF) = Victor		
LRN and biosafety training	TRF training – 2 day course provided by CDC (Atlanta) Conventional Microbiology train-the-trainer one week course provided by CDC (location varies) PCR training		
LRN lab credentials	Select agent registration and staff security risk assessment approval USDA/APHIS Regulations CLIA (Clinical Laboratory Inspection Standards) Accreditation from AAVLD (American Association Veterinary Laboratorian Diagnosticians)		

Approaches for Large-Scale Events

Pandemic Flu – For all teams, the work force will be diminished by one-third. The need for epidemiologic investigation will be far reduced relative to surveillance needs. Resource needs for pandemic flu are orders of magnitude greater.

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National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
Centers for Disease Control (CDC)	Federal Laboratory Response Network (LRN) Chemical Laboratory	Federal Resource Organization	1	Nationally	Provide Surveillance Support Detection and Analysis Confirmation Testing Investigation and Follow-up Laboratory Support
CDC	Federal LRN Biological Laboratory	Federal Resource Organization	1	Nationally	Provide Surveillance Support Detection and Analysis Confirmation Testing Investigation and Follow-up Laboratory Support
State/Federal	LRN Reference Level Laboratories	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	1	Minimum per State (152 Nationally)	Provide Surveillance Support Detection and Analysis
Federal	LRN Level 1 Chemistry Laboratories	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	10	Nationally	Provide Surveillance Support Detection and Analysis
State/Local	LRN Level 2 Chemistry Laboratories	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	36	Nationally	Provide Surveillance Support Detection and Analysis
State/Local	LRN Sentinel Clinical Laboratories	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	4,000	Nationally	Sample and Specimen Management
State	Courier system for sample transport	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	1	Per State	Sample and Specimen Management
Federal/State Local	Reagents	Equipment	As needed	Per laboratory	Sample and Specimen Provide Surveillance Support Detection and Analysis Confirmation Testing Investigation and Follow-up Laboratory Support

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
Federal/State/ Local	Laboratory Equipment and Supplies	Equipment	As needed	Per laboratory	Sample and Specimen Provide Surveillance Support Detection and Analysis Confirmation Testing Investigation and Follow-up Laboratory Support
CDC	CDC Director's Emergency Operations Center (DEOC)	Non-NIMS Resource Organization			Direct Public Health Laboratory Testing
State/Local	State and Local EOC	Resource Organization			Direct Public Health Laboratory Testing

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Respond Mission Area Target Capabilities

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ON-SITE INCIDENT MANAGEMENT

Capability Definition

Onsite Incident Management is the capability to effectively direct and control incident activities by using the Incident Command System (ICS) consistent with the National Incident Management System (NIMS).

Outcome

The incident is managed safely, effectively, and efficiently through the integration of facilities, resources (personnel, equipment, supplies, and communications), and procedures using a common organizational structure that is the ICS.

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

All Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) are coordination (resource providing) functions, thus ESFs are not involved in on-scene command. The ESFs work through coordination centers to provide the incident management organization with the resources it needs. Command is generally a local/county or State responsibility.

Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B1a 1.1.2	Develop NIMS-compliant plans and standard operating procedures (SOPs) for emergency response operations within the jurisdiction
Res.B1a 1.1.3	Develop jurisdiction emergency management plans and SOPs that are compatible and integrate support for unified command during operations
Res.B1a 1.2.1	Pre-identify resources available to supplement command and control capabilities
Res.B1a 1.1.1	Develop processes to order, track, and assign incident resources

Preparedness Measures	**Metrics**
Incident Command Post is equipped with processes and/or technologies to maintain accountability of deployed resources and personnel	Yes/No
Incident Command Post is equipped with ability to display real-time video feed of incident site (large cities only)	Yes/No
Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) is in place to provide Incident Commander with observation trips for aerial view or satellite imaging of incident (large cities only)	Yes/No
Plans and SOPs are NIMS-compliant and support multi-agency response operations	Yes/No
Electronic personnel tracking system is in place with ability to transmit personnel information to Department Operations Center (large cities only)	Yes/No

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Command Post is equipped with ability to receive information from Command and General Staff and participating agencies and transmit IAPs and other documentation	Yes/No

Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B1a 2.1.1	Train personnel in accordance with NIMS typing
Res.B1a 2.2.1	Exercise personnel in accordance with NIMS typing
Res.B1a 2.1.3	Arrange for command and elected officials to attend NIMS and other applicable training
Res.B1a 2.1.2	Develop a records management system to identify appropriate personnel who lack Incident Command System (ICS) training, and provide automated notification of training opportunities

Preparedness Measures	**Metric**
Percentage of capability staff and elected officials trained and exercised on their roles and responsibilities for implementing National Incident Management System (NIMS) during an incident	100%
Percentage of command staff (police, fire, EMS, public health) with training on how ICS will be applied locally	>90%
Personnel are trained and exercised on incident command and management protocols and procedures in compliance with NIMS	Yes/No

Performance Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: *Direct On-Site Incident Management* **Definition: In response to indication of an incident, implement management, planning, and coordination of on-site incident**	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B1a 3.3.6.1	Establish and maintain communications with EOC, dispatch center, and responding units
Res.B1a 3.3.6.2	Direct and coordinate with arriving local, tribal, regional, State, and Federal first responders
Res.B1a 3.3.4	Monitor/measure performance of assigned resources and request additional resources as needed

Performance Measures	**Metric**
Time in which additional resources are requested following initial scene assessment	Within 5 minutes of completion of assessment
Time in which resources are tracked and managed from arrival on-scene or at staging area until release	Continuously
Time in which communication is established with appropriate local, State, and Federal response entities	Within 30 minutes of arrival

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Activity: *Implement On-Site Incident Management*

Definition: In response to an incident, arrive on scene and provide initial scene report while beginning response operations; carry out management, planning, and coordination of on-site incident

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1a 4.1.1	Conduct initial assessment (size-up) (first arriving units)
Res.B1a 4.2	Initiate the Incident Command System (ICS)
Res.B1a 4.2.1	Establish and maintain communications with responding units, communications/dispatching center, and EOC
Res.B1a 4.2.2	Coordinate operations with specialized emergency response teams
Res.B1a 4.2.3	Direct arriving local, tribal, regional, State, and Federal first responders
Res.B1a 4.2.4	Request additional resources as necessary for operations and on-site incident management

Performance Measures	Metric
Time in which resources are tracked and managed from arrival on-scene or at staging area until release	Continuously
Time in which communication is established with appropriate local, tribal, regional, State, and Federal response entities	Continuously, with expanding scope as incident scale increases
Time in which initial incident conditions are reported to responding units	Within 2 minutes of first unit arriving on scene

Activity: *Establish Full On-Site Incident Command*

Definition: Establish staff and facilities necessary to conduct on-site incident command

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1a 5.1	Establish Incident Command (IC)
Res.B1a 5.1.2	Establish command and general staff positions needed to manage the incident and meet incident objectives
Res.B1a 5.1.3	Establish branches, groups, and divisions needed to manage the incident and meet incident objectives, strategies, and tactics
Res.B1a 5.1.1	Establish an incident command post, incident bases, camps, staging areas, and other facilities as required
Res.B1a 5.3.2	Transition from incident command to unified command for incidents involving multiple jurisdictions, a single jurisdiction with multi-agency involvement, or multiple jurisdictions with multi-agency involvement
Res.B1a 5.2	Implement processes to order, track, and assign incident resources
Res.B1a 5.2.2	Request mutual aid through the EOC and Multi-agency Coordination (MAC) Group ordering process

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Res.B1a 3.3.4	Monitor/measure performance of assigned resources and request additional resources as needed

Performance Measures	Metric
Time in which on-site incident command is established	Within 5 minutes of the first unit arriving on scene
Time in which the Incident Commander designates command and general staff, dependent upon complexity and scope of incident	Within 30 minutes of command being established
Command is successfully transferred to incident command organization able to manage the level of complexity and achieve the incident objectives	Yes/No

Activity: *Develop Incident Action Plan (IAP)*

Definition: Develop all necessary components of the IAP and obtain approval

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1a 6.1	Establish incident objectives, priorities, and operational periods
Res.B1a 6.2	Develop the incident action plan (IAP) to establish priorities, procedures, and actions to be accomplished to meet the incident objectives
Res.B1a 6.1.1	Establish operational period, not to exceed 24 hours

Performance Measures	Metric
Initial incident priorities and objectives are effectively communicated	Yes/No
Time to develop and approve the Incident Action Plan (IAP)	Within 12 hours of designation of command and general staff
Incident Action Plan (IAP) incorporates Incident Command System (ICS) management structures in accordance with the National Incident Management System (NIMS)	Yes/No
The IAP clearly states measurable incident objectives and communicates strategies and tactics required to fulfill the incident objectives throughout the entire operational period	Yes/No

Activity: *Execute Plan*

Definition: For each operational period, distribute IAP to response organizations for their assigned operations. The IAP is implemented to achieve the desired incident objectives.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1a 7.1.1	Disseminate IAP to other response organization through operational briefing
Res.B1a 7.3	Direct efforts to meet incident objectives in accordance with current IAP
Res.B1a 7.5.1	Evaluate and revise processes in response to incident developments

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Performance Measures	Metric
IAP is shared with other agencies and organizations at each operations briefing	Within 30 minutes of IAP approval
Formal operational briefings are conducted for each operational period	Daily
Incident objectives are accomplished through strategic and tactical actions	Yes/No
Frequency with which the IAP is re-assessed, revised, distributed, and briefed	At least at the start of each new operational period
All on-site management activities are coordinated through the Incident Command System (ICS)	Yes/No

Activity: ***Demobilize On-Site Incident Management***

Definition: Upon completion of the incident, implement demobilization plan and/or transition to recovery operations

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1a 8.1	Implement demobilization plan
Res.B1a 8.3	Transition incident command to recovery management
Res.B1a 8.2	Monitor demobilization/transition process

Performance Measures	Metric
Demobilization was implemented in accordance with demobilization plan	Yes/No
Effective transition from the on-site Incident Commander to recovery manager	Yes/No
Incident resources are returned to normal service when no longer needed	Yes/No

Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship
Emergency Operations Center Management	On-site Incident Management capability requests resources from the EOC and provides regular situation reports on incident response operations.
Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution	On-site Incident Management capability receives resource requests and coordinates resource allocation.
Firefighting Operations and Support	On-site Incident Management capability receives resource requests and incident updates.
Public Safety and Security Response	On-site Incident Management capability requests public safety resources and coordinates resource allocation.
Responder Health and Safety	On-site Incident Management capability provides resources and processes resource requests.

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Linked Capability	Relationship
Explosive Device Response Operations	On-site Incident Management capability provides resources and processes resource requests specific to EOD operations.
Fatality Management	On-site Incident Management capability processes resource requests and coordinates fatality management with the appropriate agencies/organizations.
Urban Search and Rescue	On-site Incident Management capability coordinates with US&R to determine resource needs and identify the scope of the incident.
WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination	On-site Incident Management capability provides resources and requests technical assistance on CBRNE incidents.
Mass Care	On-site Incident Management capability processes resource requests and provides assistance to shelter impacted individuals.
Triage and Pre-hospital Treatment	On-site Incident Management capability coordinates with EMS and hospitals to ensure rapid triage, treatment, and transport of impacted individuals while tracking the quantity, destination, and disposition of patients leaving the incident site.
Emergency Public Information and Warning	On-site Incident Management capability provides support and coordination to ensure prompt warning and notification to the public.
Citizen Evacuation and Shelter in Place	On-site Incident Management capability receives protective action decisions and provides support and coordination to ensure citizens receive correct information regarding the need to shelter in place or evacuate.
Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation	On-site Incident Management capability coordinates with public health when the incident is expected to have adverse human effects.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
Type V Incident Management	Local, discipline specific. Capable of functioning in an incident management function from the discovery of and arrival at an incident up to and including a full operational period as defined by the agency or jurisdiction.
Type IV Incident Management	Local, agency, or jurisdiction specific. Qualified as a Type 5. Capable of functioning in an incident management function that may involve resources from multiple agencies from the discovery of and arrival at an incident up to and including a full operational period as defined by the agency or jurisdiction.
Type III Incident Management Team	Regional or State. Qualified as a Type 4. Capable of functioning in an incident management function that involves resources from multiples agencies and jurisdictions from the local through Federal-level for multiples operational periods.
Type II Incident Management Team	State or National. Qualified as a Type 3. Capable of functioning in an incident management function that involves utilization of significant numbers of State and Federal-level resources.
Type I Incident Management Team	National. Qualified as a Type 2. Capable of functioning in an incident management function that involves utilization of significant numbers of Federal-level resources[7]
Federal Incident Response Support Team (FIRST)	Per the National Response Plan, a quick and readily deployable Emergency Response Team that serves as a forward component of the ERT-A providing on-scene support to the local incident command

Planning Assumptions

- Although applicable to several of the 15 National Planning Scenarios, the capability planning factors were developed from an in-depth analysis of the "Toxic Industrial Chemical" scenario. Other scenarios were reviewed to identify required adjustments or additions to the planning factors and national targets
- Any scenario might require the combined efforts of responders from various local, State, regional, private sector, and Federal entities to carry out sustained support for emergency operations and expand the Incident Command System (ICS) to an inter-jurisdictional and national focus. The coordination of the ICS will be critical in this regard to avoid duplication of effort and to manage strained resources. While the focus would be on response, it is important to note that some scenarios can impact a large geographical area in a relatively short period of time (e.g., when hazards are fast moving).
- Establishment of an intelligence/investigation function will be required if the event is terrorist initiated and, as such, is a criminal act that will require coordinated intelligence gathering and analysis and extensive criminal investigation.
- Type I Incident Management Teams (IMTs) are a federally or State certified standing team comprised of approximately 38 members qualified and certified through the NWCG qualification process. A

[7] NFPA Standard on Incident Management Professional Qualifications and NFPA 1561, Standard on Emergency Service Incident Management System

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Type I IMT is the most robust IMT with the most experience; is fully equipped and self-contained and is typically deployed to incidents of national significance.

- Type II IMTs are Federally or State certified standing team comprised of up to approximately 38 members qualified and certified through the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) qualification process. A Type II IMT may be self-contained and is typically deployed to incidents of regional significance.
- Type III IMTs are standing teams of trained personnel from different departments, organizations, agencies, and jurisdictions within a State or metropolitan region, deployed within a State or region to manage or support incident management at incidents that extend beyond one operational period and possibly transition to a Type II or Type I IMT.
- Type IV IMTs are designated teams of fire, EMS, and/or law enforcement officers from a region or single jurisdiction (city or county), activated when necessary to manage a major or complex incident during the first 6-12 hours and possibly transition to a Type III IMT.
- Type V IMTs are a "pool" of primarily fire officers from several neighboring departments trained to serve in Command and General Staff positions during the first 6-12 hours of a major or complex incident and possibly transition to a Type IV or Type III IMT.[8]
- Complex incident management-unified incident command will have to be established immediately. Multiagency coordination will be required.
- Resource management processes will have to be established immediately.
- An inadequate number of first responder resources will be available to manage the entire incident scene as it grows due to the wind transportation of toxic chemicals.
- An incident command post, incident base camps, staging areas, and decontamination sites will have to be established.
- The multi-agency coordinating group and incident communications management required to supplement dispatch centers and Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) will be overwhelmed from the onset.
- Responder care issues will have an immediate impact on the emergency response system.
- All incidents will be managed using the National Incident Management System/Incident Command System (NIMS/ICS) at the local level. Expanding or complex incidents may require transitioning incident management to a Type III, Type II, or Type I Incident Management Team (IMT).
- "Drawdown" of Type I and Type II IMTs due to significant wildfire activity results in increased use of Type III IMTs at incidents of national significance.
- Hazardous conditions, weather, size of area, scope, access, and criminal activity (hazard) affect how quickly incident scene can be sized up
- The Toxic Industrial Chemical scenario involves a fire and toxic industrial chemical release from a petroleum refinery caused by terrorist attack using rocket-propelled grenades and explosive devices. There are 350 fatalities, 1,000 hospitalized victims, 10,000 evacuated, 1,000 seeking shelter, 25,000 sheltering in place, and 100,000 self-evacuating. One-half of the structures at the refinery are damaged from explosions.

[8] FEMA 508-2 Typed Resource Definitions – Incident Management Resources , July 12, 2005

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Planning Factors from an In-Depth Analysis of a Scenario with Significant Demand for the Capability (Toxic Industrial Chemical)

Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Type III Incident Management Type	Moderate/complex Incident management	All-risk incident Single or unified command 100-200 responders in operations section	1 IMT; if incident is a long-duration incident, it may require a transition of a new IMT
Type II Incident Management Team	Moderate/complex incident management	All-risk incident Single or unified command 200-500 responders in operations section	1 IMT; if incident is a long-duration incident, it may require a transition of a new IMT
Type I Incident Management Team	Complex incident management	All-risk incident Single or unified command 500+ responders in operations section	1 IMT; if incident is a long-duration incident, it may require a transition of a new IMT

Approaches for Large-Scale Events

- National ICS positions and qualification standards need to be established by the NIMS Integration Center (NIC) Use existing standards established for IMTs by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and U.S. Fire Administration.
- Increase the local-level Type III and IV IMT training using existing programs such as that of the U.S. Fire Administration. Use subject matter experts (SMEs) from local, State, and Federal agencies certified/qualified in ICS to accomplish national training needs.
- The NIMS Integration Center (NIMS) needs to establish training and exercise requirements; use those established by NWCG, USDA, and USCG.

National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
Local	Type IV Incident Management Team	NIMS-Typed Resource Organization	1	Per large cities, counties, or regions	All Activities
State/ Metropolitan	Type III Incident Management Team	NIMS-Typed Resource Organization	1	State and UASI Regions	All Activities
State	Type II Incident Management	NIMS-Typed Resource Organization	1	Per State with high occurrence, or per regional area available to	All Activities

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
	Team			multiple States	
Federal	Type I Incident Management Team	NIMS-Typed Resource Organization	6	Nationally, strategically placed	All Activities
Federal	Federal Incident Response Support Team	NIMS-Typed Resource Organization			All Activities

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EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER MANAGEMENT

Capability Definition

Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Management is the capability to provide multi-agency coordination (MAC) for incident management by activating and operating an EOC for a pre-planned or no-notice event. EOC management includes EOC activation, notification, staffing, and deactivation; management, direction, control, and coordination of response and recovery activities; coordination of efforts among neighboring governments at each level and among local, regional, State, and Federal EOCs; coordination public information and warning; and maintenance of the information and communication necessary for coordinating response and recovery activities.

Outcome

The event is effectively managed through multi-agency coordination for a pre-planned or no-notice event.

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

This capability supports Emergency Support Function (ESF) #5: Emergency Management.

Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B1c 1.1.4	Establish and implement an order of command succession or continuity consistent with NIMS
Res.B1c 1.3.1	Verify that all critical communication links/circuits/systems have been identified and regularly tested; redundant and diverse links exist in case of single point of failure; and all emergency circuits are protected with telecommunications service priority for prompt restoration/provisioning
Res.B1c 1.3.2.7	Verify that all participating public safety-related Communication Centers—serving the EOC directly or indirectly—are secure and functional, have established communication links with the EOC, have appropriate supplemental resources and other outlets to provide prompt, accurate public information and effective, timely notifications, and maintain a valid common operating picture for all responders/participants
Res.B1c 1.3.2.5	Verify that all serving Public Safety Communication Centers have clear and standard operating procedures (SOPs), consistent with the potential needs specifically related to the event
Res.B1c 1.3.2.6	Verify that primary and secondary means to establish and maintain communication services through the event timeline are in place, can be activated promptly, and can continue to operate at acceptable levels
Res.B1c 1.2.1	Create one central and one backup EOC

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Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Res.B1c 1.1.6	Develop emergency operations plans, policies and procedures
Res.B1c 1.1.7	Develop continuity of operations/continuity of government (COOP/COG) plans

Preparedness Measures	Metrics
A national security policy to identify classified information handling requirements has been developed for Federal, State, and local EOCs	Yes/No
Standard operating procedures (SOPs) for activation, operation, and deactivation of EOCs/MACs are in place	Yes/No
Standard operating procedure (SOP) sections related to the role of each entity in the management of EOCs/MACs have been reviewed	Yes/No
Communications plans to exchange data and voice in real time are in place	Yes/No
Critical communication links/circuits/systems have been identified and tested	Quarterly
Redundant and diverse links exist in case of single point of failure for all critical communications	Yes/No
Design, construction, and repair reports identify and resolve any single failure point	Yes/No
Critical circuits are identified and telecommunication service priority contracted with provider	Yes/No
Alternate processes for sharing public information have been created, tested and deployed	Yes/No
Policy/procedure, appropriate equipment, and capability to relocate safely, without loss of operational integrity, is established and tested	Yes/No
Primary and secondary means to establish and maintain communication services through the event timeline are established so that services can be activated promptly and have the capacity to continue to operate at acceptable levels	Yes/No
Effective process has been established for assessing the status of any/all public safety communication centers throughout the lifetime of event	Yes/No

Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B1c 2.1	Conduct EOC specific training
Res.B1c 2.2.2	Develop exercise program to evaluate the effectiveness of emergency operations center (EOC) incident management process
Res.B1c 2.2	Develop exercise program for emergency operations plans, policies and procedures
Res.B1c 2.2.1	Develop exercise program for continuity of operations/continuity of government (COOP/COG) plans
Res.B1c 2.3	Brief chief executive and other key officials of the jurisdiction in the jurisdiction's command and control plans for large-scale emergencies

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Res.B1c 2.4	Conduct annual command and control training and exercises for large-scale emergencies

Preparedness Measures	Metric
Appropriate personnel have completed FEMA Independent Study Programs:	
▪ IS 700-NIMS, An Introduction	Yes/No
▪ IS 800-National Response Plan, An Introduction;	Yes/No
▪ IS 275-EOC Management and Operations;	Yes/No
▪ IS 100-Introduction to Incident Command System; and	Yes/No
▪ IS 200-ICS for Single Resources and Initial Action Incidents	Yes/No
Chief executive and other key officials of the jurisdiction are briefed in the jurisdiction's command and control plans for large-scale emergencies	Yes/No
Chief executive and other key officials of the jurisdiction participate in annual command and control training and exercises for large-scale emergencies	Yes/No
EOC personnel (primary and backup) are trained to perform EOC tasks and on their assigned roles and responsibilities as part of the EOC team	Yes/No

Performance Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: Direct Emergency Operation Center's Tactical Operations

Definition: In response to notification of incident, activate, staff, and organize the EOC in accordance with emergency plans and standard operating procedures; plan, direct, and coordinate information and activities internally within EOC functions, and externally with other multi-agency coordination entities and the public information system; coordinate logistical support to maintain an operationally functioning EOC until deactivation.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1c 3.1	Establish organization/operation of EOC
Res.B1c 3.1.1	Ensure that all appropriate functional areas are staffed
Res.B1c 3.3.3	Direct all support organizations participating in EOC
Res.B1c 3.1.3	Ensure appropriate maintenance and rest cycles are included in resource (personnel and equipment) management activities
Res.B1c 3.3.1	Coordinate jurisdictional emergency management operations
Res.B1c 3.7	Transition from response to recovery

Performance Measures	Metric
The emergency operations center (EOC) was activated upon notification of the incident	Yes/No

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Activity: *Activate EOC*

Definition: In response to activation, perform incident notifications, recall of essential personnel, and stand-up of EOC systems to provide a fully staffed and operational EOC.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1c 4	Activate the EOC
Res.B1c 4.3	Activate, alert, and notify EOC personnel
Res.B1c 4.4	Brief incoming personnel

Performance Measures	Metric
Time for the EOC to become fully staffed	Less than 2 hours after activation
Time for the EOC to commence operations	Less than 2 hours after activation
Time in which incoming staff is appropriately briefed and assigned	Within 15 minutes of staff arrival
Time for DHS to designate a Principal Federal Official (PFO)	Within 1 hour of the incident
Time for PFO to assemble a support staff and deploy to the affected area as soon as possible	Within 1 hour of the incident

Activity: *Gather and Provide Information*

Definition: Upon establishing EOC operations, gather, organize, and document incident situation and resource information from all sources to maintain situational awareness within the EOC, and horizontally and vertically within the National Incident Management System.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1c 5.1.1	Determine status of communication links between EOC and all participating public safety related communication centers
Res.B1c 5.1	Make proper connections with other agencies involved in incident
Res.B1c 5.2.2	Coordinate with local, county, regional, State, and Federal EOCs to collect/share data on incident situation
Res.B1c 5.2.3	Coordinate with non-government agencies and/or private sector to collect/share data on incident situation
Res.B1c 5.1.2	Monitor communication and information systems for incident information
Res.B1c 5.2	Collect, analyze, and disseminate information

Performance Measures	Metric
Process is established for assessing the status of any/all public safety communication centers throughout the event	Yes/No
Time to establish connectivity with all participating public safety-related Communication Centers, serving the EOC directly or indirectly	Within 30 minutes of becoming operational
Time to inventory and report on (to the NRCC) the availability and functionality status of all plan supporting teams and resources, including identification of deficiencies or limiting factors	Within 12 hours of the incident

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Time in which the jurisdiction produces an incident action plan (IAP) defining a schedule and set the operational period	Less than 2 hours after EOC/MAC entity is operational
Time in which the jurisdiction produces and distributes a situation report	Less than 2 hours after EOC/entity is operational
Frequency with which the jurisdiction provides situation reports	At least 1 per operational period

Activity: *Identify and Address Issues*

Definition: Upon receiving information, assess and identify current and anticipated resource shortages, technical support issues, and key policy decisions needed across all capabilities, and provide to the applicable agency, function, jurisdiction or multi-agency coordination entity for resolution.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1c 6.1.4	Identify issues
Res.B1c 6.1.5	Elevate issues up the chain of command, as needed
Res.B1c 6.3	Track issues until they are resolved

Performance Measures	Metric
Issues are tracked until they are resolved	Yes/No
Time in which appropriate decision-makers are consulted to facilitate resolution of issues	Within 30 minutes of recognizing need to consult decision-makers

Activity: *Implement Multi-Agency Coordinated Decisions*

Definition: Upon identification of issues, establish priorities between Incident and/or Area Commands; provide strategic direction; coordinate and resolve multi-agency policy issues, including the issuance of protective action recommendations and protective action decisions.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1c 7.3.4	Coordinate legal and regulatory issues with support of general counsel
Res.B1c 7.3.1	Facilitate resolution to policy, political, social, and economic sensitivities of the affected jurisdiction(s) as they impact response and recovery operations
Res.B1c 7.3.2	Facilitate formulation of protective action decisions (PADs), as needed
Res.B1c 7.3.3	Facilitate decision to implement isolation and quarantine, when needed
Res.B1c 7.4	Implement continuity of operations (COOP) plans and continuity of government (COG) plans

Performance Measures	Metric
Time in which to initiate/expedite establishment of a Joint Field Office (JFO),	Within 4 hours of the incident

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National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), and Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC)	
Time in which of continuity of operations (COOP) plans and continuity of government (COG) plans are successfully implemented	Less than 2 hours after the incident
Time to designate Federal staging areas inside incident area (forward of Federal Mobilization Center)	Within 1 hour of the incident
Time in which pre-positioned Equipment Program Teams are activated	Within 2 hours of the incident
Time in which pre-positioned Equipment Program Teams are deployed	Within 2 hours of the incident
Time in which field survey support team and remote sensing aircraft are deployed to the incident area	Within 4 hours of the incident

Activity: *Support and Coordinate Response*

Definition: Once requested, provide resource, technical, and policy support to the Incident Command by coordinating the actions of off-site agencies, organizations, and jurisdictions, implementing mutual aid agreements, and requesting higher-level assistance

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1c 8.3.1	Coordinate activation of mutual aid agreements to obtain resources
Res.B1c 8.1.1	Provide direction, information, and/or support as appropriate to incident command (IC), or unified command (UC), and/or joint field office(s)
Res.B1c 8.3.2	Support incident response operations by providing resources ordered by the Incident Management Team (IMT) through the EOC
Res.B1c 8.3	Coordinate resource logistics and distribution
Res.B1c 8.2.2	Support identification and determination of potential hazards and threats including mapping, modeling, and forecasting

Performance Measures	Metric
Time in which the jurisdiction recognizes the need to implement mutual aid agreements	Less than 2 hours after EOC/MAC operations begin
Time in which mutual aid and State and/or Federal resources are requested, as needed, during an incident	Within 2 hours of recognizing need for mutual aid, State and/or Federal resources
Process to ensure direction, information, and/or support provided to field is established	Yes/No
Frequency of status of resource requests	At least once per operational period

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Activity: ***Demobilize Emergency Operations Center Management*** **Definition: Upon completion of response phase, terminate EOC response activities, archive records, and restore systems, supplies, and staffing to a pre-incident ready State (or as appropriate for recovery activities).**	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B1c 9.3	Facilitate demobilization plans and procedures for preparation of after-action reports
Res.B1c 9.1	Re-assess and implement EOC demobilization and deactivation plans
Res.B1c 9.4	Rehabilitate and re-supply EOC entity to return to state of readiness

Performance Measures	**Metric**
Time in which criteria for demobilization of EOC are established	Within 2 hours of receipt of first demobilization request
Time in which EOC/MAC entity is to deactivated/demobilized	Within 24 hours of decision to deactivate

Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship
On-site Incident Management	EOC capability coordinates closely with IC/UC to set incident priorities, facilitate resource requests, and troubleshoot political, economic, policy, legal or regulatory, or social issues affecting on-site response operations.
Emergency Public Information and Warning	EOC capability provides information to the Emergency Public Information and Warning capability for release to the media and the public. EOC capability received information from Emergency Public Information and Warning on mis-information and rumors in the public domain that may impact response operations.
Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution	EOC capability coordinates with Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution to facilitate resources being distributed according to incident priorities.
Isolation and Quarantine	EOC capability receives protective action recommendations from the Isolation and Quarantine capability, when appropriate. Isolation and Quarantine capability assists the EOC capability in making well-informed protective action decisions and in implementing those decisions.
Citizen Evacuation and Shelter In-Place	EOC capability receives protective action recommendations from the Citizen Evacuation and Shelter In-Place capability, when appropriate. Citizen Evacuation and Shelter In-Place capability assists the EOC capability in making well-informed protective action decisions and in implementing those decisions.
Mass Prophylaxis	EOC capability receives protective action recommendations from the Mass Prophylaxis capability, when appropriate. Mass Prophylaxis capability assists the EOC capability in making well-informed protective action decisions and in implementing those decisions.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Element	Description
All EOCs	**Personnel:** Consists of basic EOC functional requirements, including: chief executive and key officials, command staff, incident commander, EOC Management Support Team (defined in NIMS), Operations Section (defined in NIMS), Logistics Section, Planning Section (defined in NIMS), Administration/financial Section (defined in NIMS), ESF areas (up to 15), and Information technology (IT) specialist. **Plans:** Emergency operations plans, policies and procedures; continuity of operations/continuity of government (COOP/COG) Plans **Equipment:** Level 1 mobile central processor, communications equipment (e.g., telephones, satellites, television, radio), computers and software (e.g., a geographic information system (GIS)) unclassified capability equipment, including the National Alert Warning System (NAWAS) and the Washington Area Warning System (WAWAS) **Training**: EOC specific training; FEMA Independent Study Program: IS 700-NIMS, An Introduction; FEMA Independent Study Program: IS 800-National Response Plan, An Introduction; FEMA Independent Study Program: IS 275-EOC Management and Operations; FEMA Independent Study Program: IS 100-Introduction to Incident Command System; FEMA Independent Study Program: IS 200-ICS for Single Resources and Initial Action Incidents **Exercises, Evaluations and Corrective Actions**: Exercise program to evaluate the effectiveness of emergency operations center (EOC) incident management processes; exercise program for emergency operations plans, policies and procedures; exercise program for continuity of operations/continuity of government (COOP/COG) Plans
State EOC	**Equipment**: Add the following: sensitive compartmented information facilities (SCIF), secret capability equipment, including: Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN)/Joint Regional Information, Exchange System (JRIES), other classified systems connectivity, secure telephone and VTC equipment, Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) capable equipment, including: Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN)/Defense Message System (DMS), other classified systems, secure telephone equipment (STE), National Secure Telephone System (NSTS), Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) secure VTC equipment, Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) secure facsimile equipment
Federal EOC	**Personnel:** Add the following: Emergency Response Team (ERT), National Emergency Response Team (ERT-N), Federal Incident Response Support Team (FIRST), Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) Detachment, Mobilization Center Management Team (MCMT), Hurricane Liaison Team (HLT), DHS Science and Technology Advisory and Response Team, CDC Incident Support Team **Equipment:** Same as State EOC

Planning Assumptions

General

- Although applicable to several of the 15 National Planning Scenarios, the capability planning factors were developed from an in-depth analysis of the Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) scenario. Other scenarios were reviewed to identify required adjustments or additions to the planning factors and national targets.

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- This capability is applicable to all scenarios in which the incident is a large-scale event requiring the establishment of a command center away from the incident site.
- One central and backup EOC for each of 3,142 counties. One central and backup State EOC are available for each State and 6 territorial governments (56+). Individual municipalities (19,429) and towns and townships (16,504) may need an EOC depending on population, legislation, and identified requirements.
- Type III Incident Management Teams (IMTs) can be maintained at the local level (city, county, and State) and staffed by qualified individuals from first-responder agencies (interagency IMTs). Such IMTs are readily available for a quick response and rapidly establish incident command on expanding incidents.
- One central and backup EOC are available for each of the signatory departments and agencies listed in the *National Response Plan* (40+).
- All jurisdictions have identified the need to carry out minimum emergency functions for effective control of any emergency through their own EOC or a shared EOC that has been identified under National Incident Management System (NIMS) operations.
- The primary or alternate EOC facility is operational and habitable.
- Sufficient personnel, ranging from 2 to 3 shifts, 24/7, are available to staff the EOC and manage all tasks.
- Sufficient personnel and equipment are available to conduct EOC operations.
- Trained personnel are available to perform EOC tasks. Personnel know their assigned roles and responsibilities as part of the EOC team.
- Primary and/or alternate communications capabilities are still functional to coordinate response and incident management.
- Governments within the United States:
  - 19,429 municipalities
  - 16,504 towns or townships
  - 3,142 counties
  - 50 State governments
  - 6 territorial governments
  - 1 Federal government
  - Total of more than 39,000 jurisdictions

- Cities with populations greater than 50,000 should identify the need for an EOC. The numbers of cities with levels of populations above 50,000 follow:
  - 364 cities with populations of 50,000—100,000
  - 173 cities with populations of 100,000—200,00
  - 36 cities with populations of 250,000—500,000
  - 29 cities with populations of 500,000+

Scenario-Specific

- The capability targets for a single incident are based primarily on the "improvised nuclear device" (IND) scenario because it was considered the most encompassing for an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) standup and response to minimize the impact and to manage the incident. An earthquake was considered the next most encompassing. The 15 possible scenarios were rated from most to least encompassing.

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Planning Factors from an In-Depth Analysis of a Scenario with Significant Demand for the Capability (Improvised Nuclear Device)

Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Communication	Level 1 mobile central processor (CP)		2 total; 1 to be used to restore "normal" public safety communications services to some level during the duration of recovery effort
Equipment needs	The capabilities/capacities are requirements for implementation to meet goals and objectives of integration and configuration of operations centers.	Applicable to all scenarios	Communications equipment, computers, satellite, AM-FM radio, and sensitive compartmented information facilities (SCIF) areas **Unclassified capabilities:** Internet Local area network (wired and/or secure wireless) Geographic information system (GIS) Geospatial imagery Interoperable software EOC operation software Sensitive-but-unclassified network Common operational picture Video wall/plasma screen Telephone Facsimile Video teleconferencing (VTC) Cable TV Satellite TV VHS/UHF/HF communications National Alert Warning System (NAWAS) Washington Area Warning System (WAWAS) State-of-the-art computer blade technology Special lighting Room acoustics Architectural noise and vibration control Environmental acoustics Sound reinforcement systems **Secret capabilities:** Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN)/Joint Regional

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Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
			Information Exchange System (JRIES) Other classified systems connectivity Secure telephone equipment Secret/secure VTC equipment VHF/UHF/HF communications Common operational picture **Top secret/sensitive compartmented information-capable equipment:** Common operational picture Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN)/Defense Message System (DMS) Other classified systems Secure telephone equipment (STE) National Secure Telephone System (NSTS) TS/SCI secure VTC equipment TS/SCI secure facsimile equipment Connectivity to other emergency operation centers (EOCs)
Personnel	Locally determined by size of emergency operating center (EOC)	Applicable to all scenarios	Capability to meet basic EOC functional requirements: Policy/incident command Safety/security Public information officer (PIO) Operations Logistics Planning Administration/finance 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESF) (if required to activate) 2 Federal agriculture employees/U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) per operational period for 24/7 staffing

Approaches for Large-Scale Events

During an emergency caused by an improvised nuclear device, when both the local and alternate EOC are not operational, it would be beneficial to know neighboring counties' vital information (e.g., population, local hazards, infrastructure complexity, urban versus rural)

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National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	# of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
City	Primary City EOC	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	1	Per city with population ≥ 50k	All performance activities
County	County EOC	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	2	Per county (primary and backup)	All performance activities
State/ Territorial	State EOC	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	2	Per State/Territory (primary and backup)	All performance activities
Federal	Federal EOC	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	2	Per designated Federal agency (primary and backup)	All performance activities
DHS/FEMA	U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) EOC	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	2	Per DHS/FEMA Regional Office (Primary and backup)	All performance activities

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CRITICAL RESOURCE LOGISTICS AND DISTRIBUTION

Capability Definition

Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution is the capability to identify, inventory, dispatch, mobilize, transport, recover, and demobilize and to accurately track and record available human and material critical resources throughout all incident management phases. Critical resources are those necessary to preserve life, property, safety, and security.

Outcome

Critical resources are available to incident managers and emergency responders upon request for proper distribution and to aid disaster victims in a cost-effective and timely manner.

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function/Annex

The capability supports the following Emergency Support Functions (ESFs):

ESF #1: Transportation
ESF #2: Communications
ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering
ESF #4: Firefighting
ESF #5: Emergency Management
ESF #6: Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services
ESF #7: Resource Support
ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services
ESF #9: Urban Search and Rescue
ESF #10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Response
ESF #11: Agriculture and Natural Resources
ESF #12: Energy
ESF #13: Public Safety and Security
ESF #14: Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation
ESF #15: External Affairs

Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B1d 1	Develop plans, procedures, and protocols for resource management in accordance with the National Incident Management System (NIMS), and include pre-positioning of resources to efficiently and effectively respond to an event
Res.B1d 1.6	Establish plans and procedures for coordinating with non-governmental and private sector

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Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
	organizations for obtaining resources
Res.B1d 1.3.2	Develop plans for establishment of logistic staging areas (LSAs) for internal and external response personnel, equipment, and supplies

Preparedness Measures	Metrics
Tracking and recording systems for resources are developed and tested	Yes/No
Resource and vendor list has been developed	Yes/No
Frequency with which resource lists are routinely updated	Annually or as required
Pre-negotiated vendor contracts for critical resources and essential services are established and maintained	Yes/No
Plans, procedures and systems are in place to pre-position resources to efficiently and effectively respond to an event	Yes/No
Processes and procedures are in place to ensure that resource providers are reimbursed in a timely manner	Yes/No

Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B1d 2.2.1	Validate resource logistics and distribution plans and training programs using exercises ranging from tabletop to full-scale

Preparedness Measures	Metric
Training in emergency logistics that incorporates linkages among damage/needs assessment, logistics management, and volunteer/donations management has been developed according to established standards for logisticians	Yes/No
Verify/validate that personnel are tested and trained on tracking and recording systems	As required/necessary, but no less than once every 18 months
Frequency of exercising resource and logistic tracking and recording systems	Annually and/or during other annual exercises

Performance Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: *Direct Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution Operations* **Definition: In response to an incident or situation that may require outside resource support, provide management and coordination for the Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution capability, from activation through demobilization.**	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B1d 3.1.1	Establish communication between EOC and Incident Management Team to determine resource

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	needs to support incident response and operations
Res.B1d 3.2.2	Identify existing internal, jurisdiction-specific resources available to support response and recovery operations
Res.B1d 3.1.2	Make determination regarding the need for additional external resources and implementing a critical resource logistics and distribution plan
Res.B1d 3.2.4	Meet ongoing resource support needs through appropriate procurement sources from the EOC
Res.B1c 3.5	Provide logistical support for the operation and requests of the IC/EOC
Res.C1a 3.2.5	Coordinate distribution of stockpile assets
Res.B3a 3.5.1	Coordinate the handling and transporting of affected persons requiring assistance
Rec.C1a 3.2.5	Provide and coordinate the use of emergency power generation services at critical facilities

Performance Measures	Metric
Time between the requests for critical resources needed for the incident and the activation of the multi-agency coordination system	Within 2 hours
Time to determine that there is a need to supplement internal resources by implementing critical resource logistics and distribution operations	Within 8 hours of incident
Time to process and approve requests for critical resources	Within 1 hour of receiving request
Determine if assistance from outside jurisdictions (i.e., mutual aid, Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)) is needed	Yes/No
Assistance from outside jurisdictions is tracked to certify performance	Yes/No

Activity: ***Activate Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution***

Definition: In response to activation, initiate the resource logistics and distribution process, to include identifying and establishing a logistics staging area (LSA).

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1d 4.1	Initiate resource logistics and distribution support for incident response operations according to the Incident Management Team (IMT) assignments in the Incident Action Plan (IAP)
Res.B1d 4.2	Implement plans and procedures for establishing a logistics staging area (LSA) for internal and external response personnel, equipment, and supplies
Res.B1d 4.3	Implement a resource tracking system
Res.B1d 4.4	Plan and prepare for the demobilization process well in advance in accordance with NIMS in order to facilitate accountability and make transportation of resources as efficient as possible

Performance Measures	Metric
Logistics staging area (LSA) is opened	Within 8 hours of incident
Critical resources are accurately tracked and recorded	Yes/No

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Activity: *Respond to Needs Assessment and Inventory*

Definition: Based on tasking from the EOC/MAC per field needs assessments, determine types of resources needed to support response operations.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1d 5.1	Obtain needs assessments from appropriate authorities (Federal advance teams, EOC, IC, etc.)
Res.B1d 5.2	Inventory, type, and categorize, by material or services, all resources (facilities, equipment, personnel, and systems) available to support emergency operations
Res.B1d 5.2.2	Determine availability of supplies stocked in distribution facilities, national stockpiles, and customer supply centers

Performance Measures	Metric
Time for logistics staging area (LSA) to respond to EOC tasking for resource support	Within 1 hour of request

Activity: *Acquire Resources*

Definition: Request and acquire resources from local, State, Federal, or private providers.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1d 6.1	Implement plans, procedures, and protocols for resource acquisition and management in accordance with NIMS
Res.B1d 6.3.2	Provide facilities, transportation, supplies, equipment/equipment maintenance, fueling, food service, and communications through the logistics staging area (LSA)
Res.B1d 6.3.4	Track/record resource movement in and out of the logistics staging area (LSA)
Res.B1d 6.3.3	Obtain supplies stocked in distribution facilities, national stockpiles, and customer supply centers

Performance Measures	Metric
Resource movement is tracked/recorded	Yes/No
Time in which the resource is available for deployment	Within 2 hours of arrival
Time in which critical resources from the State (within the State) are delivered	Within 12 hours of approval of request
Time in which critical resources from the State (State-to-State)/EMAC are delivered	Within 24 hours of approval of request
Time in which Federal critical resources are delivered in response to request	Within 24 hours of approval of request
Time in which private sector is tasked to inventory and identify available assets	Within 2 hours of need for private sector involvement
Inventory and identify (to ESF-7) all large-space facility structures within 250 miles of the incident venue(s) that could be made available for use as needed	Within 6 hours of request

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EOCs and Incident Management Teams follow standard interagency mobilization guides at the national, regional, State, tribal, and local levels	Yes/No

Activity: *Transport, Track, and Manage Resources*

Definition: Once a resource request has been filled, deploy the resource to the incident through the logistics staging area (LSA) and in coordination with EOC.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1d 7.1.4	Mobilize transportation to distribute resources
Res.B1d 7.2	Deploy and transport resources to appropriate, pre-determined locations
Res.B1d 7.3	Track the deployment, movement, and transportation of resources prior to and during an incident
Res.B1d 7.4	Support incident response operations by providing resources ordered by the Incident Management Team through the Emergency Operations Center/Multiagency Coordination Group (EOC/MAC)

Performance Measures	Metric
Private sector linkages are activated to inventory and identify available transportation assets, potential mass shelters facilities and medical facilities, personnel, equipment, and supplies	Yes/No
Transportation assets are established sufficient to transport required critical human and material resources throughout incident management phases	Yes/No
Requests have been made for State critical resources and delivery of those resources	Yes/No
Requests have been made for Federal critical resources and delivery of those resources	Yes/No
Time in which resources received at logistics staging area (LSA) are available to support response and recovery operations	Within 8 hours from receipt
Manage and inventory critical resources to ensure sustained operations	Yes/No
All required procedures for acquiring and managing resources, including reconciliation, accounting, auditing, and inventorying, are followed	Yes/No
Percent of approved resource requests met and filled accurately during the incident	100%
Initiate actions to deploy Pre-Positioned Disaster Supply (PPDS) containers	Within 24 hours
Initiate actions to deploy additional Pre-Positioned Disaster Supply (PPDS) containers	Within 48 hours
Begin backfill of Pre-Positioned Disaster Supplies (PPDS) containers	Within 72 hours
Resource status changes are recorded and reported as they occur	Yes/No

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Activity: ***Maintain and Recover Resources***

Definition: Recover all resources deployed for response and recovery support, rehabilitate and re-supply all resources, rest and recuperate all personnel, review tracking system, and retrace all resources back to original provider. The recovery process involves the final disposition of all resources.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1d 8.1.1	Cycle personnel to allow for rest and recuperation
Res.B1d 8.1.2	Cycle resources to allow for rehabilitation and/or re-supply efforts
Res.B1d 8.2.2	Rehabilitate and/or re-supply all expendable and nonexpendable resources
Res.B1d 8.2.3	Recover all deployed resources that are salvageable
Res.B1d 8.2.4	Return resources to issuing location
Res.B1d 8.4.2	Account for all resource use and expenditure
Res.B1d 8.3.1	Use established regulations and policies to deal with resources that require special handling and disposition, such as biological waste, contaminated supplies, debris, and equipment

Performance Measures	Metric
Resources and personnel are cycled	Yes/No or Per the IAP
Tracking system is reviewed	Yes/No
Resources returned to original provider	Yes/No

Activity: ***Demobilize Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution***

Definition: Upon completion of assigned duties or as directed by superiors, shut down the logistics staging area and return to pre-incident readiness.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1d 9.2	Determine that equipment and unused resources/supplies are no longer needed to support operation
Res.B1d 9.3	Implement demobilization and deactivation procedures

Performance Measures	Metric
Time from determination that demobilization of resources should begin and full implementation of demobilization plan	Within 8 hours
Time in which deployed resources are recovered following the end of response/recovery operations	Within 72 hours of end of operations
Requests for State and Federal reimbursement have been processed	Yes/No
Non-expendable resources are fully accounted for at the incident site	Yes/No
Non-expendable resources are fully accounted for upon return to the unit that issued them	Yes/No

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Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship
Onsite Incident Management	Critical resources required to support incident response will typically be identified by the onsite Incident Management Team.
EOC Management	A resource needs assessment to support incident response will be provided by the IC or Incident Management Team to the EOC, which will coordinate the acquisition of the required resources. The EOC will also coordinate with the logistical staging area.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
Logistics Planning Manager	Develops plans for logistics management
National tracking system	1 national system that captures and tracks resource availability -- includes locally managed tracking systems to feed into the larger system
Rapid Needs Assessment Team	Per NIMS, provides a rapid assessment capability immediately following a major disaster or emergency
Logistics response system	Per NIMS, part of the ICS logistics branch needed to manage critical resource logistics and distribution
Transportation Coordinator	Per NRP ESF#1; coordinates critical resource transportation needs between all organizations
Logistic staging area (LSA)	This term is used as a convenience to represent the reception area and staging/mobilization area defined in NIMS.
Cargo Transportation Teams	Vehicles and staff necessary to move large amounts of critical resources
Federal mobilization base camp	Locations at incident site to receive Federal assets
State staging area	Locations in base camps to house Federal assets transferred to the State.
Interagency warehouse	Location with appropriate material-handing equipment, to receive and house critical resources transferred from the State and donated.
Warehouse system for stockpiled resources	
Assigned resources	Per NIMS, the status condition where personnel, teams, equipment, or facilities are checked in, or in the case of equipment and facilities, receipted for, and are assigned to support incident operations.
Available resources	Per NIMS, the status condition where personnel, teams, equipment, or facilities are checked in, or in the case of equipment and facilities receipted for, assigned to an incident, and are ready for a specific work detail or function.
Out-of-service resources	Per NIMS, the status condition where personnel, teams, equipment, or facilities are assigned to an incident but are unable to function for mechanical, rest, or personal reasons, or because their condition makes them unusable.
Reception area	Per NIMS, a location separate from the staging areas, where resources report in for processing and out-processing. Also provide accountability, security, situational awareness briefings, safety awareness, distribution of IAPs, supplies, equipment, feeding, and bed down.
Staging area	Per NIMS, a temporary location established where available resources can be placed while awaiting a tactical assignment.
Incident base	Per NIMS, the location at which primary support activities are conducted. A single incident base is established to house all equipment and personnel support operations. The incident base should be designed to be able to support operations at multiple incident sites.

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Camps	Per NIMS, a location that is separate from the incident base and located in satellite fashion from the incident base where it can best support incident operations. Camps provide certain essential auxiliary forms of support, such as food, sleeping areas, and sanitation. It may also provide minor maintenance and servicing of equipment. Camps may be relocated to meet changing operational requirements.
Mobilization and staging areas	Per NIMS, staging areas will be established by the Operations Section Chief to enable positioning of and accounting for resources not immediately assigned. A staging area can be any location in which personnel, supplies, and equipment can be temporarily housed or parked while awaiting operational assignment. Staging areas may include temporary feeding, fueling, and sanitation services. Personnel must check-in with the resources unit at the staging area, while supplies and equipment are checked in with the supply unit. If neither of these functions is activated, resources report to the Staging Area Manager for direction.
Critical Resources Unit Leader	Per NIMS, this position tracks and maintains the status and availability of critical resources assigned to each incident under the area command.

Planning Assumptions

General

- The capability is constant across all 15 National Planning Scenarios; however, hazardous materials (HazMat) response incidents will require specialized, already established teams to assist with the incident. Regardless, this capability functions across all scenarios, adjusting to the needs of the incident.
- Significant, additional logistical support and coordination and public information systems will be required whenever a “shelter in place” or a “quarantine” order is implemented.
- The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will likely raise the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) to “red” status immediately following a terrorist attack for designated areas, if not the entire Nation. Depending on the location, scope, and magnitude of the event, this elevated status can prompt actions limiting the availability of air transportation within the United States. Such travel limitations can negatively impact the timely convergence, at the disaster-affected area, of needed personnel and material resources.
- Jurisdictions will identify where and how to replenish the depleted resources needed to further manage the incident.
- Development of plans, procedures, and protocols for resource management in accordance with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) will be outlined within the planning capability.
- Assistance from private contractors and voluntary agencies will be forthcoming to help the community during the incident. Precontracted services may be necessary and are encouraged through public- and private-sector organizations and partnerships.
- Resources are categorized by material or service provided.
- Inter- and intrastate mutual aid agreements will be utilized (State, tribal, and local).
- Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) will be implemented based on Federal declarations.
- Jurisdictions’ emergency response plans should include precontracted services with public and private entitities.

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- Most capability elements will be needed quickly: They must be available to respond in less than 1 hour from the initial incident to manage the scene. However, because this capability deals with critical resource logistics and distribution, the timeframe may be slightly longer (1–3 hours, depending on the resource) but still required locally.
- Warehouses will securely store and handle all stockpiled materials under appropriate conditions that will maintain their stability, integrity, and effectiveness while providing appropriate levels of physical security for all materials and facilities.

Scenario-Specific

- Based on scenario conditions, a 7.2-magnitude earthquake with a subsequent 8.0 earthquake following occurs along a fault zone in a major metropolitan area of a city, greatly affecting a 6-county region with a population of approximately 10 million people. Approximately 150,000 buildings are destroyed, and 1 million buildings are damaged. All typed personnel are based on Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Typed Resource Definitions.
- Assume 300,000 people will need to evacuate area, of this, 50 percent lack the capability to self-evacuate.

Planning Factors from an In-Depth Analysis of a Scenario with Significant Demand for the Capability

Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Logistics Planning Manager	Develop plans for logistics management	1 plan per jurisdiction affected	1 Type III Planning Manager to create plans for area to assist operations during incident
National tracking system	Capture all resources available	Find resources to support multicounty/region earthquake response operations	1 national tracking system Local tracking systems would be created to manage at local level (State, local, private, and public) to feed into larger tracking system
Rapid Needs Assessment Team	Provide a rapid assessment immediately following a major disaster or emergency; provide and collect information to determine requirements for critical resources needed to support emergency response activities	Assess 6-county affected area	2 teams (1 in affected region; 1 as backup)

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Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Logistics response system	NIMS-compliant system (utilized within the incident command system (ICS) logistics branch)	Incident will require full activation of logistics branch to manage critical resource logistics and distribution	1 logistics response system
Transportation Coordinator	Coordinate critical resource transportation needs between Federal, State, local, and private agencies and organizations	Scenario will require resources from multiple jurisdictions to help support the incident, requiring the coordinator to monitor and troubleshoot movement of resources	1 to sit in Emergency Operations Center (EOC); (can be component Emergency Support Function (ESF) #1)
Cargo transportation vehicles and personnel	Move large amounts of critical resources (e.g., trucks, planes, boats, trains)	Scenario will require at least: 550,000 gallons of water per day (1 gallon/person/day) for displaced persons 2,750,000 pounds of ice per day (1 5-pound bag/person/day) Other critical resource incident specific	Total volume of resources divided by the volume capacity of vehicle multiplied by amount of resource needed
Evacuation transportation vehicles and personnel	Ability to provide transportation to evacuees (e.g., trucks, buses, planes, boats, trains)	150,000 people will require assistance with transportation for evacuation; transportation assets can be recycled and used multiple times during an evacuation	Total number of evacuees divided by passenger capacity of vehicle
Federal mobilization base camp	House Federal assets	Scenario will require large amounts of critical resources immediately	2 base camps to receive Federal assets
State staging area	House Federal assets that have been transferred to the State	2 staging areas per base camp	4 staging areas
Interagency warehouse	House critical resources transferred from the State and donated by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the public	Incident will require one location for critical resources to be delivered and will include appropriate material-handing equipment (e.g. fork lifts, pallet jacks)	1 warehouse

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Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Evacuation terminal	Provide for evacuation locations for affected persons	As designated in jurisdictional response plans	A number should be outlined in emergency response plans
Water Supply Restoration Management Team (*suggest deletion: see footnote 9)*	Quickly restore water supply to affected areas	At least 550,000 people are without water services	One management team to coordinate with affected utilities

Approaches for Large-Scale Events

The capability is not dependent on specification of an incident and will remain constant among the 15 National Planning Scenarios.

National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	# of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
FEMA	Logistics Planning Manager	Personnel	1	Per FEMA Region	Direct Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution
State and Territories	Logistics Planning Manager	Personnel	1	State and territory	Direct Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution
Local	Type IV Logistics Planning Manager	Personnel	1	Per jurisdiction	Direct Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution
National/State/ Local System	National tracking system	Network	1	Nationally	Conduct Needs Assessment
FEMA	Rapid Needs Assessment Team	NIMS typed resource organization	1	Per FEMA Region	Conduct Needs Assessment
Federal	Logistics response system	Resource Organization	1	Nationally	All Activities
State and Territories	Logistics response system	Resource Organization	1	Per State and Territories	All Activities
Local	Logistics response system	Resource Organization	1	Per jurisdiction	All Activities
Federal/State/ Local	Transportation Coordinator	Personnel	1	Per EOC	Mobilize and Track Resources
Local	Cargo Transportation Teams	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	1	Per jurisdiction	Mobilize and Track Resources
Federal	Federal mobilization base camp	Non-NIMS Resource Organization		Not pre-established	Mobilize and Track Resources
State and	State staging area	Non-NIMS	2	Per State and territory	Mobilize and Track

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	# of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
Territories		Resource Organization			Resources
Local	Interagency warehouse	Non-Resource Organization	1	Per incident	Mobilize and Track Resources
Federal	Warehouse system for stockpiled resources	Non-Resource Organization	1	Nationally	Mobilize and Track Resources
State and Territories	Warehouse system for stockpiled resources	Non-Resource Organization	1	Per State and Territory	Mobilize and Track Resources
Non-Governmental Organization (NGO)	Warehouse system for stockpiled resources	Non-Resource Organization	1	Per organization	Mobilize and Track Resources

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VOLUNTEER AND DONATIONS MANAGEMENT

Capability Definition

Volunteer and Donations Management is the capability to effectively coordinate the registration and management of unaffiliated volunteers and unsolicited donations in support of domestic incident management.

Outcome

The positive effect of using unaffiliated volunteers and unsolicited donations is maximized and does not hinder response and recovery activities.

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

The capability supports the Volunteer and Donations Management Support Annex.

Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B1e 1.1	Develop NIMS-compatible plans, policies, and protocols for coordinating the management of unaffiliated volunteers
Res.B1e 1.3.1	Develop plans, policies, and protocols for coordinating the management of unsolicited donated goods
Res.B1e 1.3.2	Develop plans, policies, and protocols for coordinating the referral of undesignated cash donations
Res.B1e 1.1.8	Develop plan to open and staff a donations call center to accept, match and process offers of goods and services
Res.B1e 1.2.1	Develop system/criteria for evaluating and/or vetting voluntary organizations and/or relief funds
Res.B1e 1.2.2	Develop a list of verified and/or vetted voluntary organizations and/or relief funds
Res.B1e 1.4.1	Develop plans for effective information management communicating with Public Information Officers (PIOs) at all levels
Res.B1e 1.4.2	Develop plans to coordinate with local/state/tribal/federal government, nongovernmental organizations, and private entities to effectively use unaffiliated volunteers, unsolicited donated goods and undesignated cash donations
Res.B1e 1.4.3	Develop outreach plan designed to educate the preparedness and response community about the functions of the volunteers and donations management capability

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Res.B1e 6.2.2	Develop a strategic facilities management plan to identify, staff and operate all facilities including multi-agency warehouse, volunteer and donations coordination center, volunteer reception center(s) and emergency distribution centers
Res.B1e 1.1.5	Research existing liability issues and laws that affect unaffiliated volunteers utilization.
Res.B1e 1.1.5.1	Encourage agencies receiving unaffiliated volunteers to clarify their limits on liability protection
Res.B1e 1.1.6	Determine priority needs and roles required from the unaffiliated volunteers for all-hazards
Res.B1e 1.1.7	Identify potential volunteer opportunities to expedite community involvement
Res.B1e 1.1.8.1	Assign toll free number for use at call center

Preparedness Measures	**Metrics**
An unaffiliated volunteer and unsolicited donations management plan is in place that defines needs for and utilization of unaffiliated volunteers	Yes/No
An unaffiliated volunteer and unsolicited donations management plan is in place that manages unsolicited donations	Yes/No
An unaffiliated volunteer and donations management plan is in place that addresses facility management	Yes/No
National and State Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD) are established and coordinated with during disaster planning	Yes/No
Cooperative agreements and memorandums of understanding (MOUs) with volunteer management organizations are developed as appropriate	Yes/No
Norms and standards set regarding appropriate, fair and equal allocation of all donated recourses to ensure 501 (c) 3 or other determined qualifiers are used	Yes/No
Points of contact for donations are shared with outside jurisdictions, the private sector, non-government organizations, and the media, as appropriate	Yes/No

Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B1e 2.2.1	Exercise plans for unaffiliated volunteers and unsolicited donations management
Res.B1e 2.1.1	Develop and implement awareness-training programs regarding the use of volunteers and donations
Res.B1e 2.2.1.1	Develop and implement exercise and training for the distribution of public information
Res.B1e 2.1.2	Develop and conduct training to improve all-hazard incident management capability

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Res.B1e 2.2.2	Conduct an after action review to determine strengths and shortfalls and develop a corrective plan accordingly
Res.B1e 2.1.5	Participate in training exercises with government agencies and other nongovernmental organizations, as appropriate
Res.B1e 2.1.3	Complete relevant Incident Command System and/or National Incident Management System training for appropriate personnel and volunteers
Res.B1e 2.1.4	Conduct internal and external training about the activities and responsibilities of unaffiliated volunteers and unsolicited donations capability

Preparedness Measures	Metric
Plans are in place to coordinate exercise and training with local/state/tribal/federal government and nongovernmental organizations	Yes/No
Unaffiliated volunteers and unsolicited donations management plan is exercised	Annually
External awareness training is provided for government and nongovernment partners	Yes/No
Internal awareness training is provided for staff	Yes/No
Personnel are trained to manage required systems, materials and technology per their roles and responsibilities	100%
Donation management tram and warehouse personnel are trained on distribution plan and procedures	100%

Performance Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: *Coordinate Management for Unaffiliated Volunteer Management Operations and the Establishment of Warehouses and Materials Handling Equipment*

Definition: In response to citizens, businesses, and corporations spontaneously volunteering and or/donating goods or cash, provide program to manage response plans.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1e 3.1	Review and activate State and local plans for unsolicited donations and unaffiliated volunteers
Res.B1e 3.4.1	Coordinate voluntary support/activities with community/tribal leadership and liaise with local agencies
Res.B1e 6.2.1	Locate and establish warehouses and materials handling equipment
Res.B1e 6.2.2	Develop a strategic facilities management plan (multi-agency warehouse, emergency distribution centers)
Res.B1e 3.3.1	Establish a liaison with media outlets and other stakeholders (e.g., Congress, Federal agencies) to provide information about unaffiliated volunteers and unsolicited donations
Res.B1e 3.3.2	Work closely with public information officers (PIOs) to disseminate critical information about appropriate ways to volunteer and donate
Res.B1e 6.2.2.1	Implement a strategic facilities management plan (multi-agency warehouse, emergency distribution centers)

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Res.B1e 3.4.2	Coordinate and collaborate with state and national Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters (VOAD) and its members
Res.B1e 3.5.3	Collaborate with other agencies/organizations/businesses regarding volunteers and donations
Res.B1e 6.1.2	Designate and advertise points of contact for receiving equipment and technical (i.e., communications, logistics, housing, medical) solutions from the private sector, outside jurisdictions, nongovernmental organizations, and volunteers
Res.B1e 4.1.3	Establish a volunteer and donations coordination center (VDCC)
Res.B1e 3.4	Coordinate with agencies offering and/or accepting donations
Res.B1e 3.5.4	Gather donations information about collections, distributions and other events concerning donations from the field to help manage the effect

Performance Measures	Metric
Volunteer and donations coordination center is activated	Within 12 hours of incident
The media and other agencies are provided precise information about volunteer and donation needs and give guidance on appropriate ways to help	Within 24 hours after the end of a disaster or incident

Activity: ***Activate Volunteer and Donations Management Emergency Plan***

Definition: In response to an incident, mobilize personnel and facilities to begin processing offers of assistance.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1e 4.1.2	Activate pre-assigned toll-free numbers
Res.B1e 3.3.2	Work closely with a public information officer to disseminate critical information about appropriate ways to volunteer and donate
Res.B1e 4.2.2	Brief senior leadership and elected officials (government, Federal Coordinating Officer [FCO], Congress staff)
Res.B1e 4.2.3.1	Work with all affected local/state/tribal/federal governments
Res.B1e 4.1.1	Activate donations/volunteer coordination teams (DVCT)
Res.B1e 4.1.3	Establish a volunteer and donations coordination center (VDCC)
Res.B1e 3.4.2	Coordinate and collaborate with Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOAD), its members and other vetted agencies/organizations/businesses
Res.B1e 3.1	Review and activate State and local plans for unaffiliated volunteers and unsolicited donations

Performance Measures	Metric
Volunteer/donations coordinators are deployed	6 hours after the end of a disaster or incident
Pre-assigned toll-free numbers are activated	Within 12 hours of incident
Points of contact for donations are advertised to outside jurisdictions, the private sector, non-governmental organizations, and the media	Yes/No
Senior leadership and elected officials are briefed	Within 12 hours of incident

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Activity: *Organize Volunteers and Assign Them to Disaster Relief Efforts*

Definition: Gather and provide information unaffiliated volunteers to efficiently refer them to assigned organizations and agencies per developed tactical plans.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1e 5.2.1	Operate call centers and websites to gather information and register if possible, unaffiliated spontaneous volunteers
Res.B1e 5.2.4	Match and refer individual or grouped volunteers with requests from agencies
Res.B1e 5.2.2	Conduct pre-deployment/pre-assignment briefing for volunteers

Performance Measures	Metric
Ability is in place to: receive, register and provide information to volunteers (via phone bank, web site virtual call center, etc.)	Within 24 hours of incident
Volunteers receive briefing	100%
Volunteers are briefed prior to start of assignment	100%
Volunteers are matched with assignments per the tactical plan	100%
Volunteers are referred	100%

Activity: *Collect and Manage Material Donations*

Definition: Once activated, receive and manage unsolicited in-kind donations.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1e 6.1.1	Operate phone bank and websites to collect information on material donations
Res.B1e 6.2.1	Locate and establish warehouses and material handling equipment

Performance Measures	Metric
A volunteer and donations staging area, including information management technology and communications equipment is established	Within 48 hours after an incident
A strategic facility management plan was implemented	Within 24 hours after notification of a disaster or impending disaster
An operational donations management warehouse(s) with professional and volunteer staff is established	Within 24 hours following the location of a warehouse

Activity: *Collect and Manage Cash Donations*

Definition: Once activated, refer cash donations to appropriate voluntary organizations.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1e 7.1	Educate the public through press releases on the benefits of cash donations to voluntary agencies
Res.B1e 7.4	Direct cash donations to voluntary agencies supporting the incident

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Res.B1e 7.2	Keep appropriate documentation from all undesignated cash/monetary donations
Res.B1e 7.3	Coordinate with verified and/or vetted agencies for the transfer of undesignated cash donations

Performance Measures	Metric
Accuracy in accountability records is established and maintained	100%
Personnel follow policies and procedures concerning undesignated cash donations	100%
Personnel follow policies and procedures concerning referral of cash donations to appropriate voluntary agencies	100%

Activity: *Coordinate Distribution of Donations*

Definition: Process and disburse goods based on established plan.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1e 8.2	Manage surge in unsolicited donations and in-kind materials
Res.B1e 8.3	Coordinate with local/State/tribal/Federal government, nongovernmental organizations, and private entities to effectively use unsolicited goods and undesignated cash donations

Performance Measures	Metric
Donated goods are inventoried	100%
Unneeded and unusable donated goods are managed according to developed plans	Yes/No

Activity: *Transition to Long-Term Recovery*

Definition: Period after the incident is determined to be under control and extended care/service plan by partner government agencies and NGOs becomes active.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1e 9.2	Allocate undesignated cash donations and in-kind material donations to long-term recovery effort
Res.B1e 9.3	Assess the long-term needs and requirements for unaffiliated volunteers and unsolicited donations
Res.B1e 9.4	Coordinate appropriate messages with public information officers and media outlets
Res.B1e 9.5	Brief major donors on transition and redirection of donations

Performance Measures	Metric
Inventory has been performed	Yes/No
Donations are re-designated/re-assigned in accordance with donors' intent	100%
Long-tern needs and requirements are assessed	Yes/No
Transition is accomplished between the Volunteer/Donations Coordination Center and mass care, EOC management and other agencies/organizations/businesses	Yes/No

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Activity: ***Deactivate Volunteer Management and Donations***	
Definition: Based on need assessments, deactivate components of the plan (i.e. warehouse, phone bank) when appropriate	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B1e 10.3	Conduct appropriate salvage of remaining donated goods once response/recovery phase ends
Res.B1e 10.1	Close Volunteer/Donations Coordination Center and other facilities such as phone bank and warehouses
Res.B1e 10.2	Conduct a debriefing of Volunteer Management and Donations personnel

Performance Measures	**Metric**
Percentage of donations re-designated/re-assigned in accordance with donors' intent	100%
Appropriate personnel are debriefed	100%
Stakeholders provided with information from lessons learned to improve future events	Yes/No

Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship
Community Preparedness and Participation	Community Preparedness and Participation capability provides a prepared pool of unaffiliated volunteers for registration into the Volunteer Management and Donations capability to be referred as appropriate. Community Preparedness and Participation capability promotes affiliation of volunteers prior to the incident to reduce the numbers of unaffiliated volunteers registering into the Volunteer and Donations capability.
Emergency Operations Center Management	Emergency Operations Center Management provides resources and situation reports to the Volunteer Management and Donations capability, which provides situation reports in return.
Mass Care	Mass Care capability receives donated goods and individuals referred by the Volunteer and Donations Management capability.
Emergency Public Information and Warning	Volunteer and Donations Management capability requests public service announcements from Emergency Public Information and Warning.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
Volunteer and donations phone bank	Capability established pre-incident and activated as needed to handle calls. Consists of 20–60 operators (call takers) with computer terminals networked; access to high-speed Internet; phone bank database on secure Web site with logon, passwords, and varying levels of access; and 1 donation coordination team of 8–10 people with clerical support; 1 volunteer coordination team of 8–10 people to qualify offers of services and develop links to agencies needing volunteers; an 800 telephone number with 20–60 line capability; 20+ additional lines for coordination teams; and computers for coordination teams
Transportation	Trucks and drivers to pick up and deliver goods
Warehousing	One warehouse manager and associated equipment and personnel
Volunteer/Donations Coordinator	The Volunteer/Donations Coordinator manages the VDCC and media relations. Per NIMS, there are Type I, II, III, and IV donations coordinators, who are part of the Donations Management Team. The Volunteer and Donations Coordinator possesses an operational knowledge of all aspects of donations coordination, including management of unaffiliated volunteers, undesignated funds, and unsolicited goods, from concerned citizens and private organizations following a catastrophic disaster situation.
Donation Coordination Team	Per NIMS, a Donation Coordination Team consists of persons trained and experienced in all aspects of donations management.
Donations Specialist	Per NIMS, an individual who possesses an overall knowledge of all aspects of donations management at all levels. Capable of assisting in the physical establishment of the Volunteer and Donations Coordination Center (VDCC) and the Phone Bank (if required). This includes facility, data management, and internal operations

Planning Assumptions

- Although applicable to several of the 15 National Planning Scenarios, the capability planning factors were developed from an in-depth analysis of the major earthquake scenario. Other scenarios were reviewed to identify required adjustments or additions to the planning factors and national targets.
- Volunteer and Donations Management will require significant attention immediately following the event. If not promptly and appropriately managed, attention to this activity will demand the diversion of resources away from service delivery.
- Offers of assistance will come from other countries.
- Seasonal considerations include the dead of winter instead of summer.

Scenario-Specific

- Three million are affected, 2.5 million are displaced, 30,000 are killed, and 150,000 are injured.
- Infrastructure failure is pervasive in communications, energy, and water and sewer sectors.
- Resources are needed within 12–48 hours, which can be located regionally**.** The optimal location should be 15–20 miles from the event site (ground zero). However, damage to infrastructure may dictate otherwise. The Volunteer and Donations Coordination Center and Phone Bank should

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generally be located close to the State's Emergency Operation Center (EOC) for coordination purposes.

Planning Factors from an In-Depth Analysis of a Scenario with Significant Demand for the Capability (Earthquake)

Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Volunteer and Donations Phone Bank	Handles 5,000 calls/day 60 operators for 14 hours/day	An average of 2,500 calls come in a day resulting from media blitz; each call averages 10 minutes	60 operators per shift 2 shifts = 120 operators 6 supervisors per shift. 1 manager
Transportation	1 26-ft. container holds 4 tons	1,000,000 persons are displaced; need 10 pounds of clothing and personal goods per day	1,250 trucks and drivers to pick up and deliver goods
Warehousing	1 warehouse manager and associated equipment and personnel	1,000,000 persons are displaced; need 10 pounds of personal goods per day	100,000 tons of material for each warehouse; one warehouse worker per 25,000 tons = 4
Volunteer/Donations Coordinator	Manage centers and media relations.		

Approaches for Large-Scale Events

Due to the possibility of severely damaged roads, alternative methods of transportation (e.g., helicopters) will need to be considered.

National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
Non-governmental Organization	Volunteer/ Donations Coordination Center (VDCC)	Resource organization	1	Per State	Organize and Assign Volunteers Collect and Manage Material Donations Collect and Manage Cash Donations
State/ local/ non-governmental organizations/ private	Transportation	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	As needed	Per incident	Collect and Manage Material Donations

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
Non-governmental Organization	Warehousing	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	1 - 6	Per incident	Collect and Manage Material Donations
Non-governmental Organization	Volunteer/ Donations Coordinators	Personnel	4	Per region	All Activities

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RESPONDER SAFETY AND HEALTH

Capability Definition

Responder Safety and Health is the capability that ensures adequate trained and equipped personnel and resources are available at the time of an incident to protect the safety and health of on scene first responders, hospital/medical facility personnel (first receivers), and skilled support personnel through the creation and maintenance of an effective safety and health program. This program needs to comply with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) "HAZWOPER" standard (29 CFR 1910.120, as implemented by EPA or State authorities) and any other applicable Federal and State regulations. The program also needs to be integrated into the Incident Command System (ICS) and include training, exposure monitoring, personal protective equipment, health and safety planning, risk management practices, medical care, decontamination procedures, infection control, vaccinations for preventable diseases, adequate work-schedule relief, psychological support, and follow-up assessments.

This capability identifies the critical personnel, equipment, training, and other resources needed to ensure that all workers are protected from all hazards, including fire (heat and products of combustion), CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive) materials, electrical hazards, collapsed structures, debris, acts of violence, and others.

The Responder Safety and Health capability is a critical component of safe overall emergency management. First responders include police, fire, emergency medical services (EMS), and other emergency personnel, as well as emergency management, public health, clinical care, public works, and other skilled support personnel (such as equipment operators). This extended definition includes a very broad set of workers and a wide range of likely response-related activities, resulting in an increased number of potential hazards and exposures. Building the ability to protect all responders from all hazards is a substantial undertaking that involves prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery efforts.

This capability supports both the Safety Officer position identified in the National Incident Management System (NIMS)/incident command system (ICS) and the Worker Safety and Health Support Annex to the National Response Plan (NRP). The Type 1 Safety Officer described in this capability has yet to be fully defined (to include managing all of the hazards that first responders are likely to face), but the concept used is the same as the "Disaster Safety Manager" described in *Protecting Emergency Responders: Safety Management in Disaster and Terrorism Response* (NIOSH, 2004). In addition, the list of services that are critical for this capability is consistent with the actions specified under the Worker Safety and Health Support Annex and in the *Guidelines for Haz Mat/WMD Response, Planning and Prevention Training* (FEMA, 2003).

During the response to any incident, employers are responsible primarily for the safety and health of their employees. However, the ICS creates a unified safety and health organization under the Safety Officer. In large-scale incidents, because of the number and varieties of hazards and workers, the Safety Officer would be used more as a Safety Manager. This technical capability therefore does not prescribe a certain level of preparedness for any particular organization, rather it specifies the need for personal protective equipment (PPE), Safety Officers, and so forth and allows local entities to determine the best way to obtain the needed resources (e.g., through mutual aid, State resources, Federal resources) for the first 72 hours of the "initial response" operations.

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Outcome

No illnesses or injury to any first responder, first receiver, medical facility staff member, or other skilled support personnel as a result of preventable exposure to secondary trauma, chemical/radiological release, infectious disease, or physical and emotional stress after the initial incident or during decontamination and incident follow-up.

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

This capability supports the following Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) and Annex:

ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering
ESF #5: Emergency Management
ESF #6: Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services
ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services
ESF #9: Urban Search and Rescue
ESF #10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Response
ESF #11: Agricultural and Natural Resources
ESF #12: Energy
ESF #13: Public Safety and Security
Worker Safety and Health Support Annex

Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B1b 1.1	Develop and adopt agency/jurisdiction safety and health program(s)
Res.B1b 1.2	Conduct a detailed analysis of 15 planning scenarios to ensure that all workers are protected in performing the tasks from all hazards
Res.B1b 1.3	Establish plans and procedures for identifying sources of additional equipment and expertise if the safety and health program is overwhelmed

Preparedness Measures	**Metrics**
Safety and health program is in place that includes a personal protective equipment (PPE) component that adequately addresses respiratory protection and exposure protection for initial response	Yes/No
Safety and health program addresses acquisition of additional respiratory protection items for reinforced response or long term incidents	Yes/No
Safety and health program is in place that ensures initial responders are equipped with properly maintained PPE in adequate supply	Yes/No
Safety and health program ensures access to backup/cache equipment, when necessary for reinforced on long term incidents	Yes/No
An agency/jurisdiction safety and health program(s) is in place which includes: ▪ Procedures to identify and assess hazards ▪ Detection/exposure monitoring	 Yes/No Yes/No

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Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
▪ Selection/distribution of personal protective equipment (PPE)	Yes/No
▪ Health and safety planning	Yes/No
▪ Risk management practices	Yes/No
▪ Medical care	Yes/No
▪ Decontamination procedures	Yes/No
▪ Infection control	Yes/No
▪ Vaccinations for preventable diseases	Yes/No
▪ Adequate work-schedule relief	Yes/No
▪ Psychological support	Yes/No
▪ Medical follow-up assessments	Yes/No

Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B1b 2.1.1	Provide all required health and safety training, including pre-incident training and site/incident specific training, and exercises to develop and maintain appropriate knowledge and expertise for responders
Preparedness Measures	**Metric**
Percent of responders adequately trained to respond to anticipated emergencies (e.g. 15 planning scenarios)	100%
Safety Officer(s) have the training and experience necessary to manage hazards associated with all 15 planning scenarios	Yes/No
Percent of responders capable of using PPE (e.g., responders are fitted and medically cleared to use necessary PPE) so that they have the necessary health and safety training to perform their anticipated tasks (e.g. awareness level, technician level, etc.) in response to an incident	100%
The pre-incident safety and health training program is evaluated through emergency response exercises (e.g., did each responder have the necessary health and safety training to perform their task in the exercise?)	Yes/No
An Incident Specific Health and Safety Plan is developed during exercises as a way to measure responder safety and health readiness. *[These plans can include identifying and assessing hazards, detection/exposure monitoring, selection/distribution of personal protective equipment (PPE), communication of hazards/protection among response organization, maximum exposure limits, applied engineering controls, incident specific training, medical surveillance/monitoring (including psychological first aid), etc.]*	Yes/No

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Performance Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: *Direct Responder Safety and Health Tactical Operations*

Definition: Upon dispatch of responders, provide management and coordination of Responder Safety and Health capability, through demobilization.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1b 3.3.1	Monitor routine and emergency communications within the incident command structure at all times
Res.B1b 3.3.2	Maintain routine and emergency communications within the incident command structure at all times during the incident
Res.B1b 3.1	Maintain coordination and communication between agencies and departments regarding responder safety and health
Res.B1b 3.7	Contribute to development of the incident action plan (IAP) to establish priorities, procedures, and actions to be accomplished to meet the incident objectives. To Ensure that safety and health requirements are addressed, Safety Officer develops and reviews components (i.e., safety analysis, site safety and control plan, medical plan, safety message, etc.) of the IAP
Res.B1b 3.2	Provide technical specialists as needed to support the Incident Command System
Res.B1b 3.2.2	Contact and work with subject matter experts (SMEs) from the public/private agencies and academia who may be able to assist with safety issues at the incident
Res.B1b 3.4.2	Assess the availability of resources/assets provided by public, private and volunteer organizations
Res.B1b 3.4.3	Request additional safety and health resources through mutual aid
Res.B1b 3.6	Coordinate and support decontamination activities
Res.B1b 3.4.4	Utilize ordering systems to obtain additional needed resources

Performance Measures	Metric
Number of injuries/illnesses in response to the incident	Zero

Activity: *Activate Responder Safety and Health*

Definition: In response to IC recognition of the complexity or hazards in the incident, mobilize and designate Safety Officer to begin operations or continue IC-initiated operations.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1b 4.1	Designate Safety Officer within the Incident Command System
Res.B1b 4.1.1	Assume responsibility for supervision and management of the safety assistants based on severity and complexity of the incident

Performance Measures	Metric
Time until Safety Officer is designated within the ICS structure (separate from IC, who	Less than 60 minutes

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may hold this role for a period of time)	from arrival of responders
Time to initiate deployment actions for Assistant Safety Officers or Safety SME s to provide technical assistance to incident safety official	Within 1-3 hours from arrival of responders

Activity: *Identify Safety/PPE Needs and Distribute PPE*

Definition: Upon appointment as Safety Officer, assess safety and heath hazards, inform IC of needs, and develop site-specific safety and health plan.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1b 5.1.2	Observe the scene and review/evaluate hazard and response information as it pertains to the safety of all persons at the location
Res.B1b 5.4.1	Identify responder safety and health resources required
Res.B1b 5.4.2	Provide the Incident Command (IC) and Incident Command System (ICS) staff with observation-based recommendations for the safety of on-site personnel
Res.B1b 5.1	Perform an incident safety analysis
Res.B1b 5.1.1	Identify and prioritize the operations, hazards, and exposures of greatest risk to site personnel and coordinate with the Incident Command (IC) to develop specific actions to address them and protect site personnel
Res.B1b 5.2	Assist the incident commander (IC) in developing an incident safety and control plan to respond within the capabilities of available response personnel, taking into account available resources such as personal protective equipment (PPE), monitoring equipment, and control equipment

Performance Measures	Metric
Percentage of hazards detected/identified and characterized	100%
Time to complete an initial incident safety analysis	Less than 60 minutes from responder arrival

Activity: *Site/Incident Specific Safety and Health Training*

Definition: Site/Incident specific training provides necessary understanding of the hazards identified and assessed in the incident, and the necessary precautions. Site/Incident specific training builds upon pre-incident training, but tailors curriculum to the tasks/hazards of the incident. Site/Incident specific training should reflect policies and procedures specified in the incident specific health and safety plan. Site/Incident specific training needs to have a flexible approach (training may need to be conducted outside of a classroom setting) and should be conducted prior to commencing response activities.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1b 6.1	Provide incident/site-specific training
Res.B1b 6.2	Implement site-specific incident health and safety plan, including after-action care as needed for on-scene personnel
Res.B1b 6.3	Provide required PPE

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Performance Measures	Metric
Time to provide on-site training for emergency workers responding to an incident	Prior to assignment to work at incident

Activity: ***Ongoing Monitoring of Responder Safety and Health***

Definition: Upon assignment of responders to the incident, maintain continuous monitoring of responder safety and health, proper functioning of PPE and equipment, awareness of on-site hazards, oversee decontamination, document all actions and injuries/illnesses, and provide for emergency and psychological medical care.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1b 7.1.1	Ensure that the exposure monitoring (personnel and environment) specified in the health and safety plan and related standard operating procedures (SOPs) is performed
Res.B1b 7.4.1	Monitor hazardous site operations and insure that personnel have the PPE and training needed to perform their tasks in a safe manner and follow the safety-related requirements identified in the incident action plan (IAP)
Res.B1b 7.5.2	Assist the Incident Command (IC) and Incident Command System (ICS) staff in implementing exposure monitoring and enforcing safety considerations
Res.B1b 7.5	Identify and implement all corrective actions necessary to ensure the safety and health of all site personnel
Res.B1b 7.3	Coordinate with Incident Management/EOC to ensure that medical unit is established on site
Res.B1b 7.5.5	Alter, suspend, or terminate any activity judged to be an imminent danger or immediately dangerous to life and health
Res.B1b 7.4.1	Monitor hazardous site operations and ensure that personnel perform their tasks in a safe manner and follow the safety-related requirements identified in the incident action plan (IAP)
Res.B1b 7.6	Ensure recording and reporting of any and all injuries and illnesses

Performance Measures	Metric
Time until the medical unit was successfully opened and operated within an ICS structure	Less than 30 minutes from initial responder's arrival onsite
Percentage of personnel wearing the required PPE for site entry and work	100%
Percentage of workers who have their representative exposure to hazardous substances quantified and recorded	100%
Percentage of personnel who have been adequately decontaminated	100%
Percentage of affected personnel treated for injuries and illnesses through a medical unit	100%
Percentage of affected personnel diagnosed and treated through trained and credentialed psychological service provider	100%

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Activity: ***Demobilize Responder Safety and Health***
Definition: Upon completion of assigned mission, evaluate responder safety and health status before demobilization and conduct follow-up analysis of health after responder returns to normal duty.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1b 8.1	Conduct post-incident analysis of responder health and safety
Res.B1b 8.2	Coordinate with long-term health care to monitor psychological and medical status of exposed responders
Res.B1b 8.3	Coordinate with long-term health care to provide comprehensive stress management strategies, programs, worker crisis counseling, substance abuse services, and mental and behavioral health support
Res.B1b 8.1.4	Provide worker crisis counseling, substance abuse services, and mental and behavioral health support
Res.B1b 8.1.2	Debrief hazardous materials branch/group and all other exposed personnel on site-specific occupational safety and health issues involving hazardous materials/WMD releases
Res.B1b 8.1.3	Participate in the incident critique process and identify critical safety and health-related observations of incident activities

Performance Measures	**Metric**
Number of emergency workers who develop physical symptoms or illness secondary to the incident	Zero
Percentage of workers that are treated for mental health or stress-related symptoms secondary to the incident.	100%
Percent of behavioral hazards identified and mitigated (e.g., human/animal remains are covered)	100%

Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship
On-Site Incident Management	The IC will be responsible for protecting the safety and health of on-site responders until the Safety Officer is appointed, at which time, the IC will receive guidance from the Safety Officer.
EOC Management	The EOC may house an Assistant Safety Officer or Safety Manager and serve to coordinate responder safety and health among different entities and both on-site and off-site.
Critical Resources and Logistics	Protecting responder safety and health will require supply caches and/or agreements/contracts for the timely delivery of supplies, such as PPE, equipment, and trained personnel.
Environmental Health	Environmental health personnel will be provided awareness training for safety and health hazards through a range of response activities and may also be exposed to on-site safety and health hazards.

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Linked Capability	Relationship
Public Safety and Security	Public safety and security personnel will provide protection for responders, but may also be exposed to on-site safety and health hazards.
Firefighting Operations and Support	Responder firefighters and support personnel will be exposed to safety and health hazards posed by the fires, as well as other on-site safety and health hazards.
Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment	Responders performing triage will be exposed to safety and health hazards on site.
Explosive Device Response Operations	Explosive device response operations personnel will need protection from the safety and health hazards posed by the device, as well as from secondary safety and health hazards on site.
WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination	Hazardous materials response personnel responding to hazardous materials or WMD events and providing decontamination services will be exposed to on-site safety and health hazards.
Urban Search and Rescue	Responders performing urban search and rescue will be exposed to on-site safety and health hazards.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
Type 1 Safety Officer	As defined in the NIMS document, a member of the command staff responsible for monitoring and assessing safety hazards or unsafe conditions, and for developing measures for ensuring personnel safety. The Safety Officer monitors incident operations and advises the IC on all matters related to operational safety, including the health and safety of emergency responder personnel. May appoint Assistant Safety Officers as needed.
Specialized Safety Officer	Specialization needs determined by each UASI region and county based on their own specialized hazards and risks (e.g., jurisdictions with nuclear reactors may need specialized Safety Officers trained in radiation/nuclear hazards.
Specialized subject matter expert	To include Certified Industrial Hygienist, Public Health Service, radiological expert, biological expert, engineer, etc.
Analytical laboratories	Laboratory capability to analyze 1,000 samples of any CBRNE agent per day and to provide supplement field instruments for hazard detection/characterization
Training centers	Locations (including mobile units) to train (and maintain proficiency of) all responders up to minimum training requirements prior to an incident
Equipment caches	To include PPE, monitoring/detection equipment
Respiratory Fit-test Mobile Units	Manufacturer approved mobile fit test units to allow for needed fit testing in the field
Medical Unit	See NIMS/FIRESCOPE for definitions

Planning Assumptions

- Although applicable to several of the 15 National Planning Scenarios, the capability factors were developed from an in-depth analysis of the aerosolized anthrax scenario. Other scenarios were reviewed to identify required adjustments or additions to the planning factors and national targets.
- The jurisdiction may have limited Safety Officers with high-level expertise and experience in a specialized subject area, such as radiation, hazardous materials (HazMat), building/structure collapse, biohazard, and so forth.
- Mental health services will be sought by victims and responders in and near the affected area, as well as (on a lesser scale) throughout the Nation.
- Standards, training, and certification are limited for high-level (national-State) Safety Officers.
- Various Federal and State safety and health laws and regulations and related national consensus standards may overlap with one another, conflict in their requirements, and have gaps in their requirements or coverage. This program assumes compliance with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) "HAZWOPER" standard (29 CFR 1910.120, as implemented by EPA or State authorities) and any other applicable Federal and State regulations.
- The larger and/or more complex the incident the more likely that the local initial first responders safety and health programs will be unable to cope effectively and will need outside assistance from regions, State and Federal agencies.
- The more unusual or out of the ordinary the incident the more likely the local initial first response safety and health programs will be less able to cope effectively and will need outside assistance from regions, State and Federal agencies.

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- Limited funding, staffing and levels of equipment will negatively impact an agency/jurisdiction's ability to train and sustain appropriate levels of training.
- The larger and/or more complex the incident the more likely that the designation of a Safety Officer and Assistant Safety Officers will be needed.
- The more unusual or out of the ordinary the incident the more likely that the safety officer will need assistance Safety Officers and Safety SME and that outside assistance from private sector, academia, regions, State and Federal agencies will be needed.
- The larger and/or more complex the incident the more likely there will be a significant need for safety and health management at the incident scene(s).
- With insufficient training or PPE responders may become injured or ill. Responders cannot work due to lack of PPE or training.
- Additional training and/or PPE may be needed to address new hazards/new employees.
- The larger and/or more complex the incident the more likely that there will be a significant need for safety and health management during demobilization.
- The more unusual or out of the ordinary the incident the more likely the demobilization plan will need outside assistance from the private sector, academia, regions, State and Federal agencies.
- The affected jurisdiction may have limited, inappropriate, expired, or unserviceable personal protective equipment (PPE) and training.
- Respirator-fit test documentation, fit tests with the variety of equipment available at the time of the incident, and the capability to conduct fit testing during a disaster will be limited. Even if persons are fit tested at their home agency, proof may not be available onsite at a disaster requiring additional fit testing.
- Cross-training in the use of dissimilar PPEs is limited. Responders may not have appropriate training for the additional equipment available at the time of and issued at the scene of a major disaster to supplement their initial response cache; it may differ from their home agency equipment.
- Immediate response organizations will be required to support the incident in its entirety until Federal-State safety assets become available.
- Local, regional, and State response agencies will have access to specialized resources from public- and private-sector agencies and academia.
- Data enabling the recognition/characterization of hazards associated with the incident may not be immediately available. Field instrumentation and laboratory analysis may be necessary to fully characterize hazards.
- All safety and health plans should be in place and enforced for day-to-day operations. Catastrophic incidents will cause the readdressing of day-to-day safety and health policies and plans caused by the scope, complexity or uniqueness of the incident(s).

Planning Factors from an In-Depth Analysis of a Scenario with Significant Demand for the Capability (Aerosol Anthrax)

Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Type 1 Safety Officer	1 per shift	3 shifts	3
Specialized Safety Officer(s) (specialization needs determined by each Urban Area Security	1 per team deployed	20 teams	20

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Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Initiative (UASI) region and county)			
Locally determined specialized subject matter expert (SME) (e.g. certified industrial hygienist (CIH), public health service (PHS), radiological, biological, engineer)	i.e., 1 biological expert		As required by incident
Analytical laboratories	500 samples per day.	100 samples per day per laboratory	5 analytical labs
Equipment caches	1 SCBA, PAPR or P100 respirator/shift per responders	3 shifts/day 3 days 50 Responders @SCBA 500 Responders @PAPR 450 Responders @P100	450 SCBAs 4,500 PAPRs 4,050 P100s
Medical	1 medical unit/5 teams	20 teams	4 medical units
Respiratory fit-test mobile units	1 per team	20 teams	20 respiratory mobile fit test units

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Approaches for Large-Scale Events

All response organizations would need to be included in a single incident command system (ICS). A single "all-hazards" Safety Officer is designated by the incident commander (IC) to manage all safety operations associated with the incident. Assistants (e.g., specialized Safety Officers, subject matter experts, employer representatives, employee representatives) to the Safety Officer are designated and made part of response teams. All employers whose personnel are involved in the response are represented in the safety management structure. Equipment caches are based on local quantities, regional quantities (through mutual aid), State caches (interstate mutual aid), and national caches (e.g., prepositioned equipment program). Sources of equipment and notification/transportation of equipment have been addressed in advance. All responders need the specified training (e.g., technicians, operations, specialists) prior to the incident. Federal responders would follow the *National Response Plan* (NRP), including the Worker Safety and Health Support Annex. State and local response plans include worker safety and health coordination that is consistent with the actions specified under the Worker Safety and Health Support Annex.

National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	# of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
Federal/State/ Local	Type 1 Safety Officer	NIMS Personnel	300	Nationally	Activate Responder Health and Safety Identify Safety/PPE Needs and Distribute PPE to responders Ongoing monitoring of Responder Health and Safety Demobilize
Federal/State/ Local	Specialized Safety Officer	Non-NIMS Personnel	400	Nationally	Identify Safety/PPE Needs and Distribute PPE to responders Ongoing monitoring of responder health and safety
Federal/State/ Local	Specialized Subject Matter Expert (SME)	Non-NIMS Personnel	800	Nationally	Identify Safety/PPE Needs and Distribute PPE to responders Ongoing Monitoring of Responder Health and Safety
Federal/State/ Local/Private/ Academic	Analytical laboratories	Non- NIMS Resource Organization	250	Nationally	Identify Safety/PPE Needs and Distribute PPE to responders Ongoing Monitoring of Responder Health and Safety
Federal/State/ Local/Private/ Academic	Training centers	Equipment	750	25 per state	Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs
Federal/State/ Local/Private/ Academic	Equipment caches	Equipment			Identify Safety/PPE Needs and Distribute PPE to responders
Federal/State/ Local/Private	Medical Unit	NIMS Resource Organization	1	Minimum of one per incident, increased by scope, complexity and uniqueness	Ongoing Monitoring of Responder Health and Safety

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PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY RESPONSE

Capability Definition

Public Safety and Security Response is the capability to reduce the impact and consequences of an incident or major event by securing the affected area, including crime/incident scene preservation issues as appropriate, safely diverting the public from hazards, providing security support to other response operations and properties, and sustaining operations from response through recovery. Public Safety and Security Response requires coordination among officials from law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical services (EMS).

Outcome

The incident scene is assessed and secured, access is controlled, security support is provided to other response operations (and related critical locations, facilities, and resources), emergency public information is provided, while protecting first responders and mitigating any further effect to the public at risk, and any crime/incident scene preservation issues have been addressed.

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

This capability supports Emergency Support Function (ESF) #13: Public Safety and Security.

Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: ***Plan for Public Safety and Security Response During Large-Scale, All-Hazards Events*** **Definition: Review existing and/or develop new strategies, plans, procedures, programs, or systems to respond to large-scale, all-hazards events.**	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B3d 1.2	Review, revise and develop public safety policies, protocols, and procedures to be implemented to effect a command and control structure, consistent with NIMS
Res.B3d 1.2.2	Develop plans and procedures to ensure interoperable communications during public safety and security response
Res.B3d 1.2.3.1	Enter into interagency agreements and memorandums of understanding with appropriate surrounding agencies and jurisdictions, with the legal authority of the jurisdiction, to ensure adequate response and access to supplemental personnel
Res.B3d 1.2.3.2	Identify required resources and enter into contracts, as appropriate, to access and provide required resources during a crisis response to shelter, feed, and maintain a significant cadre of public safety and other related first responders
Res.B3d 1.2.1	Review and improve, as appropriate, standard operating procedures for the notification and mobilization of public safety resources during a crisis response
Res.B3d 1.4.1	Review and improve existing planned evacuation routes and staging areas to determine sufficient public safety resources required to establish and maintain perimeters, safety zones, and public order as well as facilitate evacuations and/or sheltering-in-place activities

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Res.B3d 1.4.2	Review plans for decontamination sites and access to decontamination equipment, including personal protective equipment for responders
Res.B3d 1.4.3	Ensure hospital and medical supply resources, as well as other key infrastructure, have been identified, and agreements exist or are drafted regarding the maintenance of security at these facilities during a crisis response
Res.B3d 1.4.4	Review and develop as appropriate, in coordination with legal counsel, such as the city/county attorney's and/or State Attorney General Office, policies regarding public safety enforcement actions required to maintain the public order during a crisis response, to include teams of enforcement officers for handling of persons disrupting the public order, violating laws, requiring quarantine, and so forth
Res.B3d 1.4.1.1	Develop and document, in conjunction with correctional and jail officials, coordination strategies for managing and possibly relocating incarcerated persons during a crisis response
Res.B3d 1.4.4.1	Identify and enter into agreements to secure the resources needed for the processing and temporary detention of law violators
Res.B3d 1.4.2.1	Review existing and develop protocols as appropriate for the operation of decontamination sites, and out-processing areas
Res.B3d 1.4.5	Establish a recovery strategy to access reimbursable opportunities, replenish supplies and equipment, re-assign personnel, and return to normal operation

Preparedness Measures	**Metrics**
Multi-disciplinary law enforcement and public safety agency planning teams have been established, per NIMS compliance.	Yes/No
Plans are in place for providing security for the public and properties on and around an incident site	Yes/No
Plans are in place for supporting public safety in and around an incident site	Yes/No
Plans are in place for the post-incident provision of temporary prisoner holding facilities and arrest processing documentation	Yes/No

Activity: ***Determine appropriate training and exercises necessary to address existing gaps***

Definition: Review existing training programs. Compare needs and gaps against available training assets.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B3d 2.1.1	Identify gaps in personnel training at the awareness and first response operational level, to include familiarity with the expectations of and demands on the public safety responders as set forth in agency plans, protocols, and procedures for a crisis response
Res.B3d 2.1.2	Identify existing training resources and opportunities available at the Federal, State, and local level
Res.B3d 2.1.3	Develop a training strategy for all personnel
Res.B3d 2.2.1	Develop a strategy, in coordination with area jurisdictions, to participate in and/or conduct exercises which incorporate all existing response requirements, identify gaps, develop improvement plans, and implement preparedness enhancements

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Preparedness Measures	Metric
Percent of personnel trained at the awareness level	100%
Percent of personnel trained at the operational level	Identified in training strategy
Frequency of exercises	Annual

Performance Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: ***Command and Control Public Safety and Security Response Operations***

Definition: In response to a notification for security assets, establish the management and coordination of the Public Safety and Security Response, from activation through to demobilization

Critical Tasks	
Res.B3d 3.1.1	Identify law enforcement personnel needed to maintain public safety and security
Res.B3d 3.1.3	Establish staging areas for law enforcement to conduct deputization, personnel assignment, and briefing prior to entering the impacted area.
Res.B3d 3.5	Communicate with other response agencies regarding public safety response
Res.B3d 3.1.2	Deploy appropriate relief personnel for public safety and security
Res.B3d 3.2	Coordinate public safety and security operations with Incident Command
Res.B3d 3.3.3	Arrange for shelter, housing, and feeding for law enforcement responders
Res.B3d 3.3.2	Arrange for proper sheltering, care, and feeding of detainees

Performance Measures	Metric
Time to implement safety and security plans and procedures	Within 1 hour of incident
Site safety plan is communicated to all first responders at the incident	Yes/No
Time to deploy sufficient relief personnel to maintain public safety throughout a long-term incident (relief needed is estimated at 50 percent of total uniformed (patrol) staffing of a jurisdiction having primary responsibility for the incident)	Within 12 to 15 hours of initial deployment

Activity: ***Activate Public Safety and Security Response***

Definition: Upon notification, mobilize and deploy to begin operations

Critical Tasks	
Res.B3d 4.1	Conduct a public safety and security response
Res.B3d 4.1.1	Coordinate and receive instructions from tactical operations

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Res.B3d 4.1.2	Ensure that responders have the appropriate equipment to perform assigned tasks

Performance Measures	Metric
Time to deploy sufficient personnel to perform public safety and security duties *Small local incidents: use on-duty and mutual aid personnel* *Large-scale incidents: Target should be equal to 50 percent of total uniformed (patrol) staffing of jurisdiction having primary responsibility for the incident*	Within 12 hours of initial deployment
All responding public safety personnel are self-sufficient (bring their own sleeping/eating/ restocking supplies) for up to a seven day deployment	For up to 7 days

Activity: *Assess the Incident Scene and Secure the Area*

Definition: Upon arriving on scene, assess for immediate rescue needs, for remaining safety and security threats, and initiate security operations. Identify and implement protective actions for high priority key facilities or resources that may require heightened security.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B3d 5.1	Secure the incident site
Res.B3d 5.2.2	Determine the appropriate emergency medical personnel to respond on site for injuries and fatalities
Res.B3d 5.1.1	Identify and establish inner most incident/crime scene perimeters
Res.B3d 5.1.2	Document observations regarding the affected area
Res.B3d 5.2.3	Develop and maintain a reserve corps of tactical officers at the command post to respond to unexpected occurrences

Performance Measures	Metric
Time to secure the incident site	Less than 30 minutes from initial units arrival on scene
Hot, warm, and cold zones have been identified and segregated	Yes/No
On scene personnel accountability system has been implemented	Yes/No

Activity: *Control Traffic, Crowd, and Scene*

Definition: Direct/redirect traffic and pedestrians out of the affected area(s). Assess, coordinate, and establish force protection and perimeter zones, maintain a visible and effective security presence to deter criminal conduct and maintain law and order

Critical Tasks	
Res.B3d 6.1	Identify and establish an incident perimeter and zones
Res.B3d 6.1.1	Identify security zone requirements

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Res.B3d 6.2	Establish force protection
Res.B3d 6.2.1	Provide force protection for search and rescue personnel to allow them to operate safely
Res.B3d 6.1.3	Provide and plan for access to the site for emergency workers and other necessary and appropriate personnel
Res.B3d 3.4	Implement and maintain an on-scene personnel identity management system
Res.B3d 6.2.5	Secure animals during an animal health emergency
Res.B3d 6.1.2	Secure critical sites such as hospitals and medical supply distribution points
Res.B3d 6.2.2	Plan and provide protection and security for abandoned properties within and around the incident site
Res.B3d 6.3	Control traffic and crowds

Performance Measures	Metric
All incident site control zones/points have been clearly identified and staffed	Yes/No
Perimeter zones are coordinated jointly by hazardous materials personnel, fire/rescue, and law enforcement	Yes/No
Time to identify and staff all traffic control and alternative ingress/egress routes	Less than 30 minutes from initial units arrival on scene
New or secondary injuries to the public and first responders at or around the incident site are prevented	Yes/No
Damaged buildings and debris blocking emergency response ingress/egress have been removed	Yes/No
Time to coordinate stoppage of all non-critical cargo and passenger rail, maritime, and highway transportation into incident area	Within 1 hour of the incident

Activity: ***Maintain Public Order***

Definition: Provide a visible law enforcement presence at key locations within the affected area. Protect people and property, and deter criminal activity

Critical Tasks	
Res.B3d 7.1	Assess situation for public order related concerns
Res.B3d 7.3	Implement emergency public safety and security assessment procedures
Res.B3d 7.1.1	Conduct an initial reconnaissance of the area
Res.B3d 7.2	Coordinate with appropriate unit and develop a plan of action
Res.B3d 7.4.1	Conduct tactical deployment
Res.B3d 7.4.2	Use tactical operations teams to conduct searches of high priority unsecured sites to establish security and detain lawbreakers as necessary

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Res.B3d 7.5	Maintain security operations
Res.B3d 7.1.2	Request assets required to provide security
Res.B3d 7.5.1	Provide security for public officials and investigation teams
Res.B3d 7.5.2	Institute and conduct security operations controlling personnel who are allowed to enter damaged and condemned buildings and the contents that they are allowed to remove

Performance Measures	Metric
Time to initiate and conduct search and/or apprehension procedures	Less than 30 minutes from the notification or witnessing of suspected criminal activity

Activity: *Conduct Law Enforcement Operations*

Definition: Upon notification or suspicion of criminal activity, identify, and take appropriate enforcement action with lawbreakers at or around the incident site.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B3d 8.1	Coordinate with investigators to interview witnesses/bystanders in order to identify suspects
Res.B3d 7.4.2	Use tactical operations teams to conduct searches of high-priority unsecured sites to establish security and detain lawbreakers as necessary
Res.B3d 8.3	Make arrests as necessary

Performance Measures	Metric
Appropriate and timely enforcement action taken	Yes/No

Activity: *Manage Criminal Justice Population*

Definition: Manage criminal justice population to include incarcerated persons, those under criminal justice supervision, and tactically arrested individuals in the affected area.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B3d 9.1	Establish mobile arrest and processing sites for arrestees
Res.B3d 9.1.1	Provide space in mobile arrest and processing site/area for: finger printing and photos, desk space, interview area, property storage, secure storage for valuables and/or evidence, isolation area for violent detainees, and secure area for vehicles
Res.B3d 9.2.1	Process those arrested (photos, fingerprinting) and document arrests
Res.B3d 9.2.2	Set up improvised holding cells to manage detainees
Res.B3d 9.2.3	Detain those arrested (in improvised holding cells)
Res.B3d 9.2.3.1	Provide detainee supervision 24/7 for the length of the incident
Res.B3d 9.2.3.2	Ensure holding facilities have provisions for food, access to drinking water and toilet facilities,

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	and trash removal
Res.B3d 9.2.3.3	Establish system for documenting, securing, storing, transporting, and releasing detainee property
Res.B3d 9.2.3.4	Establish system to track detainee movement – in-coming, transfers, and releases
Res.B3d 9.2.3.5	Distribute notification of the destination holding facility
Res.B3d 9.2.3.6	Provide space for Prosecutors/Public Defenders to meet with operations staff and/or detainees
Res.B3d 9.2.4	Transport detainees to secure lock-up facility
Res.B3d 9.2.5	Ensure that established procedures for transfer of detainees during major emergencies are followed
Res.B3d 9.3.1	Designate alternate facilities to ensure continued operations by local, tribal, State, and Federal prosecutors/public defenders
Res.B3d 9.3.2	Set up improvised court facilities to ensure local, tribal, State, and Federal court services continue
Res.B3d 9.3.3	Implement protocols for contacting appropriate parole/probation agencies of any changes in residency status
Res.B3d 9.3.4	Establish protocols for alternate housing facilities for local, State, and Federally incarcerated prisoners
Res.B3d 9.3.5	Establish equipment lists and mobile booking kits and store at strategic locations
Res.B3d 9.3.5.1	Inventory mobile booking kits on a regular basis to ensure that equipment and materials have not been removed or damaged and remain in working order
Res.B3d 9.3.6	Ensure the capacity to run records checks for warrants, holds on detainees, and terrorist lists

Performance Measures	Metric
Time to identify and equip an arrest processing team to intake, process, and document a large number of arrests	Within 1 hour of initial deployment
Time to coordinate and establish temporary holding cells for those arrested	Within 2 hours of initial deployment
Time to coordinate and establish prisoner transport	Within 2-4 hours of initial deployment
Time to coordinate and establish alternate facilities for prosecutor/public defenders	Within 2 hours of initial deployment
Time to coordinate and establish alternate facilities for court services	Within 2 hours of initial deployment
Time to coordinate for alternate housing facilities for local, state, federally incarcerated prisoners	Within 1 hour of initial deployment

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Activity: ***Demobilize Public Safety and Security Response Operations*** **Definition: Return to normal operations**	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B3d 10.1.1	Clear the incident scene upon completion of assigned temporary duties, or as directed by superiors
Res.B3d 10.1.2	Return local forces to regular service
Res.B3d 10.1.3	Recall temporary assistance resources to staging areas for out processing
Res.B3d 10.3	Conduct decontamination of all out processing personnel and equipment
Res.B3d 10.3.1	Identify public safety and security assets required for decontamination activities
Res.B3d 10.3.2	Coordinate with HazMat personnel to establish decontamination sites
Res.B3d 10.3.3	Coordinate with HazMat personnel to decontaminate affected public safety facilities and equipment
Res.B3d 10.2.1	Debrief all out processing personnel
Res.B3d 10.4.1	Activate reimbursement process for public safety and security resources
Res.B3d 10.4.2	Receive and process reimbursement requests
Res.B3d 10.4.3	Process compensation claims and related administrative activities
Res.B3d 10.5.1	Rehabilitate and replenish public safety and security resources
Res.B3d 10.5	Reconstitute personnel and equipment
Res.B3d 10.2.2	Participate in incident debriefing
Res.B3d 10.1.4	Identify staff needs dependant upon their upon their level of involvement and/or hours committed to the incident
Res.B3d 10.2	Decontaminate, debrief, and out-process law enforcement personnel prior to leaving the impacted area

Performance Measures	**Metric**
Time to restore public safety personnel to normal or original operations	Less than 12 hours from start of Demobilization
Public safety and security response personnel are debriefed	Yes/No

Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship
On-Site Incident Management	Public Safety and Security Response provides the notification of the need for other capabilities to On-Site Incident Command, and they both provide situation reports to each other.

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Linked Capability	Relationship
Firefighting Operations and Support	Public Safety and Security Response provides force protection to Firefighting Operations and Support, while Firefighting Operations and Support reports security issues to Public Safety and Security Response.
WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination	Public Safety and Security Response provides force protection to WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination, while WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination reports security issues to Public Safety and Security Response.
Explosive Device Response Operations	Public Safety and Security Response provides force protection to Explosive Device Response Operations, while Explosive Device Response Operations reports security issues to Public Safety and Security Response.
Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment	Public Safety and Security Response provides force protection to Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment, while Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment reports security issues to Public Safety and Security Response.
Urban Search and Rescue	Public Safety and Security Response provides force protection to Urban Search and Rescue, while Urban Search and Rescue reports security issues to Public Safety and Security Response.
Law Enforcement Investigations and Operations	Public Safety and Security Response provides information on suspected terrorist activity to Law Enforcement Investigations and Operations.
Isolation and Quarantine	Public Safety and Security Response provides perimeter security to Isolation and Quarantine.
EOC Management	Public Safety and Security Response provides perimeter security to EOC Management.
Mass Prophylaxis	Public Safety and Security Response provides perimeter security to Mass Prophylaxis.
Mass Care	Public Safety and Security Response provides perimeter security to Mass Care.
Fatality Management	Public Safety and Security Response provides perimeter security to Fatality Management.
Citizen Evacuation and Shelter in Place	Public Safety and Security Response provides traffic control to Citizen Evacuation and Shelter- In-Place, and coordinates the evacuation of incarcerated populations.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
Law Enforcement—crowd control	Uniformed/sworn, reserve, volunteer, and in-training officers to control a large crowd in a high-density area
Law Enforcement—traffic control	Uniformed/sworn, reserve, volunteer, and in-training officers to control traffic from entering and leaving the affected areas.
National Guard Civil Support Teams	To augment crowd control, traffic control, and hard target security.

Planning Assumptions

General

- Although applicable to several of the 15 National Planning Scenarios, the capability planning factors were developed from an in-depth analysis of the Radiological Dispersal Device scenario. Other scenarios were reviewed to identify required adjustments or additions to the planning factors and national targets.
- This capability applies to a wide range of incidents and emergencies, including accidental or deliberate disease outbreaks, natural disasters, and nuclear and conventional events.
- If the catastrophic incident results from terrorism, the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) level will likely be raised regionally, and perhaps nationally. Elevation of the HSAS level requires additional local, State, and Federal security enhancements that may affect the availability of certain response resources.
- Police will be needed to direct traffic away from the contaminated area, prevent access to the contaminated area, and support movement of the population out of the contaminated area.
- Looting and/or damaging to unattended properties, especially shops and stores by armed hooligans and criminals should be considered.
- Public safety personnel will need to support the evacuation, sheltering, and protection of downwind populations.
- Public safety personnel will support the movement of approximately 35,000 people to shelters. Temporary housing will be needed.
- A decontamination process must be set up. Public safety personnel will be needed to support movement of the population in and out of the decontamination area.

Scenario-Specific

- The use of a radiological dispersion device (RDD) would have local implications on the public safety and security response teams. The assumption is that an RDD would be dispersed within a downtown or highly populated areas. With Washington, D.C., as an example, there are approximately 200–250 people in a single block. If this RDD were to affect an area of 36 blocks or more, 7,500–9,000 people would be affected. It is likely that local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies would share resources to help contain the area and aid in crowd control for a high population such as this. Yet the States would have to balance the resources between preventing affected personnel from entering into other portions of the State by leaving the site.

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Planning Factors from an In-Depth Analysis of a Scenario with Significant Demand for the Capability

Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Law enforcement (for crowd control)	Capacity to control a large crowd within a downtown area	Sufficient numbers to regulate approximately 200 people per 36 blocks	Sufficient uniformed/sworn, reserve, volunteer, and in-training officers to accomplish the task
Law enforcement (for traffic control)	Capacity to control traffic from both entering and leaving the affected areas	Sufficient numbers to regulate approximately 7,000 people, depending on automobile traffic or mass transit numbers	Sufficient uniformed/sworn, reserve, volunteer, and in-training officers to accomplish the task
National Guard	Capacity to supplement local and regional law enforcement agencies	Sufficient to allow local law enforcement to perform law enforcement duties	Appropriate guards to augment law enforcement personnel for crowd control, traffic control, and hard target security (at the World Trade Center, 8,500 were deployed within 24 hours of the attacks)
Private security companies	Capacity to supplement local and regional law enforcement agencies	Sufficient to allow local law enforcement to perform law enforcement duties	Appropriate numbers to supplement law enforcement personnel for limited traffic control and provide target security for private sector sites

Approaches for Large-Scale Events

To avoid duplication of resources, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive (CBRNE) and law enforcement resource organizations should cross-train with other capabilities and foster cross-border cooperation.

National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	# of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
Local/State	Law Enforcement Officers for Crowd Control	Personnel	Sufficient	Per 80% from local sources Per 20% from State sources	Secure Area Control traffic, crowd and scene
Local/State/ Non-governmental organization	Law enforcement officers for traffic control	Personnel	Sufficient		Secure Area Control traffic, crowd and scene
State/Territory	National Guard Civil Support Teams	Federal Resource Organization	1	Per State/territory	Secure Area Control traffic, crowd and scene

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ANIMAL HEALTH EMERGENCY SUPPORT

Capability Definition

Animal Health Emergency Support is the capability to protect, prevent, detect, respond to, and recover from threats and incidents that would result in the disruption of industries related to U.S. livestock, other domestic animals (including companion animals) and wildlife and/or endanger the food supply, public health, and domestic and international trade. It includes the ability to respond to large-scale national and regional emergencies as well as to smaller scale incidents through rapid determination of the nature of the event, initiation of the appropriate response, containment of the disrupting effects, and facilitation of recovery.

Outcome

Foreign animal disease is prevented from entering the U.S. by protecting the related critical infrastructure and key assets. In the event of an incident, animal disease is detected as early as possible, exposure of livestock to foreign diseases is reduced, immediate and humane actions to eradicate the outbreak are implemented, continuity of agriculture and related business is maintained, economic damage is limited, and public and animal health and the environment are protected. Trade in agriculture products and domestic and international confidence in the U.S. food supply are maintained and/or restored. Agricultural industries are returned to their prior productivity, to include replenishment of the domestic livestock and other domesticated animals.

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

This capability supports the following Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) and Annexes:

ESF #1: Transportation (movement of supplies, equipment and carcasses)
ESF #2: Communications
ESF #3: Public Works (debris removal)
ESF #5: Emergency Management
ESF #6: Mass Care (animal housing)
ESF #7: Resource Support
ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services
ESF #10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Response (Environmental Protection)
ESF #11: Agriculture and Natural Resources
ESF #13: Public Safety and Security
ESF #14: Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation
ESF #15: External Affairs
Biological Incident Annex
Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex
Interim/Draft: Food and Agriculture Incident Annex

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Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B2e 1.1	Plan and prepare to safeguard animal health
Res.B2e 1.1.1	Develop animal safety and security plans, programs, and agreements
Res.B2e 1.5	Develop plans, procedures, protocols, and systems for control of large scale animal disease events
Res.B2e 1.6	Develop plans, procedures, and protocols for long-term animal health care
Res.B2e 1.5.7	Develop protocols for disposing of infectious agricultural waste
Res.B2e 1.5.5	Develop plans to collect and dispose of infected material to reduce the spread of animal disease
Res.B2e 6.1	Implement programs to safeguard animal health
Res.B2e 1.3	Develop plans, procedures, and polices for coordinating, managing, and disseminating public information
Pre.B2c 1.1	Facilitate the development of processes to improve security at key points and at access points of critical infrastructure
Pre.B2a 1.2	Facilitate the development of processes to improve cargo security and screening capabilities
Rec.A2b 3.2	Manage community assistance programs
Rec.C3a 1.1	Develop community recovery, mitigation, and economic stabilization plans, programs, and procedures
Pre.A1a 5.4	Collect information about threats to the Nation's food supply
Pro.A1a 5.3.2	Conduct vulnerability assessments to assess vulnerability of potential targets to identified threats
Pro.B1b 4	Conduct surveillance for food and agriculture safety and defense
Pre.A1a 3.5.7	Evaluate intelligence and surveillance activities
Pre.A2a 5.2	Prioritize threats
Pre.A1a 3.5.6	Conduct surveillance and information collection and produce intelligence
Pre.B3a 4	Conduct border control operations
Pre.A1e 3.2.1.4	Inspect materials for potential Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE) weapons or precursors
Pre.B3a 3.1	Use advanced information, targeting and technology on the ground, on the water, and in the air to prevent the entry of terrorists, terrorist weapons, and other high-risk people and goods between and among States, Tribes, and international trade partners
Pro.A1a 4	Identify critical infrastructure and key assets within the Nation, region, State, or local area
Pro.A1a 5.5.2	Map threat analysis against critical infrastructure to identify and analyze infrastructure asset

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Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
	vulnerabilities and critical risk
Pro.A1a 5.2	Conduct consequence analysis of critical assets and key resources
Pro.A2a 4.7	Implement deterrence and defense protection measures
Pro.A3a 4.1.1	Implement detection measures such as inspection surveillance, employee monitoring, and security counterintelligence

Preparedness Measures	Metrics
State Veterinary Service is capable of and authorized to:	
▪ Record biological, physical, and chemical agents that can adversely affect animals and their related products	Yes/No
▪ Rapidly respond to unexpected pest or disease incursion or other situations that put at immediate risk the sanitary status of the animal populations	Yes/No
▪ Prevent the entrance and spread of unwanted pests and diseases in the State	Yes/No
▪ Determine, monitor, and verify the sanitary status of the populations covered under its mandate	Yes/No
▪ Identify in advance those sanitary problems covered under its mandate, including animal and public health, the environment, or the trade of animals or their related products	Yes/No
▪ Update overall service in accordance with the latest scientific advances and based on the sanitary norms and measures of USDA-APHIS, OIE, Codex Alimentarius and the WTO/SPS agreement	Yes/No
▪ Inform, in an effective and timely fashion, its users of activities, programs, and sanitary developments	Yes/No
▪ Ensure that users are in compliance with the regulatory norms covered under its mandate	Yes/No
▪ Formulate and adopt regulatory norms for processes and products covered under its mandate	Yes/No
▪ Ensure national regulatory norms covered under its mandate in line with national and international norms, guidelines, and recommendations	Yes/No
▪ Negotiate, implement, and maintain equivalency agreements with other States and USDA on veterinary norms and processes under its mandate	Yes/No
▪ Track history, location, and distribution of animals and their related products covered under its mandate	Yes/No
▪ Notify USDA of its State regulations and sanitary status, in accordance with the procedures established by USDA	Yes/No
National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL), all National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) laboratories, and all State veterinary diagnostic laboratories have capacity to process diagnostic samples as described in the Performance Objectives	Yes/No
The National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL), National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) laboratories, all State veterinary diagnostic laboratories are able to process and test diagnostic samples	Yes/No
Mechanisms are in place for ensuring an early report on suspicious cases (as economic incentives)	Yes/No
National animal, plant, and health surveillance plan has been developed	Yes/No

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Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B2e 2.1.4	Conduct training and exercise programs for distribution of prophylaxis for animal health
Res.B2e 2.1.2	Develop and implement training and procedures to enable local veterinary communities to recognize exposure to CBRNE materials, and to use tools and equipment to detect the presence of CBRNE materials
Pro.B4a 3.2.1	Train the public to be aware and to report suspicious items and behavior

Preparedness Measures	Metric
Personnel are proficient in delivering just-in-time training at the Federal, State, and local levels	Yes/No
Plan has been developed for supplies and/or equipment to be available for an FMD outbreak in order to	
▪ Enter, store, and retrieve information from the field and at the coordination center	Yes/No
▪ Euthanize animals while meeting optimal humane standards to level described in performance objectives	Yes/No
▪ Move live animals, carcasses, people, pharmaceuticals, and equipment within, between, and among quarantine zones while ensuring biosecurity	Yes/No
Supplies distribution plan is developed before an incident	Yes/No

Performance Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: *Direct Animal Health Emergency Support Tactical Operations* **Definition: In response to a notification of an animal disease, provide the overall management and coordination of the epidemiological investigations and animal control measures to eradicate the disease.**	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B2e 3.2	Implement plans and procedures for animal health response
Res.B2e 3.3.1	Coordinate animal-health emergency response operations
Res.B2e 3.3.3	Coordinate and provide regional and State resources and procedures for the response to an outbreak of highly contagious animal and plant diseases
Res.B2e 3.5.1	Conduct internal communications for animal health response
Res.B2e 3.3.2	Coordinate animal safety and biosecurity response
Res.B2e 3.3	Provide coordination and support for animal health care through the Incident Command System (ICS)
Res.B2e 3.3.4	Coordinate animal health disease outbreak assessment activities
Res.B2e 3.6	Provide coordination and support for implementation of a local, regional, or national distribution system for mass animal therapeutics and vaccination program

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Res.B2e 3.5.3	Coordinate emergency public information regarding animal health issues through the Joint Information System (JIS)
Res.B2e 3.5.2	Exchange and disseminate data as necessary for appropriate animal treatment
Res.B2e 3.8	Provide personal protective equipment (PPE) to personnel involved in animal health response site operations and clean-up
Res.B2e 3.3.4.1	Coordinate epidemiological investigations and lab testing for disease outbreaks
Res.B2e 3.5	Establish and maintain information systems across animal-health related response entities
Pro.B1b 3.4.1	Coordinate food and agriculture emergency management plans at the local, State, and national levels
Pro.B1b 3	Direct and coordinate food and agricultural safety and defense operations
Res.B1c 8.4	Coordinate transportation response
Res.B2e 3.6.1	Allocate, mobilize, and manage resources for animal health operations
Res.B2e 3.6.2	Track and report resources for animal health operations

Performance Measures	Metric
Time to carry out cleaning and disinfection on premises on which FMD is presumed or confirmed to exist	Within 48 hours of being so identified
Time to develop wildlife management plan	Within 48 hours of the identification of the first presumptive positive premises
Time to set up communications network outside the incident command system (ICS)	During the first weeks of the outbreak (7 days)
Time to conduct an assessment of the risk wildlife poses to the transmission of a foreign animal disease	Within 7 days of confirmation of the first positive premises
Time to initiate research into alternative disease control strategies	Within 7 days of confirmed diagnosis
Time to provide a fair market value indemnity to owners of destroyed animals and materials	Within 72 hours of destruction
Communications messages and methods and a plan for dissemination were developed before the outbreak	Yes/No

Activity: ***Activate Animal Health Emergency Support***

Definition: In response to a notification of animal disease, respond, mobilize, and arrive on scene to begin emergency veterinary operations.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B2e 4.1	Activate animal health operations
Res.B2e 4.2	Establish and maintain animal health response communication systems across responsible entities

Performance Measures	Metric

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Time to implement plans in accordance with the National Response Plan (NRP/NIMS)	Within 24 hours of establishing an incident command
Time to implement communications plan	Within 24 hours of presumptive diagnosis
Time for deployment of sufficient veterinary medical field staff and other resources (veterinarians, animal health technicians, disease specialists, and veterinary diagnostic labs)	Within 24 hours (and for 3 weeks at a time) of confirmed diagnosis
Time to identify need for logistical support to aid the operation	Within 48 hours of presumptive diagnosis

Activity: *Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigation & Surveillance*

Definition: Conduct investigations and surveillance of animal populations to determine the sources of an animal disease outbreak, the potentially infected animal populations, and verify the elimination of the disease.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B2e 5.2	Conduct ongoing monitoring and surveillance of agricultural and animal health safety and security
Res.B2e 5.1	Conduct epidemiological investigation as surveillance reports warrant and coordinate Federal, State, and local veterinary assets/services
Res.B2e 5.1.7	Determine whether foreign animal disease agent is intentional or accidental
Res.B2e 5.1.6	Conduct animal tracing to determine source, destination, and disposition of affected animals
Res.B2e 5.1.3	Determine whether an emerging infectious animal disease agent or a biological threat agent consists of single or multiple strains
Res.B2e 5.2.3	Coordinate with vector control experts to conduct surveillance and monitoring of animal infections until population densities and infection rates return to pre-event levels
Res.B2e 5.1.2.1	Obtain samples for lab testing
Pre.C.2a 5	Search for materials
Pre.C.2a 5.2.1	Dispose of materials suspected of being, or known to be, dangerous

Performance Measures	Metric
Time to assign status and priority of investigation to premises	Within 6 hours of identifying them through traces
Time to initiate a foreign animal disease investigation, as verified by the veterinarian in charge (AVIC)	Within 8 hours of receiving the initial report
Time for a single laboratory sample to be analyzed	Within 12–72 hours (depending on type of analysis)
Number per day of laboratory samples processed by 90 people and 30 high-throughput PCR machines	10,000 samples
Number per day of laboratory samples processed by 15 people with 1 liquid handling robotic system	15,000 serum samples
Number per day of laboratory serology samples processed by one technician (nonrobotics)	450 serum samples

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Time to delivery of logistical support to aid the operation	Within 72 hours of arriving at the laboratory
Time for case definition using effective epidemiology	Within 24 hours of presumptive or confirmed diagnosis
Time to initiate an investigation of suspected wildlife cases by a qualified veterinarian	Within 24 hours of confirmed diagnosis
Time to initiate joint USDA-DOJ investigation into source of introduction	Within 24 hours of confirmed diagnosis
Time to implementation of a surveillance plan to define the present extent of outbreak and detect new cases	Within 48 hours of confirmed diagnosis
Frequency of inspection for surveillance of susceptible animals at contact premises and suspect premises	Minimum of three times per average incubation period of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD)
Frequency of inspection for surveillance of susceptible animals at at-risk premises	Minimum two times per average incubation period
Time to complete trace-forwards and trace-backs to determine primary and secondary animal exposure to disease and additional contact premises	Within 48 hours from time of confirmed diagnosis in laboratory
Period for which trace-back analysis is conducted	Minimum of two average incubation periods before the onset of clinical signs of infected animals
Period for which trace-forward analysis is conducted	Up to the time that quarantine is imposed
Rate (number of animals per day) at which surveys for trace-out and epidemiology reporting can be conducted at potentially affected premises	400 herds per day (at 670 animals per herd)
Time to characterize the disease, identify risk factors, and develop mitigation strategies	Within 96 hours of confirmed diagnosis
Time to identification of disease-free zones using a surveillance plan	Within 7 days of a confirmed diagnosis
Time to confirm absence of diseases through monitoring and surveillance	Within 3-6 months after last diagnosis
All responders were monitored for exposure to hazardous materials	Yes/No
Screening of affected personnel was conducted	Yes/No

Activity: *Implement Disease Containment Measures*

Definition: Establish isolation and quarantine zones, issue stop movement orders, and initiate animal vaccination and treatment programs, euthanasia efforts, or other protective measures designed to control the spread of the disease.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B2e 6.2	Implement plans, procedures, protocols, and systems for distribution of mass prophylaxis from the National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS)
Res.B2e 6.3.6	Implement animal control measures, i.e. for infected animals threatening the public's health (also includes stray pets/domestic animals and commensal wild animals)
Res.B2e 6.1.1	Coordinate and support implementation of protective actions to stop the spread of disease
Res.B2e 6.2.2	Provide human vaccination during animal health emergency if needed

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Res.B2e 6.2.1	Conduct strategic vaccinations or treatments of animals
Res.B2e 6.4	Implement plans to collect and dispose of infected material to reduce the spread of animal disease
Pro.B1b 3.5.2.1	Coordinate cleaning and decontamination of affected food facilities
Res.B2e 5.2.5	Determine wildlife exposure and disposition
Res.B2e 6.6	Conduct hazardous materials response for disinfectants used in animal health response
Res.B2e 6.5	Coordinate and conduct environmental decontamination for animal health response
Res.B2e 8.2.1	Implement protocols for disposing of infectious agricultural waste

Performance Measures	Metric
Time to establish a control area to ensure effective implementation of quarantine and movement control (Federal quarantine is maintained until the disease is either eradicated or a smaller control area is implemented)	Within 12 hours of a presumptive positive or confirmed positive premises
Time to implement Bio-security measures	Within 24 hours of the identification of the first presumptive positive premise
Time to implement security at processing facilities	Within 24 hours of confirmation of diagnosis
Time to implement zoning plan	During the first week of the outbreak (7 days)
All entities shared and acted upon intelligence information to protective measures	Yes/No
Time to complete an emergency ring-vaccination program (assuming vaccination is the selected strategy)	Within 1 week of confirmation of diagnosis
Time to eradicate a foreign animal disease during the event or exercise (assuming a single-point introduction, under optimal response conditions)	Within 100 days from first diagnosis
Time to eradicate a foreign animal disease during the event or exercise (assuming a multiple-point introduction, under optimal response conditions)	Within 1 year of first diagnosis
Time for diagnosis of last case until trade restrictions no longer apply	Within 3-12 months depending on circumstances and methods used (Office International des Epizooties (OIE) standards)
Number of humans who contract the disease during the epidemic	Zero
On-site education for producers, farmers, and responders is provided at the time of diagnosis and/or euthanasia	Yes/No
Number of remaining animals affected by the foreign animal disease upon resumption of normal trade	Zero
Market demand for commodities remains stable throughout outbreak	Yes/No
All appropriate personnel are issued personal protective equipment (PPE)	Yes/No

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All responders are monitored for exposure to hazardous materials	Yes/No
Contamination source and affected areas are secured	Yes/No
Decontamination sites are established	Yes/No
Decontamination is conducted in accordance with local protocol for all contaminated personnel, equipment, and animals	Yes/No
Screening of affected personnel is conducted	Yes/No
Number of animals vaccinated for disease control (assuming 670 cloven-hoofed animals per herd)	400 herds per day

Activity: *Provide Animal Welfare*

Definition: Provide affected animals with veterinarian care, husbandry services, food, and sheltering to minimize suffering while being isolated, quarantined, or undergoing treatment.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B2e 7.1	Conduct an animal safety and biosecurity response
Res.B2e 7.2	Provide husbandry services

Performance Measures	Metric
Number of animals provided with water, feed, protection from elements	268,000 animals per day

Activity: *Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal*

Definition: Provide humane methods to euthanize affected animals to stop the spread of the disease or alleviate suffering and properly dispose of animal remains.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B2e 8.1	Euthanize animals to prevent spread of disease
Res.B2e 8.2	Collect and dispose of animal-health response materials
Res.B2e 8.2.1	Coordinate with appropriate agencies to implement disposal methods for agricultural waste, including carcasses, that reduce the spread of animal disease

Performance Measures	Metric
Number of animals euthanized and disposed of for disease control using a 10-person team	One herd per day
Rate (number of animals per day) at which appraisal, euthanasia, and/or disposal are carried out at affected locations	20 herds per day (at 670 animals per herd) sustained for 100 days
Time to implementation of a plan for euthanasia and disposal of infected and susceptible animals	Within 24 hours of a premises being classified as an infected or contact remises
Time for disposal of infected animals	Within 24 hours of destruction (whenever possible)

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Activity: *Demobilize*	
Definition: Account for all assets utilized and safely return them to their original location and functions.	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B2e 9.1	Develop an animal health response operation demobilization plan
Res.B2e 9.2	Implement the animal health response operation demobilization plan
Res.B2e 9.2.1	Restore animal health response personnel and equipment to normal operations
Res.B2e 9.2.3	Complete appropriate documentation for demobilization of animal health operations
Rec.C2a 3.1	Coordinate recovery operations
Rec.B3a 3.2	Coordinate establishment of long-term monitoring of the environment
Rec.B.3a 5.1	Conduct long-term environmental impact assessments
Rec.C3b 6.1.3	Provide engineering and other support for structures, public works, and infrastructure systems
Rec.C3a 6.2	Provide economic stabilization, community recovery, and mitigation support and/or financial restitution to key service sectors (e.g., medical, financial, public health and safety)
Rec.C4a 7.1.1.1	Provide financial management and reimbursement to affected agriculture entities
Rec.C4a 3.3	Coordinate economic stabilization

Performance Measures	**Metric**
Time after diagnosis of last case until quarantine is lifted	Within 3-6 months depending on circumstances and methods used
Personnel and equipment returned to normal operations	Yes/No
Timely completion of all appropriate documentation	Yes/No

Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship
Emergency Operations Center Management	Animal Health Emergency Support requests resources from Emergency Operations Center Management, who then in turn provides the requested resources. Emergency Operations Center Management and Animal Health Emergency Support both provide situational reports to each other.
Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense	Animal Health Emergency Support provides information on potential food contamination to Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense. Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense provide control measure guidance to Animal Health Emergency Support.
Public Safety and Security Response	Public Safety and Security Response provides perimeter security to Animal Health Emergency Support.
Mass Care	Mass Care provides bulk distribution items upon request to Animal Health Emergency Support.

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Public Health Laboratory Testing	Animal Health Emergency Support provides samples for testing to Public Health Laboratory Testing. Public Health Laboratory Testing provides test results to Animal Health Emergency Support.
Mass Prophylaxis	Animal Health Emergency Support identifies individuals needing prophylaxis from zoonotic disease.
Emergency Public Information and Warning	Animal Health Emergency Support provides protective action decisions and recommendations to Emergency Public Information and Warning.
Isolation and Quarantine	Animal Health Emergency Support provides an indication of zoonotic disease(s) to Isolation and Quarantine.
WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination	WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination provides technical decontamination to Animal Health Emergency Support.
Volunteer Management and Donations	Volunteer Management and Donations provides volunteers to Animal Health Emergency Support.
Economic and Community Recovery	Animal Health Emergency Support identifies the need for grants and loans to Economic and Community Recovery.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
Federal Emergency Operations Center (EOC)	Fully staffed Federal EOCs to support vaccination and/or euthanasia process. Each Federal USDA and APHIS EOC includes 63 staff to manage the EOC (7 Per shift, 3 shifts per 24-hour period).
State and County EOCs	Fully staffed state and county EOCs to support vaccination and/or euthanasia process.
Agriculture EOC	Consists of 2 policy administrators, 2 state animal health SMEs, 1 USDA cooperative extension specialist, 3 industry representatives, 1 market representative, 1 grain industry representative, 1 crop representative, 2 support personnel
Incident Command	Fully expanded incident command posts (ICPs) to support vaccination and/or euthanasia process. Includes
National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC)	Includes 3 Per shift, 3 shifts per 24-hour period per center.
Emergency Response Teams (ERT-A)	Includes 3 Per shift, 3 shifts per 24-hour period
Technical specialist position	Federal, State, tribal, local, or private resources assigned as needed based on their area of expertise
Veterinary Medical Assistance Team	Per NIMS, volunteer teams of 60+ veterinarians, technicians, and support personnel who can be dispatched for 2-week assignments
Animal Health Technician	Personnel to perform a variety of animal healthcare duties to assist veterinarians in settings
Veterinary Epidemiologist	Specialized personnel (requires Doctor of Veterinary Medicine) to analyze factors influencing the existence and spread of diseases among humans and animals, particularly those diseases transmissible from animals to humans (required to hold degree of
Communications Technicians	Interoperable communications coordinated among local, State, national, private, and international stakeholders
Trade support personnel	Reporting to OIE and information trade partners
Quarantine personnel	Personnel to implement quarantine and restriction of movement of animals and related products
Biosecurity personnel	Personnel to limit the introduction and spread of diseases
Decontamination personnel	Personnel to render an environment free of diseases and with no adverse impact on the environment
Euthanasia personnel	Personnel to euthanize livestock
Animal Welfare Specialist	Personnel to oversee animal welfare during quarantine, housing, euthanasia, and treatment of animals

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Capability Elements	Components and Description
Disposal personnel	Personnel to dispose of euthanized livestock
Livestock appraisal personnel	Personnel to appraise livestock prior to euthanasia
Surveillance personnel	Personnel to conduct surveillance activities to find exposed and susceptible animals; consists of numerators (phone contact) and examiners (ranch visitors)
CBRNE personnel	Specialized personnel to assess and address zoonotic and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive (CBRNE) issues, with the capacity to identify risk factors for the spread and prevent the spread of zoonotic disease
Foreign animal disease personnel	Personnel with the training to identify and diagnose relevant foreign animal diseases
Laboratory personnel	Personnel to process samples
Personnel trained in risk communication	Personnel to communicate risk options
Data entry	Emergency Management Reporting System (EMRS)
Equipment for trace-back investigations	Equipment in which to enter, store, and retrieve information from field and coordination center; includes cellular phones, barcoding, and global positioning system (GPS)/geospatial information system (GIS)
Animal Identification systems	Systems to identify infected, susceptible, exposed, and at-risk herds and animals
Identification officer (recorder)	Personnel to document and record infected, susceptible, exposed, and at-risk herds and animals
Support for local ICPs	Logistical support (office space and administrative equipment) for local ICPs
Euthanasia systems	Equipment (e.g., euthanasia solution base, tranquilizers) that enables animal euthanization while meeting optimal humane standards
Animal identification systems	Tags and/or microchips, paint sticks, brandings, and associated identification equipment
Animal Identification Officer	Personnel to identify animals
Therapeutics	Equipment used to treat animals under quarantine
Dispensing personnel	Personnel to dispense therapeutics
Vaccines	Equipment (medicine) needed to vaccinate animals at risk
Vaccinators	Personnel (supervisors and staff) to vaccinate animals
Warehousing and distribution systems	Location to store and distribute pharmaceuticals and related supplies
Transportation systems and methods	Equipment and staff to move live animals, carcasses, people, pharmaceuticals, and equipment within, between, and among quarantine zones while ensuring biosecurity
Law enforcement	Personnel to enforce quarantine, incident security, and personal safety for field personnel
Wildlife specialists	Trained personnel with the ability and equipment to prevent, survey, identify,

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Capability Elements	Components and Description
	diagnose, and control disease in wildlife
Veterinary Response Team—livestock	State-credentialed personnel with the ability and equipment to respond to the needs of livestock in all-hazards incidents
Veterinary Response Team—companion animals	State-credentialed personnel with the ability and equipment to respond to the needs of companion animals in response to all-hazards incidents
Information technology support staff	Personnel, equipment, and supplies to support ICPs
Administrative support personnel	Personnel to provide procurement, contracts, logistics, etc.

Planning Assumptions

General

- Although applicable to several of the 15 National Planning Scenarios, the capability planning factors were developed from an in-depth analysis of the "foreign animal disease" scenario. Other scenarios were reviewed to identify required adjustments or additions to the planning factors and national targets.
- This capability applies to a wide range of incidents and emergencies, including accidental or deliberate disease outbreaks, natural disasters, and nuclear and conventional events.
- Any event that would adversely affect the supply of electric utilities, access to water and feed, or access to premises such as large scale natural disasters (hurricanes, floods, blizzards) would impede communications, surveillance, operations, humane care of animals and delivery of services. If the roads are non-passable due to a natural disaster, this will affect our ability to get to the affected area, conduct operations, surveillance and other activities.

Scenario-Specific

- Herd size, rate of spread, and risk factors for an epidemic are based on a median herd size of 670 susceptible animals derived from research models of the spread of FMD.
- In the event of a single point of introduction and immediate response, 2,000 herds are expected to be infected over a 100-day period.
- In the event of three points of intentional introduction, up to 60 percent of States may be affected within 10 days of the attack. This would result in most of the States being quarantined within 2 weeks.
- Forty-five percent of the cattle inventory (beef and dairy) is affected = 45 million animals.
- Fifty percent of the swine population is affected = 60 million animals.
- Twenty percent of small ruminants are affected = 1.8 million animals.
- A decision whether to vaccinate will be made and implemented at the beginning of the outbreak.
- Quarantine/movement control strategies will have a negative impact on the marketability of nonsusceptible species (e.g., poultry).
- Annual losses will include $20 billion in meat exports and $20 billion in domestic meat production, plus a 50-percent decline in milk production, with a prolonged period of depression due to lack of replacement stock and the time it takes to reach lactation age. Income will be lost from hunting restrictions and concerns over the disease in wildlife.

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- Wildlife: All cloven-hoofed wildlife species, including zoological collections, are at risk of exposure, infection, and spread of disease, including deer, feral swine, wild sheep, and goats. This includes 200,000 farmed elk, 65,000 deer, and 350,000 farmed bison.
- Distribution will be widespread due to extensive livestock transportation.
- Extensive labor costs for surveillance, monitoring, euthanasia, vaccination, animal removal and husbandry will accrue.
- Increased human morbidity and mortality would occur, including adverse impacts on mental health.
- High unemployment will occur due to both direct and indirect economic losses of the outbreak, as well as lost opportunity costs, leading to a prolonged economic depression and loss of global market share.
- Consumer confidence in meat and meat products will plummet and will take time to be restored.

Planning Factors from an In-Depth Analysis of a Scenario with Significant Demand for the Capability (Foreign Animal Disease)

Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Emergency Operations Center (EOC)	Fully staffed	Sufficient numbers to euthanize 2,000 herds and vaccinate 40,000 herds over a 100-day period Geographic distribution of herds will determine the number of incident command posts (ICPs)	Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Headquarters Operations Center 2 regional APHIS emergency operation centers (EOCs) 100 Agriculture emergency operation centers (EOCs) 50 State emergency operation centers (EOCs) County emergency operation centers (EOCs) as needed

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Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Incident Command	Fully expanded incident command posts (ICPs)	Sufficient numbers to work on 2,000 herds to be euthanized and 40,000 herds to be vaccinated over 100-day period; geographic distribution of herds will determine the number of ICPs	20 incident command posts (ICPs) for herds to be euthanized 400 incident command posts (ICPs) for herds to be vaccinated 1 National Response Coordination Center (NRCC): 9 persons 2 Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC): 18 persons 50 Emergency Response Team (ERT)-A: 150 persons 50 Multiple Area Commands (MACs): 150 persons
Technical specialist position	Federal, State, tribal, local, or private resource	Estimates for a single incident are based on requirements for a 3-month period	Technical specialists could be assigned in their areas of expertise on an as-needed basis and could be tasked for the entire duration of the incident.
Veterinary Medical Assistance Team	60 people plus equipment can be dispatched on 2-week assignments	Estimates for a single incident are based on requirements for a 3-month period	3 teams deployed for 2 weeks on and 4 weeks off
Animal Health Technician	Perform a variety of animal healthcare duties to assist veterinarians in settings	Estimates for a single incident are based on requirements for a 3-month period	Animal health technicians could be assigned in their areas of expertise on an as-needed basis and could be tasked for the entire duration of the incident The number required depends on required tasks (see below)

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Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Veterinary Epidemiologist	Analyze factors influencing the existence and spread of diseases among humans and animals, particularly those diseases transmissible from animals to humans (required to hold degree of Doctor of Veterinary Medicine)	Estimates for a single incident are based on requirements for a 3-month period	500 veterinary epidemiologists could be assigned in their areas of expertise on an as-needed basis and could be tasked for the entire duration of the incident
USDA EOC staff	Manage the USDA EOC facility	Estimates for a single incident are based on requirements for a 3-month period	21 persons
APHIS EOC staff	Manage the APHIS facility	Estimates for a single incident are based on requirements for a 3-month period	21 persons
Communications Technicians	Interoperable communications coordinated among local, State, national, private, and international stakeholders	Estimates for a single incident are based on requirements for a 3-month period	100 people to manage communications for 3-week periods
Trade support personnel	Reporting to OIE and information trade partners	Single incident	APHIS Veterinary Services and International Services; U.S. Department of State will be available as needed
Quarantine and restriction of movement of animals and related products personnel	Issuance and release of quarantine	Estimates for a single incident are based on requirements for a 3-month period	APHIS and State personnel required for issues related to quarantine will be available on an as-needed basis To enforce quarantine, 6,000 people are needed

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Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Biosecurity personnel	Limit the introduction and spread of diseases	Estimates for a single incident are based on requirements for a 3-month period	Biosecurity specialists could be assigned in their areas of expertise on an as-needed basis and could be tasked for the entire duration of the incident: 500 on-farm personnel 50 outreach personnel
Decontamination personnel	Render an environment free of diseases and with no adverse impact on the environment	Sufficient numbers to work on 2,000 herds during a 100-day period	120 supervisors 1,200 staff
Euthanasia personnel	Euthanize livestock	Sufficient numbers to work on 2,000 herds during a 100-day period	60 supervisors for animal care 600 animal handlers
Animal Welfare Specialist	Oversee animal welfare during quarantine, housing, euthanasia, and treatment of animals	Sufficient numbers to work on 42,000 herds during a 100-day period	420 specialists: 1 in every incident command posts (ICPs)
Disposal personnel	Dispose of euthanized livestock.	Sufficient numbers to work on 2,000 herds during a 100-day period	60 supervisors 600 staff
Livestock appraisal personnel	Appraise livestock prior to euthanasia	Sufficient numbers to work on 2,000-herds during a 100-day period	840 persons
Surveillance personnel	Conduct surveillance activities to find exposed and susceptible animals: Numerators (phone contact) Examiners (ranch visitors)	Sufficient numbers to work on 40,000 herds during a 100-day period	500 persons
Personnel to assess and address zoonotic and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive (CBRNE) issues	Capacity to identify risk factors for the spread and prevent the spread of zoonotic disease	Sufficient numbers to work on 2,000 herds during a 100-day period	50 specialists, including State public health veterinarians 100 technicians
Personnel with the training to diagnose relevant foreign animal diseases	Identify foreign animal diseases.	Sufficient numbers to work on 40,000 herds during a 100-day period	500 foreign animal disease diagnosticians 500 accredited veterinarians

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Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Laboratory personnel	Process samples.	Sufficient numbers to work on 40,000 herds during a 100-day period; up to 82,000 serum samples and 24,000 PCR samples per day	300 specialty technician 300 highly skilled technicians 200 administrative and laboratory support located in National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) laboratories, and State animal diagnostic laboratories
Personnel trained in risk communication	Communicate risk options.	Sufficient numbers to work on 42,000 herds during a 100-day period	100 persons nationwide or 2 per State
Data entry	Emergency Management Reporting System (EMRS)	Sufficient numbers to work on 42,000 herds during a 100-day period	500 technicians
Equipment for trace-back investigations	Enter, store, and retrieve information from field and coordination center; includes cellular phones, barcoding, and global positioning system (GPS)/geospatial information system (GIS).	Sufficient numbers to work on 42,000 herds during a 100-day period	5,000 personal digital assistant (PDAs) Computer and Internet capability
Animal Identification systems	Identify infected, susceptible, exposed, and at-risk herds and animals.	Sufficient numbers to work on 42,000 herds during a 100-day period	27,000,000 tags and/or microchips, paint sticks, brandings, and associated equipment
Identification officer (recorder)	Document and record infected, susceptible, exposed, and at-risk herds and animals.	Sufficient numbers to work on 42,000 herds during a 100-day period	600 officers
Support for local ICPs	Logistical capacity	Sufficient numbers to work on 42,000 herds during a 100-day period	Office space and administrative equipment for 420 ICPs
Euthanasia systems	Euthanize animals while meeting optimal humane standards.	Sufficient numbers to work on 2,000 herds during a 100-day period	Euthanasia solution base Tranquilizers Other methods
Therapeutics	Treat animals under quarantine.	Sufficient numbers to work on 40,000 herds during a 100-day period	

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Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Dispensing personnel	Dispense therapeutics.	Sufficient numbers to work on 2,000 herds during a 100-day period	10 supervisors
Vaccines	Vaccinate animals at risk.	Sufficient numbers to work on 40,000 herds during a 100-day period	27 million doses of vaccine
Vaccinators	Vaccinate animals.	Sufficient numbers to work on 40,000 herds during a 100-day period	100 supervisors 2,000 vaccinators
Warehousing and distribution systems	Store and distribute pharmaceuticals and related supplies.	Sufficient numbers to work on 42,000 herds during a 100-day period	
Transportation systems and methods	Move live animals, carcasses, people, pharmaceuticals, and equipment within, between, and among quarantine zones while ensuring biosecurity.	Sufficient numbers to work on 2,000 herds during a 100-day period	200 trucks 100 buses 100 minivans
Law enforcement	Enforce quarantine, incident security, and personal safety for field personnel.	Sufficient numbers to work on 2,000 herds during a 100-day period	600 persons
Wildlife	Trained personnel with the ability and equipment to prevent, survey, identify, diagnose, and control disease in wildlife	Sufficient numbers to work on 2,000 herds and their surrounding environs during a 100-day period	500 survey design 3,000 sample collectors
Veterinary Response Team—livestock	State-credentialed personnel with the ability and equipment to respond to the needs of livestock in all-hazards incidents	Sufficient numbers to work on 2,000 herds during a 100-day period	60 persons
Veterinary Response Team—companion animals	State-credentialed personnel with the ability and equipment to respond to the needs of companion animals in response to all-hazards incidents	Sufficient numbers to work on 2,000 herds during a 100-day period	60 persons

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Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Information technology support staff	Personnel, equipment, and supplies to support ICPs	1 person per ICP	420 persons
Technical specialist position	Federal, State, tribal, local, or private resource	Estimates for a single incident are based on requirements for a 3-month period	Technical specialists could be assigned in their areas of expertise on an as-needed basis and could be tasked for the entire duration of the incident

Approaches for Large-Scale Events

- To avoid duplication of resources, CBRNE weapons or devices and hazardous materials (HazMat) resource organizations should cross-train with other capabilities
- To increase throughput in handling samples, laboratory resource organizations should develop new diagnostic technologies and pursue technology enhancements
- For efficient use of national resources in emergencies with finite geographic distribution, animal treatment teams (livestock) should pursue cross-State border cooperation
- For efficient use of personal and economic support to affected communities, personal resource organizations should use on-farm labor and develop just-in-time training
- To simplify the indemnity process and provide a cost-effective alternative to euthanasia and disposal, indemnity plan resource organizations should pursue the final indemnity rule and consider the sale of vaccinated animals for slaughter

National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
Federal/State/ Local	Incident Command Post (ICP)	Resource Organization	1	Per 100 herds to be euthanized or vaccinated	Direct Tactical Operations
Federal/State/ Local	Multiple Area Command (MAC)	Resource Organization	15	Nationally	Direct Tactical Operations
DHS	Homeland Security Operations Center	Federal Resource Organization	1	Nationally	Direct Tactical Operations
USDA	Headquarters EOC	Federal Resource Organization	1	Nationally	Direct Tactical Operations

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
USDA	Regional EOC	Federal Resource Organization	100	Nationally	Direct Tactical Operations
APHIS	Headquarters EOC	Federal Resource Organization	1	Nationally	Direct Tactical Operations
APHIS	Regional EOC	Federal Resource Organization	2	Nationally	Direct Tactical Operations
APHIS	National Response Coordination Center	Federal Resource Organization	3	Nationally	Direct Tactical Operations
APHIS	Regional Response Coordination Center	Federal Resource Organization	6	Nationally	Direct Tactical Operations
State	Multi-agency coordinating group	Resource Organization	9	Per State	Direct Tactical Operations
State	Emergency Response Team (ERT–A)	Resource Organization	1	Per State	Direct Tactical Operations
APHIS	APHIS Emergency Operations Center (AEOC)	Resource Organization	1	Nationally	Direct Tactical Operations
State	Agriculture EOC	Resource Organization	2	Per State	Direct Tactical Operations
APHIS/State	Technical specialist position	Personnel	As needed	Per incident	Direct Tactical Operations
FEMA	Veterinary medical assistance team	NIMS typed Resource Organization	12	Nationally	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
APHIS	Veterinary epidemiologist	Personnel	750	Nationally	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
State	Veterinary epidemiologist	Personnel	15	Per State (average)	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
APHIS,	Communications	Personnel	200	Nationally	All Activities

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
FEMA	technicians				
State	Communications technicians	Personnel	4	Per State (average)	All Activities
Private	Communications technicians	Personnel	4	Per State (average)	All Activities
APHIS	Trade support personnel	Personnel	As needed	Per incident	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
APHIS	Quarantine personnel	Personnel	1	Per ICP	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare
State	Quarantine personnel	Personnel	3	Per ICP	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare
Local/Private	Quarantine personnel	Personnel	12,270	Nationally	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare
APHIS, DOJ	Bio-security personnel	Personnel	2	Per State	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
State	Bio-security personnel	Personnel	4	Per State	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
Local/Private	Bio-security personnel	Personnel	30	Per State	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
APHIS	Decontamination personnel	Personnel	1	Per Euthanasia ICP	Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
State	Decontamination personnel	Personnel	60	Per State	Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
Local/Private	Decontamination personnel	Personnel	7,200	Nationally, through just-in-time training	Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
State	Euthanasia personnel supervisors	Personnel	3	Per State (average)	Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
Local/Private	Euthanasia personnel	Personnel	1,800	Nationally, through just-in-time training	Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
APHIS, Animal Care	Animal welfare specialist	Personnel	1	per ICP	Provide Animal Welfare
APHIS	Disposal personnel	Personnel	1	Per State	Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
State	Disposal personnel	Personnel	2	Per State	Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
Local/Private	Disposal personnel	Personnel	90	Per State	Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
APHIS	Livestock appraisal personnel	Personnel	3	Per State	Implement Disease Containment Measures
State	Livestock appraisal personnel	Personnel	9	Per State	Implement Disease Containment Measures
APHIS	Surveillance personnel	Personnel	1	Per ICP	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
State	Surveillance personnel	Personnel	25	Per State	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
APHIS	CBRNE Personnel	Personnel	1	Per State	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
State	CBRNE Personnel	Personnel	2	Per State	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
Local/Private	CBRNE Personnel	Personnel	12	Per State	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
APHIS	Foreign animal disease personnel	Personnel	30	Per State	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
					Investigations and Surveillance
State	Foreign animal disease personnel	Personnel	30	Per State	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
Local/Private	Foreign animal disease personnel	Personnel	60	Per State	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
APHIS	Specialty Laboratory Technicians	Personnel	25	Nationally	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
State	Specialty Laboratory Technicians	Personnel	18	Per State (average)	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
APHIS	Highly Skilled Laboratory Technicians	Personnel	50	Nationally	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
State	Highly Skilled Laboratory Technicians	Personnel	18	Per State (average)	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
APHIS	Admin Laboratory Support	Personnel	25	Nationally	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
State	Admin Laboratory Support	Personnel	12	Per State (average)	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
APHIS	Risk Communication Personnel	Personnel	2	Per State	Implement Disease Containment Measures
State	Risk Communic-ation Personnel	Personnel	5	Per State	Implement Disease Containment Measures
Local/Private	Risk Communication personnel	Personnel	5	Per State	Implement Disease Containment Measures
APHIS	Data Entry supervisor	Personnel	1	Per State	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
State	Data Entry	Personnel	1	Per State	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
	Supervisor				Investigations and Surveillance
APHIS	Data Entry Technicians	Personnel	3	Per State	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
State	Data entry Technicians	Personnel	3	Per State	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
Local/Private	Data Entry Technicians	Personnel	43	Per State	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
APHIS, FEMA/State/ Local	Equipment for trace-back and trace-forward investigations	Equipment	±30,000	Nationally	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
APHIS/State/ Local	Animal identification system (individual tagging element)	Equipment	±85 million		Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
APHIS	Identification Officer	Personnel	1	Per State	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
State	Identification Officer	Personnel	1	Per ICP	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
Local/Private	Identification Officer	Personnel	47	Per State	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
APHIS/State/ Local	Euthanasia systems	Equipment	As needed		Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
APHIS/State/ Local	Therapeutics	Equipment	As needed		Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
APHIS	Dispensing personnel supervisors	Personnel	60	Nationally	Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
APHIS	Vaccine dosages	Equipment	Up to 85 million	Nationally	Implement Disease Containment Measures
APHIS	Vaccinators	Personnel	1	Per State	Implement Disease Containment Measures
State	Vaccinators	Personnel	1	Per ICP	Implement Disease Containment Measures
Local/Private	Vaccinators	Personnel	720	Per State	Implement Disease Containment Measures
APHIS, FEMA/State/ Local	Warehousing and distribution systems	Resource Organization	As needed	Per incident	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
APHIS, DOT/ State/Local	Trucks/buses/min ivans	Transportatio n Equipment	2400	Nationally	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
FBI	Law Enforcement Agent	Personnel	1	Per State	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
State	Law Enforcement Officer	Personnel	1	Per ICP	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
Local	Law Enforcement Officer	Personnel	45	Per State	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
USDA and DOI	Wildlife Specialist	Personnel	4	Per State	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
State	Wildlife Specialist Supervisors	Personnel	4	Per State	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
Local/Private	Wildlife Specialist (sample collectors)	Personnel	180	Per State	Conduct Animal Health Epidemiological Investigations and Surveillance
State	Veterinary Response Team—livestock	Resource Organization	6	Per State affected (1 in-state and 5 out of state)	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
Local	Veterinary Response Team—livestock	Resource Organization	6	Per county affected (1 county team and 5 out-of-county teams)	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
State	Veterinary Response Team—companion animals	Resource Organization	6	Per State affected (1 in-state and 5 out of state)	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
Local	Veterinary Response Team—companion animals	Resource Organization	1	Per county affected (1 county team and 5 out-of-county teams)	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
FEMA, APHIS	Information technology support	Personnel	50	Nationally	All Activities
State	Information technology support	Personnel	4	Per State	All Activities
Local/Private	Information technology support	Personnel	20	Per State	All Activities
FEMA	Administrative	Personnel	4	Per State	All Activities

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
	support personnel				
State	Administrative support personnel	Personnel	20	Per State	All Activities
Local/Private	Administrative support personnel	Personnel	50	Per State	All Activities
APHIS	Trainers	Personnel	1	Per State	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
State	Trainers	Personnel	4	Per State	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal
Local/Private	Trainers	Personnel	20	Per State	Implement Disease Containment Measures Provide Animal Welfare Conduct Euthanasia/Disposal

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ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH

Capability Definition

Environmental Health is the capability to protect the public from environmental hazards and manage the health effects of an environmental health emergency on the public. The capability minimizes exposures to all-hazards in environmental matrices (i.e., food, air, water, solid waste/debris, hazardous waste, vegetation, and sediments) animal, insect and rodent vectors. The capability provides the expertise to run fate and transport models; design, implement, and interpret the results of environmental field surveys and laboratory sample analyses; develop protective action guides (PAGs) where none exist; and use available data and judgment to recommend appropriate actions for protecting the public and environment. Environmental Health identifies environmental hazards in the affected area through rapid needs assessments and comprehensive environmental health and risk assessments. It works closely with the health community and environmental agencies to link exposures with predicted disease outcomes, disseminating physician education for the diagnosis and treatment of victims based on environmental impact, providing guidance on personal protective equipment (PPE), and advising on environmental health guidelines.

Outcome

After the primary event, disease and injury are prevented through the quick identification of associated environmental hazards to include exposure to infectious diseases that are secondary to the primary event and secondary transmission modes. The at-risk population (e.g., exposed or potentially exposed) receives the appropriate treatment or protection (countermeasures) in a timely manner. The rebuilding of the public health infrastructure, removal of environmental hazards, and appropriate decontamination of the environment enable the safe re-entry and re-occupancy of the impacted area. Continued monitoring occurs throughout the re-building process to identify hazards and reduce exposure.

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

This capability supports:

ESF #1: Transportation
ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering
ESF #5: Information and Planning
ESF #6: Mass Care, Housing and Human Services
ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services
ESF #10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Response
ESF #11: Agriculture and Natural Resources
ESF #14: Long Term Community Recovery and Mitigation
Worker Safety and Health Support Annex
Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex
Catastrophic Incident Annex
Oil and Hazardous Materials Incident Annex

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Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B3c 1.2.1	Develop a plan to coordinate the various elements of environmental health among Federal, State, and local response
Res.B3c 3.1.2	Determine lead entity within each State for the coordination of environmental health efforts to include: response work, database management of environmental sample results, interpretation of results, and risk communication
Res.B3c 3.1.3	Determine lead entity within each State and Federal agency for which Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessments (FRMAC) is required to provide coordination for the analysis and database management of environmental samples, and for which other agencies are responsible for the interpretation of results and risk communication
Res.B3c 1.2.2	Develop inputs into the crisis communication plan
Res.B3c 1.3.1.1	Create inputs for emergency response plan for both larger, regulated systems (systems regulated by the Safe Drinking Water Act [SDWA]), and small unregulated systems (private wells, etc.)
Res.B3c 1.6.1.2	Develop Mass Shelter Guidelines that include requirements for provision of safe drinking water from all sources
Res.B3c 1.3.4	Develop a geo-coded database of all Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) drinking water facilities and private systems
Res.B3c 1.3.2.1	Develop emergency guidelines and operation criteria for limited operations (boil water or do not drink order) and plan for dissemination to public and policyholders in cooperation with water utilities
Res.B3c 1.3.2	Develop communications plan for drinking water safety in emergencies, including meaning of and instructions for scenarios such as boil water order, do not drink order, do not use order, etc.
Res.B3c 1.3.3	Develop mutual aid agreements with other water providers and relevant health and environment entities for assistance in disaster/emergency events
Res.B3c 1.4.2	Develop communications plan for wastewater issues in emergencies, including instructions for scenarios such as collection systems or treatment plants not operating, operating at limited capacity, or operating in a non-standard manner (e.g., discharge without complete treatment)
Res.B3c 1.4.3	Develop mutual aid agreements with other wastewater operations for assistance in disaster/emergency events
Res.B3c 1.4.1	Create inputs into emergency response plan for both large community sewer systems (in cooperation with utilities) and small onsite systems
Res.B3c 1.4.4	Develop a geo-coded database for community wastewater facilities and on-site systems
Pro.B1b 1.1.2.2	Develop a geo-coded database of all food operations
Res.B3c 1.6.1.1	Develop mass care guidelines that include food safety and sanitation requirements
Res.B3c 1.6.1.3	Develop mass shelter guidelines that include requirements for sanitation (toilets, porta-potties, and hand washing facilities)
Res.C3a 1.2.5	Develop a geo-coded database of all pre-designated mass care operations
Res.C3a 1.2.6	Update geo-coded database of all mass care operations
Res.B3c 1.6.1.4	Identify sources and pre-arrange for delivery of toilets, porta-potties, and hand washing facilities

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Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
	necessary to meet mass care guidelines
Res.B3c 1.5.2	Develop disease specific emergency response plan for vector control including; insect, arthropod and rodent vectors
Res.B3c 1.5.3	Develop emergency vector control guidelines that include surveillance and control of insect, arthropod and rodent vectors
Res.B3c 1.5.4	Develop communications plan for vector control to include control measures for the public and public agencies
Res.B3c 1.5.5	Develop a geo-coded data base of all geographic locations assessed for vectors including locations that were treated, i.e. larvicides, spraying, etc.
Res.B3c 1.5.1	Develop plan for assessing local vector control infrastructure prior to event and how it has been damaged during the event
Res.B3c 1.5.1.1	Develop plan to work with local vector control to assist while they rebuild capabilities
Res.B3c 1.6.1	Develop mass care guidelines that include safety/ food/air/water/wastewater sanitation requirements for all mass care facilities to include: shelters, housing, ice/food distribution, feeding sites, and other care facilities
Res.B3c 1.6.1.5	Provide input into plans, procedures, and protocols to ensure individual/gross decontamination of persons and pets prior to admittance to shelters and other mass care facilities, medical and alternate care facilities, reception centers, animal shelters and other places as needed
Res.B3c 1.6.1.6	Develop plans and guidance on aspects of improvised nuclear device procedures for sheltering in place, evacuation, public education, and announcements
Res.B3c 1.8.2	Develop a plan for evaluating re-entry and re-occupancy of the community, homes, educational, institution and health care facilities that establishes evaluation process, assessment criteria, and indicators of safe re-occupation
Res.B3c 1.7.6	Develop a geo-coded database of facilities that have the potential for affecting surrounding homes and community structures to include facilities that produce, store, use and distribute, treat or dispose of hazardous chemicals, biological, radiological, and explosive hazards
Res.B3c 1.8.3	Develop communications plan for safety and environmental related hazards associated with re-entry and re-occupation of community, homes, and facilities
Res.B3c 1.8.4	Develop and implement a monitoring system to determine status of rehabilitation efforts and health and safety issues associated with re-entry and re-occupancy
Res.B2b 1.4	Assist in developing a communications plan for hazardous materials in emergencies, related to specific hazards, health guidance, educational materials, etc.
Res.B3c 1.7.2.1	Develop inputs into emergency response plan for the safe removal and disposal of solid waste and debris that Includes mutual aid arrangements, recycling plans, selection of storage sites, vector control, etc.
Res.B3c 1.7.1	Develop inputs for solid waste and debris removal guidelines
Res.B3c 1.7.3	Develop inputs for communications plan for solid waste and debris
Res.B3c 1.7.5	Develop a geo-coded database of all geographic locations that debris waste is burned and solid waste disposed
Res.B3c 1.7.2	Develop inputs into emergency response plan for managing the type and quantities of waste generated by the event and cleanup efforts
Res.B3c 1.7.4	Develop list of transportation routes for wastes to intermediate and permanent repositories

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Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Res.B3c 1.7.4.2	Determine qualifications for transportation of waste
Res.B3c 1.7.4.1	Identify suitable repositories by type and their capacities for radioactive waste disposal
Res.B3c 1.1.1.1	Develop plan for long-term environmental monitoring
Res.B3c 1.2.3	Ensure that environmental health emergency planning is fully integrated and exercised with the jurisdictional emergency plan

Preparedness Measures	Metrics
Comprehensive environmental health emergency response plan is in place that addresses:	
▪ Drinking water	Yes/No
▪ Wastewater	Yes/No
▪ Food safety	Yes/No
▪ Mass care	Yes/No
▪ Vector control	Yes/No
▪ Housing	Yes/No
▪ Hazardous materials	Yes/No
▪ Solid waste and debris removal	Yes/No
▪ Communication to the public and policyholders	Yes/No
▪ Re-occupancy	Yes/No
▪ Informatics	Yes/No
Geo-coded database includes, at a minimum, the following:	
▪ Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) drinking facilities	Yes/No
▪ Non-SDWA systems	Yes/No
▪ Community wastewater facilities	Yes/No
▪ On-site wastewater systems	Yes/No
▪ Food operations	Yes/No
▪ Mass care operations (hospitals, shelters, etc.)	Yes/No
▪ Vector control	Yes/No
▪ Educational and institutional facilities (including associated chemical, biological, and radiological hazards)	Yes/No
▪ Commercial facilities involved in the production and distribution of hazardous materials	Yes/No
▪ Debris waste disposal sites	Yes/No
▪ Solid waste landfill sites	Yes/No
▪ Environmental laboratories	Yes/No
Geo-coded database is distributed to State and local emergency operations	Yes/No
Geo-coded environmental samples database is capable of cataloging results by collection medium (such as water, drinking water, soil, air, animal vectors)	Yes/No
Comprehensive environmental health assessment is completed for pre-selected facilities and structures	Yes/No
Frequency with which geo-coded database is updated	Monthly
Frequency with which geo-coded database and updates are distributed to State and local	Monthly

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Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
emergency operations	
Geo-coded environmental samples database is capable of cataloging results by collection medium (such as water, drinking water, soil, air, animal vectors)	Yes/No
Comprehensive environmental health assessment is completed for pre-selected facilities and structures	Yes/No

Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B3c 2.1.1	Develop and conduct emergency response training relevant to environmental health in drinking water systems to field staff and managers of State/local drinking water programs and drinking water utilities
Res.B3c 2.1.2	Develop and conduct relevant emergency response training relevant to environmental health for field staff and managers of State/local wastewater programs and utilities
Res.B3c 2.1.4	Develop and conduct emergency food safety response training relevant to environmental health to field staff and mangers of State/local food programs having responsibility for food safety response
Pro.B1b 2.1.2	Provide food safety training to responders and volunteers
Res.B3c 2.1.3.1	Develop and conduct emergency vector control response training to field staff and managers of State/local programs having responsibility for vector control
Res.B3c 2.1.5	Develop and conduct emergency response training to field staff and managers of State/local programs having responsibility for safety/food/air/water/wastewater sanitation assessments of mass care operations
Res.B3c 2.1.6	Develop and conduct environmental health training to pre-designated managers, responders and volunteers of mass care operations
Res.B2b 2.1.2	Provide appropriate hazardous materials response training to field staff and mangers of State/local programs having involvement in hazardous materials response

Preparedness Measures	Metric
Frequency with which emergency response training is provided to field staff and managers of State and local environmental health programs	At least annually
Training addresses the range of environmental health issues	Yes/No
Training on food safety is provided to responders and volunteers	Yes/No
Training on environmental health is provided to pre-designated managers, responders, and volunteers of mass-care operations	Yes/No

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Performance Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: ***Direct Environmental Health Tactical Operations*** **Definition: In response to notification of environmental hazards, provide overall mobilization, management of assessment, and coordination and support of Environmental Health activities through demobilization**	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B3c 3.1.1	Develop an incident-specific plan to coordinate the various elements of environmental health among Federal, State, and local response
Res.B3c 3.1.2	Identify lead entity for the incident within each State for coordination of environmental health efforts to include: response work, database management of environmental sample results, interpretation of results, risk communication
Pro.B1b 6.4.1	Determine food facilities that are adversely affected
Res.B3c 3.1.3	Identify lead entity for the incident within each State and Federal agency for which Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessments (FRMAC) is required to provide coordination for the analysis and database management of environmental samples, and for which other agencies are responsible for the interpretation of results and risk communication
Res.B2b 1.1.4	Utilize existing or assist in developing a geo-coded database of facilities involved in the production, storage or distribution of hazardous materials
Res.B3c 5.7.3	Provide geo-coded hazardous materials sampling reports
Res.B3c 3.7	Provide environmental health support and coordination for hazardous materials response
Res.B3c 3.11.1	Issue environmental health alerts as appropriate
Res.B3c 3.13.1	Assist in data review of assessments on affected fish and shellfish populations
Res.B2e 3.5.4	Provide advice through response partners (USDA, State Agriculture Departments, etc.) to farmers on protecting their animals and crops from contamination
Res.B3c 3.13.2	Conduct follow-up monitoring of food
Res.C3a 1.4.2	Identify all groups and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) involved in mass feeding and food preparation
Res.B3c 3.4.1	Determine location of all mass feeding and food preparation sites and distribution points
Res.B3c 3.1.5	Provide input on forecasting and planning aspects as part of the Incident Command System (ICS) for needs in the coming days
Res.B3c 3.5	Provide environmental health support and coordination for debris and solid waste disposal
Res.B3c 5.5.1.2	Assess food safety/sanitation at mass care facilities-shelters, feeding centers, food/ice distribution centers
Res.B3c 5.5	Coordinate environmental health assessments of Mass Care Operations and monitor with changing population levels
Res.B3c 1.2.1.1	Provide environmental public health representation on national advisory teams for environmental health services
Res.B3c 1.2.1.2	Identify appropriate expertise needed for all aspects of environmental health response
Res.B3c 5.7.2	Assist hazardous materials response in investigation of reports of chemical odors, orphaned containers, and spills
Res.B3c 3.14.1	Provide advice to law enforcement authorities regarding safe re-entry for tasks including:

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	personal needs
Res.B3c 5.10.1	Assist assessments to collect and analyze data needed to determine safe re-entry and re-occupancy of community, homes and facilities
Res.B3c 3.14	Provide environmental health support and coordination for safe re-entry and re-occupancy of community, homes, and facilities
Res.B3c 3.1.4.1	Develop crisis and emergency risk communication information for dissemination through the Joint Information Center to media, public, partners and stakeholders
Res.B3c 3.1.4.2	Clearly identify and communicate environmental health risk issues to the affected population
Res.B3c 3.11.2	Assist epidemiologists and health providers in linking environmental exposures to health risks, prevention strategies, and disease outcomes
Res.B3c 5.8.1	Assist law enforcement and others to establish contaminated areas requiring access restriction, where necessary
Res.B3c 5.7	Participate in overall response to hazardous materials by providing environmental health support
Res.B3c 5.8.2	Provide environmental health advisory services regarding practical and effective decontamination of persons and vehicles leaving affected area, if necessary
Res.B3c 5.8.3	Provide environmental health guidance regarding practical and effective decontamination of essential routes (highways and secondary road surfaces) through affected area
Res.B3c 3.3.1	Provide technical assistance to individual owners of onsite systems and operators of small communal onsite systems
Res.B3c 3.2.1	Provide technical assistance during response to private well owners and operators of small, unregulated non-Safe Drinking Water Act drinking water systems

Performance Measures	Metric
Time to provide the general public via media and internet with environmental health education	Within 4 hours of notification of incident
Frequency with which environmental public health education updates are provided to the general public via media and internet	Every 12-24 hours during incident or more frequently if required by nature of incident
Frequency with which environmental health provides input on forecasting and planning aspects as part of the Incident Command System (ICS) for needs in the coming days, weeks, and/or months beyond event	Begin within 24 hours of incident; increasing emphasis by Day 7
For IND scenario, percentage of exposed at-risk population leaving the affected area that is measured for radiological contamination via screening portals	Screening for radiological contamination is offered to 100% of at-risk population at reception centers
Time to initiate food safety assessment program to comply with FDA 1998 guidelines (specific for IND scenario)	Within 48 hours of incident
Plan is initiated for safe re-entry and re-occupancy of the community, homes, educational, institution, and health care facilities	Within 48 hours of incident
Geo-coded status report of community, homes and facilities identified as safe or unsafe to re-enter and re-occupy are provided	Updated every 24 hours
Geo-coded database is updated with all mass care operations	Updated every 12 hours
Solid waste and debris and disposal workers are adequately trained and protected (PPE)	100% of workers
Hazardous materials response is coordinated	Within 24 hours of incident

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Activity: *Activate Environment Health*	
Definition: In response to activation, identifies required experts and mobilizes personnel to begin Environmental Health assessment and response activities.	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B3c 4.1	Identify environmental health specialties required to assess and support response
Res.B3c 4.2	Mobilize environmental health personnel
Res.B3c 4.3	Mobilize environment health resources

Performance Measures	**Metric**
Appropriate Environmental Health specialties have been identified or put on stand-by	Yes/No
Time for Environmental Health personnel to be mobilized	Within 24 hours of incident
Time in which drinking water personnel participate in overall infrastructure assessment	Within 48 hours of incident
Time in which hazardous materials response personnel participate in infrastructure assessment	Within 48 hours of incident

Activity: *Assess Environment*	
Definition: Upon arriving on scene, assess nature and extent of environmental hazards, assist in developing baseline standards, inform EOC of needs, and provide expert advice.	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B3c 5.1	Provide assessment of immediate health and environmental consequences
Res.B3c 5.1.2	Provide health impact assessment of sampling results from various environmental sources to include: water, air, surfaces and soil
Res.B3c 5.3.2	Determine potability of all drinking water facilities affected (larger, regulated SDWA systems and non-SDWA systems, such as private wells)
Res.B3c 5.4.1	Conduct initial assessments of community sewer systems using Emergency Guidelines and Operation Criteria or applicable code
Res.B3c 5.9.1	Conduct initial assessments of food facilities using Emergency Guidelines and Operation Criteria or applicable code
Res.B3c 7.3	Conduct assessment of insect, animal, and rodent vectors to include population densities, infectivity rates, and human risk potential
Res.B3c 5.7.1.1	Conduct environmental health follow-up monitoring and sampling of ambient air, contaminated recreational waters, floodwaters, community sites, and facilities for chemical, biological, and radiological contaminants
Res.B3c 5.7.5	Assist in conducting community hazard assessments to identify hazards, threats, vulnerabilities and risk of facilities involved in the production, storage or distribution of hazardous materials
Pro.B1b 5.1.4	Conduct product tracing to determine source, destination, and disposition of adulterated and contaminated food products
Res.B3c 5.9.3	Conduct environmental investigations of disease outbreaks possibly related to food-borne exposure supported by information systems that comply with the PHIN Functional Area *Outbreak Management*

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Res.B3c 5.5.1	Conduct initial comprehensive environmental assessments (safety/food/water/wastewater sanitation) of mass care operations to ensure compliance with mass care guidelines
Res.B3c 5.6.1	Provide environmental health assessment of solid waste and debris in affected geographic area, including; accumulation amounts, characterization of solid waste and debris (wood, trees, vehicles, etc.)
Res.B3c 5.5.1.4	Conduct comprehensive safety/food/air/water/wastewater/waste/vector control sanitation assessments of pre-selected mass care facilities to identify capability of structures to meet mass care Guidelines
Res.B3c 5.5.1.1	Assess sanitation (including drinking water) at mass care facilities-shelters, feeding centers, sources of ice
Res.B3c 5.5.1.3	Assess wastewater and sanitation (including toilets, on-site systems and hand washing facilities) at mass care facilities
Res.B3c 1.6.2	Conduct building/facility inspections in advance to identify food/sanitation capability and suitability of structures identified as mass care facilities (housing, shelters, feeding and care facilities)
Res.B3c 5.3.6	Ensure that drinking water personnel participate in infrastructure assessment
Res.B3c 5.4.3	Ensure that wastewater personnel participate in infrastructure assessment
Res.B3c 5.9.4	Ensure that food safety personnel participate in infrastructure assessment
Res.B3c 5.7.4	Ensure that hazardous materials response personnel participate in infrastructure assessment
Res.B3c 5.3.3	Conduct initial assessments of Safe Drinking Water Act drinking water facilities using emergency guidelines and operation criteria or applicable code
Res.B3c 5.3.4	Conduct initial assessments of non- Safe Drinking Water Act drinking water facilities (private wells, etc.) using emergency guidelines and operation criteria or applicable code
Res.B3c 5.3.1	Conduct assessments of potable water purification systems
Res.B3c 5.3.5	Conduct assessments of ice making operations, bottled water and bulk water hauling for quality and safety
Res.B3c 5.4.2	Conduct initial assessments of individual or small community onsite systems using Emergency Guidelines and Operation Criteria or applicable code
Res.B3c 5.2	Provide assessment long-term health and environmental consequences

Performance Measures	Metric
Time to complete initial assessment of insect, animal, and rodent vectors	Within 24 hours of confirmed incident
Time to complete comprehensive environmental assessments (water, air, sanitation, food, and safety) at mass care facilities, shelters, feeding centers, and food/ice distribution centers Safe water – 7.7-15 liters/day Cot spacing (overcrowding) – 3.5 m2 Minimum 1 toilet/20 persons, etc.	Within 48 hours of shelter operation
Time to assess SDWA drinking water facilities using emergency guidelines and operation criteria or applicable code such as revised EPA revised protective action guides	Within 72 hours of incident
Time to initiate assessment of non-SDWA drinking water facilities (e.g., private wells) using emergency guidelines and operation criteria or applicable code	Within 1 week of incident

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Wastewater personnel participate in infrastructure assessment	Yes/No
Time to initiate assessment of community sewer systems (both collection and treatment) using emergency guidelines and operation criteria or applicable code	Within 72 hours of incident
Time to initiate assessment of individual or small community wastewater systems using emergency guidelines and operation criteria or applicable code	Within 1 week of incident
Percentage of exposed at-risk population leaving the affected area who are measured for radiological contamination via screening portals	100%
Percentage of at-risk citizens, responders, and companion animals who are monitored for environmental contamination	100%
Hand held contamination survey meters were available for primary or additional monitoring	Yes/No
Time to initial assessments of ambient soil, vegetation, air and potentially contaminated floodwaters, recreational waters, community sites, and other selected facilities	Within 72 hours of incident
Time to initial assessment of solid waste and debris in affected geographic area, including accumulation amounts and characterization (e.g. radioactive, chemical, or biological, as well as soil, sediment, wood, trees, vehicles, etc.), suitable repositories with their capacities, authorized transportation routes, acceptable collection/decontamination methods, and permitted transporters affected	Within 72 hours of incident
Food safety personnel participate in overall infrastructure assessment	Yes/No
Time to complete sanitation assessment of drinking water at mass care facilities, shelters, and feeding centers to ensure the water quality meets EPA standards	Within 48 hours of onset of shelter operation
Time to initiate assessment of food facilities using emergency guidelines and operation criteria or applicable code	Within 72 hours of incident

Activity: *Monitor Environment*

Definition: Maintain continuous monitoring of environment affected by environmental hazards and provide expert advice on response measures.

Critical Tasks

Res.B3c 6.1.1	Provide drinking water technical expertise team for emergency operations, both for Safe Drinking Water Act (larger, regulated systems) and non-Safe Drinking Water Act (private wells) drinking water systems
Res.B3c 6.2.1	Provide wastewater technical expertise team for questions at emergency operations, both for large centralized community systems and smaller onsite systems
Pro.B1b 3.4.2	Provide food safety technical expertise team for questions for emergency operations
Res.B2b 3.2.4	Provide a hazardous materials technical expertise team for emergency operations for both industry and public
Res.B3c 6.2.3	Provide short-term sewage disposal alternatives until infrastructure is restored
Res.B3c 6.1.2	Conduct follow-up monitoring of drinking water quality and system pressure in Safe Drinking Water Act systems
Res.B3c 5.5.2	Conduct follow-up environmental health assessments (safety/food/air/water/wastewater sanitation) of mass care operations

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Res.B3c 6.7.1	Determine, recommend, and assess appropriate decontamination methods
Res.B3c 6.5.1	Provide for the safe collection and disposal of solid waste and debris
Res.B3c 6.5.2	Provide solid waste technical expertise team for questions from both industry and public
Res.B3c 6.6.1	Provide geo-coded status report of community, homes and facilities identified as safe or unsafe to re-enter and re-occupy
Res.B3c 6.2.4	Conduct follow-up monitoring of treatment plant effluent and integrity of collection systems
Res.B3c 3.13.3	Conduct follow-up/re-opening assessments
Res.B3c 5.7.1.1	Conduct environmental health follow-up monitoring and sampling of ambient air, contaminated recreational waters, floodwaters, community sites, and facilities for chemical, biological and radiological contaminants
Res.B3c 6.2.2	Determine all wastewater facilities affected, including both large community sewer systems and small onsite systems

Performance Measures	Metric
Percent of affected communities, homes, educational, institutional and health care facilities monitored in accordance with established evaluation processes and criteria	100%
Frequency with which data is analyzed to determine status of safe re-entry and re-occupancy of community, homes, and facilities	Every 24 hours during the incident
Time for a geo-coded system to be implemented to determine status of rehabilitation efforts and health and safety issues associated with reentry and re-occupancy	Within 72 hours of the incident
Affected populations are provided with adequate temporary sewage disposal alternatives (1 portable toilet per 20 persons or access to pit latrines provided to all personnel according to SPHERE guidelines)	Yes/No
Time to begin solid waste and debris removal	Within 24 hours of incident
Time to begin the safe collection and disposal of solid waste and debris	Within 4 days of incident
Frequency with which geo-coded database is updated with all locations assessed or treated for vectors	Every 12 hours during incident
Frequency with which geo-coded database is updated with all geographic locations that debris waste is burned, buried, processed, or otherwise held for safety reasons	Every 24 hours after the collection and disposal process begins

Activity: *Provide Vector Control*

Definition: After vector is identified, mobilize and equip control personnel with appropriate personal protective equipment and direct control strategies and application of vector control substances.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B3c 7.1	Provide vector control
Res.B3c 7.2	Establish a vector control technical expertise team for surveillance and monitoring of animal infections until population densities and infection rates return to pre-event levels
Res.B3c 1.5.5	Develop a geo-coded database of all geographic locations assessed for vectors including

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	locations that were treated (larvicides, spraying, etc.)
Res.B3c 1.5.3	Develop emergency vector control guidelines that include surveillance and control of insect, arthropod, and rodent vectors
Res.B3c 7.1.1	Assist in the overall coordination of vector control response
Res.B3c 7.4	Coordinate emergency vector control measures to the extent needed to supplement local capacity and reduce risk to pre-event levels

Performance Measures	Metric
Percent of vectors mitigated	85% of vectors mitigated
Time to initiate animal control measures	Within 96 hours of incident
Frequency of updating database with areas treated for vector control	Every operational period during incident

Activity: *Demobilize Environmental Health Operations*

Definition: Upon completion of assigned mission, evaluate response to environmental hazards, returns equipment, and releases personnel.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B3c 8.2	Participate in incident debriefing for environmental health support operations
Res.B3c 8.3	Release environmental health support personnel
Res.B3c 8.4	Reconstitute environmental health resources and facilities

Performance Measures	Metric
Environmental personnel are debriefed	Yes/No
Time in which environmental health personnel resume normal activities	Within 7 days of completion of recovery

Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship
Emergency Operations Center Management	Environmental Health provides information back to EOC for situational awareness about environmental hazards that require response (clean-up, evacuation, etc) and/or that impact responder health and safety. Environmental Health makes recommendations on mitigation to decision makers in the EOC. Environmental Health also requests resources from logistics section within the EOC.
Citizen Evacuation and/or In-Place Protection	Environmental Health provides protective action recommendations to Citizen Protection: Evacuation and/or In-Place Protection.
Mass Care	Environmental Health provides oversight to Mass Care operations to ensure safe food, clean air and water, and necessary waste disposal and other sanitation requirements.
Animal Health Emergency Support	Environmental Health provides an environmental health threat assessment to Animal Health Emergency Support.
Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation	Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation identifies potential vectors to Environmental Health. Environmental Health findings inform epidemiological investigations and targeted surveillance.

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Linked Capability	Relationship
Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense	Environmental Health provides information on potential contaminated soil and water to be monitored. Environmental Health tasks related to eradication of crop diseases/pests, integrity of the food producing industry, and removal and disposal of potentially compromised food are listed in Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense capability.
Emergency Public Information and Warning	Environmental Health provides information and recommends protection and mitigation strategies to be included in public releases to Emergency Public Information and Warning.
Restoration of Lifelines	Environmental Health provides information on environmental hazards to Restoration of Lifelines.
WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination	Environmental Health cooperates with WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination on when and how to perform decontamination, after appropriate samples have been taken and returned for lab analysis.
Responder Health and Safety	Environmental Health comprises many of the "SMEs" referenced in the Responder Health and Safety capability who will do environmental testing to inform what types of PPE are needed and what hazards exist for responders entering an environment.
Economic and Community Recovery	Environmental Health provides information regarding safe return to previously dangerous areas. Environmental Health also conducts long-term monitoring and remediation of contaminated sites.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
Health Physicists	To advise on a wide range of radiation exposure and relevant actual or potential health effect issues
Trained radiological monitoring personnel	To monitor the exposed population for radiation contamination and assist with decontamination
Nuclear Medicine Technicians	To monitor patients for contamination and assist with decontamination
Emergency department Clinicians	Familiar with medical effects of localized radiation in moderately high doses
Community Resilience Task Force	To identify and address issues of concern to the impacted populations
Commercial clinical laboratories (hematology)	For surge capacity in processing blood samples
Field personnel/first responders	Local and State field personnel/first responders for first assessments of radiological and chemical contamination.
Survey Teams	To measure ambient radiation levels for the potentially impacted area and to guide where to collect samples
Mobile analytical laboratories	Federal and State mobile analytical laboratories (radiological and chemical) for analysis of initial field samples.
Analytical laboratories	Federal, State, and commercial analytical laboratories (radiological and chemical) for high throughput analysis of priority samples and to clear backlog.
Public Health Planning and Forecasting Team	To plan for long-term public health needs
Environmental Epidemiologists	To provide public health assessments of a hazardous area
Sampling Advisory Workgroup	Environmental Health Scientists and Health Physicist to determine appropriate strategy for chemical sampling and radiological sampling, respectively
Sampling Teams	To collect environmental samples of food, water, soil, air, vegetation, and other media
Environmental Health Scientists/Health Physicist	To assess sampling results and establish consensus health guidance values for human and animal exposures
Environmental Health Scientists (specifically sanitarians and engineers)	To assess extent of damage to water and sewer infrastructure outside impact zone
Scientists to staff the Federal Advisory Team for Environment, Food, and Health	Health physicists, environmental health, medical doctors, veterinarians, food and agriculture, etc, to staff the Federal Advisory Team for Environment, Food, and Health to develop the Federal protective action recommendations and provide coordinated technical advice and recommendations to the coordinating agency (per NRP Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex)
Environmental Health Technicians/Health Physicists	For screening/monitoring of victims and responders
Registered Sanitarians	For all aspects of environmental health services
Vector Control Specialists	For vector population monitoring and assessment, and for planning and executing vector control measures

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Capability Elements	Components and Description
Public works personnel	To develop and execute plans for water, waste management
Medical Entomologists	With experience in trapping, identification and control measures and knowledge of notifications that need to be done before control can commence (i.e., beekeepers, no spray registries etc.)
Air sampling equipment	Including continuous air monitors (CAMs)
Radiation portal monitors	For monitoring at-risk population for radiological contamination
Portable radiation survey instruments	To address radiation and contamination issues for people, pets, vehicles or other belongings.
Other equipment	Light traps, CO2, aspirators, microscopes, dippers, pans, kill jars, containers to ship specimens keeping a cold chain.
Drinking water sampling and testing equipment	Portable incubator, coliform/E. coli results in 24 Hours; pocket UV lamp, whirlpaks with dechlorinating agent, chlorine calorimeter, total pH, conductivity, total dissolved solids (TDS), and temperature meter free and total chlorine colorimeter.

Planning Assumptions

- This capability applies to a wide range of incidents and emergencies including accidental or deliberate disease outbreaks, natural disasters, nuclear and conventional events. Specific assumptions on consequences are based on the Improvised Nuclear Device Scenario.
- Of the ambulatory victims, 60 percent will self-evacuate and present to hospitals; 40 percent will be evacuated via “formal” EMS resources.
- 450,000 will need screening for external contamination within 72 hours or upon evacuation or rescue. 100,000 will present for external contamination monitoring after self evacuation within 10 days.
- 5,000 blinded, 5,000 deafened, 50,000 burn victims, 50,000 physical trauma. Virtually all will experience psycho-social trauma from the event.
- Evacuation of total population in the blast zone and in the area under the plume. Remediation of surface soil and structures will be required.
- Fishing advisories will need to be issued because stream sediment, shell fish, and bottom feeding fish will be significantly contaminated.
- No safe tap water within the blast zone and other areas served by water distribution system; sewage system also compromised until water system restored. Shelter in place population has increased risk of infectious disease (diarrhea, respiratory).
- Need for large scale disposal, decontamination, and mortuary services.
- Long-term environmental and ecosystem contamination and related concerns regarding locally raised produce and livestock; need for food and water advisories. Downstream drinking water sources maybe compromised.
- Normal deliveries of food, etc. to shelter in place zone will be interrupted; anticipate an increase in childhood thyroid cancer due to consumption of food (especially goat and cow milk) from contaminated geographic area.
- Need to control movement of food items out of contaminated geographic area.
- 300,000 environmental samples will be submitted for analysis within 30 days.
- 3 million total environmental samples will be submitted for analysis in response to the event.
- Shortage of immediately available monitoring equipment.

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- Limited immediate risk. If urban area is evacuated, the abandoned region may become overrun with commensal rats for a time. Risk of plague if this occurs in a plague endemic area (western US).

Planning Factors from an In-Depth Analysis of a Scenario with Significant Demand for the Capability

None specified

Approaches for Large-Scale Events

None specified

National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
The National Targets table will be completed in the next version of the Target Capabilities List	Health Physicists	Personnel			
	Trained radiological monitoring personnel	Personnel			
	Nuclear Medicine Technicians	Personnel			
	Emergency Department Clinicians	Personnel			
	Community Resilience Task Force	Personnel			
	Commercial clinical laboratories (hematology)	Personnel			
	Field personnel/first responders	Personnel			
	Survey Teams	Personnel			
	Mobile analytical laboratories	Personnel			
	Analytical laboratories	Personnel			
	Public Health Planning and Forecasting Team	Personnel			
	Environmental Epidemiologists	Personnel			
	Sampling Advisory Workgroup	Personnel			

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
The National Targets table will be completed in the next version of the Target Capabilities List	Sampling Teams	Personnel			
	Environmental Health Scientists/Health Physicists	Personnel			
	Environmental Health Scientists (specifically Sanitarians and Engineers)	Personnel			
	Scientists to staff the Federal Advisory Team for Environment, Food, and Health	Personnel			
	Environmental Health Technicians/Health Physicists	Personnel			
	Registered Sanitarians	Personnel			
	Vector Control Specialists	Personnel			
	Public works personnel	Personnel			
	Medical Entomologists	Personnel			
	Air sampling equipment	Equipment			
	Radiation portal monitors	Equipment			
	Portable radiation survey instruments	Equipment			
	Other equipment	Equipment			
	Drinking water sampling and testing equipment	Equipment			

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3. National Incident Management System (NIMS). Department of Homeland Security. March 2004. http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/NIMS-90-web.pdf
4. National Mutual Aid and Resource Management Initiative, Resource Typing Definitions - I, Federal Emergency Management Agency. January 2004.
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6. Medical Personnel Exposed to Patients Contaminated with Hazardous Waste. Occupational Safety and Health Administration standard interpretation. March 1992.
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8. CDC Interim Plague Response Plans and Guidelines. Version 7. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Epidemic/Epizootic West Nile Virus in the US: Guidelines for Surveillance Prevention and Control. August 1998.2003. http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/westnile/resources/wnv-guidelines-aug-2003.pdf/11/2002.
9. Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents. EPA 400R9200, US Environmental Protection Agency. 1991. (Revised guidance due to be issued late 2005/early 2006 will include Protective Action Guides for water)
10. CDC Interim Tularemia Response Plans and Guidelines. Version 6/24/2002.

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EXPLOSIVE DEVICE RESPONSE OPERATIONS

Capability Definition

Explosive Device Response Operations is the capability to coordinate, direct, and conduct improvised explosive device (IED) response after initial alert and notification. Coordinate intelligence fusion and analysis, information collection, and threat recognition, assess the situation and conduct appropriate Render Safe Procedures (RSP). Conduct searches for additional devices and coordinate overall efforts to mitigate chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) threat to the incident site.

Outcome

Threat assessments are conducted, the explosive and/or hazardous devices are rendered safe, and the area is cleared of hazards. Measures are implemented in the following priority order: public safety; safeguard the officers on the scene (including the bomb technician), protect and preserve public and private property, collect and preserve evidence, and accommodate the public/restore services.

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

This capability supports the following Emergency Support Functions (ESFs):

Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex
ESF #10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Response
ESF #13: Public Safety and Security

Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B2c 1	Develop procedures and standardized training to deal with terrorist events, including WMD, suicide bombers, vehicle and radio controlled improvised devices.
Res.B2c 1.1	Ensure all squads remain accredited and technicians certified
Res.B2c 1.2	Assist squads in achieving a Type I rating

Preparedness Measures	**Metrics**
Bomb squad is accredited by the FBI to standards set by the National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board	Yes/No
Procedures exist for dealing with suicide bombers	Yes/No
Procedures exist for dealing with vehicle borne improvised explosive devices	Yes/No
Procedures exist for dealing with radio controlled improvised explosive devices	Yes/No
Procedures exist for dealing with improvised devices that contain chemical, biological, and radiological features (Weapons of Mass Destruction)	Yes/No

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Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Current mutual aid agreement in place that permits sharing of personnel and/or equipment	As needed
Squads obtain the equipment and training to receive a Type I rating	Yes/No

Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B2c 2.1	Develop and implement explosive device response training program
Res.B2c 2.2	Develop and implement explosive device response exercise program
Res.B2c 2.3	Train uniformed public safety personnel in explosive device awareness
Res.B2c 2.4	Provide information and training to citizens in bomb threat awareness
Res.B2c 2.3.1	Train to minimum recommendations set in the National Guidelines for Bomb Technicians
Res.B2c 2.3.2	Train and certify bomb technicians with a standardized curriculum set by the FBI Hazardous Devices School (HDS) and the National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board

Preparedness Measures	Metrics
Percent of uniformed public safety personnel trained in explosive device awareness	100 %
Squad meets the minimum training set in the National Guidelines for Bomb Technicians	Yes/No
Citizens are provided with bomb threat awareness training	As needed
Bomb squad training is standardized and the curriculum approved by the FBI Hazardous Devices School (HDS)	Yes/No

Performance Measures and Metrics and Critical Tasks

Activity: *Direct Explosive Device Response Operations* Definition: In response to notification of a potential exploding device, provide management and coordination of Explosive Device Response Operations capability, through demobilization.	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B2c 3.1	Establish on-site command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) operations for explosive device response operations
Res.B2c 3.2	Coordinate with Incident Command (IC) to establish perimeter control (hot, warm, cold zones) commensurate with hazard magnitude
Res.B2c 3.3	Coordinate with appropriate unit and develop a plan of action
Res.B2c 3.4.1	Provide overall supervision of a consolidated unexploded ordnance demolition area if the device can be moved

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Performance Measures	Metrics
On-site command and control communications (C3) is established and real time tactical information shared *Note: If C3 and info-share are established, bomb squad will demonstrate ability to "join" rather than establish the network*	15 minutes from arrival on-site

Activity: *Activate Public Safety Bomb Squad*

Definition: In response to activation, mobilize and arrive at the incident scene to begin operations.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B2c 4.2	Activate Explosive Device Render Safe Team/Bomb Squad
Res.B2c 4.3	Assemble properly equipped Explosive Device Render Safe Team/Bomb Squad Team(s) (EDRST/BST) at assembly area
Res.B2c 4.4	Dispatch Explosive Device Render Safe Team/Bomb Squad to incident site
Res.B2c 4.5	Transport team (personnel and equipment) to scene

Performance Measures	Metric
Bomb squad is assembled and dispatched toward the scene	Within 1 hour from initial notification
Determine resources and personnel needed to complete the mission *Note: Identification may begin during notification and recall. Safety issues take precedence over time considerations*	Within 1 hour from arrival at scene

Activity: *Search and Assess Site*

Definition: Once on scene and equipped, provide rapid assessment of assigned Bomb Squad work areas, recommend search priorities/tactics to management, and begin search operations utilizing canine, physical and technical (e.g. electronic, robotic) search techniques

Critical Tasks	
Res.B2c 5.1	Conduct an initial reconnaissance of the area
Res.B2c 5.2	Implement emergency assessment procedures
Res.B2c 5.3	Conduct improvised explosive device threat analysis
Res.B2c 5.4	Provide positive ordnance identification and safety guidance

Performance Measures	Metric
Initial cordon is verified	Within 1 hour upon arrival at incident scene

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Operational Threat Assessment is complete	Within 1 hour upon arrival at incident scene

Activity: *Render Safe Onsite*

Definition: Once on scene, establish site perimeters based on Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and threat, conduct IED on-site response and isolate device(s) from potential remote detonation commands, clear the onsite area for render safe operations, and ensure compliance with Radiological Assistance Program, Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan, National Response Plan for radiological IEDs

Critical Tasks:	
Res.B2c 6.3	Conduct improvised explosives device (IED) on-site response
Res.B2c 6.1	Isolate device(s) from remote detonation commands
Res.B2c 7.4	Document and preserve evidence
Res.B2c 6.3.1	Ensure compliance with Radiological Assistance Program plan (RAP), Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) and National Response Plan for radiological IEDs
Res.B2c 6	Render explosive devices safe on-site

Performance Measures	**Metric**
Public Safety Bomb Squad verifies and assesses site perimeters based on standard operating procedures (SOP) and threat *Note: If perimeters were previously established Bomb Squad will verify*	Within 1 hour from arrival on-site
Diagnostics and render safe procedures are conducted *Note: Safety issues take precedence over time considerations*	Within 1 hour from arrival on-site

Activity: *Conduct Recovery, Removal, and Transport Operations*

Definition: Collect and transport device and/or components for further processing of hazardous elements.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B2c 7.1	Conduct on-site treatment of device to deactivate, disrupt, disable, and containerize for transport
Res.B2c 7.2	Transport and escort device(s) to a secure site
Res.B2c 7.3	Conduct off-site treatment of device
Res.B2c 7.4	Document and preserve evidence
Res.B2c 6.3.1	Ensure compliance with Radiological Assistance Program plan (RAP), Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) and National Response Plan for radiological IEDs

Performance Measures	**Metric**
Device and/or components are prepared for transport to a safe and secure site for processing and/or disposal	To be determined by bomb technicians on the scene, in accordance with public safety considerations

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Activity: ***Demobilize Explosive Device Removal Operations***	
Definition: Upon completion of assigned mission, conduct 100% accountability of personnel and equipment, reconstitute as required and disengage from incident site, and either be placed on standby or redeploy to headquarters and stand-down	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B2c 8.1	Maintain accountability of personnel and equipment
Res.B2c 8.2	Coordinate with Incident Command (IC) and Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to redeploy Explosive Devise Render Safe Team/Bomb Squad Team to headquarters or other incident site
Res.B2c 8.3	Conduct debriefing for Explosive Devise Render Safe Team/Bomb Squad Team personnel

Performance Measures	**Metric**
Public Safety Bomb Squad personnel are debriefed after incident	100%

Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship
Onsite Incident Management	Public Safety Bomb Squad capability management integrates itself into the local Incident Command/Unified Command system. Public Safety Bomb Squad provides Incident Command/Unified Command with situation status reports and threat/consequence information from which Incident Command determines, coordinates, and controls response actions. Onsite Incident Management also provides additional resources as requested by the Public Safety Bomb Squad Teams.
Public Safety and Security Response	Public Safety Bomb Squad determines and provides Public Safety and Security Response with threat information and safe distance recommendations for establishing a safety perimeter to include hot, warm, and cold zones and any safety corridors that need to be established for movement of explosive devices.
Law Enforcement Investigations and Operations	Public Safety Bomb Squad follows procedures for preservation of evidence and chain of custody of evidence. Public Safety Bomb Squad turns site over to Law Enforcement Investigations and Operations after neutralizing the threat.
WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination	Public Safety Bomb Squad turns over remains of device to WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination for further treatment as necessary.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
Bomb Squads Type I	Per NIMS, a Type I level accredited bomb squad is capable of handling multiple/simultaneous incidents. Squads must have render safe capabilities including a remote (robotic) vehicle capable of handling a vehicle borne IED. Squads trained and equipped to work in a CBRN environment.
Bomb Squads Type II	Per NIMS, a Type II level accredited bomb squad is capable of handling multiple incidents. Squads must have render safe capabilities including a remote (robotic) vehicle which may not be capable of handling a vehicle borne IED. Squads trained and equipped to work in a CBRN environment.
Bomb Squads Type III	Per NIMS, a Type III level accredited bomb squad is capable of handling a single incident. Squads must have basic render safe capabilities without a remote (robotic) vehicle. Squads may be trained, but not equipped to work in a CBRN environment.

Planning Assumptions

- Although applicable to several of the 15 National Planning Scenarios, the capability factors were developed from an in-depth analysis of the Improvised Explosives Device scenario. Other scenarios were reviewed to identify required adjustments or additions to the planning factors and national targets.
- It is noted that the specific placement of existing bomb squads has been driven by bombing activity levels in the past, and the issue of adding new bomb squads or the rapid expansion of existing bomb squads is currently managed through a "Needs Survey" process by the FBI, based on standards set by the National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board (NBSCAB) for the purpose of maintaining the optimum levels of qualified and experienced bomb squad personnel. The Needs Survey is further defined in the National Guidelines for Bomb Technicians
- All situations must be assessed by the bomb technician on the scene as to time sensitive considerations. Safety issues take precedence over time considerations. In catastrophic level Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) situation where full remote capabilities are available, it is desired to have the technological potential for diagnostics and execution of the disruption tools within one hour from time of arrival on the scene.
- Effective response times are directly related to threat identification and communicative chain to dispatch.
- Response timelines are dependent on location of event relative to placement of capability.
- A system is in place to ensure the timely receipt of intelligence or device information to assist those responding to the threat
- Bomb Squad – A bomb response organization, consists of at least one bomb response team (see the definition of a "bomb response team"), accredited by the FBI Hazardous Devices School to standards set by the National Bomb Squad Commanders Advisory Board.
- Bomb Response Team - A sub-unit within a bomb squad, consisting of at least two certified bomb technicians and a full set of equipment meeting minimum standards for bomb squad operations.
- Military EOD units are not currently resource typed within NIMS but are available to respond to incidents in the community either to assist the "accredited" bomb squad, or respond to the incident in an area without State/local bomb squad presence.

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Planning Factors from an In-Depth Analysis of a Scenario with Significant Demand for the Capability (Improvised Explosives Device)

Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity
General Guidance	Coverage of high density population and critical infrastructure/key resources (CI/KR) locations by Type I level bomb squad teams is being added as a factor in the "Needs Survey" process, detailed in the National Guidelines for Bomb Technicians Other Locations – Type I, II, or III based on population, population density, critical infrastructure requirements, and additional factors as defined in the "Needs Survey" process
Large Vehicle Bombs	Type I teams minimum
Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Device (RCIED)	Type II team minimum, plus Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) training and equipment meeting standards set by NBSCAB
Suicide Bomber(s)	Type III team minimum

National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	# of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
State/Local	Accredited Bomb Squads (Type I, II, and III)	NIMS Typed Resource Organization	458	Nationally	All activities
Federal Bureau of Investigation	FBI Special Agent Bomb Technician	Personnel	140	Nationally, across 56 Field Offices	All activities
Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco & Firearms	ATF Explosive Enforcement Officers	Personnel	30	Nationally	All activities
Department of Homeland Security	DHS Bombing Prevention Unit	Federal Resource Organization	1	Nationally	All activities
Department of Homeland Security	DHS/TSA Explosives Unit	Federal Resource Organization			All activities
National Guard	National Guard EOD	Federal Resource Organization			All activities
Department of Defense	DoD/Military EOD	Federal Resource Organization			All activities
Department of Homeland Security	DHS/ICE Explosives Division	Explosives Detection Dog Teams			

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FIREFIGHTING OPERATIONS/SUPPORT

Capability Definition

This capability provides coordination and implementation of fire suppression operations, which include the following tasks: assessing the scene, assigning resources, establishing an incident command system (ICS) consistent with the National Incident Management System (NIMS), communicating the status of the situation, requesting additional resources, establishing a safe perimeter, evacuating persons in danger, rescuing trapped victims, conducting fire suppression, determining the cause of the fire(s), and ensuring the area is left in a safe condition. This capability further includes support necessary to prepare the community and reduce vulnerabilities in the event of a major event.

Outcome

Dispatch and safe arrival of the initial fire suppression resources occurs within jurisdictional response time objectives. The initial arriving unit initiates the incident command system (ICS), assesses the incident scene, communicates the situation, and requests appropriate resources. Firefighting activities are conducted safely and fires are contained, controlled, extinguished, investigated, and managed in accordance with emergency response plans and procedures.

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

The capability supports Emergency Support Function (ESF) #4: Firefighting.

Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B2a 1.1	Develop plans, programs, and agreements on fire-related public safety protection activities, including region-wide or interstate automatic and mutual aid response protocols
Res.B2a 1.2.5	Develop firefighting capability needed based on risk and threat assessment
Res.B2a 1.2.2	Develop procedures and protocols for coordinating protective action communications with at-risk population on-scene
Res.B2a 1.2.6	Conduct fire code inspections and coordinate with appropriate personnel for building inspections and compliance strategies
Res.B2a 1.1.1	Conduct fire education and life safety training and education programs
Res.B2a 1	Develop plans, procedures, and equipment guidelines to support firefighting response operations
Res.B2a 1.1.3	Conduct building plan reviews to reduce or eliminate hazards
Res.B2a 1.2.3	Develop plans for establishing alternative water supply

Preparedness Measures	**Metrics**
Plans include special risk requirements (e.g., alternative water supply)	Yes/No

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Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Regional and interstate mutual and automatic aid agreements have been established	Yes/No
Department has specialized equipment needed for high-rise firefighting (e.g., 1-hr. bottles, high-rise packs, litters for evacuating injured, high-rise communication systems)	Yes/No
Department has specialized equipment for subway firefighting and search and rescue	Yes/No
Department has preplans and maps for subway system and standard operating procedure (SOP) for dispatching companies to subway egress points to assist in search and rescue and evacuation (departments with subway systems)	Yes/No
Department has access to aerial units for deployment to roofs or high-rises (departments with high-rises)	Yes/No
Department has sufficient stocked and garaged spare apparatus to surge total number of companies by 25 percent over normal first-line staffing (large cities)	Yes/No
Department has procedures and protocols for coordinating protective action communications with at-risk population on-scene	Yes/No
Department has procedures in place to ensure safety of operating personnel	Yes/No

Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B2a 2	Develop and implement firefighting training and exercise program
Res.B2a 2.1.3	Develop and implement training to enable fire rescue and emergency medical services to recognize the presence of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive (CBRNE) materials

Preparedness Measures	Metric
Annual training is provided in strategies for large-scale incidents	Yes/No
Annual training is provided in flammable liquid/bulk fuel storage firefighting (departments with ports, refineries, storage and shipment facilities for flammable liquids and gases)	Yes/No
Annual training is provided in high-rise fires (departments with high-rises)	Yes/No
Annual training is provided in mass transit fires (departments with subways and/or commuter rail or light rail)	Yes/No
Annual training is provided in shipboard firefighting (departments with deep-water ports)	Yes/No
Annual training is provided in wilderness/urban interface firefighting	Yes/No

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Performance Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: ***Direct Firefighting Operations and Support Tactical Operations*** **Definition: In response to indication of fire, provide coordination and management of Firefighting Operations and Support through demobilization.**	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B2a 3.2.1	Coordinate with On-Site Incident Management
Res.B2a 3.3.1	Assign a Safety Officer to oversee firefighting operations
Res.B2a 3.2.5	Establish Rapid Intervention Crew
Res.B2a 3.2.2	Establish objectives for conducting firefighting operations at incident scene
Res.B2a 3.4.2	Assess resource requirements
Res.B2a 3.2.3	Coordinate fire suppression operations
Res.B2a 3.5.1	Notify other agencies as required by law
Res.B2a 3.5.2	Communicate internal incident response information
Res.B2a 3.2.4	Develop a water supply plan
Res.B2a 3.3.4	Maintain personnel accountability system
Res.B2a 3.3.2	Provide for responder safety, in coordination with Safety Officer, including responder rehabilitation

Performance Measures	**Metric**
Time to establish incident command for firefighting operations	Within 5 minutes of arrival on scene
Time to establish Rapid Intervention Crew	Prior to start of interior structural firefighting operations
Time to request local mutual aid	Up to 1 hour
Time to notify other agencies of incident as required by law	Within 30 minutes of arrival on scene
Time to establish responder rehabilitation	Within 30 minutes of arrival on scene

Activity: ***Activate Firefighting Operations and Support*** **Definition: Receive alarm signal and respond to incident site.**	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B2a 4.2.1	Establish and implement on-scene management for firefighting (utilizing ICS)
Res.B2a 4.1	Receive notification of incident
Res.B2a 4.3	Respond to scene with initial fire suppression resource assignment
Res.B2a 4.4	Arrive on scene

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Performance Measures	Metric
Time for first fire suppression resource to arrive on scene	Within 4 minutes, 90% of the time (and/or initial resource arrives on scene within 8 minutes)
Initial resource assignment was assembled in accordance with NFPA 1710 and NFPA 1720 (National Fire Protection Association Standards)	Yes/No
Personnel accountability system was implemented	On arrival
Time to initiate tactical operations	Within 2 minutes of arrival

Activity: *Size Up (Assess Site)*

Definition: Observe scene and provide situation report.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B2a 5.1.1	Observe incident site upon arrival and conduct initial size-up (site assessment)
Res.B2a 5.1.4	Provide verbal situation report
Res.B2a 5.2.1	Communicate need for additional resources

Performance Measures	Metric
Situation report is provided to additional responding personnel/units	Within 2 minutes of arrival on scene

Activity: *Contain and Control*

Definition: Upon arrival on scene, engage in fire suppression operations to contain, control, and extinguish fire, initiate search for trapped or endangered victims, remove victims to safe area, and request or provide appropriate medical treatment.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B2a 6.1	Implement fire attack plan
Res.B2a 6.2	Conduct firefighting operations
Res.B2a 6.2.2	Establish large master stream to contain spread of fire
Res.B2a 6.2.5	Establish collapse zones and protect critical infrastructure
Res.B2a 6.5.3	Incorporate additional resources to contain, control, and extinguish fire
Res.B2a 6.3	Establish plan and alternate water supply
Res.B2a 6.3.1	Implement plan and alternate water supply if needed
Res.B2a 6.5.1	Initiate search for endangered, trapped, or injured victims
Res.B2a 6.5.2	Remove endangered, trapped, or injured victims to safe area

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Res.B2a 6.5.4	Assist in removal of affected individuals from the incident site
Res.B2a 6.5.5	Initiate or request treatment for victims
Res.B2a 6.6	Provide ongoing situation reports

Performance Measures	Metric
Tactics employed were commensurate with incident	Yes/No
Primary and secondary search is completed	Within reasonable time based on size of structure, available resources, and incident conditions
Fire is contained and extinguished	Within reasonable time based on type and size of structure, available resources, and incident conditions
Sufficient size and quantity of hand lines are deployed	Appropriate for type and size of structure, and volume of fire present
Sufficient volume of alternate water supply in the event of loss of domestic water supply was established	Within 30 minutes

Activity: *Conduct Overhaul Operations*

Definition: Locate and extinguish hot spots and hidden fire in void spaces.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B2a 7.2	Locate hot spots and hidden fire in void spaces
Res.B2a 7.1	Conduct fire overhaul operations

Performance Measures	Metric
Hot spots are located and extinguished	100%
Heavily involved areas are opened up, from which materials are removed from the structure, and are thoroughly soaked	100%

Activity: *Preserve the Scene*

Definition: Participate in on-site investigation to determine origin of fire and possible cause.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B2a 8.1	Notify other agencies of incident as required by law
Res.B2a 7.3	Preserve incident scene for fire investigators and/or law enforcement
Res.B2a 8.2	Participate in collecting and preserving non-contaminated evidence
Res.B2a 8.3	Participate in collecting and preserving contaminated evidence
Res.B2a 8.4	Participate in fire investigation

Performance Measures	Metric

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Time to notify other agencies of incident in compliance with applicable laws	Within 30 minutes of size-up
Time for qualified Fire Investigator to arrive on-site	Within 1 hour of notification
Cause of fire is determined	Yes/No

Activity: ***Demobilize Firefighting Operations and Support***

Definition: Upon completion of activities prepare apparatus and personnel to leave incident site and return to service.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B2a 9.1	Inventory equipment and apparatus
Res.B2a 9.2	Clean and repair equipment and apparatus prior to return to service
Res.B2a 9.3	Participate in incident debriefing

Performance Measures	**Metric**
Capability is demobilized as specified in demobilization plan	Yes/No
Equipment and apparatus are inventoried	Less than 30 minutes from start of demobilization
Equipment and apparatus are cleaned and prepared to return to service	Less than 1 hour from start of demobilization

Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship
On-Site Incident Management	Firefighting Operations and Support capability receives and provides situation reports from/to On-Site Incident Management to communicate immediate protective actions with at-risk population.
Public Safety and Security Response	Firefighting Operations and Support capability requests Public Safety and Security Response establish perimeter and crowd control.
WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination	Firefighting Operations and Support capability provides victims to WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination for decontamination.
Triage and Pre-hospital Treatment	Firefighting Operations and Support capability transfers patients to Triage and Pre-hospital Treatment for medical care and transport.
Fatality Management	Firefighting Operations and Support capability provides notification of fatalities to Fatality Management for tracking and processing.
Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations	Firefighting Operations and Support capability requests Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations investigate evidence.
Mass Care	Firefighting Operations and Support capability requests Mass Care provide assistance and services to displaced victims.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
Type 1 Engine Strike Team	Per NIMS. Includes fire engines, staff, and Strike Team Leader.
Type 1 Fire Truck-Aerial Strike Team	To assist with delivering foam solution for bulk tank fires or provide elevated streams to assist in controlling moored shipboard fire and assist boarding efforts
Type 1 Foam Tender	To supply foam concentrate for 65-minute application (8,000 gallons assuming 2 120-foot diameter tanks) NFPA 11
Type 1 Fire Boat Strike Team	Supplies ship fire-fighting capability and augments water supply to land-based units
U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) National Strike Team (NST)	Per NIMS. There are three 40-member NST Teams in the Nation: the Atlantic Strike Team in Fort Dix, NJ; the Gulf Strike Team in Mobile, AL; and the Pacific Strike Team in Novato, CA
Type 1 Mobile Communications Unit	Per NIMS
Type 1 breathing apparatus support	Self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) filling capability with compressor
Field mobile mechanic	Provides repair capacity

Planning Assumptions

- Although applicable to several of the 15 National Planning Scenarios, the capability planning factors were developed from an in-depth analysis of the Toxic Chemical Event scenario. Other scenarios were reviewed to identify required adjustments or additions to the planning factors and national targets.
- The capability must perform in conjunction with hazardous materials (HazMat) operations, public safety jurisdictions, emergency medical services (EMS), on-scene incident management, search and rescue, and emergency management functions across all 15 scenarios.
- The majority of response assets will be used during the response.
- Fixed fire suppression systems are destroyed by explosions.
- Several operational response areas are in effect at the same time: port, refinery, and downwind.
- Water-based oil release may extend beyond the 96-hour time allotment.
- Victims must be rescued within 4 hours and recovered within 4 days.
- All fires are extinguished within 4 days.
- The response phase is 96 hours.
- Local response time is 0–2 hours.
- Regional response time is 2–12 hours.
- State response time is 12–24 hours.
- Federal response time is 24+ hours.
- “Zero hour” (incident clock) is the time of incident occurrence.
- Domestic water supply is not affected; the water supply is adequate to deliver 50,000 gallons per minute (GPM) in affected areas.

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- Fire suppression operations are conducted separately from EMS, HazMat, search and rescue, and so forth.
- Distribution of resources for fire operations and support should be compliant, at a minimum, with the requirements of NFPA 1710, 1720, and 1201.

Planning Factors from an In-Depth Analysis of a Scenario with Significant Demand for the Capability (Toxic Industrial Chemical)

Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Firefighting operations support for a major event would be addressed with an appropriate combination of existing resources from multiple jurisdictions and levels of government sufficient to meet risk and threat assessment based needs.			

Approaches for Large-Scale Events

Strategies listed will accomplish objectives for large-scale events.

National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
Firefighting operations support for a major event would be addressed with an appropriate combination of existing resources from multiple jurisdictions and levels of government sufficient to meet risk and threat assessment based needs.					

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WMD/HAZARDOUS MATERIALS RESPONSE AND DECONTAMINATION

Capability Definition

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination is the capability to assess and manage the consequences of a hazardous materials release, either accidental or as part of a terrorist attack. It includes testing and identifying all likely hazardous substances onsite; ensuring that responders have protective clothing and equipment; conducting rescue operations to remove affected victims from the hazardous environment; conducting geographical survey searches of suspected sources or contamination spreads and establishing isolation perimeters; mitigating the effects of hazardous materials, decontaminating on-site victims, responders, and equipment; coordinating off-site decontamination with relevant agencies, and notifying environmental, health, and law enforcement agencies having jurisdiction for the incident to begin implementation of their standard evidence collection and investigation procedures.

Outcome

Hazardous materials release is rapidly identified and mitigated; victims exposed to the hazard are rescued, decontaminated, and treated; the impact of the release is limited; and responders and at-risk populations are effectively protected.

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

This capability supports Emergency Support Function (ESF) #10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Response.

Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B2b 1.1	Develop plans, programs, agreements and requirements for responding to hazardous material incidents
Res.B2b 1.2	Develop plans, programs, criteria, and protocols for conducting decontamination
Res.B2b 1.3.1	Pre-identify resources (personnel and equipment) to provide rapid initial size up of hazardous materials incident
Res.B2b 1.5	Ensure plans are in place for self-presenting contaminated victims off-site (e.g., hospitals)

Preparedness Measures	**Metrics**
Risk analysis completed for potential hazmat vulnerabilities, including fixed facilities and transportation-related emergencies	Yes/No
Frequency with which Emergency Response Plan is updated	Annually
Local Emergency Planning Commission functional	Yes/No

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Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Frequency with which pre-planned hazards and targets are updated	Annually
Plans are in place for pre-identified and equipped hazmat personnel to respond to hazmat incident and provide initial rapid hazmat incident size up within 30 minutes of notification (<2hrs if regional resource)	Yes/No
Hazmat personnel equipped and trained for weather prediction and hazard pluming	Yes/No
Redundant hazmat response teams and equipment are available (or accessible through mutual aid agreements) to provide resiliency in the event of a large-scale incident	Yes/No
Jurisdiction's hazmat team(s) has current protocol to coordinate with emergency medical services (EMS) on victim care post-decontamination (identification of substance, administration of antidotes, etc.)	Yes/No
Jurisdiction's hazmat team(s) has current protocol to coordinate with law enforcement for evidence collection and crime scene control	Yes/No
Emergency response and command vehicles and Incident Command Posts equipped with Emergency Response Guidebook, NIOSH pocket guidebook, and discipline-related references relevant to the region	Yes/No

Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B2b 2.1.1	Develop and implement training related to detection and reporting of hazardous material
Res.B2b 2.1.2	Provide appropriate hazardous materials response training to field staff and mangers of State/local programs having involvement in hazardous materials response
Preparedness Measures	**Metric**
Police, fire, emergency medical services (EMS) first responders (other than those assigned to hazmat responses) that are trained to hazmat awareness level	100%
First responders assigned to hazmat operations that are trained to hazardous materials operations level (in accordance with 1910.120 (g) or NFPA 472)	100%
Personnel assigned to hazmat technician responsibilities who are trained to the hazmat technician level (in accordance with 1910.120 (g) or NFPA 472)	100%
Personnel assigned to hazmat specialist responsibilities who are trained to the hazmat specialist level (in accordance with 1910.120 (g) or NFPA 472)	100%
Personnel assigned to manage hazardous materials who are trained to hazardous materials management level (in accordance with 1910.120 (g), NFPA 471 and NFPA 472) for detection equipment, including flammability, toxicity, radiations, chemical warfare agents (CWAs) and biologicals	100%
Personnel assigned to manage hazardous materials who are trained to hazardous materials management level (in accordance with 1910.120 (g), NFPA 471 and NFPA 472) for substance identification equipment, for bases and vapors, liquids, solids and biologicals (white powder)	100%
Hazmat personnel equipped and trained for weather prediction and hazard pluming	Yes/No

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Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Jurisdiction's hazardous materials team(s) trains regularly with emergency medical services (EMS) to ensure proper coordination of victim care post-decontamination (identification of substance, administration of antidotes, etc.)	Yes/No
Jurisdiction's hazardous materials team(s) trains regularly with law enforcement to ensure proper coordination for evidence collection and crime scene control	Yes/No

Performance Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: ***Direct WMD/Hazardous Material Response and Decontamination Tactical Operations*** **Definition: In response to notification of WMD/hazmat event or contamination, provide management and coordination of hazmat response and decontamination operations through demobilization and/or transition to recovery operations.**	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B2b 3.1	Receive alert/activation order for WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination
Res.B2b 3.2	Establish and implement on-scene management for hazmat material response
Res.B2b 3.2.4	Provide a hazardous materials technical expertise team for emergency operations for both industry and public
Res.B2b 3.4	Implement a hazardous materials response (e.g., implement plans, programs, agreements, and requirements)
Res.B2b 3.2.7	Coordinate technical, administrative support, personnel, facilities, communications and information
Res.B2b 3.2.6.2	Provide required Personal Protection Equipment to WMD/HazMat responders in coordination with safety officer
Res.B2b 3.2.5.1	Assess hazardous material situation and assist incident command (IC) and planning section in developing an incident action plan (IAP)
Res.B2b 3.2.5.5	Recommend protective action guidelines based on updated hazard assessments to on-site incident management
Res.B2b 3.2.5.4	Develop a site safety plan
Res.B2b 3.2.6.1	Observe the scene and review/evaluate hazard and response information as it pertains to the safety of all persons on the scene and responding
Res.B2b 3.2.6	Coordinate with safety officer to ensure the safety of on-scene WMD/HazMat responders
Res.B2b 3.4.7	Coordinate and support decontamination activities on-site
Res.B2b 3.4.7.4	Coordinate with and provide technical guidance to entities performing off-site decontamination
Res.B2b 3.4.7.5	Coordinate with hospitals to develop plans for managing/decontaminating self-presenting contaminated victims
Res.B2b 3.2.8	Coordinate resource management of hazardous materials equipment, supplies, and personnel
Res.B2b 4.3.7.6	Request decontamination technical assistance resources
Res.B2b 3.2.6.3	Coordinate with safety officer to brief hazardous materials branch/group personnel on site-specific occupational safety and health issues involving hazardous materials/WMD releases

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Res.B2b 3.4.7.7	Issue instructions for self-decontamination, where appropriate, expedient and possible

Performance Measures	Metric
WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination personnel injured during rescue efforts	Less than one loss-time injury per deployment
Develop tactical plan, based on the incident action plan (IAP), and for implementation by the State, region, and/or local WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination	Within 2 hours of arrival on-scene

Activity: *Activate WMD/Hazardous Material Response and Decontamination*

Definition: In response to activation, mobilize and arrive at the incident scene to begin operations.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B2b 4.1	Initiate WMD/HazMat procedures
Res.B2b 4.2	Assemble personnel and equipment at designated location
Res.B2b 4.3	Transport team (personnel and equipment) to scene

Performance Measures	Metric
Coordinate/incorporate into ICS	On arrival
Initial hazmat size up is completed	Within 30 minutes of notification of incident
Regional assets (e.g., Type I hazmat Team or Type III or IV Incident Management team) arrive on-scene, if requested by IC	Within 2 hours of asset request
State assets (e.g., Type I hazmat Team or Type II or III Incident Management team) arrive on-scene, if requested by IC	Within 12 hours of asset request
Federal assets (e.g., Type I hazmat Team or Type I or II Incident Management team) arrive on-scene, if requested by IC	Within 24 hours of asset request
Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REPP) Response Teams appropriate for the incident size involving a radiological hazard are deployed	Within 24 hours of asset request
Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) Teams are deployed	Within 2 hours of asset request

Activity: *Identify and Evaluate Scene*

Definition: Upon arriving on scene, begin to assess site, sample, identify, and characterize WMD/hazmat and contamination situation, conduct hazard analysis to determine potential consequence and risk, develop plans for safety and hazmat/decontamination operations and set up hazmat zones.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B2b 5.1.1	Notify law enforcement for guidance on collection and management of evidence from potential crime scenes
Res.B2b 5.1	Initiate hazmat response

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Res.B2b 5.2	Assess the incident site for hazardous materials and other conditions
Res.B2b 5.2.1	Identify hazardous materials and the extent/scope of the incident
Res.B2b 5.5.1	Collect data for hazard analysis
Res.B2b 5.5.3	Analyze weather forecast to conduct hazard zone prediction
Res.B2b 5.2.2	Conduct contamination surveys
Res.B2b 5.2.3	Assess hazmat release situation
Res.B2b 5.2.3.1	Conduct oil and hazmat assessment
Res.B2b 5.5.2	Monitor movement of hazardous releases and formulate predictions on dispersion and characteristics over time
Res.B2b 5.5	Characterize consequences and risk
Res.B2b 5.3	Identify and establish perimeter and hazardous materials zones (hot, warm, cold)
Res.B2b 5.4	Conduct ongoing assessments and predictions

Performance Measures	Metric
Isolate area and control public access	Less than 15 minutes of arrival on scene
Identify hazardous materials or category involved	Less than 30 minutes of arrival on scene
Obtain preliminary estimate of number of victims exposed to toxic/hazardous material and source identification	Less than 2 hours of arrival on-scene
Identify the at risk population and make protective action recommendations	Less than 1 hour

Activity: *Conduct Rescue Operations*

Definition: Once on scene and equipped with protective and response equipment, implement rescue operations.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B2b 6.1	Extricate and rescue victims within the hot zone
Res.B2b 6.2	Coordinate rescue efforts with law enforcement to ensure safety of rescuers while law enforcement secure the incident site

Performance Measures	Metric
Rescue contaminated victims	Less than 2 hours after arrival on scene

Activity: *Conduct Mitigation Activities*

Definition: Once on scene and equipped with protective and response equipment, implement operations plan to minimize contamination.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B2b 7.1.3	Identify appropriate PPE based on suspected hazardous material

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Res.B2b 7.1.1	Coordinate with safety officer to monitor responders for exposure to hazardous materials
Res.B2b 7.1.2	Coordinate with safety officer to monitor and control the operating time of rescuers assigned to the hot zone to minimize rescuer exposure
Res.B2b 7.1	Secure the contamination source and affected areas
Res.B2b 7.2	Monitor and track compliance with containment requirements

Performance Measures	Metric
Begin to implement initial action plan and objectives	Less than 4 hours after arrival on scene
Contain hazardous materials/WMD contamination	Less than 12 hours after arrival on scene

Activity: *Conduct On-Site Gross Decontamination*

Definition: Once on scene and equipped with decontamination equipment, decontaminate affected persons and animals, and also monitor contamination flow.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B2b 8.1	Identify assets required for decontamination activities
Res.B2b 8.2	Determine which agent-specific decontamination procedures are appropriate
Res.B2b 8.4.5	Implement plans, procedures, and protocols to ensure on-site individual gross decontamination of persons and household pets affected by the incident
Res.B2b 8.4.6	Provide a means to allow medical treatment facilities and shelter managers to readily identify people who have received gross decontamination
Res.B2b 8.3.1	Establish decontamination sites for victims and household pets
Res.B2b 8.4.1	Screen affected persons and household pets
Res.B2b 8.4.2	Decontaminate victims exposed to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive (CBRNE) materials
Res.B2b 8.5.1	Coordinate livestock decontamination
Res.B2b 9.2.3	Monitor clean areas within the contamination control line
Res.B2b 9.2.2	Monitor the exit points for hazmat contaminate movement outside the isolation zone

Performance Measures	Metric
Perform emergency gross decontamination of victims on-scene after decontamination team arrives	Less than 2 hours depending on substance
Perform emergency gross decontamination of household pets on-scene after decontamination team arrives	Less than 4 hours depending on substance

Activity: *Conduct On-Site Technical Decontamination*

Definition: For on-scene first responders, provide thorough decontamination.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B2b 9.1	Conduct first responders technical decontamination

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Res.B2b 9.2.2	Monitor the exit points for hazmat contaminate movement outside the isolation zone
Res.B2b 9.2	Decontaminate affected facilities and equipment used for technical decontamination
Res.B2b 9.4.1	Perform cleanup operations
Res.B2b 9.4.2	Implement hazardous materials disposal plan

Performance Measures	Metric
Perform technical decontamination of first responders on-site	Less than 2 hours from end of work period depending on substance
Perform technical decontamination of off-site victims (e.g., at hospitals and designated decontamination stations)	Less than 2 hours depending on substance
Perform technical decontamination of household pets off-site (e.g., at designated decontamination stations)	Less than 2 hours depending on substance
Perform technical decontamination of human remains	Less than 24 hours from end of work period

Activity: ***Demobilize WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination***

Definition: Upon completion of response phase transition to recovery operations, inventory equipment, complete paperwork, pursue rehabilitation, and conduct post event analysis (e.g., lessons learned) in accordance with incident demobilization plan.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B2b 10.1	Repackage WMD/HazMat equipment cache
Res.B2b 10.2	Demobilize WMD/HazMat base of operations
Res.B2b 10.3	Arrange transportation for demobilized WMD/HazMat personnel and equipment
Res.B2b 10.4	Debrief WMD/hazmat capability personnel

Performance Measures	Metric
Re-inventory and package equipment cache for transport	Less than 12 hours from start of demobilization process
Return base of operations to original conditions	Less than 12 hours from start of demobilization process
WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination task force debriefed	Yes/No

Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship
On-Site Incident Management	WMD/Hazmat and Decontamination capability management integrates itself into the local Incident Command/Unified Command system.
Public Safety and Security Response	WMD/Hazmat and Decontamination capability relies upon Public Safety and Security Response assistance to secure WMD/hazmat and decontamination sites, safely divert public from the area, and to provide security support for the

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	WMD/hazmat and decontamination base of operations.
Firefighting	WMD/Hazmat and Decontamination coordinates with Firefighting to decontaminate on-site victims and coordinates with hazmat on tactics to monitor and minimize release of hazardous materials during firefighting operations.
Environmental Health	WMD/Hazmat and Decontamination capability relies upon Environmental Health to monitor environmental public safety from decontamination and other hazmat response operations.
Citizen Protection: Evacuation and Shelter-in-Place	WMD/Hazmat and Decontamination capability relies upon Citizen Evacuation assistance to help plan for and implement the protective actions recommended by the IC in consultation with the WMD/hazmat team to both protect and decontaminate evacuees.
Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment	WMD/Hazmat and Decontamination capability relies upon Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment to transfer care of victims that have been decontaminated from WMD/hazmat.
Fatality Management	WMD/Hazmat and Decontamination capability notifies Fatality Management of location of decontaminated remains encountered from WMD/hazmat exposure.
Public Health Laboratory Testing	WMD/Hazmat and Decontamination capability provides Public Health Laboratory and Testing with samples for testing.
Debris and Hazardous Waste Management	WMD/Hazmat and Decontamination capability relies upon the New Phase II capability for debris removal, hazardous waste management, and site restoration of the environment.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
Type III Hazmat Entry Team	Per NIMS
Type II Hazmat Entry Team	Per NIMS
Type I Hazmat Entry Team	Per NIMS
EPA Radiological Emergency Response Team	The Radiological Emergency Response Team (RERT), based in EPA's Office of Radiation and Indoor Air and regional offices, responds to emergencies involving releases of radioactive materials by providing environmental measurement and guidance activities: monitoring, sampling, and laboratory activities and providing State and local authorities with advice on protecting local residents from exposure to harmful radiation levels..
Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC)	The Department of Energy (DOE) Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) coordinates Federal radiological monitoring and assessment activities with those of State and local agencies.
Hazmat Information/Research Function	Reference/research function performs the compiling and interpretation of technical information related to products, agents, containers, excreta and provide relevant information to the Hazardous Materials Branch Director or Group Supervisor.
Medical Function	Part of the logistics section for the provision of medical services for response personnel.
Hazmat Resources Function	The "resources group" technically would be within the planning section and be termed the resources unit and would reside outside of the hazmat structure. Resources on the scene would be assigned to the staging area manager.
Hazmat Technical Specialists	Single resources that will be assigned as needed and defined in 29CFR1910.120

Planning Assumptions

- Although applicable to several of the 15 National Planning Scenarios, the capability planning factors were developed from an in-depth analysis of the Toxic Industrial Chemical scenario. Other scenarios were reviewed to identify required adjustments or additions to the planning factors and national targets.
- This capability applies to a wide range of incidents and emergencies, including those caused by an improvised nuclear device, aerosol anthrax, a blister agent, a nerve agent, and a radiological dispersal device.
- If decontamination is ongoing during the early stages of a catastrophic incident, persons undergoing decontamination will have logistical, medical, and mental health needs that will need to be addressed quickly.
- All victims are rescued within 4 hours
- Decontamination priorities will be set up using the following priorities, in order of importance: life safety, incident stabilization, and property conservation.
- All fires are extinguished in 4-day response phase.

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- Water-based oil release may extend beyond the 96-hour limit. Assets will be on scene, but containment operations may not be able to begin immediately on arrival.
- Three operational response areas: port, refinery, and downwind
- The response phase is 96 hours.
- Local response time: 0–2 hours
- Regional response time: 2–12 hours
- State response time: 12–24 hours
- Federal response time: 24+ hours
- "Zero hour" (incident clock) = time incident occurred
- Unconstrained need: consider all assets required for response, do not factor response time or asset availability into planning.
- Planning factors are based on scenario and planning assumptions for a level III hazardous materials (hazmat) incident, where there are 1,000 injuries and 350 deaths, 25,000 sheltered, 10,000 evacuated, and 100,000 self-evacuated. About half of equipment and facilities are damaged (of three refineries). Two ships sank and the port was damaged near improvised explosive device (IED) sites and property was damaged in the downwind area.
- A significant number of individuals exposed to a plume cloud or contaminant agent will flee the scene before first responders arrive. It may prove difficult to determine which of those individuals require decontamination, and to ensure such individuals present themselves for decontamination.
- The absolute effectiveness of decontamination techniques

Planning Factors from an In-Depth Analysis of a Scenario with Significant Demand for the Capability (Toxic Industrial Chemical)

Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Type 1 Hazmat Entry Team (focused on extrication)	3 victim extrications per hour per team 12 victim extrications over a 4-hour period per team	1,000 injuries (downwind area) 350 deaths 2 response areas port and downwind. *Note: cannot respond in level A in a fire environment (this excludes refinery response area).* 4-hour rescue phase	Type 1 Hazmat Entry Team (focused on extrication)
Type 1 Hazmat Entry Team (focused on decontamination)	10 victims decontaminated/ hour per team (5-man team) 40 victims decontaminated per team in a 4-hour rescue phase	1,000 injuries (downwind area) 350 deaths Two response areas: port and downwind. Note: cannot respond in level A in a fire environment (excludes refinery response area) 4-hour rescue phase	Type 1 Hazmat Entry Team (focused on decontamination)
Hazmat Information/Research Group/Team	1 team per 12-hour shift for all response areas	96-hour response phase (8 shifts)	Hazmat Information/Research Group/Team

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Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Hazmat Medical Group/Team	1 team per 12-hour shift per response area	96-hour response phase (8 shifts) 2 response areas (port and downwind)	Hazmat Medical Group/Team
Hazmat Resources Group/Team	1 team per 12-hour shift per response area	96-hour response phase (8 shifts) Two response areas (port and downwind)	Hazmat Resources Group/Team
Hazmat Liaison Officer	1 officer per 12-hour shift per response area	96-hour response phase (8 shifts) 2 response areas (port and downwind)	Hazmat Liaison Officer
Hazmat Specialists	1 specialist per response area per 12-hour shift	96-hour response phase (8 shifts) 2 response areas (port and downwind)	Hazmat Specialists
EPA Radiological Emergency Response Team	Phase I CMRT: Phase II CMRT:	4-hour readiness posture (6-10 hour response time) Up to 500 members, round-the-clock operations capacity, 24-36 hour response time	
Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC)		2-hour call-up (working hours), 4-hour call-up (non-working hours)	27 teams in 8 DOE regions

Approach for Large-Scale Events

- Just-in-time training is the only innovation to reduce number of teams required; however, the 4-hour rescue phase makes training counterproductive
- The United States has approximately 64 nuclear stations supported by the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program (REPP). No less than 30 REPP response teams should be able to respond to an "improvised nuclear device" scenario within 24 hours
- Quantity of resources is achievable through mutual aid
- Each jurisdiction is expected to sponsor and support community emergency response teams (CERTs)
- The projected effects of contamination resulting from a catastrophic incident are generally based on an estimated population density of 2,000 people per square mile, but may increase for major urban areas
- Large-gathering situations (e.g. National Security special events, sporting events, conventions, etc.) create higher localized population densities
- Biological agents typically have delayed symptoms. As such there will rarely be an on-site incident requiring response when a biological agent is released
- Health care facilities are the most likely locations for managing a biological incident

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- Secondary contamination will be a major concern. Hospital emergency rooms may close if patients are admitted without proper decontamination. Other secondary contamination issues include control of runoff of fluids used in decontamination, and the handling of contaminated clothing and personal effects. In addition, the secondary contamination of first responders, even those wearing personal protective equipment, can occur during the removal of patients from a hazardous area, during the performance of basic life support functions, or when initial responders are unaware that a hazardous material is involved.
- The psychological dimensions of being exposed to a contaminant, and subsequent decontamination, may present social management challenges and concerns. Of greatest concern are the short- and long-term psychological consequences resulting from actual exposure to chemical, biological and radiological substances, and which subsequently produce negative health effects. Short-term stress symptoms may be a prelude to long-term, debilitating, post-traumatic stress disorder.

National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
City	Type I Hazmat Entry Team (extrication)	NIMS-Typed Resource Organization	20	Per UASI Area[9]	Identify and Evaluate On-Scene Conduct Rescue Operations
County	Type I Hazmat Entry Team (extrication)	NIMS-Typed Resource Organization	1	Per county	Identify and Evaluate On-Scene Conduct Rescue Operations
City	Type I Hazmat Entry Team (decontamination)	NIMS-Typed Resource Organization	20	Per UASI Area	Identify and Evaluate On-Scene Conduct On-site Gross Decontamination Conduct On-site Technical Decontamination
County	Type I Hazmat Entry Team (decontamination)	NIMS-Typed Resource Organization	1	Per county	Identify and Evaluate On-Scene Conduct On-site Gross Decontamination Conduct On-site Technical Decontamination
City	Hazmat information/ research group/team	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	2	Per UASI Area	Direct Tactical Operations
City	Hazmat medical group/team	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	2	Per UASI Area	Conduct Rescue Operations

[9] Actual numbers based on risk/threat-based assessment.

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
City	Hazmat resources group/team	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	2	Per UASI Area	Direct Tactical Operations
City	Hazmat liaison officer	Personnel	2	Per UASI Area	Direct Tactical Operations
County	Hazmat specialist	Personnel	1	Per county	Identify and Evaluate On-Scene Conduct Mitigation Activities
EPA	EPA Radiological Emergency Response Team	Federal Team			Identify and Evaluate On-Scene Conduct Mitigation Activities
DOE	Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC)	Federal Organization			Identify and Evaluate On-Scene Conduct Mitigation Activities

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CITIZEN EVACUATION AND SHELTER-IN-PLACE

Capability Definition

Citizen evacuation and shelter-in-place is the capability to prepare for, ensure communication of, and immediately execute the safe and effective sheltering-in-place of an at-risk population (and companion animals), and/or the organized and managed evacuation of the at-risk population (and companion animals) to areas of safe refuge in response to a potentially or actually dangerous environment. In addition, this capability involves the safe reentry of the population where feasible.

Outcome

Affected and at-risk populations (and companion animals) are safely sheltered-in-place and/or evacuated to safe refuge areas, in order to obtain access to medical care, physical assistance, shelter, and other essential services, and effectively and safely reentered into the affected area, if appropriate.

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

This capability is supported by the following Emergency Support Functions (ESFs):

ESF #1: Transportation
ESF #5: Emergency Management
ESF #6: Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services
ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services
ESF #14: Public Safety
ESF #15: External Affairs

Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B.3a 1	Develop plans, procedures, and protocols to manage evacuations and sheltering-in-place
Res.B.3a 1.2.1	Develop evacuation procedures for populations and locations at risk (including high density areas, neighborhoods, high-rise buildings, subways, airports, special events venues, etc), and institutions that should begin evacuations early (e.g., hospitals, nursing homes, long-term care facilities and correctional facilities
Res.B3a 1.1.1.1	Develop and distribute public education materials on evacuation/shelter-in-place preparation, plans, and procedures
Res.B3a 1.1.1.2	Participate in citizen preparedness activities to ensure that public information on evacuation/shelter-in-place preparation and processes is effectively communicated
Res.B3a 1.1.3	Participate in establishment of public information announcements to be issued as part of

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Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
	evacuation/shelter-in-place orders
Res.B3a 1.3.1	Develop and implement plans and procedures to identify in advance populations requiring assistance during evacuation/shelter-in-place
Res.B3a 1.3.1.1	Establish registry of populations requiring assistance during evacuation/sheltering-in-place
Res.B3a 1.3.1.2	Develop and implement procedures to identify and arrange for transportation to accommodate immobilized individuals or others requiring special assistance during transport
Res.B3a 1.3.2	Develop plans and procedures for identifying during an incident those populations requiring assistance with evacuation, including identification of type of assistance required
Res.B3a 1.3.3	Establish processes to ensure that immobilized and other individuals require special assistance can be moved to collection points for evacuation
Res.B3a 1.3.4	Establish processes for identifying and collecting individuals who do not go to collection points
Res.B3a 1.4.1	Pre-identify evacuee collection points and staging/reception areas (for immediate sheltering/processing)
Res.B3a 1.4.3.1	Pre-arrange contracts and agreements to ensure provision of transportation vehicle and drivers during an incident
Res.B3a 1.4.4	Identify and arrange for the staging and use of resources from outside the planning area
Res.B3a 1.4.5	Develop plans and procedures to get resources to those who have sheltered in place (Long term—3 days or more)
Res.B3a 1.4.6	Develop plans and procedures for coordinating with other agencies to meet basic needs during evacuation
Res.B3a 1.4.7	Develop agreements with neighboring areas regarding the movement and receipt of evacuees from the affected area
Res.B3a 1.2.4	Develop plans and procedures for evacuation/shelter-in place of companion animals

Preparedness Measures	Metrics
Appropriate informational materials for use in citizen preparedness for evacuation and shelter-in-place have been developed and coordinated with public education/citizen preparedness programs	Yes/No
Relevant planning and informational materials to be released to the public for evacuation or sheltering in place have been shared with the servicing public safety communication centers and Public Service Answering Points (PSAPs)	Yes/No
Plans addressing authority and decision-making processes for shelter-in-place and/or evacuations are in place	Yes/No
Plans addressing authority and procedures to declare and enforce a mandatory evacuation are in place	Yes/No
Plans are in place for the immediate evacuation of:	
▪ neighborhoods	Yes/No
▪ high-rise buildings	Yes/No
▪ subways	Yes/No
▪ airports	Yes/No
▪ correctional facilities	Yes/No

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Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
▪ hospitals/nursing homes/assisted-living/elder care facilities ▪ special events venues ▪ other high-risk areas in response to a threat or attack	Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No
Processes are in place for identifying populations that may need assistance with evacuation/shelter-in-place, prior to an incident	Yes/No
Processes are in place for identifying, during an incident, populations that may need assistance with evacuation/shelter-in-place	Yes/No
Processes are in place for identifying and addressing the different types of assistance needed (e.g., physical movement, transportation assistance, language translation, etc.)	Yes/No
Populations that may need assistance with evacuation/shelter-in-place have been identified	Yes/No
Evacuation plan(s) are in place to provide transportation and other evacuation assistance to all persons who need evacuation assistance; plans, at a minimum, address assistance for: ▪ Non-institutionalized populations requiring assistance to be moved (e.g., the elderly, disabled, etc). ▪ Transient populations (e.g., the homeless; tourists and visitors); ▪ Institutionalized populations (e.g., nursing homes, hospitals, psychiatric institutions, boarding schools,) ▪ Populations out of the home (e.g., students, those in public venues) and the work force during a surprise incident ▪ Companion animals	 Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No
Plans are in place to coordinate with public safety agencies in evacuating incarcerated populations	Yes/No
Evacuation plan(s) identifying evacuation routes and traffic flow and control measures are in place	Yes/No
Evacuation routes are marked	Yes/No
Plans identifying measures to ensure adequate services (e.g. gas, food, water, tow trucks, medical emergencies, etc.) along the evacuation route(s) are in place	Yes/No
Plans to provide for leadership at evacuation staging points and/or at temporary evacuation shelters for up to 72 hours are in place	Yes/No
Plans are in place to coordinate with mass care agencies to provide required services at evacuation staging points and/or at temporary evacuation shelters for at least 72 hours	Yes/No
Arrangements are in place with agencies to be involved in evacuations/sheltering, staffing of shelters, logistical supply, security, and support of shelters	Yes/No
Plans are in place to coordinate with medical care agencies to provide medical support, supervision, and symptom surveillance of evacuees during a prolonged evacuation (e.g., monitoring and caring for people with pre-existing medical conditions or disabilities and those who may become ill during the evacuation)	Yes/No
Memorandums of understanding (MOU) with jurisdictions that will serve as host communities for evacuees during an incident have been developed	Yes/No
Plans are in place to address re-entry of the general population	Yes/No
Plans are in place to address re-entry support for populations requiring assistance to return	Yes/No

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Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Plans are in place to coordinate with utility companies regarding safety instructions for returning homeowners	Yes/No

Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B3a 2	Develop and implement training programs for staff involved in evacuation/shelter-in-place implementation
Res.B3a 2.2.1	Develop and implement exercises involving evacuation of various types of locations to local shelters as well as more distant cities
Res.B3a 2.2.2	Assess the training and exercise gaps
Res.B3a 2.2.3	Review existing training and exercise resources available for participation and/or inclusion in comprehensive training and exercise strategy

Preparedness Measures	Metric
Staff of agencies to be involved in evacuations/sheltering, staffing of shelters, logistical supply, and support of shelters have been trained	Yes/No
Pre-event exercises of the notification and activation of evacuation and shelter-in-place plans are conducted with citizen participation	Yes/No
Local emergency response agencies/staff including public safety answering points, are trained on local evacuation/shelter-in-place strategies	Yes/No

Performance Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: *Direct Evacuation and/or In-Place Protection Tactical Operations* **Definition: In response to a hazardous condition for a locality, direct, manage, and coordinate evacuation and/or in-place sheltering procedures for both the general population and those requiring evacuation assistance throughout incident.**	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B3a 3.1.2	Identify populations, institutions (e.g., hospitals, nursing homes, correctional facilities) and locations to be evacuated or sheltered in place
Res.B3a 3.1.3	Coordinate with law enforcement to identify risk (e.g., from a potential terrorist attack) to transportation infrastructure that may be used for evacuation
Res.B3a 3.1.4	Coordinate with law enforcement to anticipate secondary attack, and identify security and survival vulnerabilities of the evacuated or sheltered population and protective countermeasures
Res.B3a 3.2.1	Identify appropriate decision-making authority responsible for deciding a course of action to address the incident
Res.B3a 3.2	Determine appropriate course of action to address the incident
Res.B3a 3.4.4	Coordinate with serving Public Service Answering Points regarding communication of the evacuation and/or shelter-in-place decision
Res.B3a 3.3	Re-assess evacuation/shelter-in-place plans and begin implementation

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Res.B3a 3.3.2	Re-assess location of evacuation collection points and staging areas identified in plans and adjust as needed
Res.B3a 3.3.1	Re-assess evacuation traffic management plan and adjust as needed
Res.B3a 3.4.2	Coordinate with mass care, medical, and other services to set up evacuation staging areas
Res.B3a 3.3.1.1	Re-assess emergency evacuation routes and adjust as needed
Res.B3a 3.4.1	Coordinate with transportation agencies to implement evacuation plans
Res.B3a 3.3.4	Coordinate with mass care services to identify location of shelter facilities and other mass care services for evacuees
Res.B3a 3.3.3	Coordinate with mass care agencies to assess the need for emergency feeding and sheltering activities
Res.B3a 3.4.5	Coordinate with appropriate agencies regarding caring for companion animals in transit
Res.B3a 3.5.3	Coordinate medical assistance for special need evacuees in transit
Res.B3a 3.5.4	Notify appropriate agencies of anticipated medical assistance required upon arrival at temporary locations (staging area, shelters, etc)
Res.B3a 3.6	Coordinate with HazMat to conduct decontamination of evacuees, including those with disabilities and medical needs (including their equipment)
Res.B3a 3.7	Coordinate with environmental health to monitor progress of affected area to determine when re-entry is deemed appropriate

Performance Measures	Metric
Appropriate authority to select protective strategy was identified	Yes/No
Appropriate authority identified the information that needed to be assessed	Yes/No
Necessary information was gathered	Yes/No
Appropriate and available strategies were identified	Yes/No
An appropriate strategy was selected and communicated	Yes/No
Appropriate protective strategy to meet the potential risk/danger to the various populations was selected within appropriate timeframe	Yes/No
Citizen protection decision was coordinated with surrounding jurisdictions to support evacuation routes, and activate reception facilities and shelters	Yes/No
Re-entry planning was conducted during the course of response to the event	Yes/No

Activity: ***Activate Evacuation and/or In-Place Protection***

Definition: In response to activation, identify and ensure notification of at-risk populations, and identify populations requiring assistance in evacuation and/or in-place protection.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B3a 4.1	Identify and mobilize appropriate personnel
Res.B3a 4.2.1	Issue shelter-in-place order
Res.B3a 4.2.3	Issue evacuation order
Res.B3a 4.2.4	Coordinate with agencies providing emergency public information and warning to ensure effective communication of evacuation/shelter-in-place order and procedures
Res.B3a 4.4.1	Determine locations of populations who may need assistance with evacuation from affected area (e.g., using pre-established registry of populations in facilities)

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Res.B3a 4.4.2	Implement plan to capture self-reporting by those requiring assistance with evacuation (e.g., via hot-line)
Res.B3a 4.4.3	Conduct triage upon identification to determine type of assistance required
Res.B3a 4.5	Implement systems for tracking evacuees and those who shelter in place
Res.B3a 4.3	Implement notification protocols for communication to Public Service Answering Points (911 centers)

Performance Measures	Metric
Time to notify affected population of shelter-in-place order	Within 15 minutes of order to shelter-in-place
The most affected populations for evacuation are notified first (e.g., ring evacuations)	Yes/No
The public is notified of evacuation procedures, routes, locations, and sources of evacuation information throughout the incident	Yes/No
Percent of population requiring assistance that has been identified	100%

Activity: *Implement Evacuation Orders for General Population*

Definition: *Assist the self*-evacuation of affected population by providing public information and instructions, traffic control, and support services to evacuees along evacuation routes.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B3a 5.1	Provide public notification agencies with information to provide instructions for evacuation
Res.B3a 5.2	Activate approved traffic control plan
Res.B3a 5.2.1	Coordinate with appropriate agencies regarding support for traffic control
Res.B3a 5.1.2	Provide information regarding evacuation staging area location
Res.B3a 5.4.3	Implement procedures for allowing voluntary tracking of evacuees who participate voluntarily
Res.B3a 4.6	Monitor evacuation traffic flow/demand and adjust evacuation traffic management plan and measures as appropriate
Res.B3a 5.4.1	Provide services (e.g. gas, food, water, tow trucks, etc.) along the evacuation route(s)
Res.B3a 5.4.2	Monitor evacuation traffic to identify those no longer able to self-evacuate and requiring specialized assistance

Performance Measures	Metric
Frequency of notification to the public of evacuation procedures, routes, locations, or sources of evacuation information throughout the incident. [*This is incident driven and the times need to change from an immediate vs. long term incident*]	Every 30 minutes initially, tapering off to every 2 hours throughout evacuation
Time in which the traffic and transportation plan is implemented to enable evacuation within the incident timeframe	Within 1-3 hours from evacuation order
Time to complete the evacuation of the affected general population for an event with advanced warning [*This is a general timeframe and may vary greatly beyond this period depending on the type of hazard*]	Within 24-72 hours of the order to evacuate

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Activity: *Collect and Evacuate Population Requiring Assistance*

Definition: Upon identification of individuals requiring assistance and type of assistance required, collect and move individuals to established evacuation staging/reception area for further services.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B3a 6.1	Order transportation services for evacuation
Res.B3a 6.1.1	Coordinate with supporting agencies and pre-arranged providers to obtain appropriate means of transportation for those requiring transportation assistance (e.g., buses, ambulances, handicap-assisted vans)
Res.B3a 6.1.2	Implement plans for providing alternative means of transport for immobilized individuals or those needing other special assistance in transit
Res.B3a 6.2.3	Provide appropriate specialized transportation services for those requiring additional support during evacuation
Res.B3a 6.2.4	Coordinate provision of medical support services for evacuating special needs populations
Res.B3a 6.3.1	Collect individuals at pre-established collection points and transfer to staging/reception area
Res.B3a 6.3.2	Collect individuals at non-specified locations and transfer to staging/reception area

Performance Measures	Metric
Requests for evacuation assistance for those in need have been met in accordance with established procedures	Yes/No
Procedures for obtaining evacuation assistance have been publicized to general public	Yes/No
Service organizations follow established procedures to provide evacuation assistance	Yes/No
Sources of surge transportation assistance for evacuations have been contacted and provided information on their role	Yes/No
Sources of assistance to evacuated persons with special needs have been contacted and provided information on their role	Yes/No
Specific arrangements for medical support services for evacuation of those requiring it have been implemented	Yes/No
Transportation assistance is provided for/by hospitals, nursing homes and other institutions that will need to evacuate or help/evacuate those in their care	Yes/No
Other collection points for individuals needing special evacuation assistance have been established and publicized	Yes/No

Activity: *Operate Evacuation Staging/Reception Area*

Definition: In coordination with mass care, medical, and other service agencies, provide immediate basic needs and processing of evacuated individuals en route to other destinations (e.g., to shelters, hospitals, etc).

Critical Tasks	
Res.B3a 7.1	Establish evacuation staging/reception area
Res.B3a 7.1.1	Conduct security sweeps of evacuation staging/reception areas prior to occupancy, if incident is a terrorist attack or suspected terrorist attack

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Res.B3a 7.2.1	Provide, in coordination with mass care, for basic needs support and processing of evacuated individuals and companion animals in preparation for further movement
Res.B3a 7.2.2	Provide, in coordination with medical care, access to medical services for evacuated individuals in staging/reception area
Res.B3a 7.2.3	Provide, in coordination with WMD/Hazardous Materials Response capability, for decontamination of evacuated individuals if necessary (including those with medical needs)
Res.B3a 7.2.4	Coordinate with appropriate agencies to address needs of those requiring assistance
Res.B3a 7.3.1	Provide tracking of people needing evacuation assistance
Res.B3a 7.3.2	Provide voluntary registration/tracking system for general population to support reunification

Performance Measures	Metric
Evacuation staging/reception areas in the affected area have been coordinated with necessary sites and assisting agencies	Yes/No
Public information messages regarding evacuation staging/reception areas are prepared and disseminated	Yes/No
Percentage of evacuees whose basic needs are met at the staging area	100%

Activity: ***Manage Incoming Evacuees***

Definition: In coordination with other service agencies, provide short-term and long-term support to evacuees arriving from affected areas.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B3a 8.1	Establish reception areas/centers for evacuees in the host jurisdiction
Res.B3a 8.2	Monitor traffic movement of self-evacuees into/through area, and redirect as necessary
Res.B3a 8.3	Coordinate with support agencies to provide short-term needs for evacuees, such as directions, information, shelter, medical care, and other assistance
Res.B3a 8.4	Plan, in coordination with social service agencies, for long-term support for evacuees (e.g., temporary housing, schools, job searches, etc.)

Performance Measures	Metric
Evacuation staging/reception areas in the host jurisdiction have been coordinated with necessary authorities and assisting agencies	Yes/No
Public information messages to publicize evacuation staging/reception areas in the host jurisdiction are prepared and disseminated	Yes/No
Processing, registration and tracking systems have been established with procedures, necessary forms and materials, and trained staff	Yes/No
Plans are completed and arrangements established to provide necessary care, shelter, lodging and short term needs	Yes/No

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Activity: *Implement In-Place Protection Procedures*

Definition: Upon in-place protection activation, assist at-risk population in sheltering in homes or designated in-place sheltering locations.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B3a 9.2	Identify steps to reduce infiltration of hazard(s)
Res.B3a 9.3.1	Ensure access to emergency communications while sheltered-in-place
Res.B3a 9.3.2	Use emergency alerts system and Public Service Answering Points (PSAPs) to advise and update information of incident

Performance Measures	Metric
Time to notify affected population of initial in-place protection procedures	Immediately, using standing emergency instructions.
Time to shelter-in-place the affected general population	Less than 30 minutes
Frequency of follow-on instructions to sheltered-in-place populations (e.g. hazard mitigation recommendations)	Continuously

Activity: *Assist Re-Entry*

Definition: Upon notification of the affected area being safe, assist in-shelter population and/or evacuees in re-entering area.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B3a 10.1	Adapt and implement reentry plans as officials announce areas within the region to be approved for reentry
Res.B3a 10.2	Assist in the re-entry of people and pets into evacuated areas when appropriate and safe
Res.B3a 10.3	Provide re-entry information to the public on a timely and on-going basis
Res.B3a 10.4	Coordinate with appropriate agencies to provide instructions and information if re-entry is not feasible

Performance Measures	Metric
Re-entry planning is conducted during the course of response to the event	Yes/No
Evacuees are notified of temporary re-entry procedures	Yes/No
Evacuees are instructed of permanent re-entry procedures, including safety precautions	Yes/No

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Activity: ***Demobilize Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-In-Place Operations*** **Definition: Upon completion of assigned duties, decontaminate equipment, supplies, and personnel if appropriate, and demobilize.**	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B3a 11.1	Arrange for decontamination of equipment, supplies, and personnel used in evacuation/in-place protection
Res.B3a 11.2	Participate in incident debriefing on evacuation/in-place protection implementation
Res.B3a 11.3	Release personnel supporting evacuation/in-place protection

Performance Measures	**Metric**
Citizen Evacuation and/or Shelter-In-Place personnel are debriefed	Yes/No
Lessons learned are identified and addressed	Yes/No

Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship
Citizen Preparedness	Citizen Evacuation/Shelter-in-Place capability coordinates with Citizen Preparedness to ensure that citizens are educated on how to prepare for and conduct evacuation and sheltering-in-place.
On-Site Incident Management	Citizen Evacuation/Shelter-in-Place capability management integrates itself into the local Incident Command/Unified Command system to coordinate protective action decisions.
WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination	Citizen Evacuation/Shelter-in-Place capability coordinates with WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination to ensure evacuation and/or in-place protection personnel and equipment are appropriately decontaminated. WMD also supports decontamination of evacuees when necessary.
EOC Management	Citizen Evacuation/Shelter-in-Place capability management works through the EOC Management to notify affected and general population of protective action decisions.
Public Safety and Security Response	Citizen Evacuation/Shelter-in-Place capability relies upon Public Safety and Security Response assistance to safely maneuver affected populations through evacuation routes and provide assistance for traffic and crowd control. Public Safety and Security also handles the evacuation of the incarcerated populations at risk.
Triage/Medical Surge	Citizen Evacuation/Shelter-in-Place capability coordinates with Triage and/or Medical Surge to obtain immediate medical treatment for evacuees in need, either en-route or at evacuee staging area.
Mass Care	Citizen Evacuation/Shelter-in-Place capability coordinates with Mass Care to provide basic services to evacuees and assists in transferring evacuees to Mass Care shelters for at-risk populations.
Emergency Public Information and Warning	Citizen Evacuation/Shelter-in-Place capability coordinates with emergency public information and warning to provide accurate and timely and continuous information to the affected and general populations regarding evacuation and/or shelter-in-place orders and procedures, and subsequent reentry information and instructions.
Environmental Health	Citizen Evacuation/Shelter-in-Place capability relies on environmental health capability for assessment of hazards to determine whether areas are safe for re-entry.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
Emergency Alert System (EAS)	Established by the FCC in 1994 to provide the President with access to thousands of broadcast stations, cable systems and participating satellite programmers to transmit a message to the public
Other emergency alert and notification systems	Any notification system capable of reaching 100% of the at-risk population, including a redundant capability
Traffic control packages	Teams of law enforcement personnel and traffic control equipment (barriers, cones, directional signals)
Transportation resources	Buses and other mass transit vehicles including drivers
Local evacuation plan	Addressing components identified in preparedness measures/metrics
Local evacuation education program	Personnel and information dissemination equipment to provide local training on evacuation, reentry and shelter-in-place processes
Small Animal Transport Teams	Per NIMS
DOT Evacuation Coordination Team (Type I, II, and III)	Per NIMS, facilitates the rapid, efficient, and safe evacuation of threatened populations
DOT Evacuation Liaison Team	Per NIMS, provides support in State and local emergency response efforts by compiling, analyzing, and disseminating traffic-related information that can be used to facilitate the rapid, efficient, and safe evacuation and reentry of threatened populations.

Planning Assumptions

General

- Although applicable to several of the 15 National Planning Scenarios, the capability factors were developed from an in-depth analysis of the Chlorine Tank Explosion scenario. Other scenarios were reviewed to identify required adjustments or additions to the planning factors and national targets.
- This capability applies to a wide range of incidents and emergencies, including accidental or deliberate disease outbreaks, natural disasters, and nuclear and conventional events.
- Large-scale evacuations, organized or self-directed, may occur. More people are initially likely to flee and seek shelter for attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear agents than for natural events.
- Transportation and traffic routes will be severely and negatively affected by the evacuation
- Many evacuees will require provision of transportation.
- The health-related implications of an incident may aggravate or impair attempts to implement a coordinated evacuation management strategy.
- Public anxiety and stress will result from evacuations, requiring mental health services, appropriate risk communications, and public education/instruction.
- Local jurisdictional resources will be quickly overwhelmed and will require mutual aid from other jurisdictions and support from Federal, State, and regional agencies.
- Through memorandums of understanding (MOUs) incorporated into planning, adjacent communities will be prepared to handle significant numbers of evacuees from affected areas. These host communities also will identify resources, personnel, and equipment to shelter and support evacuees.

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- Pre-event identification of shelter sites has been planned for by emergency management agencies and MOUs are in place for use of the facilities.
- Although shelters will require a minimum time for setup and activation, populations will require services immediately on evacuation, notably those for special needs populations and containment.
- For shelter-in-place, evacuation, sheltering, and reentry planning, each jurisdiction has unique hazards and unique resources. Capabilities for at-risk populations are based on jurisdictional hazard vulnerability analysis. Plans (including emergency operations plans), procedures, mutual aid agreement, and so forth must be in place to support effective evacuation and sheltering, dependent on the hazard/risk analysis and the resources available for the at-risk population. The measurement for this capability is: Can the jurisdiction evacuate and/or shelter the at-risk population and, if they cannot, what actions will procure/garner adequate resources for them?

Scenario-Specific

- A large amount of the chemical chlorine has been released into the atmosphere (a plume) and is disbursed in a widely populated area. Decontamination of evacuees will require additional resources and triage areas before citizens can be sheltered; therefore, fire/emergency medical services (EMS), hospitals, and HazMat teams will be required to decontaminate evacuees.
- Local and regional resources will be quickly overwhelmed and require State and Federal assistance.
- Long-term sheltering and decontamination will be required.
- City/jurisdiction is a large urban area with a network of streets and highways. Within the affected area, the evacuation and reentry routes and zones encompass 25 major intersections in a 25-mile evacuation radius.
- Approximately 25 percent of the evacuated population will require shelter. The remaining populations will self-evacuate and arrange own shelter.
- Approximately one percent of the 25 percent of the evacuated populations are special need populations and will require medical shelters and appropriate transportation.

Planning Factors from an In-Depth Analysis of a Scenario with Significant Demand for the Capability (Chlorine Tank Explosion)

Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Emergency alert and notification systems (e.g., sirens, emergency alert system (EAS), call-out systems, television captioning system)	1 system that will alert 100% of the at-risk population	Warning and notification of 700,000 people	1 system within the jurisdiction to reach the at-risk population with redundant capability
Local, regional, and State public works	Provision of traffic control equipment and towing of vehicles/obstacles	70,000 people will self-evacuate and reenter the affected areas when safe, leading to traffic congestion and delaying response assets	Traffic control package containing: Barriers Cones Directional signs/signals Within high-risk evacuation

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Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
			area (distributed to predetermined locations) 1,000 barriers 1,000 traffic cones 50 directional signs
Local and regional transportation jurisdictions	Ability to provide transportation to evacuees	630,000 people will require assistance with evacuation through buses; each bus can hold 50 people and can be recycled and used multiple times during an evacuation	Local and regional (combined): 100 buses, including school and mass transit buses and other vehicles of mass transportation State and unaffected areas: 100 buses Federal: not timely resources for immediate evacuation, but can be used for reentry
Federal transportation resources	Ability to provide reentry support	630,000 people will need reentry assistance	Support after utilizing local, regional, and State resources Federal: 100 buses or other mass transit vehicles
Special needs shelters/shelter-in-place requirements	Shelters need capacity to support special needs functions (e.g., oxygen, durable medical products, medical and emotional support)	1,800 persons with special needs will need assistance	Refer to health and medical capabilities
Security and law enforcement	The event occurs in a large urban area with extensive network of streets and traffic flows	Legal authority to alter traffic flow and use of highways 1 law enforcement officer at major intersections; 25 major intersections in the evacuation route Other persons, (non-law enforcement types, such as Volunteers in Police Service) assigned traffic control duties at other intersections directing traffic flow	Local: 25 law enforcement officers Regional/State: 150–175 officers working outside the affected area restricting access and diverting highway traffic Local: 200 non-law enforcement persons to direct traffic along the evacuation/reentry routes Regional/State: resources for reentry would be needed to augment local resources: 300 persons

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Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Small Animal Transport Teams	60% of households have companion animals (CAs) and most people will not evacuate if they believe there is no facility to support them and their animals (general population shelters generally do not accept CAs)	Average: 2 pets/household	10 Small Animal Transport Teams (per National Incident Management System (NIMS) typing)

National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	# of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
Federal	Emergency Alert System (EAS)	Federal Resource	1	Nationally	Activate Evacuation and Shelter-In-Place Re-Entry
State	Public warning system	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	1	Per State	Activate Evacuation and Shelter-In-Place Re-Entry
Local	Public Warning System	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	1	Per jurisdiction	Activate Evacuation and Shelter-In-Place Protection Re-Entry
Local	Evacuation Plan	Plan	1	Per city/county	All activities
Local	Local evacuation education program	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	1	Per jurisdiction	All activities
Local	Transportation Resources	Resource Organization	17	Per 100,000 population	Implement Evacuation Orders for General Population Implement In-Place Protection Procedures
State	Transportation Resources	Resource Organization	17	Per 100,000 population	Implement Evacuation Orders for General Population Implement In-Place Protection Procedures
Federal	Transportation Resources	Resource Organization	17	Per 100,000 population	Implement Evacuation Orders for General Population Implement In-Place

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	# of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
					Protection Procedures
Local	Traffic control package	Resource Organization	1	In accordance with Evacuation Plans	Implement Evacuation Orders for General Population Implement In-Place Protection Procedures
State	Law Enforcement and Security	Resource Organization		As required per incident	Implement Evacuation Orders for General Population Implement In-Place Protection Procedures
Local	Fire/Emergency medical services (EMS)	Resource Organization		As required per incident	Implement Evacuation Orders for General Population Implement In-Place Protection Procedures
Local	Tow trucks	Transportation Equipment		As required per incident	Implement Evacuation Orders for General Population Implement In-Place Protection Procedures
Federal	Small Animal Transport Teams	NIMS-typed resource organization		As required per incident	Implement Evacuation Orders for General Population Implement In-Place Protection Procedures
Federal	DOT Evacuation Coordination Team (Type I, II, and III)	NIMS-typed resource organization		As required per incident	Implement Evacuation Orders for General Population Implement In-Place Protection Procedures
Federal	DOT Evacuation Liaison Team	NIMS-typed resource organization		As required per incident	Implement Evacuation Orders for General Population Implement In-Place Protection Procedures

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ISOLATION AND QUARANTINE

Capability Definition

Isolation and Quarantine is the capability to protect the health of the population through the use of isolation and/or quarantine measures in order to contain the spread of disease. Isolation of ill individuals may occur in homes, hospitals, designated health care facilities, or alternate facilities. Quarantine refers to the separation and restriction of movement of persons who, while not yet ill, have been exposed to an infectious agent and may become infectious. Successful implementation will require that sufficient legal, logistical, and informational support exists to maintain these measures. Most experts feel that isolation and quarantine will not stop the outbreak and that if used, the focus will be on cases that might introduce the disease into the state or other geographic area.

Outcome

Individuals who are ill, exposed, or likely to be exposed are separated, movement is restricted, basic necessities of life are available, and their health is monitored in order to limit the spread of a newly introduced contagious disease (e.g., pandemic influenza). Legal authority for these measures is clearly defined and communicated to the public. Logistical support is provided to maintain measures until danger of contagion has elapsed.

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

This capability supports the Emergency Support Function (ESF) #8: Public Health and Medical Services.

Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B3b 1.1	Develop plans, policies, and procedures for implementing isolation and quarantine
Res.B3b 1.1.1	Introduce legislation authorizing isolation and quarantine (including quarantine of groups)
Res.B3b 1.3.1	Stand up isolation and quarantine units (including defining procedures/protocols) in all 83 of the target cities and as needed in foreign countries
Res.C1a 6.2.3	Improve monitoring of adverse treatment reactions among those people who have received medical countermeasures and have been isolated or quarantined
RecA2b 1.1	Create and implement policies to deal with the financial impact to individuals who are placed in isolation or quarantine and to the public health system

Preparedness Measures	**Metrics**
Legislation has been enacted authorizing appropriate isolation and quarantine measures (including quarantine of groups)	Yes/No
Plan is in place that addresses coordinating quarantine activation and enforcement with public safety and law enforcement	Yes/No
Plan is in place that addresses tracking details of individuals placed in Isolation or	Yes/No

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Quarantine using Personal Health Identification Number (PHIN)	
Plan is in place that addresses implementation of infection control precautions	Yes/No
Legal authority to isolate and/or quarantine individuals, groups, facilities, animals and food products is defined	Yes/No
Plan addresses how to ensure adequate stockpiles of appropriate personal protective equipment	Yes/No
Plan addresses having or having access to information systems to support tracking adherence to isolation and quarantine measures that comply with the PHIN functional requirements for *Countermeasure and Response Administration.*	Yes/No

Performance Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: *Direct Isolation and Quarantine Tactical Operations*

Definition: In response to a need for isolation and quarantine orders, direct, manage and coordinate isolation and quarantine operations.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B3b 3.1.1	Identify decision-makers to oversee isolation and quarantine conduct
Res.B3b 3.1.3	Develop disease-specific isolation and quarantine plan
Res.B3b 3.1.2	Identify applicable isolation and quarantine laws, policies, and implementation procedures
Res.B3b 3.2	Provide isolation and quarantine information to emergency public information for release
Res.B3b 3.2.2	Coordinate with public information agencies to disseminate health and safety information to the public
Res.B3b 3.2.5	Coordinate public information releases about those people who have been isolated or quarantined
Res.B3b 3.2.1	Coordinate with public information agencies regarding notification of quarantine or isolation to ensure compliance of the general public (e.g. doors are locked and may be opened only by public health official or designated persons)
Res.B3b 3.2.3	Promote the public acceptance of isolation and quarantine as necessary control measures
Res.B3b 3.2.2	Coordinate with public information agencies to provide timely dissemination of health and safety information to the public regarding risk and protective actions
Res.B3b 3.3.1	Coordinate with Law Enforcement to monitor and enforce restrictions, if necessary
Res.B3b 3.1.4	Ensure appropriate judicial review of isolation and quarantine orders
Res.B3b 3.3.2	Coordinate with public health and medical services to ensure appropriate care for those individuals who have been isolated or quarantined
Res.B3b 3.3.2.1	Ensure critical medical care for any ill individuals (related to the epidemic or not)
Res.B3b 3.3.2.2	Coordinate comprehensive stress management strategies, programs, and crisis response teams for isolation and quarantine operations
Res.B3b 3.3.5	Assist public health in disease control, quarantine, containment, and eradication
Res.B3b 3.3.3	Coordinate with Mass Care to provide water, food, and bulk supplies to isolated and quarantined individuals
Res.B3b 3.3.3.1	Ensure that adequate food, water, and medication are provided to quarantined or isolated persons

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	(through public health officials; oversight by case manager) (Note: Not only public health officials, all appropriate sectors are involved in this)
Res.B3b 3.3.4	Coordinate with Public Works for retrieval and disposal of contaminated articles from homes or other locations where individuals are isolated or quarantined
Res.B3b 3.3.5	Coordinate with the agriculture community regarding potential animal influence on need for isolation/quarantine
Res.B3b 3.4.2	Report health status data on isolated and quarantined populations
Res.B3b 6.3.1.1	Monitor for fever or evidence of infection (quarantine) or progression of illness requiring hospitalization (isolation) by epidemic agent
Res.B3b 6.3.1.2	Identify and respond to adverse events (epidemic treatment or prophylaxis)
Pro.B1e 3.2.1	Maintain communication channels (CDC Coordinating Office for LRN)
Res.B3b 6.6	Have or have access to information systems to support monitoring adherence to isolation and quarantine measures that comply with the PHIN functional requirements for Countermeasure and Response Administration.

Performance Measures	Metric
Public health official with legal authority to issue isolation and quarantine orders is identified	Yes/No
Time to issue isolation and quarantine order	Within 4 hours of notification of need to implement isolation and quarantine
Time to provide educational information for release	Within 1 hour of order being issued
Time to notify and assemble medical resource personnel at isolation and quarantine areas	Within 8 to 12 hours of need to implement isolation and quarantine
Time to establish communications with public health officials and CDC	Within 30 minutes of need to implement isolation and quarantine

Activity: *Activate Isolation and Quarantine*

Definition: Initiate plan and mobilize (healthcare and security) personnel and resources to contain a communicable disease outbreak.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B3b 4.1	Identify community sites suitable for quarantine
Res.B3b 4.3	Issue isolation and quarantine order or an agreement for voluntary isolation
Res.B3b 4.3.1.1	Issue an order that closes public venues based on the recommendation of an epidemiologist.
Res.B3b 4.4	Disseminate guidelines for isolation and quarantine restrictions
Res.B3b 4.4.1	Disseminate protocols for isolation and care giver treatment of isolated individuals
Res.B3b 4.2	Stand up isolation and quarantine units
Res.B3b 4.4.2	Ensure mental health care and access to religious practices
Res.B3b 4.4.3	Ensure access to communication with family and friends to reduce unnecessary stress
Res.B3b 4.4.4	Provide personal protective equipment (PPE) and culturally and linguistically appropriate instruction in its use for household members and caregivers.

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Performance Measures	Metric
Time to stand up isolation and quarantine units	Within 12 to 24 hours of notification of need to implement isolation and quarantine
Time to deploy personnel to traveler screening locations	Within 2 hours of identifying screening locations
Time to disseminate restriction guidelines and treatment protocols to medical care providers	Within 2 hours of order being issued

Activity: *Implement Travel Restrictions*

Definition: Screen travelers and implement travel restrictions consistent with disease specific precautions.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B3b 5.1	Establish traveler screening locations
Res.B3b 5.2.1	Screen inbound/outbound travelers from outbreak or pandemic areas for illness or exposure
Res.B3b 5.2.2	Prevent boarding of potentially infected passengers in foreign countries with endemic disease
Res.B3b 5.2.3	Educate international travelers on health risks and symptoms
Res.B3b 5.2.4	Screen and educate all staff of outbound flights to exclude potentially infected passengers
Res.B3b 5.2.5	Isolate and quarantine potentially infected travelers

Performance Measures	Metric
Time to establish screening locations	Within 30 minutes of screener arrival onsite
Percent of inbound/outbound travelers screened while isolation and quarantine order is in effect	100%
Percent of screened positive persons isolated and quarantined	100%

Activity: *Implement Voluntary Isolation and Quarantine*

Definition: Within an identified geographic area, implement separation and restriction of movement of potentially exposed asymptomatic individuals and isolate symptomatic individuals on a voluntary basis.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B3b 6.1	Acquire identification information of affected individuals under voluntary isolation and quarantine
Res.B3b 6.2	Provide medical and supportive care guidance to community under voluntary isolation and quarantine
Res.B3b 6.5	Provide infection control education materials to community under voluntary isolation and quarantine and hospitals
Res.B3b 6.3.1	Monitor health status of voluntarily isolated and quarantined individuals and caregivers in the community and hospitals

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Res.B3b 6.4	Arrange for transportation to designated healthcare facilities of critically ill individuals under voluntary isolation and quarantine
Res.B3b 6.3.2	Monitor compliance in whatever way is necessary (e.g., direct communication with the person under order via land line)

Performance Measures	Metric
Percent of caregivers for isolated patients who become infected while under voluntary isolation and quarantine	0%
Frequency of updates to tracking system from voluntarily isolated or quarantined individuals while under voluntary isolation and quarantine	Daily
Percent of persons receiving care and prevention instruction while under voluntary isolation and quarantine	100%
Percent of caregivers using infection control precautions while under voluntary isolation and quarantine	100%

Activity: ***Implement Mandatory Isolation and Quarantine***

Definition: Ensure compliance with orders for separation and restriction of movement of potentially exposed asymptomatic individuals and isolation of symptomatic individuals within an identified geographic area.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B3b 7.1	Acquire identification information of affected individuals under mandatory isolation and quarantine
Res.B3b 7.2	Provide medical and supportive care guidance to affected population under mandatory isolation and quarantine
Res.B3b 7.3	Monitor compliance with infection control and mandatory restrictions of movement
Res.B3b 7.4	Monitor health status of individuals and caregivers under mandatory isolation and quarantine and hospital staff
Res.B3b 7.5	Arrange for transportation to designated healthcare facilities of critically ill individuals under mandatory isolation and quarantine

Performance Measures	Metric
Percentage of caregivers for isolated patients who become infected while under mandatory isolation and quarantine	0%
Frequency of updates to tracking system from isolated or quarantined individuals while under mandatory isolation and quarantine	Daily
Percent of persons receiving care and prevention instruction while under mandatory isolation and quarantine	100%
Percent of caregivers using infection control precautions while under mandatory isolation and quarantine	100%
Percent of isolated or quarantined persons receiving daily monitoring and compliance contact	100%

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Activity: *Demobilize Isolation and Quarantine*	
Definition: Upon isolation and quarantine order being lifted, decontaminate equipment, supplies and personnel if appropriate and demobilize.	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B3b 8.2	Participate in incident debriefing on isolation and quarantine implementation
Res.B3b 8.3	Release personnel supporting isolation and quarantine operations
Res.B3b 8.4	Reconstitute resources and facilities supporting isolation and quarantine operations

Performance Measures	**Metric**
Time to restore isolation and quarantine facilities to pre-incident operations	Within 7 days from isolation and quarantine order being lifted
Isolation and quarantine personnel debriefed	Yes/No

Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship
Emergency Operations Center Management	Emergency Operations Center Management provides resources to Isolation and Quarantine. Emergency Operations Center Management and Isolation and Quarantine provide each other with situation reports.
Public Safety and Security Response	Public Safety and Security Response provides perimeter and crowd control to Isolation and Quarantine.
Mass Care	Mass Care provides bulk distribution items to Isolation and Quarantine.
Emergency Public Information and Warning	Isolation and Quarantine provides care guidance to public and protective order information to Emergency Public Information and Warning for release to the public.
Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment	Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment transfers symptomatic persons to Isolation and Quarantine.
Long-Term Healthcare (under development)	Isolation and Quarantine transfers patients to new proposed Long-Term Healthcare capability.
Mass Prophylaxis	Mass Prophylaxis transfers symptomatic persons to Isolation and Quarantine.
Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation	Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation participates in order modification/evaluation with Isolation and Quarantine.
Fatality Management	Isolation and Quarantine transfers deceased persons to Fatality Management.
Debris and Hazardous Waste Management (under development)	Isolation and Quarantine disposes of biohazard waste material to a new proposed Debris and Hazardous Waste Management capability.
WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination	WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination provides technical decontamination to Isolation and Quarantine.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
Community Isolation/and Quarantine Teams	Teams located in district, county, and municipal office that comprise 6 officers per district or county team and 4 officers per municipal team
Federal Quarantine Stations	CDC Quarantine Stations provide advanced emergency response capabilities, including isolation and communications facilities; they include regional health officers to provide clinical, epidemiologic, and programmatic support, and quarantine public health officers to conduct surveillance and response and communicable disease prevention activities.

Planning Assumptions

- Although applicable to several of the 15 National Planning Scenarios, the capability planning factors were developed from an in-depth analysis of the pandemic influenza and plague scenarios. Other scenarios were reviewed to identify required adjustments or additions to the planning factors and national targets.
- Isolation and quarantine deals specifically with infectious diseases.
- Isolation and quarantine deals specifically with separation of individuals rather than prohibition on structures.
- This capability refinement addresses community separation and not hospitalized patients.
- Recognition and assessment of exposure to an illness is an epidemiological function.
- 50 percent of infected persons are asymptomatic shedders of the influenza virus
- Shedding of the virus occurs 24 hours before the development of symptoms.
- Cases are occurring in a single wave over 8 weeks. The response is an evolving process – it has a phased approach.
- Number of days in quarantine are 10 to 14 days (epidemiological evidence may allow for a reduction in this time).
- Number of days in isolation varies by age (7 days for adults; 14 days for children).
- World Health Organization (WHO) pandemic influenza phase: Phases 1 and 2 are interpandemic; 3, 4, and 5 are pandemic alert; 6 is pandemic period. General preparedness activities have occurred in WHO Phases 1 – 3.
- WHO Phase 1 – 3: General Preparedness activities.
- In WHO Phase 4, cases are occurring outside of the USA.
- WHO Phase 4, if there is extensive trade or travel links with the affected country, and WHO Phase 5 are the most important when considering isolation and quarantine.
- WHO Phase 5 is larger clusters, more transmission, suggesting that the virus is becoming more adoptive to human transmission.
- WHO Phase 5 is most important when considering Isolation and Quarantine.
- Setup isolation/quarantine stations in each foreign country that is a source of the infection.
- Under the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), there are 83 tier 1 cities in the United States (i.e. airports with more than 1 million travelers, seaports with more than 100k travelers, or land borders with more than 5 million crossings); currently there are stations at 18 of these cities.
- Screening for inbound/outbound flights will be needed.
- WHO Phase 6 try and isolate 10 cases per million population. Sustained community transmission is assumed to be occurring when cases exceed 10 per million population.

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- Attempt to quarantine 30 contacts per case (300 contacts per 1 million population).
- This will be community based rather than hospitalized patients.
- Closing of public venues may be retained here.
- There is a high percentage of absenteeism related to medical, traditional first responder, and public health personnel.
- Isolation orders will be based on a case definition, not strictly on laboratory test results.
- At least eight other countries are affected.
- Resources for provision of mental health services are not defined in this capability.
- Resources for provision of law enforcement are not defined in this capability.
- Resources for public information are not defined in this capability.

Planning Factors from an In-Depth Analysis of a Scenario with Significant Demand for the Capability (Pandemic Influenza and Plague)

Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Community Isolation/and Quarantine Team	One per 20 persons isolated or quarantined.	Isolate 10 per million population; quarantine 300 per million population. Current population of the USA is 297 million. Need to isolate 2970 persons and quarantine 89,100 persons. Total 92,070, divided by 20 =4,604. Could be reduced by number of hospital isolations — need to cross-reference with HRSA.	
Federal Quarantine Station	Two per 83 Tier One Cities, plus one per affected overseas country.	Provide isolation and quarantine services to inbound and outbound passengers in Tier One cities.	

Approaches for Large-Scale Events

- Community Isolation/Quarantine Teams need to be situated locally.
- Federal Quarantine Stations need to be located in tier 1 cities (those that have airports with more than 1 million travelers, seaports with more than 100,000 travelers, or land borders with more than 5 million crossings). Note that 18 Federal Quarantine Stations currently exist in tier 1 cities.

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National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
Cities/ Municipal	Community Isolation & Quarantine Team	Resource Organization	1	Per jurisdiction affected	All Activities
District/ County	Community Isolation & Quarantine Team	Resource Organization	1	Per district/county affected	All Activities
Centers for Disease Control	Federal quarantine station	Resource Organization	1	Per Tier 1 City	Implement Travel Restrictions
World Health Organization (WHO)	Quarantine Station	Resource Organization	1	Per pandemic agent source country	Implement Travel Restrictions

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URBAN SEARCH & RESCUE

Capability Definition

Urban Search & Rescue is the capability to coordinate and conduct urban search and rescue (US&R) response efforts for all hazards, including searching affected areas for victims (human and animal) and locating, accessing, medically stabilizing, and extricating victims from the damaged area.

Outcome

The greatest numbers of victims (human and animal) are rescued and transferred to medical or mass care capabilities, in the shortest amount of time, while maintaining rescuer safety.

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

This capability supports the Emergency Support Function (ESF) #9: Urban Search and Rescue.

Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Critical Preparedness Tasks	
Res.B4a 1.1.1	Incorporate Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) plans, procedures into jurisdiction's Emergency Operations Procedures (EOP) or EOP Annexes
Res.B4a 1.3.2	Pre-identify typed US&R resources
Res.B4a 1.3.3	Develop resource allocation processes and procedures for US&R capable resources that are also support other capabilities/functions
Res.B4a 1.3.4	Identify resources from other agencies or capabilities that may assist with US&R, and plan to integrate such additional resources as necessary
Res.B4a 1.2.1	Develop plan to incorporate nationally certified US&R volunteers
Res.B4a 1.2.2	Develop a management plan to address uncertified volunteers
Res.B4a 1.1.2	Develop plan for US&R teams that will be deployed out-of-region to be self-sustaining for 72 hours

Preparedness Measures	**Metrics**
Scale of jurisdiction's urban search and rescue capability is related to risk/threat analysis	Yes/No
Team is equipped in accordance with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) Resource Typing System	Yes/No
Federal, State, regional, and local US&R Capabilities are NIMS Compliant	Yes/No

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Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs	
Critical Preparedness Tasks	
Res.B4a 2.1.1	Establish training and exercise program for US&R personnel as per EOP
Res.B4a 2.1.2	Train and equip US&R personnel to the appropriate standards commensurate with their mission

Preparedness Measures	Metric
Training and exercises program established	Ongoing, annual
US&R personnel trained and equipped as per EOP and SOPs	Yes/No

Performance Measures and Metrics and Critical Tasks

Activity: *Direct Urban Search & Rescue Tactical Operations* Definition: In response to notification of entrapment, provide management and coordination of US&R capability, through demobilization for single or multiple teams.	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B4a 3.1	Receive and accept Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) request/activation order
Res.B4a 3.2	Participate in US&R planning process and operational briefings
Res.B4a 3	Direct and coordinate US&R tactical operations
Res.B4a 3.4.1	Direct Urban Search & Rescue (US&R) resources according to the National Incident Management System (NIMS), the Incident Command System (ICS), and consensus-level technical rescue standards.
Res.B4a 3.4.3	Determine need for deployment of additional US&R resources
Res.B4a 3.6.1	Provide timely situational and resource awareness and response information
Res.B4a 3.6.2	Document and collect US&R operations information, including chronological log of events in the field
Res.B4a 3.7.3	Re-assign/rotate technical specialists, as needed
Res.B4a 3.2.1	Identify logistics capability of incident site to determine whether deployed US&R teams must be self-sustaining
Res.B4a 3.7	Develop demobilization/reassignment plan which includes long-term follow-up on personnel for exposure, psychological, or emotional issues resulting from the incident

Performance Measures	Metric
Situation and resource status information received	Every 30 minutes and after a significant change
Number of US&R personnel injured during US&R efforts	Less than (1) loss-time injury per deployment
Time in which tactical plan is developed and implemented by State, regional, and/or local US&R, based on the incident action plan (IAP)	Within 2 hrs of arrival on-scene

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Time in which tactical plan is developed and implemented by Federal US&R resource(s) based on the incident action plan (IAP)	Within 4 hrs of arrival on-scene
Demobilization/reassignment plan is developed and takes into account long-term personnel follow-up	Yes/No

Activity: *Activate Urban Search & Rescue*

Definition: In response to notification, mobilize and arrive at the incident scene to begin operations.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B4a 4.3	Participate in Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) planning process and operational briefings
Res.B4a 4.2	Initiate mobilization procedure
Res.B4a 4.2.1	Assemble personnel and equipment at Incident Command-designated location
Res.B4a 4.1.2	Deploy Federal, State, regional or local US&R resources commensurate with request
Res.B4a 4.2.2	Transport team (personnel and equipment) to Incident Command-designated location
Res.B4a 4.2.3	Collect and analyze incident information to assist US&R capability deployment decisions

Performance Measures	Metric
Time for local US&R capability to arrive on-scene	Within 2 hours of notification
Time for regional US&R capability to arrive on-scene	Within 12 hours of notification
Time from request to deployment of federally designated US&R capable resources	Within 6 hours of task force notification
Time for first activated Federal US&R resources to arrive on-scene	Within 24 hours of activation

Activity: *Provide Materiel and Other Support*

Definition: Upon arriving on scene, provide, track, and maintain equipment and supplies as well as support base of operations.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B4a 4.3	Participate in US&R planning process and operational briefings
Res.B4a 5.1	Integrate into base of operations
Res.B4a 5.2	Maintain accountability of team equipment/supplies
Res.B4a 5.1.1	Coordinate medical care for US&R personnel, including service animals

Performance Measures	Metric
Time to establish functional Base of Operation and be ready to support initial US&R operations	Within 60 minutes of arrival at incident site
Percentage of accountability for team equipment/supplies is maintained	100%

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Duration of time for which US&R capability can sustain its own operations without additional resources	Deployable US&R capability up to 72 hours Local US&R as per SOP
Percentage of US&R personnel and service animals whose health is monitored at least once per work cycle	100%

Activity: *Conduct US&R Reconnaissance*

Definition: Once on scene and equipped, provide rapid assessment of assigned US&R work areas and recommend search priorities/tactics to management.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B4a 6.1.1	Assess stability of incident site to determine urban search and rescue tactical options in accordance with SOP
Res.B4a 6.1.2	Assess the incident site for hazardous materials (hazmat) and other dangerous conditions
Res.B4a 6.1.3	Develop sketch map of assigned area
Res.B4a 6.3	Communicate findings and recommend priorities to US&R Division Supervisor/Branch Director

Performance Measures	Metric
Time for reconnaissance team to provide preliminary recommendation on search priorities and strategy	Less than 1 hour

Activity: *Search*

Definition: Upon being assigned search area, begins search operations.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B4a 4.3	Participate in US&R planning process and operational briefings
Res.B4a 7.1	Ensure scene/site safety (security, shoring, debris)
Res.B4a 7.2	Conduct area search for victims
Res.B4a 7.2.1	Search for victims using canine, physical, and technological search capabilities
Res.B4a 7.2.2	Identify and record potential/actual victim locations (live and dead)
Res.B4a 7.3	Direct ambulatory victims to safe assembly point
Res.B4a 7.4	Provide periodic progress reports while searching
Res.B4a 7.5	Maintain accountability for search personnel, equipment, and supplies

Performance Measures	Metric
Percentage of assigned area searched	100%
Time in which systematic search of an area affected by a large-scale emergency is initiated	Within 30 minutes after operations briefing
Percentage of ambulatory victims directed to safe assembly point	100%
Updated situation and resource status report	Every 30 minutes and after major change in

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	conditions

Activity: *Extricate* **Definition: Upon notification of location of victim, perform extrication.**	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B4a 4.3	Participate in US&R planning process and operational briefings
Res.B4a 7.1	Ensure scene/site safety
Res.B4a 8.1.1	Coordinate extrication strategy with medical personnel
Res.B4a 8.1	Extricate trapped victims
Res.B4a 8.2	Provide periodic progress reports while rescuing
Res.B4a 8.3	Maintain accountability of extrication personnel, equipment, and supplies

Performance Measures	**Metric**
Degree to which dangerous conditions affecting extrication were mitigated to allow worker and victim safety in accordance with SOP	100%
Updated situation and resource status report	Every 30 minutes and after major change in conditions
Percentage of located victims extricated	100%

Activity: *Provide Medical Treatment* **Definition: Upon access to victim, coordinate with medical personnel to treat and transfer victim to more definitive medical care.**	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B4a 4.3	Participate in US&R planning process and operational briefings
Res.B4a 9.1.1	Coordinate medical treatment with extrication and medical personnel
Res.B4a 9.2	Res.B.4 4.3.4.4 – Transfer victims to more definitive medical care
Res.B4a 9.1.2	Provide periodic progress reports while medically stabilizing victim
Res.B4a 9.3	Maintain accountability of medical personnel, equipment, and supplies

Performance Measures	**Metric**
Percent of victims whose standard of care is maintained according to local medical protocols	100%
Percent of time resources were identified to transfer patient to more definitive medical care	100% of the time

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Activity: *Demobilize/Redeploy US&R*	
Definition: Upon completion of assigned mission, disengage from incident site, and debrief personnel.	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B4a 10.2.1	Repackage equipment cache
Res.B4a 10.2	Demobilize base of operations
Res.B4a 10.1.1	Arrange transportation for personnel and equipment
Res.B4a 10.1.2	Debrief US&R capability personnel before leaving the scene

Performance Measures	**Metric**
Time in which equipment cache is re-inventoried and packaged for transport	Within 12 hours of start of demobilization
Time in which base of operations is returned to original conditions	Within 12 hours of start of demobilization process
US&R task force is debriefed before leaving the scene	Yes/No

Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship
On-Site Incident Management	US&R capability management integrates itself into the local Incident Command/Unified Command system.
WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination	US&R capability coordinates with WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination to identify hazardous conditions, ensure US&R members have appropriate protective clothing and equipment, and ensure US&R personnel and equipment are appropriately decontaminated.
Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment	US&R capability coordinates with Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment to ensure medical care of victims during and after extricated
Public Safety and Security Response	US&R capability relies upon Public Safety and Security Response assistance to secure search and rescue sites, safely divert public from the area, and to provide security support for the US&R Base of Operations.
Mass Care	US&R capability notifies Mass Care of location of people and companion animals encountered during course of search and rescue operations.
Animal Health Emergency Support	US&R capability notifies Animal Health Emergency Support of location of livestock, dangerous animals, and injured wildlife encountered during course of search and rescue operations.
Fatality Management	US&R capability notifies Fatality Management of location of remains encountered during search and rescue operations.
Responder Health & Safety Capability	US&R capability relies upon responder health and safety for site hazards to help ensure that appropriate precautions are identified and that personnel protective equipment/supplies are available to protect US&R personnel.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
Type I US&R Task Force (TF)	Per NIMS
Type II Collapse Search and Rescue Team	Per NIMS
Type II Heavy Rescue Strike Team	Per NIMS
Type II Heavy Rescue Squad	Per NIMS
Type I Large Animal Rescue Strike Team	Per NIMS
Type I Small Animal Rescue Strike Team	Per NIMS

Planning Assumptions

General

- Although applicable to several of the 15 National Planning Scenarios, the capability planning factors were developed from an in-depth analysis of the Toxic Industrial Chemical scenario. Other scenarios were reviewed to identify required adjustments or additions to the planning factors and national targets.
- This capability applies to a wide range of incidents and emergencies, including improvised nuclear devices, toxic industrial chemical scenarios, major earthquakes or hurricanes, and radiological dispersal devices. The primary condition affecting the performance of the capability is whether the incident requires an urban search and rescue or water search and rescue. For urban search and rescue, conditions affecting the performance include the number and size of collapsed structures, number of trapped persons in collapsed structures, and any risks involved for the rescuers (including fire and potential hazardous materials (hazmat) exposure).
- Local response time: 0–2 hours
- Regional response time: 2–17 hours
- State response time: 12–24 hours
- Federal response time: 24+ hours
- Given that US&R is extremely time-sensitive, initial operations will be undertaken by State and local responders and those volunteer personnel willing to assist in locating victims. If the catastrophic incident involves collapsed buildings, national US&R task force response assets will immediately deploy in accordance with the Catastrophic Incident Response Execution Schedule (Annex 1).
- All injuries and fatalities need to be extricated.
- All locations need hazmat assessment for proper personal protective equipment (PPE).
- Typical fire and hazmat response has PPE to extricate lightly trapped victims.
- US&R strike teams begin to extricate moderately trapped victims.
- US&R task forces extricate heavily trapped victims.
- Trapped victims surviving the initial exposure will be viable.
- Trapped victims have the best chance of survival if they are rescued within 72 hours. They may survive up to 14 days if provided drinking water.

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- The doctrine of "do no additional harm" will apply to all US&R operations. Urban search and rescue personnel will take into consideration the dangers of contamination and unstable physical structures before entering into an area that may contain surviving victims and will take appropriate safety and protective measures before commencing operations.
- The size of the jurisdiction and the risks/threats present will determine how extensive the US&R capability needs to be.
- Jurisdictions may be able to obtain US&R resources that are sufficient to meet that jurisdiction's needs from elsewhere.
- Training should be commensurate with population and risk.
- US&R resource may not be available due to other incidents or activities in the area.
- Location, distance, available transportation, and weather affect how quickly US&R resources can reach the scene.
- Type of US&R resource deploying will affect what type of equipment it has and how long it can conduct US&R operations without re-supply.
- When there is a base camp with sufficient resources US&R teams may not need to be self-sustaining
- Hazardous conditions, weather, size of area, scope, access, criminal activity (hazard) determines level of work-area access and efficiency with which areas can be searched for victims.
- Complexity and circumstances of the entrapment affects the amount of time required to safely access, stabilize, and extricate victim.
- Not all US&R resources have integrated confined space medical components thus the care available to the victim will depend on the type of US&R team providing treatment throughout the extrication process.
- Intensity of equipment and personnel utilization will increase or decrease duration each US&R capability is able to work.
- The level of effort required to restore (or replace) equipment cache items will depend on how heavily they were used and the extent to which they need to be decontaminated/cleaned

Planning Factors from an In-Depth Analysis of a Scenario with Significant Demand for the Capability (Toxic Industrial Chemical)

Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Type I US&R Task Force	Extrication of victims in 24 hrs: Heavy construction (HC): Entombed: 4 Structurally trapped: 12 Nonstructurally trapped: 20 Light construction (LC): Entombed: 8 Structurally trapped: 24 Nonstructurally trapped: 40	HC: 20 maximum rescued per day LC: 40 maximum rescued per day	1350 victims trapped 50% trapped in HC (675) 675 victims/3 day optimum rescue = 225 225 victims/20 maximum = 11.25 Type I US&R Teams for 3 days 1350 victims trapped 50% trapped in LC (675) 675 victims/3 day optimum rescue = 225 225 victims/40 maximum = 5.6 Type I US&R Teams for 3 days
Type II Collapse	Extrication of victims in 12 hrs:	HC: 18 maximum	Requires 2 teams, each

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Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Search and Rescue Team	HC: Entombed: 1 Structurally trapped: 3 Nonstructurally trapped: 5 LC: Entombed: 2 Structurally trapped: 6 Nonstructurally trapped: 10	rescued per 24 hours LC: 36 maximum rescued per 24 hours	having 1 12-hour operational period
Type II Heavy Rescue Strike Team	Extrication of victims in 12 hrs: HC: Nonstructurally trapped: 6 LC: Structurally trapped: 6 Nonstructurally trapped: 9	HC: 12 maximum rescued per day LC: 30 maximum rescued per day	Requires 2 teams, each having 1 12-hour operational period
Type II Heavy Rescue Squad	Extrication of victims in 12 hrs: LC: Structurally trapped: 2 Nonstructurally trapped: 3	LC: 10 maximum rescued per day	Requires 2 teams, each having 1 12-hour operational period
Type I Large Animal Rescue Strike Team	This six-member team should be capable of completing an average of one rescue every 30 minutes in a suburban setting and one rescue every hour in rural settings. These times would be semi-dependent on uncontrollable factors such as terrain, weather, road conditions, and distance between rescue sites.		Number of teams ordered will be based on number of rescues anticipated.
Type I Small Animal Rescue Strike Team	This six-member team should be capable of completing an average of one rescue every 30 minutes in a suburban setting and one rescue every hour in rural settings. These times would be semi-dependent on uncontrollable factors such as terrain, weather, road conditions, and distance between rescue sites.		Number of teams ordered will be based on number of rescues anticipated.

Approaches for Large-Scale Events

- During incidents, licensing and certifications need to be national and not restricted by State borders. A border should not determine the location of a resource.

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- Basic disaster training should be standard, such as that sanctioned by NIMS and the National Response Plan (NRP), to allow more personnel to be used on the day of the incident
- Training must be coordinated at the Federal level
- FEMA, in coordination with the Department of State (DOS), will coordinate the use and employment of international urban search and rescue assets/resources if the level of response will overwhelm our national capability

National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
DHS	Type 1 US&R Task Force (TF)	Resource Organization	1	Per each pre-determined location	All US&R Activities
City	Type II Collapse Search and Rescue Team	Resource Organization	1	Per population > 100k	All US&R Activities
City	Type II Heavy Rescue Squad	Resource Organization	1	Per population >25k but <100k	All US&R Activities

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EMERGENCY PUBLIC INFORMATION AND WARNING

Capability Definition

The Emergency Public Information and Warning capability includes public information, alert/warning and notification. It Involves developing, coordinating, and disseminating information to the public, coordinating officials, and incident management and responders across all jurisdictions and disciplines effectively under all hazard conditions.

(a) The term "public information" refers to any text, voice, video, or other information provided by an authorized official and includes both general information and crisis and emergency risk communication (CERC) activities. CERC incorporates the urgency of disaster communication with risk communication to influence behavior and adherence to directives.

(b) The term "alert" refers to any text, voice, video, or other information provided by an authorized official to provide situational awareness to the public and/or private sector about a potential or ongoing emergency situation that may require actions to protect life, health, and property. An alert does not necessarily require immediate actions to protect life, health, and property and is typically issued in connection with immediate danger.

(c) The term "warning" refers to any text, voice, video, or other information provided by an authorized official to provide direction to the public and/or private sector about an ongoing emergency situation that requires immediate actions to protect life, health, and property. A warning requires immediate actions to protect life, health, and property and is typically issued when there is a confirmed threat posing an immediate danger to the public.

(d) The term "notification" refers to any process where Federal, State, local, tribal, and nongovernmental organization, department, and/or agency employees and/or associates are informed of an emergency situation that may require a response from those notified.

(e) Public Information, Alert/Warning, and Notification refers to the collection of policies, procedures, processes, plans, and coordination involved in disseminating information to the following three primary audience groups:

(1) The Public – Any persons not performing an official duty as a response or coordinating official or agent of the Federal, State, local, tribal or nongovernmental response entities. The term "public" also includes special, vulnerable, and at-risk populations that are economically disadvantaged, have limited language proficiency, have disabilities (physical, mental, sensory or cognitive limitations), experience cultural or geographic isolation, or are vulnerable due to age.

(2) Federal, State, local, tribal, and nongovernmental (NGO) coordinating officials – Decision making authorities that are not directly responding to incidents but play a role in the development, delivery, monitoring and management of information.

(3) Incident Management and Responders – Any persons responsible for the coordination of response activity and any indvidual that is officially part of a response effort.

Outcome

Government agencies and public and private sectors receive and transmit coordinated, prompt, useful, and reliable information regarding threats to their health, safety, and property, through clear, consistent information delivery systems. This information is updated regularly and outlines protective measures that can be taken by individuals and their communities.

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Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

This capability supports the following Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) and Annex:

ESF #5: Emergency Management
ESF #15: External Affairs
Public Affairs Support Annex

Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B1f 1.2.2	Identify all pertinent stakeholders across all disciplines and incorporate them into the information flow through a clearly defined information sharing system
Res.B1f 1.1.1	Develop plans, procedures, and polices for coordinating, managing, and disseminating public information effectively under all hazards and conditions
Res.B1f 1.1.2	Develop plans, procedures, and polices for coordinating, managing, and disseminating alerts and warnings effectively under all hazards and conditions
Res.B1f 1.1.3	Develop plans, procedures, and polices for coordinating, managing, and disseminating notifications effectively under all hazards and conditions
Res.B1f 1.2	Develop communication plans, policies, procedures, and systems that support required information sharing and communications across stakeholders to support public information, alert/warning, and notification
Res.B1f 1.3	Develop crisis and emergency risk communication (CERC) plan
Res.B1f 1.3.2	Develop and maintain emergency declaration protocols and templates
Res.B1f 1.4.1	Develop procedures for disseminating information on the re-entry of citizens
Res.B1f 1.2.6	Develop a communication network with State homeland security departments
Res.B1f 1.2.1	Develop programs and systems to process the inflow of public-related information from all sources in a timely fashion
Res.B1f 1.2.3	Develop procedures to ensure that information provided by all sources includes the necessary content to enable reviewers to determine its authenticity and potential validity.
Res.B1f 1.1	Prepare emergency public information plans.
Res.B1f 1.3.1	Develop plans, procedures, programs and systems to rapidly control rumors by correcting misinformation
Res.B1f 1.1.5	Develop community-based mechanisms to support providing prompt, accurate information to the public in the dominant languages of the community and languages and formats appropriate for those with limited language competence, disabilities, cultural or geographic isolation, or vulnerabilities due to age
Res.B1f 1.1.4	Develop emergency plans that take into account special needs populations

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Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Res.B1f 1.2.3	Develop emergency plans that are community-based and include outreach and education to the public, through community and faith-based organizations and other institutions to promote individual preparedness based on the risks in their communities
Res.B1f 1.2.4	Establish neighborhood pre-disaster and post-disaster information centers at schools, the work place, libraries, shopping centers, places of worship, and other community institutions, to provide information on evacuations and the location of disaster assistance sites

Preparedness Measures	Metrics
The emergency operations plan (EOP) provides for enacting the public information function	Yes/No
The emergency operations plan (EOP) provides for enacting the alert/warning function	Yes/No
The emergency operations plan (EOP) provides for enacting the notification function	Yes/No
The emergency operations plan (EOP) provides a communications strategy to engage the media to ensure accurate information is disseminated	Yes/No
The emergency operations plan (EOP) provides for establishing a Joint Information System (JIS)	Yes/No
The emergency operations plan (EOP) provides procedures for use when normal information sources (i.e. TV) are lost	Yes/No
Emergency alert system (EAS) activation plan is in place	Yes/No
Public awareness and education plan is in place with all appropriate agencies and partners	Yes/No
Plans for Joint Information Center (JIC) include multi-jurisdictional, multi-disciplinary agencies, the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, and staffing JIC functions	Yes/No
Communications plan in place to communicate changes in threat level (in the Homeland Security Advisory System) to the public	Yes/No
Public Information Field Guide is in place	Yes/No
Public Information Field Guide includes protocols for interfacing with the media, legislative interests, officials and celebrities, community-citizens, and tribal, city, county, State, Federal, and private industry leaders	Yes/No
Public Information Field Guide includes a listing of homeland security and emergency management sources of information and updatable media lists	Yes/No
Public Information Field Guide includes protocols for operating in Joint Information Center (JIC)	Yes/No
Crisis and emergency risk communications (CERC) plans are in place	Yes/No
Public Information Field Guide includes protocols for identification of resources and responsibilities in advance of an accident	Yes/No
Procedures are in place for rapidly deploying public affairs teams, which are self-sufficient, established across all Federal departments and agencies with key Homeland Security responsibilities, and can deploy	Yes/No
Procedures following standards set by the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1600 are in place for communicating with internal groups and individuals about disasters and emergencies	Yes/No

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Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Procedures following standards set by the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1600 are in place for communicating with external groups and individuals about disasters and emergencies	Yes/No
Procedures and protocols exist to communicate and coordinate effectively with other JICs and other incident command system (ICS) components, structured according to the incident command, unified command, or area command	Yes/No
Preparedness information is widely distributed in languages appropriate to the cultural and ethnic needs of the populations of the area	Yes/No
Information dissemination and alert/warning mechanisms are structured so that private sector entities receive accurate, timely, and unclassified information	Yes/No
Plans and procedures are in place to update alerts/warning frequently	Yes/No
Plans and procedures are in place to receive and archive responses from stakeholders that have been previously notified	Yes/No
Plans and procedures are in place for how notification of recovery assistance information will be disseminated to the public	Yes/No
Post-incident containment informational program is established	Yes/No

Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs	
Critical Tasks	
Res.B1f 2.1.1	Develop and implement awareness training about public information
Res.B1f 2.2	Develop and implement public information, alert/warning, and notification training and exercise programs.
Res.B1f 2.2.2	Incorporate public information function as part of multi-discipline response operations exercises
Res.B1f 2.1.3	Ensure potential spokespersons identified to provide information during an emergency have been trained in the principles of Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication (CERC)
Res.B1f 2.2.1	Develop tests, and exercise the plan to enhance its effectiveness
Res.B1f 2.1.2	Develop and conduct training to improve all-hazard incident management capability
Res.B1f 2.2.3	Conduct an after action review to determine strengths and shortfalls and develop a corrective plan accordingly

Preparedness Measures	Metric
All appropriate agencies and personnel are trained in and exercise the Emergency Alert System (EAS) plan	Annually
Frequency in which Joint Information Center (JIC) deployment and operations are exercised	Annually
Plans and procedures are tested to ensure accuracy and completeness	Annually

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Public awareness and education plan is updated	Annually
Emergency risk communications plan is exercised	Annually
Emergency Operations Plans are exercised	Annually
Alert and warning systems are exercised	Quarterly
Exercise community-based mechanisms to support providing prompt, accurate information to the public in the dominant languages of the community and languages and formats appropriate for those with limited language proficiency, disabilities, cultural or geographic isolation, or vulnerabilities due to age	Annually
Relevant staff are trained on public information, alert/warning, and notification policy and procedures	100%

Performance Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: ***Manage Emergency Public Information and Warnings***

Definition: In recognition of likely hazards provide management and coordination of public information, alert/warning, and notification activities.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1f 3.1.1	Coordinate internal information programs
Res.B1f 3.1.2	Coordinate external information programs
Res.B1f 3.1	Coordinate public emergency information
Res.B1f 3.1.5	Implement government agency and nongovernmental organization notification protocols and procedures
Res.B1f 3.4.1	Implement a community relations plan for ensuring continued communications with citizens and city, county, tribal, State, Federal, and private industry leaders
Res.B1f 3.3.1	Plan and coordinate warnings, instructions and information updates
Res.B1f 3.3.1	Coordinate with EOC/responders for public safety concerns that need to be disseminated
Res.B1f 3.3.4	Identify information transfer between and among Incident Command Post concerning pubic information
Res.B1f 3.3.5	Monitor communications and information systems as needed to identify information to be disseminated to public
Res.B1f 3.3.6	Coordinate with law enforcement and provide media outlets to provide the public with accurate, consistent and timely information
Res.B1f 3.3.7	Coordinate with intelligence information to provide States, local, and tribal authorities with clearly defined information needs based on the threat environment
Res.B1f 3.3.8	Coordinate dissemination of incident site information within a National Incident Management System (NIMS) compliant framework
Res.B1f 3.1.3	Implement international affairs operations

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Performance Measures	Metric
Time to develop initial communications strategy in collaboration with interagency partners	Within 90 minutes of the incident
During an incident, plan and coordinate public warnings, instructions, and information updates	Continuously
Mechanism exists to supply States, local, and tribal authorities with clear and easy to understand information based on the threat environment	Yes/No
Public information, alert/warning and notifications are managed according to the established plan	Yes/No

Activity: ***Activate Public Information, Alert/Warning, and Notification Plans***

Definition: Activate key personnel, facilities, and procedures.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1f 4.4	Activate and establish Joint Information System (JIS)
Res.B1f 4.2.6	Activate and deploy public information/affairs personnel
Res.B1f 4.2.1	Assign Public Information Officer (PIO)
Res.B1f 4.2.2	Identify appropriate spokesperson(s)
Res.B1f 4.1.5	Activate the Homeland Security Advisory System, as appropriate
Res.B1f 6.1.2	Notify, as the first responding agency, both public and private partner agencies regarding Joint Information Center (JIC) activation
Res.B1f 4.2	Ensure appropriate representation of all relevant public affairs entities, to include nongovernmental organizations and the private sector, in any Joint Information Center (JIC) that is established by the government
Res.B1f 4.1.1	Identify public information needs of the affected area
Res.B1f 4.3	Disseminate domestic and international travel advisories

Performance Measures	Metric
Time for notification of partner agencies by the designated or assigned public information officer (PIO) at the initial responding agency	Within an hour of notification to respond to the incident
Contact information for public and private partners is current and available	Yes/No
Emergency Operations Plan is activated	Yes/No
All JIC personnel are registered	Yes/No
All JIC personnel are briefed	Yes/No
Information is delivered to stakeholders based on security clearance level	Yes/No
Appropriate spokesperson is identified	Within an hour of opening JIC

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Activity: ***Issue Public Information, Alerts/Warnings, and Notifications***

Definition: Issue public information, alerts, warnings, and notifications through established systems to the public, coordinating officials, and incident managers and responders.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1f 5.1	Disseminate crisis and emergency risk communication emergency (CERC) information to the media, public, partners and stakeholders
Res.B1f 5.2	Implement communications and warning system to include the media, the Emergency Alert System (EAS) and other warning systems that take into account special needs/disabilities
Res.B1f 5.2.5	Provide emergency information to the public that is verified, accurate, and as up-to-date as possible
Res.B1f 5.3	Ensure accurate and timely dissemination of reactive and protective action messages to general public and emergency personnel
Res.B1f 5.2.1	Disseminate prompt, accurate information to the public in languages appropriate to the cultural and ethnic needs of the populations in the area and formats/media that take into account special needs/disabilities
Res.B1f 5.1.1	Coordinate the provision of timely and accurate emergency public information through the Joint Information System (JIS)
Res.B1f 5.2.4	Provide emergency public information to special, vulnerable, and at-risk populations that are economically disadvantaged, have limited language proficiency, have disabilities (physical, mental, sensory, or cognitive limitations), experience cultural or geographic isolation, or are vulnerable due to age
Res.B1f 5.3.3	Activate Rapid Response Plan for rumor control and correcting misinformation
Res.B1f 5.2.2	Disseminate critical health and safety information designed to alert the public to clinical symptoms and reduce the risk of exposure to ongoing and potential hazards.
Res.B1f 5.7	Disseminate guidance for the public regarding appropriate donation methods and volunteer activities

Performance Measures	**Metric**
Time from threat notification to activation of warning systems	Within one half hour of notification
Population is notified of an emergency utilizing multiple available warning systems	Yes/No
Notifications are communicated to appropriate individuals and special needs groups in accordance with the public awareness and education plan	Yes/No
Alert/warning systems and media outlets are monitored to assure the proper message is delivered	Yes/No
System is in place to receive response to interagency notifications previously sent out (if required)	Yes/No
System is in place to conduct public information activities, as needed	

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Activity: *Establish Joint Information Center*

Definition: Activate and implement a Joint Information Center (JIC) and disseminate information to public.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1f 6.1	Activate Joint Information Center (JIC) to include nongovernmental and private-sector partners as appropriate
Res.B1f 6.2	Coordinate emergency public information through the Joint Information System (JIS).
Res.B1f 6.1.3	Provide a central contact for the media through the Joint Information Center (JIC), ensuring a "one accurate message, many voices" approach to information dissemination
Res.B1f 6.2.2	Coordinate among Joint Information Centers (JICs) at all levels of government
Res.B1f 6.2.1	Implement routing and approval protocols for release of information
Res.B1f 6.2.3	Provide for external media support and operations
Res.B1f 6.1.1	Establish adequate numbers of trained personnel at dispatch or communications centers to process and disseminate information

Performance Measures	Metric
Time to active a JIC	Within the first 2 hours of notification of threat or incident
JIC personnel that have been vetted and credentialed	100%
JIC chain of command and operations management chain of command are established	Yes/No
Regularly scheduled updates are provided for JIC personnel	Yes/No
Written documentation or log is kept for major JIC activity	Yes/No

Activity: *Conduct Joint Information Center Operations*

Definition: Upon activation of the JIC, monitor media conduct press briefings.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1f 7.2.1	Provide periodic updates and conduct regularly scheduled media conferences
Res.B1f 7.2.5	Track media contacts and public inquiries, listing contact, date, time, query, and outcome
Res.B1f 7.2.4	Monitor media coverage of event to ensure that information is accurately relayed
Res.B1f 7.2.6.1	Correct misinformation before next news cycle
Res.B1f 7.2.6	Issue corrective message when errors are recognized in previous public announcements
Res.B1f 7.2.7	Establish frequently updated public information hotline

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Res.B1f 7.1.2	Receive, authenticate, and screen information for relevance at the supervisory level in a timely manner
Res.B1f 7.1.4	Use a NIMS compliance framework for coordinating incident related communications
Res.B1f 7.2.8	Provide for rumor control within information network
Res.B1f 7.5	Prepare post-incident information

Performance Measures	Metric
Time to alert media of JIC activation and how to access services	Within 2 hours of JIC activation
Time in which first formal news conference is held	Within 3 hours of incident, as appropriate
Time to release public messages providing information on how to apply for individual assistance	Within 24 hours of incident, as appropriate
Inaccuracies are addressed on a timely basis	Prior to next news cycle
Time in which public information hotline is activated	Within 4 hours of incident
Hotline information is updated as required to ensure that the most accurate information is distributed in a timely fashion	Continuously while hotline is active
Alerts/warnings and notifications are provided to planners and decision makers at all levels as appropriate	Continuously
Information is authenticated and screened for relevance at the supervisory level	As received
First responders are notified of new and developing information	As authenticated

Activity: ***Demobilize Emergency Public Information and Warning***

Definition: Upon deciding public information services are no longer needed, close the JIC and demobilize personnel.

Critical Tasks	
Res.B1f 8.2	Disseminate notice of JIC closure to all Federal, State, local, tribal, and nongovernmental stakeholders and the media
Res.B1f 8.3	Archive important records of JIC activities and NIMS compliant records
Res.B1f 8.1	Demobilize JIC personnel and facilities as necessary
Res.B1f 8.2.1	Debrief staff and JIC partners

Performance Measures	Metric
Time in which notice of JIC closure is disseminated	24 hours prior to JIC closure
Staff and JIC partners are debriefed	Yes/No

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All pertinent information and documentation is collected	Yes/No
After action review is conducted to determine strengths and shortfalls and develop a corrective plan accordingly	Yes/No
Alert/warning systems are returned to normal operations mode	Yes/No

Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship
On-Site Incident Management	Emergency Public Information and Warning provides informational support and coordination to On-Site Incident Management, and vice versa.
Emergency Operations Center Management	Emergency Operations Center Management approves information for release.
Citizen Protection: Evacuation and/or In-Place Protection	Emergency Public Information and Warning provides information, alerts, warnings, and/or notifications. Citizen Protection: Evacuation and Shelter-In-Place provides protective action information or decisions to disseminate.
Isolation and Quarantine	Emergency Public Information and Warning provides information, alerts, warnings, and/or notifications for Isolation and Quarantine. Isolation and Quarantine provides protective action information or decisions to disseminate.
Mass Prophylaxis	Emergency Public Information and Warning provides information, alerts, warnings, and/or notifications related to Mass Prophylaxis. Mass Prophylaxis provides protective action information or decisions to disseminate.
Volunteer Management and Donations	Emergency Public Information and Warning provides public announcements for volunteers and donations.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
Joint Information Center (JIC)	As defined by the NRP, a facility established to coordinate all incident-related public information activities on-scene. It includes representatives of local, State, Federal, and voluntary agencies, the Governor's Office, as appropriate, and JIC operations functional staff.
Public Information Officer (PIO)	As defined by the NRP, the PIO is a member of the Command Staff responsible for interfacing with the public and media at incident site and with other agencies with incident-related information requirements.
JIC/JFO Public Affairs Officer (PAO)	Includes two public affairs leads at the JIC and JFO, one is the Lead Federal PAO and the other is the Lead State PAO.
JIC Support - Research Team	Personnel to gather and verify information, do fact checking, handle writing and research.
JIC Rapid Response Team	Team to rapidly evaluate rumors and misinformation and issue corrections.
JIC Support - Media Operations Team	Personnel to staff news desk, handle outreach, support field operations, monitor the media, handle video and photography.
JIC Support - Logistics Team	Personnel to provide event planning, design and production, JIC setup and operations.
Alert/warning and notification system	An alert/warning and notification system appropriate to population, special needs of citizens and hazards in a jurisdiction.
JIC media briefing room	Designated media briefing area that includes podium/lectern, malt box, flags, seals, turtle phone, overhead projector, PowerPoint projector, screen – Pre-establish alerts/warnings announcements for citizens to take protective actions.
JIC office equipment	Cell phones, landline phones, video conference capabilities, blast fax, fax machines, radio bank, television with recording capability, laptops/computers, server , copiers, printers, furniture, supplies, maps, directories, telephones.

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Planning Assumptions

- Although applicable to several of the 15 National Planning Scenarios, the capability planning factors were developed from an in-depth analysis of the major earthquake scenario. Other scenarios were reviewed to identify required adjustments or additions to the planning factors and national targets.
- Coordinated, accurate, timely public information will be required immediately to inform the public of appropriate protective and self-care actions.
- Accurate and timely information over time must be distributed to the affected populations to control rumors and minimize psychological effects. This activity will be particularly important following CBRNE-related events.
- All scenarios will require a multi-jurisdictional/multi-agency response to implement the Joint Information System (JIS) and a Joint Information Center (JIC) to ensure that public information activities are consistent and coordinated across agencies and jurisdictions.

- All scenarios require that jurisdictions provide timely and accurate public information. Some scenarios will have advanced warning, and others will occur with no warning. All scenarios need to consider alternate communications means. Power outages will disrupt radio, television, the World Wide Web, and other power-dependent information outlets.
- Door-to-door notification would not be feasible given scenario requirements of higher population densities.
- The jurisdiction may have systems in place to conduct emergency notification.
- Implement a public awareness program whenever people are threatened by a serious hazard.
- The JIC will include representatives of each jurisdiction, agency, private sector, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) involved in incident management activities. Inclusion of liaisons from the various responding agencies will ensure a "one voice" approach and consistency of information released. A unified effort also fosters collaboration, helping to ensure all agencies' critical messages are identified and appropriately addressed.
- A single JIC location is preferable, but the system should be flexible enough to accommodate multiple JIC locations if required. For example, multiple JICs may be needed for a complex incident spanning a wide geographic area.
- Following the command structure will ensure consistency of operations and will enhance cooperation among JICs, command posts, and other partners.
- Effective warning of people with special needs or disabilities will require the media, the Emergency Alert System (EAS), and other communications systems to use multiple communications.
- This information was derived from the Partnership for Public Warning's document, *A National Strategy for Integrated Public Warning Policy and Capability.*
- The amount of resources needed should be determined by each agency participating in the response, in coordination with the leads for the JICs.
- Emergency public information and warning is dependent on the timely availability of accurate information on the type of threat or hazard presented, as indicated in the *Target Capabilities List.* An additional factor is the availability and reliability of accurate information that has been verified and is ready for distribution.
- Timely, accurate information is essential to all scenarios. It is important for the incident commander and other critical functions included in the ICS to emphasize public information in their respective operations.
- Implementation of a JIC ensures a "one message, many voices" approach that incorporates representatives across multiple jurisdictions. All agencies involved in disaster response must be represented in the JIC.

Planning Factors from an In-Depth Analysis of a Scenario with Significant Demand for the Capability (Earthquake)

Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Public Affairs Officers/Specialists (PAOs)	Operate 7/24 in two 12-hr shifts per JIC Includes at least one representative of each local, State, Federal, and voluntary agency, the Governor's Office and the Incident	Minimum of one per agency per level of government, plus writers, researchers, media relations specialists, broadcast specialists, field PAOs, Rapid Response	1 IC command structure per impacted jurisdiction=2 PAOs County JIC=10 PIOs per county

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Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
	Commander per JIC Per 2 12-hour shifts per JIC: Local: 1 State: 1 Federal: 1 Voluntary agency: 2 Emergency management/ homeland security: 1 Governor: 1 U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT): 1 Public health: 1 Law enforcement: 1 Fire: 1 Emergency medical services (EMS): 1 Public works: 1 Search and rescue: 1 Human services: 1 Housing: 1	Team.	Regional JIC=10 PIOs per region State JIC=10 PIOs Federal=10 PIOs
JIC staff (people)	Operate 7/24 in two 12-hr shifts per JIC Includes Deputy PAO for each PAO office manager and administrative staff Research team: fact checking, information verification, writing/research Media operations team: field operations, media monitoring, video, photography, design work Logistics team: event planning, JIC setup and operations Government Translators Rapid Response Team	Lead PAO for all levels of government	Per 2 12-hour shifts per JIC: IT staff: 2 Support administrator: 1 Media relations (field operations, media monitoring) Rapid Response Team Creative services (writing/research, graphic liaison, program liaison) Special Projects (video, photography, event planning)
JIC support staff (training)	Requires ICS 100–200, NIMS IS–700 Core base training, such as: Basic public information course Advanced public information course		

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Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
	Cultural competency Interoperable communications Public and volunteers Risk communications		
Alert and notification systems	Each jurisdiction should have an alert and notification system appropriate to population and hazards.	1 per jurisdiction	1 per jurisdiction
JIC equipment	Available 7/24 for each JIC	Applicable to all scenarios	Quantities are estimated per activated JIC
Cell phones with walkie-talkie, chargers	1 per PAO and PIO	1 per JIC staff	92 per JIC
Landline phones with speakerphones	1 per PAO and PIO	1 per JIC staff	92 per JIC
Video conference capabilities	1 per JIC	1 per JIC	1 per JIC
Blast fax	1 per JIC	1 per JIC	1 per JIC
Fax machines – incoming, outgoing	2 per JIC	2 per JIC	2 per JIC
Radio bank – with recording capability	1 per JIC	1 per JIC	1 per JIC
Televisions with recording capability	6 per JIC	1 per JIC	6 per JIC
Laptops/Computers with CD/DVD burner and appropriate software	1 per person	1 per person	92 per JIC
Server	1 per JIC	1 per JIC	1 per JIC
High-speed color copier	1 per JIC	1 per JIC	1 per JIC
Color printers	1 per 3 people	1 per 3 people	30 per JIC
Desk, chair	1 per staff	1 per staff	92 per JIC
Office supplies i.e. paper, pens, binders. Easels, video tapes etc.	1 per staff	1 per staff	1 per staff
Maps of updated, disaster-impacted areas	1 per PIO and PAO	1 per PIO and PAO	1 per PIO and PAO

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Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Local telephone directories	1 per person	1 per person	92 per JIC
Office telephone directory	1 per person	1 per person	92 per JIC
JIC meeting space or access to a meeting room	1 per JIC	1 per JIC	1 per JIC
Private room or access to a private room	1 per JIC	1 per JIC	1 per JIC
JIC Media Briefing Room. designated media briefing areas: Podium/lectern Malt box Flags Seals Turtle phone Overhead projector – PowerPoint projector Screen	Available 7/24 for incident duration, accommodates x briefing attendees 1 per JIC	1 per JIC	1 per JIC

Approaches for Large-Scale Events

Approaches to large-scale events are similar to Emergency Operations Center Management.

National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
All levels	Joint Information Center (JIC)	NIMS Typed Resource Organization	1	Per impacted jurisdiction	All Activities
All levels	Public Information Officer (PIO)	Personnel	1	Per central & backup EOC per 12 hour shift	All Activities
All levels	JIC/JFO Lead PAOs	Personnel	1	Per central & backup EOC per 12 hour shift Per federal	All Activities

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
				Per state	
All levels	JIC/JFO Deputy Lead PAOs	Personnel	1	Per central & backup EOC per 12 hour shift Per federal Per state	All Activities
All levels	JIC - Research Team	Personnel Team	1	Per central & backup EOC per 12 hour shift	All Activities
All levels	JIC - Media Operations Team	Personnel Team	1	Per central & backup EOC per 12 hour shift	Conduct Media Relations
All levels	JIC - Logistics Team	Personnel Team	1	Per central & backup EOC per 12 hour shift	All Activities
All levels	Alert and Notification System	Equipment	1	Per central & backup EOC per 12 hour shift	Issue Emergency Warnings
All levels	JIC Meeting Space	Equipment	1	Per central & backup EOC	All Activities
All levels	JIC Media Briefing Room	Equipment	1	Per central & backup EOC	Conduct Media Relations
All levels	JIC Office Equipment (complete set)	Equipment	1	Per central & backup EOC	All Activities

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TRIAGE AND PRE-HOSPITAL TREATMENT

Capability Definition

Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment is the capability to appropriately dispatch emergency medical services (EMS) resources; to provide feasible, suitable, and medically acceptable pre-hospital triage and treatment of patients; to provide transport as well as medical care en-route to an appropriate receiving facility; and to track patients to a treatment facility.

Outcome

Emergency Medical Services (EMS) resources are effectively and appropriately dispatched and provide pre-hospital triage, treatment, transport, tracking of patients, and documentation of care appropriate for the incident, while maintaining the capabilities of the EMS system for continued operations.

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

This capability supports the following Emergency Support Functions (ESFs):
ESF #1: Transportation
ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services
ESF #9: Urban Search and Rescue
ESF #10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Response

Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Critical Tasks	
Res.C1a 1.1	Assess, categorize, and track health and medical resources at the State, regional, and local levels, including but not limited to trauma centers, burn centers, pediatric facilities, acute care facilities, and other specialty facilities
Res.C1a 1.1.1	Ensure appropriate protective resources are available, including vaccinations, prophylaxis, and PPE for pre-hospital providers and their families
Res.C1a 1.1.2	Ensure sufficient EMS personnel and resources are available to respond to day-to-day emergencies in the community
Res.C1a 1.1.3	Ensure sufficient EMS personnel, supplies, and equipment are available to respond to and manage a catastrophic incident until Federal resources become available
Res.C1a 1.2.1	Develop procedures for effective, reliable interoperable communications between EMS, incident command, public health, and healthcare facilities
Res.C1a 1.2.2	Establish and maintain intrastate and interstate EMS communications systems
Res.C1a 1.3.1	Develop protocols and procedures for tracking triage and pre-hospital treatment response staff and equipment during day-to-day operations as well as catastrophic incidents
Res.C1a 1.1.4	Ensure that EMS systems include an education, licensure, and credentialing system consistent with national standards
Res.C1a 1.2.3	Identify and coordinate with public safety access points that have enhanced capabilities (e.g., automatic location identification) and redundancy and are capable of handling a surge in call

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	volume
Res.C1a 1.3.2	Establish a means to allow EMS resources to be used across jurisdictions, both intrastate and interstate, using the National Incident Management System (NIMS) (e.g.,, mutual aid agreements)
Res.C1a 1.4	Develop and/or maintain protocols and procedures for EMS dispatch, assessment, triage, treatment, transport, logistical support, medical command and coordination, safety, communications, and tracking of patients during day-to-day operations as well as catastrophic incidents
Res.C1a 1.5	Develop mechanisms to ensure freedom of movement of medical response, transport, and personnel when faced with restricted travel laws, isolation/quarantine, or security measures
Res.C1a 1.3.3	Develop plans and mechanisms for obtaining reimbursement for both public and private expenditures for triage and pre-hospital treatment following a declared catastrophic incident

Preparedness Measures	**Metrics**
State EMS personnel certification and licensure system is in place modeled after the principles of the National EMS Education Agenda for the Future (and its five components) and NIMS	Yes/No
Written mutual aid protocols and procedures have been developed	Yes/No
Sufficient certified/licensed EMS personnel available to staff the current EMS system 24 hours per day, 7 days per week and with response consistent with established local response times	Yes/No
Recall procedures are in place to summon off-duty personnel when needed	Yes/No
Sufficient numbers of ambulance transport and support vehicles are available to handle routine call volume 24/7 with response consistent with established local response times	Yes/No
For all cities a minimum of one spare ALS vehicle. For cities greater than 300,000, at least one spare vehicle for every 100,000 maintained on an in-service basis (i.e., stocked and garaged) to support immediate surge needs	Yes/No
EMS personnel participate on a regular basis with emergency management planning and operations	Yes/No
Jurisdiction-wide EMS data collection system is in place that complies with the National EMS Information System (NEMSIS) version 2.0 or later	Yes/No
Written protocols are available—approved by medical control—for EMS assessment, triage, transport, and tracking of patients during a catastrophic event	Yes/No
Written EMS dispatch procedures include the dispatch of personnel and equipment in the unique circumstances of a catastrophic event	Yes/No
Redundant public safety answering points (PSAPs) that comply with phase II Federal Communications Commission (FCC) requirements for cell phone access are available and are capable of handling a large volume of calls	Yes/No
The vehicle tracking system is consistent with a written infrastructure protection plan and NIMS resource typing	Yes/No
Written plans and procedures for coordination of the local EMS system with the National Disaster Medical System are available	Yes/No
Sufficient PPE is available for all EMS personnel who would respond to a catastrophic or routine incident (scenario-specific)	Yes/No
Adopt a NIMS-compliant plan that enables communicable disease first responders and receivers to understand their roles, responsibilities, and requirements when responding to a communicable disease outbreak (scenario-specific)	Yes/No

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A plan is in place for prophylaxis and issuance of PPE to non-surge first responders and first receivers within 24 hours of a communicable disease outbreak, including the logistical chain to support this effort	Yes/No
A plan is developed that accounts for the multi-jurisdictional pre-hospital response to a catastrophic incident that considers mutual aid agreements and associated equipment, staff, command and control, and nontraditional patient movement and transfers	Yes/No
Compatible communications equipment and communications radio frequency plans are in place for: ▪ common hospital diversion and bed capacity situational awareness at the local, State, and regional levels; ▪ command and control dispatch procedures for task force operations	 Yes/No Yes/No
A statewide interoperable patient tracking system is in place that allows patient tracking from the first response site to a healthcare facility and allows data to be accessible among statewide users	Yes/No
A plan to return to normal operations post-incident is in place	Yes/No

Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs	
Critical Tasks	
Res.C1a 2.1.1	Conduct appropriate medical training of dispatch personnel in dealing with mass casualty incidents
Res.C1a 2.1.2	Develop and implement multi-disciplinary training programs for EMS personnel, based on local risk vulnerability assessments and lessons learned
Res.C1a 2.2	Develop and implement multi-disciplinary exercise programs for EMS personnel, based on local risk vulnerability assessments and lessons learned

Preparedness Measures	**Metric**
Frequency of exercises using scenarios based on a jurisdiction-specific risk vulnerability assessment and Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) guidelines	At least annually
Percentage of field responders who received statewide training programs for dispatch, triage, treatment, and transport protocols and procedures	80%
Percentage of dispatchers who received statewide training programs for dispatch, triage, treatment, and transport protocols and procedures	80%

Performance Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: *Direct Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment Tactical Operations*

Definition: In response to a notification for emergency medical assets, provide the overall management and coordination of the Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment Response, through to demobilization.

Critical Tasks	
Res.C1a 3.1.1	Establish Medical Branch/Group officer
Res.C1a 3.1	Coordinate triage and pre-hospital treatment operations with on-site Incident Command
Res.C1a 3.1.2	Coordinate and integrate triage and pre-hospital treatment operations with the National Disaster

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	Medical System
Res.C1a 3.2	Implement and coordinate effective, reliable interoperable communications between EMS, incident command, public health, and healthcare facilities
Res.C1a 3.3.2	Assess need for additional EMS resources/mutual aid
Res.C1a 3.3.3	Initiate recall and/or mutual aid to staff spare ambulances and provide immediate surge capability
Res.C1a 3.3.4.1	Implement and maintain accountability procedures for EMS personnel, equipment, and supplies
Res.C1a 3.3.4.2	Provide medical support, safety considerations, and appropriate PPE for EMS responders
Res.C1a 3.3.1	Organize and distribute resources for triage and pre-hospital treatment operations

Performance Measures	Metric
Time for medical dispatch to react and respond to the increased call volume	Within 30 minutes – 1 hour from start of increased call volume
Time to provide medical coordination of on-scene EMS system personnel and other health resources	Within 30 minutes from initial units arrival on scene
Time to provide medical coordination of public health services, hospitals, and healthcare providers	Within 1 hour from the establishment of Medical Command
Time to establish primary and secondary communication	Within 15 – 30 minutes from the establishment of Tactical Operations
Time to execute recall and mutual aid agreements with State and local partners	Less than 1 hour from initial request for additional resources
Time to ensure that sufficient and appropriate medical equipment and supplies are readily available to on scene personal	Within 2 hours of initial units arrival on scene
Time to organize and provide accessible PPE to all on scene medical response personal	Within 30 minutes of initial units arrival on scene (note: 15 minutes is ideal)
Ongoing safety, health, and well-being of on-scene personnel is provided	Yes/No

Activity: *Activate Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment*

Definition: In response to a notification, respond, mobilize, and arrive on scene to begin emergency medical operations.

Critical Tasks	
Res.C1a 4.1	Dispatch EMS to provide medical care
Res.C1a 4.2	Complete scene survey
Res.C1a 4.2.1	Establish scene safety for EMS personnel, based on the type and severity of the incident
Res.C1a 4.3	Establish triage, treatment, and transport areas

Performance Measures	Metric
Time for EMS responders to be notified and dispatched toward the scene	Within 5 -10 minutes from 911 receipt of initial call

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Activity: *Triage*

Definition: Once on scene, provide initial and ongoing emergency medical triage of ill and injured patients that prioritizes their respective treatment and transport.

Critical Tasks	
Res.C1a 5.1	Conduct initial and on-going pre-hospital triage
Res.C1a 5.2	Initiate a patient tracking system
Res.C1a 5.3.1	Ensure decontamination of patients prior to treatment and transport
Res.C1a 5.4	Move patients to safe, secure, and easily accessible treatment area(s)

Performance Measures	Metric
Time to initiate triage of ill/injured patients	Within 30 minutes of receipt of call
Time to initiate a patient tracking system	Within 30 minutes from the initiation of on scene triage
Data management system is operational	Yes/No

Activity: *Provide Treatment*

Definition: Provide medical treatment appropriate to the patient's injuries and the incident.

Critical Tasks	
Res.C1a 6.1	Establish immediate, minor, and delayed treatment areas
Res.C1a 6.2	Provide pre-hospital treatment appropriate to the nature of incident and number of injured/ill
Res.C1a 6.2.1	Administer antidotes for victims of WMD attacks
Res.C1a 6.2.2	Provide ongoing pain management therapy as needed to victims awaiting transport
Res.C1a 6.3	Ensure documentation of patient care and transfer, in accordance with mass casualty protocols

Performance Measures	Metric
Time in which ill/injured patients receive initial treatment by appropriately credentialed on-scene medical personnel	Within 30 minutes of initial units arrival on scene
Time in which on-line medical control is notified of incident	Within 10 minutes of initial patient triage on a not-to-interfere basis with immediate patient treatment

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Activity: *Transport*

Definition: Transport ill and injured patients via the most appropriate mode of transport available (e.g. Ambulances, helicopters, etc.), provide ongoing medical assessment and treatment en route to the designated receiving facility, and upon arrival transfer medical care of the patient(s) to the receiving facility's staff.

Critical Tasks	
Res.C1a 7.1	Identify transport vehicles, victims, and priority of transport
Res.C1a 7.1.1	Provide for alternative modes of transport should air or other operations be necessary (e.g. – helicopters along with a corresponding landing zone [LZ])
Res.C1a 7.2	Coordinate and transport patients to the appropriate treatment facility
Res.C1a 7.2.1	Provide ongoing assessment and treatment en route
Res.C1a 7.2.2	Transfer care of the patient to the medical staff at the facility

Performance Measures	Metric
Time in which patients are transported in vehicles appropriate to each patient's conditions and the nature and magnitude of the incident	Within 2 hours of initial units arrival on scene
Time in which patient transportation is coordinated with appropriate treatment facility	Within 30 minutes of initial unit arrival on scene for single patient transfers (Within 30 minutes of EMS Transportation/ Communications Officer arrival for mass casualty incidents)

Activity: *Demobilize Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment*

Definition: Upon completion of duties, clear the incident scene, reconstitute as appropriate, and return to service or end duty tour.

Critical Tasks	
Res.C1a 8.1.1	Reconstitute EMS personnel and equipment
Res.C1a 8.1.2	Participate in incident debriefing for triage and pre-hospital treatment operations
Res.C1a 8.3.1	Identify EMS staff needs dependent upon their level of involvement and/or hours committed to the incident
Res.C1a 8.3.2	Implement comprehensive stress management strategies and programs for all emergency responders and other workers
Res.C1a 8.2	Reestablish normal EMS operations
Res.C1a 8.3.3	Ensure post-event medical monitoring and care of pre-hospital/triage responders
Res.C1a 8.3.4	Conduct post-event analysis, including development and dissemination of lessons learned; revise plan as indicated

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Performance Measures	Metric
Time in which triage and pre-hospital personnel are restored to normal or original operations	Less than 12 hours from start of Demobilization
Triage and pre-hospital treatment personnel are debriefed	Yes/No

Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship
Urban Search and Rescue	Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment receives extricated patients from Urban Search and Rescue.
WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination	Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment receives decontaminated patients from WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination.
Firefighting Operations and Support	Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment receives patients from Firefighting Operations and Support.
Public Safety and Security Response	Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment provides information on, or the location of, potential witnesses to Public Safety and Security Response, while Public Safety and Security Response provide patients to Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment.
Fatality Management	Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment notifies Fatality Management of the location of deceased human remains, or they directly transfer these remains to Fatality Management.
On-Site Incident Management	Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment provides patient tracking information to On-Site Incident Management, and they both provide situational reports to each other.
Mass Care	Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment transfers care of uninjured affected victims to Mass Care.
Medical Surge	Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment transfers medical care of injured victims requiring a higher-level of definitive care during surge to Medical Surge. Non-surge emergency medical care will need to be addressed in a future capability.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
Command, Control, Communication, Coordination (C4) Infrastructure	NIMS compliant Emergency Medical Services (EMS) C4 component integrated with local, State and Federal C4 components. While any direct jurisdictional linkages to Federal components are not meant to bypass State C4 components, this may be appropriate under certain conditions
Emergency Medical Services Communication System	A State interoperable EMS communication system capable of coordinating cross-jurisdictional EMS operations and supporting State EMS command, control, and coordination. This system must enable communications among pre-hospital providers, EMS operations, hospital facilities, public health and safety, and emergency management.
Emergency Medical Task Force	Per NIMS, any combination (within span of control) of resources (e.g., ambulances, rescues, engines, squads) assembled for a medical mission, with common communications and a leader (supervisor).
Emergency Medical Services preparedness assessment capability	The capacity to assess national, State and local triage and pre-hospital treatment capabilities in support of the National Preparedness Goal and coordinated with the Federal Interagency Committee on EMS, and the ability to coordinate pre-event emergency preparedness efforts

Planning Assumptions

General

- The primary role of the EMS system during an incident is triage, treatment and transportation of patients to definitive care facilities. The EMS system will have a graded response and may be required to adopt alternate standards of care from the norm depending on the locality, demographics, type of incident and number of people affected. At any point of an incident or outbreak, there could be spikes or reductions in pre hospital needs.
- EMS will coordinate scene safety, security and law enforcement investigate needs with law enforcement authorities.
- Neighboring States/jurisdictions may resist accepting patients that are contaminated or infectious.
- The national capacity requirement should focus on maintaining the integrity of the health care system and delivery of health care services to the general population. As the incident wears on through potential multiple phases, relief of medical staff will become necessary.
- An unknown percentage of EMS workers will become injured/ill during any given incident rendering them unavailable for duty.
- Planning, response, and preparedness activities should focus on reducing morbidity and mortality rates, which will vary based upon the type of agent involved, time, geography and availability of resources.
- Non standard dispatch, triage and treatment criteria will need to be applied due to the huge demands on limited health care resources.
- Special needs populations, i.e. pediatrics, geriatrics and the disabled, will need to be given particular consideration.
- Information will need to be provided in multiple languages.

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- Public Health Emergency under HHS authority and a Stafford Act Emergency declaration will be declared in order to obtain needed Federal resources.
- Response to the demand for emergency medical services will require an altered standard approach to treatment and transport of injured or ill patients.
- In areas with climate extremes EMS systems will need the ability to create sheltered (warmed or cooled, as needed) treatment areas
- EMS systems are functioning close to peak capacity at time of incident.
- Professional responders and volunteers may fail to participate as expected due to dual roles in emergency care delivery and/or fear of the unknown.
- EMS systems will have education, licensure and credentialing systems in place consistent with national standards.
- States will have in place trauma and triage protocols identifying transportation of large numbers of victims across regional and State boundaries to assure appropriate distribution of patients.
- Local, regional and response agencies will have access to specialized medical resources from public/private sector agencies and academia.
- EMS responders will have participated in multi-disciplinary exercises with State and local emergency management agencies, fire-rescue, public health, hospitals, law enforcement and other related agencies.
- Patient transportation to and from airheads and medical treatment facilities (MTFs) will be problematic due to excessive congestion on local roads and limited patient movement alternatives (e.g. rotary wing lift)

Planning Factors from an In-Depth Analysis of a Scenario(s) with Significant Demand for the Capability

Event	Victims per Population	Duration of EMS role	Required Ambulances/ Other Transport	EMS Personnel	Comments
Biological – Communicable (plague, avian flu)	20-30% of population	Days to months	50% of sick population requires transport	2 EMS personnel per transport vehicle	Numbers reflect 200 – 300 % increase in average daily activity
Biological – Non-communicable (anthrax – 330,000 exposures)	4% of exposed become infected (13, 000 infected)	Days to weeks	25% of infected population requires transport	2 EMS personnel per transport vehicle	Majority of patient transports will occur in the first week
Chemical	100% of exposed population	Hours to days	25% of exposed population (Up to 75% of victims in a major incident will self-transport.)	2 EMS personnel per transport vehicle; each ambulance transporting twice. On-scene: 1:4 ratio of personnel to	Majority of transports will be in the first hours

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Event	Victims per Population	Duration of EMS role	Required Ambulances/ Other Transport	EMS Personnel	Comments
				patients	
Explosive (may be multiple IEDs)	100 fatalities 500 injured per each major IED	Hours	50% of injured	2 EMS personnel per transport vehicle (approx. 125 ambulances, each transporting twice). On-scene: 150 EMS personnel (1:4 ratio of personnel to patients)	Majority of transports will be in the first hours
Radiological Dispersion Device	180 fatalities 270 injuries Up to 20,000 exposed/ potentially exposed	Hours	50% of injured	2 EMS personnel per transport vehicle (135 ambulances - each ambulance transporting only one patient due to decontamination requirements). On-scene: 135 EMS personnel (1:2 ratio of personnel to patients due to safety and logistic concerns)	Injuries include blast, burn, radiological exposure, and trauma
Nuclear (10 kiloton)	Several hundred thousand over thousands of square miles	Hours to days due to logistical issues	Several hundred thousand	Only EMS personnel with specialized training and equipment can enter on-scene. EMS personnel receive decontaminated victims. 10s of 1000s EMS personnel	Injuries include blast, burn, radiological exposure, and trauma

National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
Federal	Command, Control and Communications Infrastructure	Resource Organization	1	Per Joint Field Office	Direct Operations Activate Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
					Demobilize
State	Command, Control and Communications Infrastructure	Resource Organization	1	Per State	Direct Operations Activate Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment Demobilize
Jurisdictional	Command, Control and Communications Infrastructure	Resource Organization	1	Per Jurisdiction	Direct Operations Activate Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment Demobilize
State	Emergency Medical Services Communication System	Resource Organization	1	Per State	Direct Operations
State	Emergency Medical Task Force	Resource Organization	1	Minimum per State	Triage Provide Treatment Transport
All levels	Emergency Medical Services preparedness assessment capability			As needed	Direct Operations

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MEDICAL SURGE

Capability Definition

Medical Surge is the capability to rapidly expand the capacity of the existing healthcare system (long-term care facilities, community health agencies, acute care facilities, alternate care facilities and public health departments) in order to provide triage and subsequent medical care. This includes providing definitive care to individuals at the appropriate clinical level of care, within sufficient time to achieve recovery and minimize medical complications. The capability applies to an event resulting in a number or type of patients that overwhelm the day-to-day acute-care medical capacity. Planners must consider that medical resources are normally at or near capacity at any given time. Medical Surge is defined as rapid expansion of the capacity of the existing healthcare system in response to an event that results in increased need of personnel (clinical and non-clinical), support functions (laboratories and radiological), physical space (beds, alternate care facilities) and logistical support (clinical and non-clinical equipment and supplies).

Outcome

Injured or ill from the event are rapidly and appropriately cared for. Continuity of care is maintained for non-incident related illness or injury.

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

This capability supports Emergency Support Function:

(ESF) #8: Public Health and Medical Services.

Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Critical Tasks	
Res.C1b 1.5.1	Establish a healthcare system to receive and appropriately treat incident specific casualties or illnesses. This system should be composed of multiple resources from state, sub-state and community resources
Res.C1b 1.9.7.2	Coordinate with WMD/Hazmat to develop plans for managing/decontaminating self-presenting contaminated victims off-site
Res.C1b 1.3.8	Identify local, State, sub-State, and interstate mental health and substance abuse professionals or paraprofessionals by survey
Res.C1b 1.9.1	Integrate local, State, and regional mental health and substance abuse professionals or paraprofessionals in response planning, exercise, and drills
Res.C1b 1.11.5	Ensure emergency system patient transport and tracking systems are interoperable with national and Department of Defense systems
Res.C1b 1.10.3	Ensure that comprehensive stress management strategies and programs are in place and available to all emergency responders, support personnel and healthcare professionals

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Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Res.C1b 1.4.2	Develop medical mutual aid agreements for medical facilities and equipment
Res.C1b 1.14.2	Ensure facility based evacuation plans include identification of receiving facilities and transportation assets. Transportation assets should be coordinated and planned out with response partners
Res.C1b 1.14	Develop healthcare system evacuation plans to include receiving facilities and transportation assets that are coordinated on a regional basis
Res.C1b 1.14.1	Identify adequate evacuation transportation assets and receiving facilities with adequate facilities
Res.C1b 1.15.3	Develop plans to mitigate identified hazards to medical treatment facilities
Res.C1b 1.11.3	Develop electronic medical records for recording treatment provided and patient self-reporting
Res.C1b 1.3.11	Develop plans to identify staff, and equipment and resources to operate alternate care facilities
Res.C1b 1.15.1	Develop plan to restrict access and secure healthcare and surge facilities
Res.C1b 1.5.6	Develop a local regional/State regional pharmaceuticals management system that captures current inventory of MMRS, HRSA-hospital, MMRS, CHEM-PACK caches; ensures a sufficient supply of pharmaceuticals to provide prophylaxis for 3 days first responders and their families, and other key incident response/management personnel, and the general public as determined by local authorities; and tracks the dispensing of pharmaceuticals during the incident

Preparedness Measures	Metrics
The healthcare system is prepared to complete triage, treatment, and initially stabilize 500 cases per million population for patients with symptoms of acute infectious disease – especially smallpox, anthrax, plague, tularemia and influenza	Yes/No
The healthcare system is prepared to complete triage, treatment, and initially stabilize 50 cases per million population for patients with symptoms of acute botulinum intoxication, acute chemical poisoning and nerve agent exposure	Yes/No
The healthcare system is prepared to complete triage treatment and initially stabilize 50 cases per million population for patients suffering burn or trauma	Yes/No
The healthcare system is prepared to complete triage treatment and initially stabilize 50 cases per million population for patients manifesting the symptoms of radiation-induced injury – especially bone marrow suppression	Yes/No
Plan is in place for community based surge hospital bed surge capacity	Yes/No
A 50-bed nursing subunit – per 50,000 population – can be staffed	Yes/No
At least one healthcare facility is identified in each defined sub-state region is able to support initial evaluation and treatment of at least 10 total adult and pediatric patients at a time in negative pressure isolation within 3 hours of the event	Yes/No
All acute care hospitals have capacity to maintain, in negative pressure isolation, at least one suspected case of a highly infectious disease or a febrile patient with a suspect rash or other symptoms of concern who might be developing a highly communicable disease	Yes/No
Sufficient supply of pharmaceuticals are stored at the healthcare facility to provide prophylaxis for 3 days to hospital personnel (medical and ancillary staff) and their family members and hospital based emergency first responders and their families	Yes/No

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Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Sufficient supplies of PPE are available for current and surge health care personnel to work safely within the limits defined by their SOPs	Yes/No
Secure and redundant communications system exists, providing connectivity during a an incident of national significance among health care facilities and all other responder disciplines at all jurisdictional levels	Yes/No
Developed and updated medical surge plans have been developed in conjunction with critical multi-disciplinary partners (public health, EMA, law enforcement, etc.)	Yes/No
Plans exist to operate without public utilities for 72 hours	Yes/No
Plans exist for the set up, staffing and operation of alternate care facilities	Yes/No
A local regional/State regional pharmaceuticals management system exists that:	
▪ Captures current inventory of MMRS, HRSA-hospital, MMRS, CHEM-PACK caches	Yes/No
▪ Ensures a sufficient supply of pharmaceuticals to provide prophylaxis for 3 days first responders and their families, and other key incident response/management personnel and the general public as determined by local authorities	Yes/No
▪ Tracks the dispensing of pharmaceuticals during the incident	Yes/No

Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs	
Critical Tasks	
Res.C1b 2.1.6	Train designated hospital personnel in NIMS, NRP and ICS (HEICS)
Res.C1b 2.2.4	Exercise healthcare system, in compliance with appropriate national, state, and local guidance
Res.C1b 2.2.3	Develop and/or implement training, preparedness and exercise programs based on local risk vulnerability assessment and lessons learned
Res.C1b 2.1.7	Train designated hospital personnel in recognition and treatment of CBRNE
Res.C1b 2.2.5	Exercise medical surge plans
Res.C1b 2.1.1	Develop and conduct competency-based education and training programs for adult and pediatric pre-hospital, hospital, and outpatient health care personnel
Res.C1b 2.1.2	Develop program to train medical and non-medical personnel
Res.C1b 2.1.3	Develop program to train health professions students
Res.C1b 2.2.1	Evaluate emergency management plans through training and multiple methods including drills and exercises at tribal, local, State and national levels
Res.C1b 2.2.2	Exercise all plans on an annual basis to demonstrate proficiency in responding to bioterrorism, other infectious disease outbreaks and other public health threats and emergencies
Res.C1b 2.1.5	Develop just-in-time training programs health care workers for unfamiliar critical job functions, and PPE for specific threats

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Preparedness Measures	Metric
Hospitals utilize competency-based education and training programs for all hospital personnel responding to a terrorist incident or other public health emergency	Yes/No
Percentage of hospitals that are NIMS/ ICS compliant	100%
Percentage of acute care facilities that participate in exercises consistent with national and JCAHO requirements	75%
Hospitals and their healthcare partners, have an exercise program which conforms with JCAHO, HRSA, CDC, NIMS, and HSEEP requirements	Yes/No

Performance Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: ***Direct Medical Surge Tactical Operations***

Definition: In response to notification of mass casualty incident, provide overall management and coordination of medical surge operations.

Critical Tasks	
Res.C1b 3.7.1	Implement incident response communications within the healthcare system
Res.C1b 3.4.1	Execute medical mutual aid agreements
Res.C1b 3.6	Provide coordination and support through the NIMS for providing medical care
Res.C1b 3.6.4.1	Coordinate public health and medical services for those individuals who have been isolated or quarantined
Res.C1b 3.7.2	Provide consistent, accurate and relevant public health and medical information to clinicians, other responders, and the public in a timely manner
Res.C1b 3.7.3	Coordinate with Emergency Public Information to disseminate public health and safety information to the public to improve provision of home healthcare
Res.C1b 3.4.5	Implement emergency credentialing and privileging procedures

Performance Measures	Metric
Policies are implemented for security of healthcare facilities and its perimeter during a mass casualty incident or large scale public health emergency	Yes/No
Percentage of hospitals in the local regional incident impact area that support the incident	90%
Timely public health information is disseminated to improve provision of home healthcare and other personal, family, and employer actions	Yes/No
Activate National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) and other hospital asset reporting and tracking system	Within 1 hour of the incident
Initiate deployment actions for the HHS ICRT	Within 4 hours of the incident
Time to activate the State medical coordinating system	Within 2 hours of notification of the incident

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Time to activate Federal ESF 8 assets	Within 6 hours of notification of the incident
Time to initiate deployment actions for NDMS Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT)	Within 6 hours of incident
Activate and initiate deployment actions for NDMS DMAT equipment caches	Within 24 hours of the incident

Activity: *Activate Medical Surge*

Definition: In response to a mass casualty incident, activate medical surge through implementation of surge plan.

Critical Tasks	
Res.C1b 4.1	Activate healthcare system incident command
Res.C1b 4.4	Consider the implementation of altered standards of care
Res.C1b 4.6	Activate medical surge plans, procedures, and protocols to ensure medical treatment for populations requiring specialized assistance

Performance Measures	Metric
Medical Surge plans are implemented	Yes/No
Personnel are available to augment treatment facilities	Yes/No
Time, in cases of a Catastrophic Incident Supplement (CIS) activation, for VA Primary Receiving Centers (PRCs) within 500 miles of an incident venue to prepare to terminate noncritical medical services and redirect available resources for receipt of patients at VA medical facilities. DOD facilities will respond under NRP. DOD facilities within close proximity will provide support under immediate response authority	Within 24 hours of CIS activation
Time to begin development of a reconstitution plan	Upon identification of Planning Section Chief

Activity: *Implement Surge Patient Transfer Procedures*

Definition: Transition from pre-event bed utilization to access surge capabilities.

Critical Tasks	
Res.C1b 5.2	Activate alternative care sites and overflow emergency medical care facilities to manage hospital surge capacity
Res.C1b 5.3	Provide knowledge or visibility of available destination medical care facilities/services and tracking for mass movement of patients, ensuring patients are matched with transportation and destinations that provide appropriate levels of medical care

Performance Measures	Metric
Systems are in place to identify patients able to be transferred	Yes/No
Time to identify patients to discharge	Within 6 hours of

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	notification of requirement to move patients
Resources are available to provide tracking and mass movement of patients	Yes/No
System in place to coordinate patient transfers with local or State EOC	Yes/No
Time to activate traditional and non-traditional emergency transport vehicles	Within 3 hours of notification
Level of coordination with patient tracking system	100%

Activity: *Implement Surge Staffing Procedures*

Definition: Maximize staffing levels in accordance with medical surge plans.

Critical Tasks	
Res.C1b 6.1	Activate healthcare workers' and volunteers' call systems
Res.C1b 6.3.1	Support medical surge capability by using volunteer resources
Res.C1b 6.2.1	Mobilize incident specific medical treatment personnel for pediatrics and adults
Res.C1b 6.2.2	Mobilize non-medical support personnel
Res.C1b 6.3	Assess initial and ongoing need for medical specialists and augment as needed
Res.C1b 6.5	Provide just-in-time training for staff performing non-standard duties
Res.C1b 6.4	Coordinate staff transportation and staging through the state and local EOC
Res.C1b 6.3.2	Coordinate response staffing with MRC, MMRS, Federal and interstate resources, and NGOs and faith based groups

Performance Measures	Metric
Percentage of healthcare organizations that implement call-back procedures	100%
Just-in-time materials and instructions are in place	Yes/No
State participates in Emergency System for Advance Registration of Volunteer Health Professionals (ESAR-VHP) Program	Yes/No

Activity: *Receive and Treat Surge Casualties*

Definition: Receive mass casualties and provide appropriate clinical care.

Critical Tasks	
Res.C1b 7.1.2	Provide treatment appropriate to nature of incident and number of injured/ill
Res.C1b 7.3.1	Ensure adequacy of medical equipment and supplies in support of immediate medical response operations and for restocking supplies/equipment requested
Res.C1b 7.3.3	Coordinate and integrate with local, Federal and State ESF 8
Res.C1b 7.2.3	Implement comprehensive stress management strategies and programs for all emergency

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	responders and workers
Res.C1b 7.1.3	Provide short-term mental health and substance abuse behavioral health services to the community

Performance Measures	Metric
Systems in place to accrue supplies, pharmaceuticals, and equipment available to support facility surge capacity	Yes/No
Patient decontamination is confirmed prior to facility access	Yes/No
Patients and responders are identified, screened, and monitored after an event	Yes/No
Percentage of patients tracked from arrival at healthcare system though duration of medical care	100%

Activity: *Demobilize Medical Surge*

Definition: Prepare to return healthcare system to normal operations.

Critical Tasks	
Res.C1b 8.1	Transition from surge to normal operations
Res.C1b 8.2	Implement plan for reconstitution of healthcare system capabilities
Res.C1b 8.3	Conduct after-action reviews and prepare report

Performance Measures	Metric
Percentage of healthcare system conducting After Action Review	100%

Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship
Emergency Operations Center Management	Medical Surge and Emergency Operations Center Management provided one another with situation reports. Emergency Operations Center Management also provides resources to Medical Surge as needed.
Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment	Medical Surge capability receives patients from Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment.
Medical Supplies Management and Distribution	Medical Surge capability receives medical resources from Medical Supplies Management and Distribution.
Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution	Medical Surge capability receives resources from Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution.
Fatality Management	Medical Surge capability provides remains to Fatality Management.

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Long-term Healthcare	Medical Surge capability transfers patients to Long-term Healthcare. (Will be developed in Phase II)
Mass Prophylaxis	Medical Surge sends patients to Mass Prophylaxis to receive appropriate protection (countermeasures) and treatment.
Public Safety and Security	Medical Surge receives perimeter security from Public Safety and Security.
WMD/Hazardous Materials and Decontamination	Medical Surge receives decontaminated patients from WMD/Hazardous Materials and Decontamination.
Mass Care	Medical Surge provides medical personnel to shelters to conduct treatment of the sheltered.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
Surge bed capacity for infectious disease treatment	Beds above the daily bed capacity for triage treatment and initial stabilization for patients requiring hospitalization with symptoms of acute infectious disease
Other surge bed capacity	Beds above the daily bed capacity for triage treatment and initial stabilization for patients requiring hospitalization with: (1) symptoms of acute botulinum intoxication or other acute chemical poisoning; (2) suffering from burns or trauma or (3) symptoms of radiation-induced injury—especially bone marrow suppression
Surge Healthcare Staff Unit	For establishing an acute care center, staff include: 1 physician, 1 PA or NP, 6 RNs or a mix of RNs and LPNs, 4 nursing assistants/nursing support technicians, 2 medical clerks (unit secretaries), 1 RT, 1 case manager, 1 social worker, 1 housekeeper, and 1 patient transporter. This is a recommended minimum staffing level. Staffing levels will vary and be incident specific. Staffing and support functions will be more efficient as similar patients are treated at individual facilities. For surge support to existing health care facility, staff include: 1 physician, 1 PA or NP, 6 RNs or a mix of RNs and LPNs, 4 nursing assistants/ nursing support technicians
Isolation capacity (1-person)	The capacity to maintain, in negative-pressure isolation, at least one suspected case of a highly infectious disease or a febrile patient with a suspect rash or other symptoms of concern who might be developing a highly communicable disease.
Isolation capacity (10-person)	The capacity to support the initial evaluation and treatment of at least 10 total adult and pediatric patients at a time in negative-pressure isolation.
Regional pharmaceutical cache system	Develop a local regional/State regional pharmaceuticals management system that captures current inventory of HRSA-hospital, MMRS, CHEM-PACK caches; ensures a sufficient supply of pharmaceuticals to provide prophylaxis for 3 days for first responders, their families, other key incident response/management personnel, and the general public as determined by local authorities; and tracks the dispensing of pharmaceuticals during the incident.
Personal protective equipment (PPE)	Adequate PPE to protect current and additional healthcare personnel. The quantity and type of PPE will be established based on a health vulnerability assessment (HVA) and the level of decontamination that is being designed.
Secure and redundant communications system	Secure and redundant communications system ensures connectivity during an incident of national significance among healthcare facilities, state and local health departments, EMS, emergency management agencies, public safety agencies, neighboring jurisdictions, and Federal ESF#8 elements. .
Data reporting system	

Planning Assumptions

General

- Although applicable to several of the 15 National Planning Scenarios, the capability planning factors were developed from an in-depth analysis of the Pandemic Influenza scenario. Other scenarios were reviewed to identify required adjustments or additions to the planning factors and national targets.

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- This capability may require support from multiple ESFs and capabilities.
- HHS Secretary can lift Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) requirements for 72 hours.
- Each State should review with HHS other restrictions that may need to be lifted or minimized during the time of an emergency such as Critical Access Hospitals, HIPPA and Medicare and Medicaid rules.
- Triage done in the field will have a significant impact on the subsequent healthcare surge capacity system.
- This Capability applies to a wide range of incidents and emergencies including accidental or deliberate disease outbreaks, natural disasters, nuclear, chemical, and conventional explosive events.
- The professionals listed in the following have basic skill sets commensurate with their professional training and experience qualified by professional licensure and/or industry standards.
- There will be a significant problem locating and providing information on displaced family members as well as victims at treatment facilities.
- Federal, State, and local Emergency Response Plans are activated.
- Non-Federal hospitals of the NDMS, as well as VA Primary Receiving Center (PRCs) and DoD MTFs within the local vicinity of the incident are authorized to provide definitive care to casualties of a catastrophic mass casualty incident.
- Public Health Emergency and Stafford declaration will be utilized to enable the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to invoke Emergency Hiring Authority and additional resources for additional healthcare assets.
- Alternative Care Facilities (ACFs) are community based medical facilities such as ambulatory surgical centers, which can be rapidly mobilized for medical surge. ACFs are typically buildings that serve a medically-related purpose when not requisitioned for use in an emergency to house patients.
- Ambulatory Care Centers (ACCs) are buildings of opportunity which can be resourced and staffed to provide medical care. The FMCS can also be incorporated within this structure. These are community facilities that do not necessarily provide a medical function outside of an emergency, but have the space and access needed to house patients (armories, auditoriums, conference centers, firehouses, etc.)
- Response to the overwhelming demand for services will require non-standard (Altered Standards of Care) approaches, including: Discharge of all but critically ill hospital patients. Expansion of hospital "capacity" by using all available space. Less than code compliance beds. Relaxation of practitioner licensure requirements as deemed appropriate, such as ratio of staff to patients. Utilization of general purpose and special needs shelters as temporary health facilities.
- Secondary bacterial infections following any mass casualty event will stress antibiotic supplies.
- There will be critical shortages of health care resources such as staff, hospital beds, mechanical ventilators, morgue capacity, temporary holding sites with refrigeration for storage of bodies and other resources.
- Routine medical admissions for acute medical and trauma needs will continue.
- Alternate healthcare facility plans are implemented.
- Emergency Use Authorities will be sought.
- Victims and responder monitoring and treatment may be required over a long time frame.
- There may be a denigration of healthcare staff numbers for a variety of causes.
- A large number (75 percent plus) of victims could self present without field triage or evaluation.
- The "normal" supply chain will likely be disrupted.
- Hospital logistical stores will be depleted in the early hours of any large scale event.

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- Blood supplies will be taxed and significant regional shortages could materialize quickly following a catastrophic incident. Blood manufacturing, infectious disease-testing, and distribution of tested blood will be problematic.
- There will be a significant increase and demand for specialty healthcare personnel and beds (biological contagious, burn, trauma, pediatrics) depending on the specific event.
- A large number of patients may self refer to a healthcare facility requiring decontamination.
- Healthcare providers are subject to the effects of disasters and may need decontamination, prophylaxis, or immunization measures before being able to perform their response roles.
- Patient transportation to and from airheads and medical treatment facilities (MTFs) will be problematic due to excessive congestion on local roads and limited patient movement alternatives (e.g. rotary wing lift).
- Public anxiety related to a catastrophic incident will require effective risk communication and may require mental health and substance abuse services.
- During a catastrophic incident, medical support will be required not only at medical facilities, but in large numbers at casualty evacuation points, evacuee and refugee points, and shelters as well as to support field operations.
- The DHS National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) and HHS U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS) Commissioned Corps assets will be the first Federal health and medical assets to arrive on the scene of a catastrophic event. Although they may not arrive at all.
- Sub-state regions are able to provide and sustain medical surge capacity in a large-scale public health emergency or bioterrorism event. Ideally, each sub-State region will contain one acute care hospital, one EMS agency, and one public health department/district and work with a multitude of various public agencies as well as private and faith based groups, all of which would respond to a wide-scale event.

Scenario-Specific

Pandemic Influenza:

- Pandemic is pervasive and not localized.
- Worst case scenario would produce 733,000 patients hospitalized on any given day.
- Up to 20 percent of those hospitalized (146,600 patients) are critical and will each require a critical care bed, mechanical ventilation; necessitating staff to patient ratios of 1:2 registered nurses (RN) (73,300 RNs), 1:10 physicians (14,660 MDs); 1:5 respiratory therapists (29,320 RTs). Ratios should be consistent with State/sub-State regions
- 80 percent of those hospitalized (586,400 patients) are non-critical and necessitate a general medical bed, patient to staff ratios of 1:40 physician (14,660 MDs) and 1:20 RN (29,320 RNs).
- Vaccine availability will be insufficient and time to produce additional vaccine unacceptably long.
- Antiviral drug production will be surged.
- Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) will be depleted.
- 42 million out patient visits need to be provided with antivirals, antipyretics, analgesics
- 50 million at home on self care are on over-the-counter (OTC) only.
- 1 percent of the hospitalized patient population (7,338) warrant transfer from one healthcare facility to another more than 100 miles.
- 50 percent of the transferring patient population (3,669) will require transfer during one two-month period; the other half (3,669) during a separate two-month period; averaging 61 patients per day, with surging to 200 patients per day for one week.

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- 10 percent of transferring patients (total of 733 patients over/during the entire scenario) could travel by commercial means sans medical attendance en route.
- 50 percent are ambulatory (total 3,669) but require medical attendance en route at a rate of 1 nurse per 50 patients.
- 40 percent are restricted to litters (total 2,936) and require medical attendance at a rate of 1 nurse per 20 patients.
- 50 percent of litter patients are critical and require ventilation and 1 nurse per patient (1,468).
- There is a critical need for containment measures to prevent additional disease spread. Specific counter measures such as social distancing, masks, and hand hygiene should be instituted.
- Because of the limited supply and production capacity, there is a need for explicit prioritization of influenza vaccine based on the risk of influenza complications, the likelihood of benefit from vaccination, role as an influenza pandemic responder, and impact of the pandemic on maintenance of critical infrastructure.
- Persons of all ages will likely need 2 doses of vaccine, 3-4 weeks apart in order to be protected.
- Primary prevention including masks, hand hygiene, and social isolation maybe the primary mode of preventing the spread of disease if vaccine and viral agents are not available in adequate quantities.

Chemical:

- Most likely route of introduction of a chemical exposure in a mass casualty event will be inhalation.
- There will be a delay in the identification of the chemical.
- All chemicals are toxic depending on the concentration and time spent in that concentration.
- Medical treatment facilities have inadequate decontamination capabilities.
- Chemical events will result in immediate and potentially life threatening injuries.
- Appropriate response will rely on rapid decontamination and a locally deployable, pharmaceutical cache. (i.e., Chempack or MMRS)
- Many potential victims may present to healthcare facilities requiring decontamination.

Nuclear Detonation:

- Triage will be a major issue for care providers.
- Decontamination and monitoring will be a major issue.
- As a rule of thumb, the sooner the onset of symptoms and the higher the dose received the less likely the victim will survive.
- Generally, invasive (open) procedures should be performed within the first 48 hours in those receiving significant doses of radiation exposure due to follow on progressive immunocompromised state.
- Critical infrastructure and personnel will be damaged and rendered ineffective for a three mile radius.
- Tens of thousands will require decontamination and both short-term and long-term treatment.
- The evacuated population will require shelter and food for an indefinite time.
- Healthcare facilities and emergency workers in the affected area will be overwhelmed.
- There will be a significant psychological impact on survivors creating long term mental health demands.
- The effects of the radiation will be prevalent for years creating long term health issues.
- Healthcare facilities involved in the affected area will have to be replaced and relocated.
- Triage may identify a significant number of patients who have received lethal doses of radiation with zero chance of survivability who will require palliative care only.

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- There is a lack of palliative care resources and planning for large numbers of victims.
- Timely and accurate emergency public health information / crisis information news releases are vital for mitigation and prevention of further health issues.

Planning Factors from an In-Depth Analysis of a Scenario with Significant Demand for the Capability (Pandemic Influenza)

Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Beds			Provide triage treatment and initial stabilization above the current daily staffed bed capacity for the following classes of adult and pediatric patients requiring hospitalization. 500 cases per million population for patients with symptoms of acute infectious disease 50 cases per million population for patients with symptoms of acute botulinum intoxication, acute chemical poisoning, and nerve agent exposure 50 cases per million population for patients suffering from burns or trauma 50 cases per million population for patients manifesting the symptoms of radiation-induced injury—especially bone marrow suppression
Personnel (option 1): the concept of operations for the acute care center	Suggested minimum staffing per 12-hour shift for a 50-bed nursing subunit follows:		1 physician 1 physician assistant (PA) or nurse practitioner (NP) (physician extenders) 6 registered nurses (RNs) or a mix of RNs and licensed practical nurses (LPNs) 4 nursing assistants/nursing support technicians Medical clerks (unit secretaries) 1 Respiratory therapist (RT) 1 Case manager 1 Social worker 1 Housekeepers 1 patient transporter
Pharmaceutical caches			Establish a local regional/State regional pharmaceuticals management system that captures current inventory of MMRS, HRSA-hospital, MMRS, CHEM-PACK caches; ensures a sufficient supply of pharmaceuticals to provide prophylaxis for 3 days first responders and their families, and other key incident response/management personnel, and the general public as determined by local authorities; and tracks the dispensing of pharmaceuticals during the incident.

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Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Personal protective equipment (PPE)			Ensure adequate PPE (to include prophylaxes) to protect current and additional healthcare personnel during an incident. The quantity and type of PPE will be established based on a hazardous vulnerability analysis (HVA) and the level of decontamination that is being designed
Communications and information technology			Establish a secure and redundant communications system that ensures connectivity during an incident of national significance among healthcare facilities, state and local health departments, EMS, emergency management agencies, public safety agencies, neighboring jurisdictions, and Federal ESF-8 elements. Enhance the capability of rural and urban hospitals, clinics, EMS systems, and poison control centers to report syndrome-related and diagnostic data that is suggestive of terrorism or a highly infectious disease to local and State health departments on a 24/7 basis
Training and education			Use competency-based education and training programs for adult and pediatric pre-hospital, hospital, and outpatient healthcare personnel responding to a terrorist incident or public health emergency

National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
Sub-State region, Federal, State, Tribal, City	Beds - Surge capacity for infectious disease treatment	Equipment	500	Per million population	Receive and Surge Treat Casualties
Sub-State region, Federal, State, Tribal, City	Beds - Surge capacity for other treatment	Equipment	500	Per million population	Receive and Surge Treat Casualties
Sub-State region	Surge Healthcare Staff Unit (Option 1 – for establishing acute care center)	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	2	Per 50-bed unit	Receive and Surge Treat Casualties
Sub-State region	Surge Healthcare Staff Unit (Option 2 - for surge support to existing health care facility)	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	1	Per surge bed assuming a 1:4 staff to patient ratio	Implement Surge Staffing Procedures Receive and Surge Treat Casualties

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
Sub-State region	Surge Healthcare Staff Unit (Option 2) - for surge support to existing health care facility	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	1.4	Per surge bed assuming a 1:6 staff to patient ratio	Implement Surge Staffing Procedures Receive and Surge Treat Casualties
Sub-State region	Isolation capacity (1-person)	Equipment	1	Per Healthcare facility	Receive and Surge Treat Casualties
State	Isolation capacity (10-person)	Equipment	1	Per Regional healthcare facility	Receive and Surge Treat Casualties
State	Regional Pharmaceutical cache system	Equipment	1	Per Public health region	Receive and Surge Treat Casualties
State, City, Sub-State region, Tribal	Personal protective equipment (PPE)	Equipment	1	Per Healthcare provider (person)	Receive and Surge Treat Casualties

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MEDICAL SUPPLIES MANAGEMENT AND DISTRIBUTION

Capability Definition

Medical Supplies Management and Distribution is the capability to procure and maintain pharmaceuticals and medical materials prior to an incident and to transport, distribute, and track these materials during an incident.

Outcome

Critical medical supplies and equipment are appropriately secured, managed, distributed, and restocked in a timeframe appropriate to the incident.

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

This capability supports the following Emergency Support Functions (ESFs):

ESF #1: Transportation
ESF #2: Communications
ESF #5: Emergency Management
ESF #7: Resource Support
ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services
ESF #13: Public Safety and Security
ESF #14: Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation
ESF #15: External Affairs

Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Critical Tasks	
Res.C1c 1.2	Develop plans for establishing staging areas for internal and external medical response personnel, equipment, and supplies
Res.C1c 1.2.3	Establish strategies for transporting materials through restricted areas, quarantine lines, law enforcement checkpoints, and so forth that are agreed upon by all affected parties

Preparedness Measures	**Metrics**
Emergency public health and medical material distribution plans are in place	Yes/No
Hazard-specific response plan identifies and prioritizes resource needs	Yes/No
Plans for the procurement, rotation and maintenance of Federal, State, local stockpiled assets or private/commercial inventories are implemented	Yes/No
Medical treatment facilities and State, county and local governments have coordinated with	Yes/No

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Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
medical distributors to develop preplanned worst-case scenario orders that reflect differing needs for various possible scenarios (chemical, biological attacks, natural disaster)	
Frequency with which pre-plan worst-case scenario orders are reviewed and updated	Semiannually
Medical treatment facilities and State, county and local government plans reflect input from local and regional sources of potential medical supplies and pharmaceuticals to lower dependency on federal assets	Yes/No
Plans are in place for assuring physical security of medical materiel in transport and distribution	Yes/No
Distributors' plans and logistical systems are in place to identify potential sources of excess in their supply chains that might be diverted to higher need locations	Yes/No
Manufacturers have MOUs in place to determine collective inventory accessibility and to ramp up manufacturing capability as needed	Yes/No
Frequency with which the Federal Government receives updates from distributors and manufacturers on the status of critical items that would prove necessary in a large scale incident with the focus on likely shortage and bottleneck situations	Quarterly
Increased inventory levels of critical items are maintained by medical supplies, equipment, and pharmaceutical manufacturers and distributors working in conjunction with the government	Yes/No
Stockpile includes supplies and pharmaceuticals for special populations (i.e. pediatrics and geriatrics)	Yes/No
Jurisdiction has identified locally available sources of critical medical supplies to use prior to arrival of external (State/Federal) resources	Yes/No
Jurisdiction has acquired and established access, through MOUs, contracts or established supply depots, to effective pharmaceuticals (including medical gases) and medical material in accordance with forecasted needs	Yes/No

Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs	
Critical Tasks	
Res.C1c 2.1.1	Provide training on various types and models of medical supplies likely to be used in an emergency situation through government grants and industry-sponsored workshops
Res.C1c 2.2.1	Establish and regularly exercise plans for transporting medical material assets at the Federal, State, local, and private/commercial levels with specific focus on their transfer between various levels or organizations

Preparedness Measures	Metric
NIMS-compliant courses are held to train emergency coordinators on plans and procedures	Annually
NIMS-compliant exercise is conducted to ensure that plans and procedures are understood and executable	Annually

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Performance Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: ***Direct Medical Supplies Management and Distribution Tactical Operations*** **Definition: In response to a need for medical assets, provide overall management and coordination for Medical Supplies Management and Distribution.**	
Critical Tasks	
Res.C1c 3.1	Provide medical supply management and distribution support to incident response operations according to Incident Management Team (IMT) assignments in the incident action plan (IAP)
Res.C1c 3.2.1	Request Strategic National Stockpile assets from Centers for Disease Control
Res.C1c 3.2.3	Coordinate and obtain external resources for sustained operations of medical supplies management and distribution
Res.C1c 3.4	Maintain communications with transportation vendors during distribution of medical supplies
Res.C1c 3.2.4	Coordinate acquisition of private source medical supplies
Res.C1c 3.2.5	Coordinate with medical surge operations and the American Association of Blood Banks (AABB) Task Force to identify supply levels at the supporting medical facilities for the incident
Res.C1c 3.3	Monitor supply usage by health facilities, mass prophylaxis sites, and other critical care venues
Res.C1c 3.2.7	Ensure the timely provision of medical supplies to shelters and mass care and medical facilities
Res.C1c 3.2.7	Provide personnel for shelters and mass care and medical facilities
Res.C1c 3.2.6	Monitor stockpiles levels of medical supplies maintained by private sources
Res.C1c 3.3.1	Process and manage requests for additional medical supply personnel or equipment
Res.C1c 3.2	Provide logistics support for medical supplies management and distribution
Res.C1c 3.5	Provide for financial management and reimbursement of medical supplies
Res.C1c 3.5.1	Coordinate with CDC for return of unused federal assets

Performance Measures	**Metric**
Time to request Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) following medical surveillance indication	6 hours from indication

Activity: ***Activate Medical Supplies Management and Distribution*** **Definition: Upon identification of medical resource shortfalls and/or SNS deployment, activate warehousing operations.**	
Critical Tasks	
Res.C1c 4.1	Establish medical supplies warehouse management structure
Res.C1c 4.2	Activate warehousing operations for receipt of medical assets
Res.C1c 4.3	Identify needed transportation assets for medical supplies
Res.C1c 4.4	Identify Technical Advisory Response Unit (TARU) team resource needs
Res.C1c 4.5	Provide and coordinate the use of emergency power generation services at medical supply

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	warehouse locations

Performance Measures	Metric
Time from approved request for Federal medical assets to activation and full staffing of warehouse	6 hours from request
Time for request of local supplies to arrival at warehouse (to be used until Federal/State assets arrive)	2 hours from request
Medical supplies and pharmaceuticals were properly maintained and arrived in undamaged, serviceable condition and within the expiration date indicated on each container (bottle, case, vial, etc.)	Yes/No
Time to begin backfill of medical support packages from Strategic National Stockpile (SNS)	Within 36 hours

Activity: *Establish Security*

Definition: Upon activation of warehouse, activate Medical Supplies Management and Distribution Security Plan.

Critical Tasks	
Res.C1c 5.3.1	Execute plan for credentialing medical supplies personnel
Res.C1c 5.2.1	Ensure security meets medical assets at point of entry into State
Res.C1c 5.3.2	Identify areas requiring increased security within the medical supplies warehouse
Res.C1c 5.2.2	Establish security checkpoints in vicinity of medical supplies warehouse and at staging areas

Performance Measures	Metric
Security and credentialing is provided at all steps of transportation of pharmaceuticals and supplies	Yes/No

Activity: *Repackage and Distribute*

Definition: After delivery of medical assets to warehouse facility, repackage pharmaceuticals and other assets and distribute to Points Of Distribution (PODs) and other health facilities.

Critical Tasks	
Res.C1c 6.2	Assemble medical supplies warehouse teams (receiving, order management, picking, packaging, quality control, and shipping)
Res.C1c 6.3	Inventory medical supplies warehouse resource levels
Res.C1c 6.4	Provide quality control/quality assurance for requested medical assets prior to shipping
Res.C1c 6.5	Track re-supply requests for medical supplies

Performance Measures	Metric
Time from arrival of medical resources/SNS at warehouse to arrival at points of distribution (PODs)	12 hours from arrival

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Time from approval of request for re-supply to the delivery of additional medical assets to PODs	12-36 hours from approval

Activity: *Recover Medical Resources*	
Definition: As warehousing activities diminish, activate plan to recover unused medical resources.	
Critical Tasks	
Res.C1c 7.1	Ensure recovery of unused (unopened) pharmaceuticals from mass prophylaxis sites
Res.C1c 7.2	Provide unused but open medical resources to appropriate medical facility
Performance Measures	**Metric**
Unused medical assets are recovered	Yes/No

Activity: *Demobilize Medical Supplies Management and Distribution*	
Definition: Inventory, reorganize, and reconstitute stockpiles to return to pre-incident levels, and release personnel from Medical Supplies Management and Distribution duties	
Critical Tasks	
Res.C1c 8.1	Execute plan to reduce medical supplies warehouse operations as distribution needs ease
Res.C1c 8.2	Dispose of waste materials generated by medical supplies warehousing operations
Performance Measures	**Metric**
Medical waste materials are properly disposed of	Yes/No

Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship
Emergency Operations Center Management	Medical Supplies Management capability and the Emergency Operations Center communicate operational and resource needs to one another.
On-Site Incident Management	On-Site Incident Management identifies medical resource shortages and issues and communicates this to Medical Supplies Management.
Public Safety and Security Response	Public Safety and Security Response provides perimeter security for the Medical Supplies and Management capability, including transport, warehouse, and distribution site security.
Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution	Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution provides non-medical resources to the Medical Supplies Management capability.
Mass Prophylaxis	Following a re-supply request from Mass Prophylaxis, Medical Supplies Management and Distribution capability provides the request medical resources.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
Stockpile Content Management Group	Experts in medicine and public health to determine what is required in the various stockpiles or needs to be supplemented in the existing supply chain
Strategic National Stockpile (including Vendor Managed Inventory)	12-hour Push Package of pharmaceuticals, antidotes, and medical supplies; may include follow-on vendor managed inventory (VMI) supplies
National Medical Equipment and Supplies Stockpile	Medical equipment and supplies necessary for a comprehensive all hazards response that are not currently accounted for in the Strategic National Stockpile at quantities determined by robust modeling tools and input from experts in the field
SNS Technical Advisory Response Unit (TARU)	The HHS Strategic National Stockpile program teams of emergency responders and logistics experts who arrive with the first shipment of the SNS to provide technical assistance related to receipts of medical material from SNS
Receipt, Staging, and Storage Site (RSS)	The warehouse (minimum 12,000 square feet, loading dock, climate controlled) from which the SNS materiel will be received and distributed. Includes staff for operations management, inventory control, distribution dispatch, and repackaging. Includes inventory management system and equipment
Interagency warehouse and team	Location to house critical resources as transferred from State, donated by non-governmental organizations (NGO) and public. Includes staff necessary to activate, set up and manage warehouse and inventory; includes inventory management equipment and systems required to efficiently run warehouse
National Tracking System	National system that captures and tracks resource availability -- includes locally managed tracking systems to feed into the larger system
Federal Mobilization Base Camp	Locations at incident site to receive Federal assets
Transportation vehicles and personnel	To move large amounts of critical resources (trucks, planes, boats, trains)
Transportation Coordinator	Per NRP ESF#1; coordinates critical resource transportation needs between Federal, State, local and private agencies and organizations
Security personnel	Provide required physical security to pharmaceuticals and medical supplies while stockpiled prior to an incident, in transit to and incident and while on site during an incident

Planning Assumptions

- For contagious and/or pandemic diseases (and possibly other scenarios), there will be limited or no implementation of cooperative agreements due to quarantine or actual or perceived contamination and/or widespread infection.
- Prior to dying, many people would use considerable healthcare resources because of their critical condition at admission.

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- Existing medical devices (e.g., ventilators, respiratory equipment) will be inadequate. Manufacturers of large, expensive medical devices typically manufacture product on an "as needed" basis with a minimum of a 2–4 week lag time. Even surge production capacity is likely to be inadequate for short-term requirements.
- Surge capacities of pharmaceutical and medical product manufacturers and distributors will diminish compared with projected capabilities due to high absenteeism in all commercial sectors resulting from employees being directly affected by the scenario or choosing to stay home with families.
- Development of plans, procedures, and protocols for resource management in accordance with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) (Res.B.1.5) will be outlined within the Planning capability.
- Transport of medical supplies, pharmaceuticals, and laboratory supplies from federally controlled sources to the Federal mobilization base camp is the responsibility of the Federal Government.
- Transport of medical supplies, pharmaceuticals, and laboratory supplies from a Federal mobilization base camp to the State staging area is the responsibility of the State unless otherwise negotiated with the Federal Government.
- The originating entity is responsibly for transporting non-federally owned supplies to an interagency warehouse unless otherwise negotiated with Federal or State organizations.
- Any of the services, performance measures, or capabilities can and should be applied to the supply chain for laboratory testing materials as well. Although this does not necessarily fall directly under *medical* supplies, it is crucial that the diagnostic supplies to support medical functions are not forgotten or ignored.
- The capability to keep track of potential shortages of critical drugs during a large-scale event already exists within the Food and Drug Administration's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research. This program can serve as a viable model for beginning such a program with medical supply distributors and manufacturers. This process absolutely must be initiated as soon as possible with the government providing necessary assurances to maintain commercial confidentiality. Destruction of physical structures over large areas will result in structures without permanent address which complicates or prohibits shipment of DEA scheduled drugs (controlled substances). Planning for alternatives should be initiated.
- During large scale contaminating event (rad/nuc, chem., bio), provisions need to be made for transition of large volume of medical supplies into warm/hot zones without losing use of vehicles to contamination.

Planning Factors from an In-Depth Analysis of a Scenario with Significant Demand for the Capability

Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Stockpile Content Management Group	Experts in medicine and public health to determine what is required in the various stockpiles or needs to be supplemented in the existing supply chain	3 management groups with continuous open dialogue to determine the current requirements	Pharmaceuticals Management Group Medical Supplies Management Group Laboratory Supplies Management Group

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Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Strategic National Stockpile (including vendor managed inventory)	Store and maintain medical materiel required for all hazards response	Response capability will leverage both Federal stockpiles and commercial capabilities.	Resource quantities needed must be determined by robust modeling tools to estimate stockpiles requirements based on the national planning scenarios and anticipated resultant patients/populations
SNS Technical Advisory Response Unit (TARU)	Staff associated with the Strategic National Stockpile that can coordinate delivery and distribution of stockpile assets with state and local officials		1 TARU per State/municipality receiving stockpile assets directly from stockpile
State Staging Area (Receipt, Staging, and Storage Site (RSS))	12,000 sq ft, temperature/humidity control, emergency electrical power, secure area for controlled substances	2 RSS per State	Minimum of 2 RSS sites per State
RSS personnel	Staff necessary to activate and manage RSS		
RSS equipment	Material Handling Equipment and Supplies; and an Inventory management system required to efficiently run RSS		
Interagency warehouse	House critical resources, donated by non-governmental organizations (NGO) and public prior to transfer to State	Establish warehouse sites as necessary based on volume of donated goods	1 warehouse minimum, based on incident need
Warehouse personnel	Staff necessary to activate, set up and manage warehouse and inventory		
Warehouse equipment	Inventory management equipment and systems required to efficiently run warehouse		

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Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Transportation vehicles and personnel	Ability to move large amounts of critical resources (trucks, planes, boats, trains)	Climate controlled and non-climate controlled transport capacity for all pharmaceuticals, and medical and laboratory diagnostic supplies	Volume capacity of vehicle multiplied by amount of resource needed
Transportation Coordinator	Coordinates critical resource transportation needs between Federal, State, local and private agencies and organizations	Scenario will require resources from all over to help support the incident, therefore coordinator will need to have overarching capability to monitor and troubleshoot movement of resources	1 to sit in Emergency Operation Center (EOC) / can be component Emergency Support Function (ESF) #1
Security personnel	Provide required physical security to pharmaceuticals and medical supplies while stockpiled prior to an incident, in transit to and incident and while on site during an incident		

Approaches for Large-Scale Events

None are specified.

National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
Federal	SNS TARU	Federal Resource Organization	12	1 TARU per SNS push pack	Establish Security Repackage and Distribute
Federal	National Medical Equipment and Supplies Stockpile	Equipment	1		Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems Repackage and Distribute
State	State Pharmaceutical and Supply Stockpiles	Equipment			Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems Repackage and

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
					Distribute
Local	Local Pharmaceutical and Supply Stockpiles	Equipment	20% increase	Increase over usual supply at local medical treatment facilities	Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems Repackage and Distribute
Federal	National Tracking System	Network	1	Nationally, including jurisdictional components	Direct Tactical Operations Recover Resources
Federal/ State/ Local	Transportation Coordinator	Personnel	1	per EOC	Repackage and Distribute Recover Resources
Federal/ State/ Local	Transportation Vehicles	Vehicle		Depends on incident need	Repackage and Distribute Recover Resources
Federal/ State/ Local	Transportation Personnel (drivers, pilots...)	Personnel		Depends on incident need	Repackage and Distribute Recover Resources
Federal	Federal Staging Area	Resource Organization		Not pre-established	Repackage and Distribute Establish Security
State	RSS	Resource Organization	2	Minimum per State & territory	Repackage and Distribute Establish Security
Local	Interagency warehouse	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	1	Per incident	Repackage and Distribute Establish Security

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MASS PROPHYLAXIS

Capability Definition

Mass Prophylaxis is the capability to protect the health of the population through administration of critical interventions in response to a public health emergency in order to prevent the development of disease among those who are exposed or are potentially exposed to public health threats. This capability includes the provision of appropriate follow-up and monitoring of adverse events, as well as risk communication messages to address the concerns of the public.

Outcome

Appropriate drug prophylaxis and vaccination strategies are implemented in a timely manner upon the onset of an event to prevent the development of disease in exposed individuals. Public information strategies include recommendations on specific actions individuals can take to protect their family, friends, and themselves.

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

This capability supports the Emergency Support Function:

(ESF) #8: Public Health and Medical Services

Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems		
Critical Tasks		
Res.C2a 1.3	Create plans and systems for mass prophylaxis patient movement and tracking	
Res.C1c 1.1	Create plans and systems for transport and tracking of medical supplies and equipment	
Preparedness Measures		**Metrics**
Current rating on the Strategic National Stockpile State Assessment is a passing grade *Note: The Mass Prophylaxis Appendix captures the State SNS Assessment Tool currently in use. The SNS program is revising the instrument to place more emphasis on performance outcomes.*		Passing Grade

Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs	
Critical Tasks	
See Appendix for State SNS Assessment Tool	
Preparedness Measures	**Metric**
See Appendix for State SNS Assessment Tool	

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Performance Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: *Direct Mass Prophylaxis Tactical Operations*

Definition: In response to notification of a mass prophylaxis incident, provide overall management and coordination of mass prophylaxis operations.

Critical Tasks	
Res.C2a 3.2	Coordinate dispensing/administration of mass therapeutics
Res.C2a 3.4	Coordinate public information releases regarding mass prophylaxis operations
Res.C2a 3.3.1	Coordinate with the medical stockpile warehouse to re-supply Points of Dispensing (PODs) as needed
Res.B3b 3.2.2	Coordinate with public information agencies to disseminate health and safety information to the public
Res.B3b 3.3.2	Coordinate public health and medical services among those individuals who have been isolated or quarantined
Res.C2a 3.3.4	Coordinate with law enforcement to provide security to protect medicines, supplies, and public health personnel

Performance Measures	Metric
Percent of Points of Dispensing (PODs) that completely deplete all medical resources prior to re-supply	0%
Public information messages are accurate, consistent, and timely	Public informed in time to prevent and/or curb symptoms
Rate of administration of the intervention not affected by supply chain or other logistical problems	No interruption in administration of the intervention due to supply availability and logistics

Activity: *Activate Mass Prophylaxis*

Definition: Upon notification, activate points of dispensing for mass prophylaxis operations.

Critical Tasks	
Res.C2a 4.4	Implement local, regional, and State plans for distributing and dispensing prophylaxis
Res.C2a 4.2.1	Initiate call down lists for mass prophylaxis site staffing
Res.C2a 4.3.1	Ensure mass prophylaxis site operations are established in accordance with memoranda or agreement/understanding
Res.C2a 4.3.2	Provide internal and external security for mass prophylaxis sites
Res.C2a 4.4.1	Have or have access to information systems that support tracking mass prophylaxis allocation that comply with the Public Health Information Network (PHIN) functional requirements for Countermeasure and Response Administration

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Performance Measures	Metric
Percentage of sufficient, competent personnel available to staff dispensing centers or vaccination clinics, as set forth in SNS plans and State/local plans	100%

Activity: *Establish Points Of Dispensing*

Definition: Set up POD to receive members of the general public, according to POD plan.

Critical Tasks	
Res.C2a 5.2	Make arrangements for treatment of mass prophylaxis site staff and their families
Res.C2a 5.3	Make arrangements for treatment for mass prophylaxis response personnel
Res.C2a 5.1.4	Ensure adequate staffing levels for anticipated mass prophylaxis throughput
Res.C2a 5.4	Ensure security is present when pharmaceuticals and other assets are delivered to mass prophylaxis sites

Performance Measures	Metric
Percent of POD staff and their families given treatment prior to POD opening to general public	TBD

Activity: *Conduct Triage for Symptoms*

Definition: Conduct initial screening of individuals prior to their entering the POD in order to prevent symptomatic individuals from potentially contaminating POD.

Critical Tasks	
Res.C2a 6.1.1	Ensure, in the event of a communicable disease, initial medical screening/triage is performed either at a staging area or in separate area away from the mass prophylaxis site to prevent contamination of site
Res.C2a 6.1.2	Establish number of triage stations commensurate with the anticipated size of the throughput
Res.C2a 6.2.1	Transport symptomatic individuals to appropriate health facility prior to their entering mass prophylaxis site

Performance Measures	Metric
Time in which clinical staff and volunteers become available at triage station	Within 24 hours of decision to activate site
Transportation assets are available to bring symptomatic individuals to appropriate health facility	Yes/No

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Activity: *Conduct Medical Screening*	
Definition: Review patient screening documentation and available medical history to determine proper course of treatment.	
Critical Tasks	
Res.C2a 7.1	Ensure proper documentation is created for each individual seeking prophylactic treatment
Res.C2a 7.2	Identify appropriate treatment based on medical history and exposure
Res.C2a 7.3	Ensure sufficient staffing at mass prophylaxis distribution site screening station to prevent initial bottlenecks

Performance Measures	**Metric**
Time in which clinical staff and volunteers become available at medical screening station	Within 24 hours of decision to activate site

Activity: *Conduct Mass Dispensing*	
Definition: Dispense oral medication/administer vaccination according to standing medical orders.	
Critical Tasks	
Res.C2a 8.2.6	Implement plan to treat minors
Res.C2a 8.3	Maintain a system for inventory management to ensure availability of critical prophylaxis medicines and medical supplies
Res.C2a 8.3.1	Submit re-supply orders early enough to prevent running out of pharmaceuticals and other supplies
Res.C2a 8.3.2	Ensure adequate supply of ancillary medical supplies
Res.C2a 8.3.3	Distribute pre-printed drug information sheets

Performance Measures	**Metric**
Rate at which dispensing centers or vaccination clinics process patients (persons per hour) meets SNS Plans and State/Local Plans	Yes/No
Percentage of at-risk population that was successfully provided initial prophylaxis within 48 hours of decision to provide prophylaxis	100%

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Activity: *Monitor Adverse Events*	
Definition: Through monitoring, identify individuals who have an adverse reaction to prescribed medication and initiate alternate therapies.	
Critical Tasks	
Res.C2a 9.1	Track outcomes and adverse events following mass distribution of prophylaxis
Res.C2a 9.3	Provide alternate medication as ordered by clinician
Res.C2a 9.1.1	Access information systems that support monitoring of adverse reactions that comply with the PHIN functional requirements for Countermeasure and Response Administration

Performance Measures	**Metric**
Percent of individuals provided with prophylaxis monitored prior to leaving POD	100%
Number of staff who monitor individuals is adequate based on number of individuals in the adverse events monitoring section	Yes/No

Activity: *Demobilize Mass Prophylaxis Operations*	
Definition: Upon completion, stand down POD operations, return site to normal operations, and release or redeploy staff.	
Critical Tasks	
Res.C2a 10.1	Debrief mass prophylaxis personnel
Res.C2a 10.2	Reconstitute mass prophylaxis personnel and supplies
Res.C2a 10.3	Provide a staff debriefing on mass prophylaxis operations

Performance Measures	**Metric**
Percentage of staff debriefed after mass prophylaxis distribution	100%

Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship
Emergency Public Information and Warning	Mass Prophylaxis provides releasable public information of POD sites and other relevant information to Emergency Public Information and Warning for public notification.
Emergency Operations Center Management	Emergency Operations Center Management provides situation reports to the Mass Prophylaxis capability, which provides situation reports in return.
Medical Supplies Management and Distribution	Medical Supplies Management and Distribution capability provides medical assets to Mass Prophylaxis capability.
Public Safety and Security Response	Public Safety and Security Response capability provides perimeter security and crowd/traffic control for Mass Prophylaxis.

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Linked Capability	Relationship
Isolation and Quarantine	Mass Prophylaxis capability provides symptomatic persons to the Isolation and Quarantine.
Epidemiology Surveillance and Investigation	Epidemiology Surveillance and Investigation provides information for Mass Prophylaxis.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
Dispensing/Vaccination Centers (DVC) Points of Distribution (PODs)	Locations where prophylaxis will be provided. Personnel include clinicians/public health professions; ancillary support personnel, traffic control personnel, security personnel, inventory assistants, and staff for storing, receiving and distributing federal medical supplies and equipment to fully staff 24 hour operations at each POD
Adverse event monitoring	
Medical assets/supplies (prophylaxis)	12-hour Push Package of pharmaceuticals, antidotes, and medical supplies; may include follow-on vendor managed inventory (VMI) supplies
SNS Coordination Center	

Planning Assumptions

- Assume population potentially exposed and requiring prophylaxis is 2 million in one metropolitan area.
- Additional illnesses will occur prior to mass prophylaxis campaign. Many people likely to present who fear they might have been exposed multiple unexplained physical symptoms (MUPS). Due to time elapsed prior to plan execution and non-informed public. Studies show that between 4 and 50 times as many people seek medical care after an event for MUPS than for diagnosable symptoms treatable by medical providers.
- State/local medicines and medical supplies are insufficient for mass prophylaxis.
- Federal medical assets requested and received at each location within 12 hours from the Federal decision to deploy assets.
- State/locals receive prophylaxis materials and supplies for 6 million. Estimates affected Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) @ 2 million in 3 geographic locations.
- Adequate prophylaxis is readily available from the Strategic National Stockpile; initial 10-day regimen with ciprofloxacin (Cipro) or doxycycline (Doxy) assuming that the organism is sensitive to these antibiotics. Goal to protect exposed or potentially exposed population as quickly as possible based on current Centers for Disease Control (CDC) recommendations for anthrax prophylaxis.
- Follow-on prophylaxis with vaccine and antibiotics (50-day supply) for persons at highest risk of exposure based on epidemiological data and current CDC recommendations for anthrax prophylaxis.
- State/locals have sufficient personnel to fully command or staff a mass prophylaxis dispensing operation. This may include assistance from Federal response teams, if requested.
- State/locals have developed and exercised an SNS response plan.
- Guidelines for post exposure prophylaxis populations will be developed by public health officials and subject matter experts depending on epidemiological circumstances. Decision based on estimates of timing, location and conditions of exposure.
- Point of Distribution (POD) Staffing: Number of PODs determined assumes 24 hour operation, Population equally distributed among PODs, perform at 100% capacity at all times, constant flow of people, staffing is constant and adequate. PODs should be located where easily accessible to the public i.e., publicly owned buildings.
- Medical Assets/Supplies – Adequate prophylaxis is readily available in the SNS.

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- Population Centers – resources readily available for largest urban areas for duration of prophylaxis period.
- Receiving, shipping, and storage (RSS) – State/local jurisdictions with mass prophylaxis plans have identified a site for receiving, staging, and storing Federal assets. In some worse case scenarios, more than one site may need to be identified.
- Risk Factors:
  - The occurrence of multiple events could deplete the availability of Federal stockpiled medical assets and Federal resources i.e., staff, supplies, etc.
  - The unavailability of staff and volunteers to operate the POD system.
  - Fear and mass panic could escalate.
  - Inadequate planning for mass prophylaxis would result in delays in response and ultimately risk of loss of life.

Planning Factors from an In-Depth Analysis of a Scenario with Significant Demand for the Capability

Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Dispensing/Vaccination Centers (DVCs) Points of Distribution (PODs)	47,667 patients per hour (PPH)	Prophylaxis for 2 million	47 DVCs (PODs)
Receiving, shipping, and storage	Single warehouse, 12,000 square feet	Prophylaxis medicines for 2 million	Federal assets from SNS based on estimated number of exposed persons
Technical Advisory Response Unit (TARU) Teams	12-hour response.	1 7-9 member team for logistics, operations, and communications	1 team per single geographic incident
SNS Coordination Center	24 hours/7 days	24-hour communications with site of incident/command	18 staff/2 shifts = 36 SNS operations persons
Multiagency Coordination Systems (MACS) based on incident command system (ICS) functions (planning, logistics, operations, finance/administration and information		Number/shift	Number/2–3 shifts
Adverse event monitoring	24 hours	1 per 25,000 recipients of prophylaxis for recommended postexposure prophylaxis	2 million/25,000 = 80 for period of postexposure prophylaxis Note: Estimates will vary depending on population receiving prophylaxis at

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Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
			each DVC and other options available such as call-in hotlines

Approaches for Large-Scale Events

The information and analysis included in this capability reflects only one of the 15 scenarios - aerosolized anthrax.

National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
State/Local	Dispensing/ Vaccination Centers/Points of Distribution (DVC/PODs)	Resource Organization	1	Per population of 42,554 (47 DVC/PODs per 2 million people)	Establish POD Conduct Triage for Symptoms Conduct Medical Screening Conduct Mass Dispensing Conduct Adverse Events Monitoring
Federal/State/ Local/Private	Prophylaxis supplies and materials	Equipment			Conduct Mass Dispensing
Federal/State	Adverse event monitoring	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	1	Per population of 25,000	Conduct Adverse Events Monitoring
	SNS Coordination Center	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	1	Per geographic unit receiving SNS	Activate Mass Prophylaxis Establish POD Demobilize

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MASS PROPHYLAXIS APPENDIX

Strategic National Stockpile Assessment Tool Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services	
The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) Program has developed a tool for evaluating State readiness to receive, distribute, and dispense SNS assets in the event of a national emergency. The assessment tool is an outline of the core functions identified by the SNS program and the key elements that are regarded as either critical or important planning steps within each function.	
DEVELOPING AN SNS PLAN	
Critical Elements	A. SNS specific Preparedness Plan has been developed B. SNS Plan is incorporated into overall State Emergency Response Plan C. SNS Plan is updated annually
Important Elements	A. Planning Group formed and are working together in a collaborative planning effort (Inclusive of all representatives from State Public Health, State Emergency Management, Governor's Office and other supporting agencies) o Advisory Council o Workgroup o Health Department o Emergency Management Agency/State Office of Homeland Security o Public Works o Highway Department/Department of Transportation o Law Enforcement o National Guard (Army and Air) o Emergency Medical Services o Fire o Hospitals o Department of Administration/Finance o Department of Corrections o DOD/Military Installations o MMRS Cities B. Policy issues reviewed, identified, and addressed to support SNS operations o Process for requesting SNS assistance o Number of doses that a family member can pick-up at a dispensing site o Minimum identification requirements in order to receive medication o Credentialing process used to identify volunteers and staff at SNS sites o Rules of engagement for law enforcement o Providing prophylaxis to Native Americans on reservations C. Legal issues reviewed, identified, and addressed to support SNS operations o Medical practitioners authorized to issue standing orders and protocols for dispensing sites o Medical practitioners authorized to dispense medications during a state of emergency o Procurement of private property o Authorized overtime pay D. Liability/workers compensation
COMMAND AND CONTROL	
Critical Elements	A. State utilizes Incident Command System (ICS) structure with integration of SNS functions. Elements should include: o Governor's Office

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	o Health Department o Emergency Management Agency o SNS Coordinators o Other State Offices o Emergency Response Organizations o Local Elected officials B. Incident Commander identified with back-up and point of contact (POC) information C. Procedures are documented and in place for apportionment and inventory control of SNS materiel D. Sign-off on SNS plan documented between appropriate agencies and organizations
Important Elements	A. Regional plans between states are documented and in place between appropriate agencies and organizations B. State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC)/Health Department Operations Center (HDOC) is able to allow decision makers to communicate with each other
REQUESTING SNS	
Critical Elements	Individual or person(s) authorized by the governor to request SNS materiel are identified with POC information State SNS Plan contains request justification guidelines Signed MOU between CDC and State
Important Elements	Plan for Governor or designee(s) to communicate with key state officials to discuss incident and determine when to request SNS materials SNS Plan lists individuals who are authorized to sign for SNS materiel SNS Plan lists DEA Registrant Local SNS Plans contain request justification guidelines to the state Request procedures for on-going support for locals have been developed and are in the local SNS Plan Request procedures at the local and state level have been exercised A. Initial request for support B. On-going requests for support
MANAGEMENT OF SNS OPERATIONS	
Critical Elements	State SNS Coordinator identified with back-up and POC information The following State Leads have been identified with back-up and POC information: Communications Security RSS Distribution Repackaging Dispensing Sites Treatment Centers Training/Exercise/Evaluation Call-down rosters for SNS Leads are current and updated at least quarterly
Important Elements	State infrastructure in place to support State SNS plan o Support from Governor's office o Support from State Health Director Budget allocation adequately supports local SNS functions o ____% of funds has been sent out to locals

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	o Mechanism being used to fund locals o Specified deliverables o Contract monitoring
TACTICAL COMMUNICATION	
Critical Elements	A. State Communications Lead has a job action sheet and has been trained B. Communication networks and back-up system between Command and Control locations o State EOC o Health Department o RSS location o Distribution sites o Dispensing sites o Security o Transportation C. Maintenance plans to ensure rapid repair if communications systems go down D. Staffing call-down lists are reviewed to ensure accuracy at least quarterly
Important Elements	Conducts call-down exercises to test call lists quarterly Internal Communications at RSS/Dispensing/Distribution sites o Ham/Amateur Radio Operators o Cell Phones o UHF/VHF/ 800 MHz Radio Systems o Runners/couriers Communication networks are tested and exercised at least once annually
PUBLIC INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS	
Critical Elements	A. State Public Information and Communications Lead has a job action sheet and has been trained B. A plan to coordinate local media efforts is in place: o All local media channels have been identified and contact information (and backup) documented o Capabilities and audiences for each media outlet have been identified o Regular meetings with local media are planned to educate, provide background information and foster collaboration between SNS Public Information and Communication Lead and media representatives. o Media channels have threat-specific information "on the shelf" and ready if needed. C. A plan to compile information for clinical and drug information has been developed o Information has been collected o Storage location (electronic and hard copy) identified and updated regularly o Plan for mass reproduction and storage of printed materials has been developed D. A plan for disseminating information to the public and to health care professionals has been developed: o Plan is in place for channels to disseminate information to state and local community. o Information has been evaluated and adapted for needs of local community o Plan to distribute printed materials o Plan for 24/7 Public Information Hotline in place E. A plan for public information campaigns has been developed: o Web site information, printed material, newspaper inserts, videos o Dispensing site location, news briefs, informing public, rumor control

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	o Medication compliance
Important Elements	A. A plan to translate information is in place for non-English speaking, hearing impaired, visually impaired or functionally illiterate individuals: o Documents have been translated as appropriate for community o On-site interpreters available for dispensing sites o Translators and TTY plans for Public Information Hotlines B. Staff have been identified and trained in communications function
SECURITY	
Critical Elements	A. State Security Lead has a job action sheet and has been trained B. Security at RSS o Ample persons to secure facility o Protect the SNS materiel once signed over to the state o Securing materiel during RSS operations C. Coordination with US Marshals Service D. Plan in place for protecting staff/volunteers o RSS sites o Dispensing sites o Distribution sites o Treatment centers E. Crowd control plan for RSS sites F. Crowd control plan for Dispensing sites G. Crowd control plan for Treatment centers H. Developed a credentialing plan for SNS staff at RSS and Regional Distribution sites I. Developed a credentialing plan for SNS staff at Dispensing sites
Important Elements	A. Security procedures in place to transport SNS materiel to various locations around the state B. Traffic control plans for various SNS related sites (RSS, Dispensing, Distribution and Treatment Centers) C. Staff have been identified and trained in security functions
RECEIPT/STAGE/STORE (RSS)	
Critical Elements	A. State RSS Lead has a job action sheet and has been trained B. Primary location with alternate site(s) identified C. Locations reviewed by CDC SNS Consultant using Site Survey Tool D. The following Leads have been identified with back-up and POC information for each facility identified: o RSS Site Manager o Material Management (Inventory Management System) o Apportionment (Pick Teams) o Logistics o QA/QC o Safety o Security o Communications/IT o Appropriate Material Handling Equipment on site or readily available upon request o Pallet Jacks o Pallets o Hand Carts/Dollies o Forklifts o Repackaging/Shipping Materials (tape, plastic wrap, pens, paper, etc.) A. Appropriate Office Equipment o Telephones

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	o 3 Analog telephone lines for TARU Team o Fax machine o Table/chairs o Copier B. Call-down rosters for RSS Leads/staff are current and updated quarterly C. Staff have been identified and trained in RSS functions
Important Elements	A. Locations have been reviewed by the State B. Developed staffing plan for 24/7 operations C. Developed care/feed plan for staff D. RSS Site Manager and back-up trained in RSS operations E. The following Leads and back-ups have been trained in RSS operations for each facility identified: o Materiel Management o Apportionment o QA/QC o Safety o Security o Communications/IT o Logistics Lead
CONTROLLING SNS INVENTORY	
Critical Elements	A. Inventory Management System (IMS) in place with back-up o Computer Program o Electronic Spread Sheet o Paper System B. Inventory staff identified and trained in IMS functions
Important Elements	A. Procedure for chain of custody involving SNS materiel B. Procedure for chain of custody involving controlled substances
REPACKAGING ORAL MEDS	
Critical Elements	A. State Repacking Lead has a job action sheet and has been trained B. Repackaging plan or contingent contracts have been developed C. Repackaging staff call-down rosters are current and updated at least quarterly
Important Elements	A. Staff have been identified and trained in Repackaging functions
DISTRIBUTION	
Critical Elements	A. State Distribution Lead has a job action sheet and has been trained B. Plan for coordinating delivery of SNS materiel directly to treatment facilities, distribution/dispensing sites C. Agreements are documented and in place with organization(s) that will distribute materiel D. Plan for 24/7 recovery and repair of vehicles/distribution assets E. Appropriate Material Handling Equipment for Regional Distribution sites (off-loading and loading as needed) o Pallet Jacks o Hand Carts/Dollies o Forklifts o Repackaging/Shipping Materials (tape, plastic wrap, pens, paper, etc.)
Important Elements	A. Drivers and Support Personnel have been credentialed B. Staff have been identified and trained in Distribution functions o Chain of custody protocol o Routing information

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	o Security/communication procedures o Appropriate Use of Material Handling Equipment o Assist in loading and off-loading materials
DISPENSING ORAL MEDS	
Critical Elements	A. Dispensing Site Managers have been identified with back-up and POC information for each dispensing site B. Safety Lead identified with back-up and POC information C. Security Lead identified with back-up and POC information D. Communications Lead identified with back-up and POC information E. Logistics Lead identified with back-up and POC information F. Plan to rapidly dispense medications to the public G. Plan contains standard operating procedures/protocols for the operation and management of dispensing sites H. Plan in place to request and receive SNS materiel I. Plan contains interpreters/translation services identified to support dispensing operations J. Dispensing sites identified by state and or local jurisdiction o Population o Number of Sites o Estimated Thru-put of population/hour K. Call-down rosters for SNS Leads/staff are current and updated at least quarterly L. Core dispensing site staff per site have been identified and trained in Dispensing functions
Important Elements	A. Local Dispensing Site plans are exercised annually B. A cross section of identified dispensing sites have been reviewed by the state C. Agreements are documented and in place for dispensing sites D. Plan to provide prophylaxis to first responders, essential personnel and their families E. Equipment and supplies to support dispensing site operations o Office supplies o Medical supplies o Drug Fact Sheets o Agent Fact Sheets F. Name/Address/Patient/History (NAPH) forms and plan developed for patient tracking G. Plan to reproduce and distribute NAPH forms to dispensing sites H. Triage/Transport plan developed for those who are symptomatic I. Dispensing Site Manager and back-up trained in dispensing operations J. Safety Lead and back-up trained in dispensing operations K. Security Lead and back-up trained in dispensing operations L. Communications Lead and back-up trained in dispensing operations M. Logistics Lead and back-up trained in dispensing operations
TREATMENT CENTER COORDINATION	
Critical Elements	A. State Treatment Center Lead has a job action sheet and has been trained B. Point of Contacts for Treatment Centers have been identified and is documented in SNS plan
Important Elements	A. Coordination exists between SNS Coordinator and HRSA Coordinator at state level B. Process for Treatment Centers to request SNS materiel C. Request process has been exercised o Forms o Communication

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TRAINING, EXERCISE, AND EVALUATION	
Critical Elements	State Training/Exercise/Evaluation Lead has a job action sheet and has been trained A. Training Plan • State/Regional/Local agencies • Timelines/ schedules • SNS functions • Incident Command System B. Training Plan implemented C. Exercise Plan • State/Regional/Local exercises • Goals and objectives • Orientations/Drills/Tabletops/Functional D. Exercise Plan implemented E. Evaluation Plan o After Action Review (AAR) o Written evaluation Report o Corrective Action Plan o SNS Plan updated/revised o Training o Exercises F. Evaluation Plan implemented
Important Elements	A. State/Local Agencies support training/exercise functions o Administrative o Financial o Personnel and equipment B. Staff have been identified and trained in Training/Exercise/ Evaluation functions as it relates to the overall SNS program C. Are the Following Exercised or Evaluated? o Overall SNS Plan o Requesting SNS Procedures o Tactical Communications Plan o Public Information and Communication Plan o Security Plan o RSS Plan o Inventory Management System Plan o Distribution Plan o Dispensing Plan o Treatment Center Coordination

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MASS CARE (SHELTERING, FEEDING, AND RELATED SERVICES)

Capability Definition

Mass Care is the capability to provide immediate shelter, feeding centers, basic first aid, bulk distribution of needed items, and related services to persons affected by a large-scale incident. The capability also provides for companion animal care/handling through local government and appropriate animal-related organizations. Mass care services are also delivered to those in medical shelters.

Mass care is usually performed by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as the American Red Cross, or by local government sponsored volunteer efforts, such as Citizen Corps. Medical shelters are the responsibility of local government, and are typically addressed by the medical community and/or its alternate care facilities. State and Federal entities also play a role in public and environmental health by ensuring safe conditions, safe food, potable water, sanitation, clean air, etc.

Outcome

Mass care services (sheltering, feeding, bulk distribution) are rapidly provided for the population and companion animals within the affected area.

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

This capability supports the following Emergency Support Functions (ESFs):

ESF #6: Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services
ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services

Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Critical Tasks	
Res.C3a 1.3	Develop plans, policies, and procedures for the provision of mass care services to general populations and companion animals in coordination with all responsible agencies
Res.C3a 1.3.4	Develop processes and criteria for conducting an assessment (cultural, dietary, medical) of the general population registering at the shelter to determine suitability for the shelter, identify issues to be addressed within the shelter, and the transference of individuals and caregivers/family members, to medical needs shelters if appropriate
Res.C3a 1.3.5	Develop plans, policies, and procedures to coordinate delivery of mass care services to medical shelters
Res.C3a 1.1	Develop plans, policies, and procedures for activation and mobilization of mass care staff
Res.C3a 1.3.1	Develop plans, policies, and procedures to address common issues (e.g. cultural, language, ADA accessibility, etc.) as part of the mass care service delivery

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Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Res.C3a 1.2.2	Develop plans, procedures and protocols for pre-identification of sufficient and suitable facilities for evacuation and post-impact shelters (to include non-traditional shelter facilities such as camps, hotels, apartment leasing, etc.)
Res.C3a 1.2.7	Enter pre-identified shelter facilities into the National Shelter Database (NSD)
Res.C3a 1.2.3	Develop shelter contingency plans that allow for shelter self-sufficiency for a minimum 48 hours without re-supply
Res.C3a 1.3.8	Develop shelter contingency plans that allow for shelter relocation when shelter is no longer habitable due to changing incident conditions(e.g., structural damage, contamination, etc)
Res.C3a 1.3.2	Develop plans, procedures, and protocols for coordination of mass care services with agencies providing human services and housing, (e.g., welfare inquiry, transitional/interim housing services, other individual/family assistance programs), companion animal inquiry, and family reunification
Res.C3a 1.3.3	Develop plans, policies, and procedures for coordination of mass care services with supporting agencies (e.g., conducting decontamination, citizen evacuation/shelter-in-place, volunteer management and donations, environmental health, and public safety and security)
Res.C3a 1.5	Develop public education materials concerning mass care services
Res.C3a 1.6.1	Develop criteria and guidance materials for sheltering companion animals
Res.C3a 1.4.1	Develop MOUs/MOAs for critical mass care resources, including shelter agreements

Preparedness Measures	Metrics
A mass care plan has been developed for the general population	Yes/No
Plans are in place for the transference of individuals with medical needs, beyond the shelter's capacity, to medical shelters with their caregivers/family	Yes/No
A mass care plan has been developed for companion animals (includes provision of shelter, food, and animal welfare inquiry services)	Yes/No
Shelter agreements are in place for each jurisdiction	Yes/No
Shelter plans include advance designation of shelters to assigned citizens/population according to the space available in shelters vis-à-vis the local residents	Yes/No
Local government has a companion animal care/handling plan coordinated with appropriate partners	Yes/No
The mass care plan includes MOUs with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to provide personnel and equipment support following an incident	Yes/No

Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs	
Critical Tasks	
Res.C3a 2.1.1	Develop and implement training programs for mass care personnel to include sheltering, feeding and bulk distribution for general population
Res.C3a 2.1.2	Develop and implement training programs for mass care personnel for the provision of mass care

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Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
	services (feeding/bulk distribution) at medical shelters
Res.C3a 2.1.3	Develop and implement training programs for mass care personnel for delivery of mass care companion animal services
Res.C3a 2.2.1	Develop and implement exercise programs for mass care personnel to include sheltering, feeding and bulk distribution for general population
Res.C3a 2.2.2	Develop and implement exercise programs for mass care personnel for the provision of mass care services (feeding/bulk distribution) at medical shelters
Res.C3a 2.2.3	Develop and implement exercise programs for mass care personnel for delivery of mass care companion animal services

Preparedness Measures	Metrics
Training and exercise program for mass care personnel is in place and covers sheltering, feeding and bulk distribution services	Yes/No
Training and exercise program is in place for mass care personnel and includes general population and companion animals	Yes/No
Training and exercise program addresses common mass care issues (e.g. culture, language, ADA accessibility, etc.)	Yes/No
Training and exercises for mass care operations occur on regular basis	Yes/No

Performance Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: *Direct Mass Care Tactical Operations* Definition: In response to requests made by agencies, provide management and coordination of Mass Care capability.	
Critical Tasks	
Res.C3a 3.1	Conduct initial and ongoing mass care needs assessment (sheltering, feeding, bulk distribution)
Res.C3a 3.1.1.1	Monitor population levels, demographics, and location of affected populations
Res.C3a 3.3	Designate sites to serve as mass care facilities to include shelters, feeding sites, reception centers, food preparation sites, distribution points, etc.
Res.C3a 3.1.2.2	Estimate numbers requiring sheltering services
Res.C3a 3.1.2.3	Estimate numbers requiring mass feeding services
Res.C3a 3.1.2.4	Estimate numbers requiring bulk distribution of relief services
Res.C3a 3.7.4	Implement a daily counting and reporting system for sheltering, feeding, and bulk distribution services delivered
Res.C3a 3.7.5	Activate contingency plans for shelter surge capacity, as needed
Res.C3a 3.7.6	Activate vendor agreements/MOUs/MOAs in support of mass care activities as needed
Res.C3a 3.7.1	Acquire and provide resources necessary to support mass care services

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Res.C3a 3.8	Provide appropriate communication systems for mass care personnel
Res.C3a 3.4.1	Supervise and support day-to-day mass care operations
Res.C3a 3.8.1	Disseminate accurate, timely, and accessible information to the public, media, support agencies, and vendors about mass care services
Res.C3a 3.4	Coordinate mass care services for general population with appropriate agencies
Res.C3a 3.6	Coordinate mass care services for companion animals and owners with appropriate agencies
Res.C3a 3.5	Coordinate mass care services for the medical shelter population, including family members/care givers, with appropriate agencies
Res.C3a 3.4.2	Coordinate with appropriate agencies on common population issues (e.g. disability, language, culture, etc)
Res.C3a 3.1.2.1	Coordinate anticipated need for mass care services with agencies responsible for evacuation
Res.C3a 3.4.3	Coordinate environmental health assessment of mass care operations with agencies responsible for environmental health
Res.C3a 3.8.2	Disseminate notification of cessation of mass care operations

Performance Measures	Metric
Time in which the mass care plan is activated	Within 2 hours of notification of need for mass care
Time in which the initial mass care needs assessment is completed	Within 5 hours of notification of need for mass care
Time in which appropriate organizations are tasked to mobilize resources to provide mass care services	Within 6 hours of the notification of need for mass care
Frequency with which population levels, demographics, and locations of affected populations is recorded from all mass care facilities	At least once every 24 hours
Frequency with which reports of population levels, demographics, and locations of affected populations (along with status updates) are received from all mass care facilities	At least once every 24 hours
Frequency with which mass care needs are assessed	At least once every 24 hours
Percentage of total number of people seeking shelter who are either sheltered or referred to suitable accommodations	100%
Time to establish oversight of sanitation of shelters, food service, and distribution operations	Within 12 hours

Activity: ***Activate Mass Care***

Definition: Activate and mobilize mass care personnel and resources.

Critical Tasks	
Res.C3a 4.2	Notify trained mass care staff
Res.C3a 4.3	Mobilize needed mass care resources

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Res.C3a 4.2.1	Assemble mass care management teams for each identified mass care site (e.g. shelter, feeding, bulk distribution)
Res.C3a 4.1	Activate emergency shelters
Res.C3a 4.4	Mobilize veterinary and animal shelter services
Res.C3a 4.4.1	Assemble mass care management teams for each identified companion animal site

Performance Measures	Metric
Mass care staff are notified	Within 2 hours of notification of need for mass care services
Mass care staff mobilized within timeframe designated in SOPs	Yes/No
Time in which a systematic approach to determining real-time availability of a shelter capability (facility, staff, resources) within jurisdiction (local, State, inter-state) is implemented	Within 2 hours of activation

Activity: *Establish Shelter Operations*

Definition: Staff and equip shelter in preparation to receive displaced persons and/or companion animals.

Critical Tasks	
Res.C3a 5.1	Determine whether areas are deemed safe for mass care service delivery
Res.C3a 5.1.1	Conduct building/facility inspection of identified mass care facilities to determine structural integrity, capability, and suitability (including food/sanitation capability, and ADA accessibility)
Res.C3a 5.2.1	Staff shelter with appropriately trained personnel
Res.C3a 5.2	Set-up shelter for operations
Res.C3a 5.2.2	Establish self-sufficiency (water/food/staffing) of shelter for minimum of 48 hours
Res.C3a 5.2.3	Ensure adequate communication systems are available for shelter staff
Res.C3a 5.3	Conduct regular communications with mass care tactical operations
Res.C3a 5.4	Coordinate provision of shelter support services with appropriate agencies (e.g., food service, medical, security, etc.)
Res.C3a 5.5	Coordinate with appropriate agency to conduct an environmental health assessment for mass care operations

Performance Measures	Metric
Time in which shelters are opened for staff and setup	Within 8 hours of
Time to coordinate public safety and security services provided at shelter	3 hours prior to shelter opening to public

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Activity: ***Shelter General Population***

Definition: Provide temporary shelter for those individuals displaced during an incident but do not require additional medical assistance.

Critical Tasks	
Res.C3a 6.1	Conduct shelter registration for general population
Res.C3a 6.1.1	Conduct initial assessment (cultural, dietary, medical) of general population registering at shelter to ensure appropriate shelter services are provided
Res.C3a 6.1.2	Establish processes to address issues identified in the assessment of shelter registrants
Res.C3a 6.1.3	Transfer individuals and caregivers/family members to medical needs shelters if appropriate
Res.C3a 6.4	Request additional resources and equipment necessary to support shelter operations
Res.C3a 6.2.1	Implement mechanisms for daily reporting of shelter population
Res.C3a 6.2.2	Coordinate with internal/external facility management structures
Res.C3a 6.2.3	Coordinate to provide medical services
Res.C3a 6.2.4	Coordinate to provide safety/security services
Res.C3a 6.2.5	Coordinate feeding services for general populations in shelters
Res.C3a 6.2.5.1	Provide culturally and diet-restricted appropriate feeding services when possible
Res.C3a 6.3.1	Provide regular updates on shelter needs and capacity
Res.C3a 6.3.2	Assess ongoing medical and public health needs of shelter population and refer as appropriate

Performance Measures	**Metric**
Percentage of population initially assessed for suitability within 24 hours of seeking shelter	100%
Percent of shelter population registered within 24 hours of residing in shelter	100%
Frequency with which shelter population is recorded	Once every 24 hours
Percentage of population seeking shelter admitted to shelter and/or referred to appropriate facility	100%

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Activity: *Shelter Companion Animals*

Definition: Provide temporary shelter for companion animals of displaced owners or those companion animals who are abandoned.

Critical Tasks	
Res.C3a 7.1.2	Establish companion animal shelter
Res.C3a 7.1.3	Arrange for companion animal care/handling services
Res.C3a 7.3	Operate companion animal care/handling facilities
Res.C3a 7.3.1	Coordinate provision of veterinary medical services with appropriate agencies
Res.C3a 7.2.1	Coordinate with entities responsible for search and rescue for transference of companion animals into animal shelters
Res.C3a 7.2.2	Coordinate message regarding companion animal evacuation with agencies responsible for issuing evacuation orders
Res.C3a 7.3.2	Coordinate animal shelter operations with agencies responsible for environmental health
Res.C3a 7.4.3	Coordinate acquisition of needed companion animal resources with appropriate agencies receiving donations
Res.C3a 7.2.3	Coordinate transportation of companion animals with appropriate agencies
Res.C3a 7.3.3	Identify any special procedures necessary for the intake of companion animals (e.g., decontamination)
Res.C3a 7.3.4	Identify and implement special procedures (e.g., decontamination) for companion animal intake
Res.C3a 7.3.5	Implement procedures for companion animal intake/registration
Res.C3a 7.3.6	Implement tracking system for intake and export of companion animals in compliance with local holding regulations
Res.C3a 7.4.1	Provide feeding services that ensure adequate nutrition for companion animals
Res.C3a 7.4.2	Establish guidance for staff on integrating volunteers while maintaining health and safety for staff, companion animals, and volunteers
Res.C3a 7.3.7	Manage shelter facility maintenance

Performance Measures	**Metric**
Time in which shelters are opened for staff and set-up	Within 8 hours of mobilization
Companion animal import/export process complies with local holding regulations	Yes/No
Percentage of companion animals sheltered and/or referred to appropriate responsible authority	100%

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Activity: ***Close Shelter***	
Definition: Deactivate shelter and staff upon determination that immediate shelter needs have been met or if the shelter is no longer suitable to meet mission needs.	
Critical Tasks	
Res.C3a 8.1	Coordinate with agencies responsible for transportation of shelter population to residence or temporary/interim housing
Res.C3a 8.2	Disseminate notification to close shelter operations
Res.C3a 8.3	Conduct closing inspection and walk-through of shelters

Performance Measures	**Metric**
Time in which shelter closure notification is provided	48 hours prior to shelter closure
All shelter residents transitioned from shelter to alternative accommodations/interim housing/homes prior to shelter closure	Yes/No

Activity: ***Establish Feeding Operations***	
Definition: Identify real-time capacity and availability of resources for feeding operations.	
Critical Tasks	
Res.C3a 9.1	Estimate projected feeding services required
Res.C3a 9.2.1	Identify kitchens and capacities to prepare and distribute food
Res.C3a 9.2.2	Identify additional mobile feeding resources necessary to meet feeding need
Res.C3a 9.2.3	Assess number of pre-packaged meals needed to augment kitchen services
Res.C3a 9.2	Develop a strategy to meet projected feeding services required
Res.C3a 9.3.1	Conduct building/facility inspection of identified food operation facilities to determine structural integrity, capability, and suitability (e.g., food/sanitation capability, ADA accessibility)
Res.C3a 9.3.2	Verify that kitchen facilities are in compliance with local health regulations
Res.C3a 9.3.3	Staff kitchens with appropriately trained personnel
Res.C3a 9.3.4	Acquire and provide foodstuffs for feeding operations
Res.C3a 9.4	Establish mobile feeding routes
Res.C3a 9.5	Implement reporting mechanism for daily meal counts
Res.C3a 9.6	Coordinate with shelter managers to ensure adequate feeding is conducted at general population, medical, and companion animal shelters

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Performance Measures	Metric
Time to complete initial projection of need for feeding services	Depends on conditions
Time to develop strategy to meet demand for feeding services	Within 6 hours of notification
Time in which feeding services are mobilized	Within 12 hours of activation
Time to identify locations for effective service delivery to meet feeding needs	Within 24-36 hours of activation
Frequency with which reassessment of feeding strategy is conducted	At least once daily

Activity: ***Prepare and Distribute Food***

Definition: Prepare and distribute meals to affected general populations, medical, and companion animal shelters.

Critical Tasks	
Res.C3a 10.1	Implement strategy to meet feeding needs of affect population
Res.C3a 10.4	Monitor progress of strategy to meet feeding needs
Res.C3a 10.1.2	Conduct food preparation and distribution using safe food handling protocols
Res.C3a 10.2	Conduct mass feeding activities
Res.C3a 10.3.1	Conduct mobile and fixed feeding operations, as needed
Res.C3a 10.3.2	Conduct feeding operations at medical shelters
Res.C3a 10.3.3	Conduct feeding operations for companion animals
Res.C3a 10.1.3	Provide culturally and diet-restriction appropriate feeding services
Res.C3a 10.1.4	Ensure adequate nutrition is provided for shelter populations
Res.C3a 10.4.1	Report accurate count of meals and snacks served
Res.C3a 10.4.2	Disseminate notification of end to feeding operations

Performance Measures	Metric
Percent of anticipated need for feeding services met	100%
Percent of strategy to meet needs for feeding services implemented	100%
Time in which first meal is served	Within 6 hours of activation
Time in which notification of end to feeding services is provided	48 hours prior to end of operations

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Activity: *Establish Bulk Distribution Operations*

Definition: Establish bulk distribution sites and prepare them to distribute items to the affected population.

Critical Tasks	
Res.C3a 11.2.1	Conduct building/facility inspection of identified mass care bulk distribution facilities to determine structural integrity, capability, and suitability (e.g., space available, access, security)
Res.C3a 11.2.2	Staff bulk distribution site with appropriately trained personnel
Res.C3a 11.2.3	Ensure adequate communication systems are available for bulk distribution staff
Res.C3a 11.2.3.1	Conduct communications with mass care tactical operations
Res.C3a 11.2.4	Establish reporting mechanisms for daily distribution count
Res.C3a 11.2	Establish bulk distribution operations at fixed sites
Res.C3a 11.1.1	Determine mobile bulk distribution routes
Res.C3a 11.3	Acquire and provide items for bulk distribution
Res.C3a 11.1	Coordinate with appropriate agencies to determine bulk distribution needs of affected population
Res.C3a 11.3.1	Coordinate with agencies receiving donations to acquire items needed for bulk distribution, including supplies for companion animals
Res.C3a 11.3.2	Coordinate with logistics resources to acquire items needed for bulk distribution operations

Performance Measures	Metric
Time in which operational sites receive ongoing support to maintain service delivery	Within 24 hours of site activation
Time in which facilities are opened and operating to receive and distribute disaster relief items	Within 24 hours of site activation
The locations of distribution centers are accurately and clearly communicated to the public	Yes/No

Activity: *Conduct Bulk Distribution Operations*

Definition: After establishing bulk distribution operations, distribute items to the affected population.

Critical Tasks	
Res.C3a 12.1	Conduct bulk distribution of relief items at fixed sites
Res.C3a 12.1.1	Conduct mobile bulk distribution operations
Res.C3a 12.1.2	Report to tactical operations daily distribution count, number of people served and needed items
Res.C3a 12.2	Disseminate notification of end to bulk distribution operations

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Performance Measures	Metric
Based on event, distribution of bulk items to affected population begins in timely manner	Within 72 hours of notification of need
Time in which notification of end to bulk distribution services is provided	48 prior to end of operations

Activity: *Demobilize Mass Care Operations*

Definition: Upon completion of assigned mission, demobilize mass care resources.

Critical Tasks	
Res.C3a 13.1	Coordinate demobilization of mass care resources with participating agencies
Res.C3a 13.2	Disseminate notification of demobilization of mass care resources/services
Res.C3a 13.3	Demobilize mass care assets
Res.C3a 13.4	Demobilize mass care resources

Performance Measures	Metric
Percent of participating agencies notified of demobilization	100%

Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship
Emergency Operations Center Management	Mass Care capability coordinates with Emergency Operations Center Management on resource requests and situation reports.
Onsite Incident Management	Mass Care capability coordinates with Onsite Incident Management on resource requests and situation reports.
Isolation and Quarantine	Mass Care capability prepares food and relies on Isolation and Quarantine to distribute food and relief items to those who are quarantined and relies on Isolation and Quarantine to provide quarantine information to mass care personnel.
WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination	Mass Care capability relies upon WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination to provide decontamination to persons and companion animals prior to shelter entry.
Volunteers Management and Donations	Mass Care capability relies upon Volunteers Management and Donations to provide volunteers and donations at mass care facilities.
Public Safety and Security Response	Mass Care capability relies upon Public Safety and Security Response to provide security at mass care facilities, including companion animal shelters.
Environmental Health	Mass Care capability relies upon Environmental Health to provide a health assessment of facilities, food, persons, and companion animals.
Medical Surge	Mass Care capability relies upon Medical Surge to provide medical staff at mass care facilities.

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Linked Capability	Relationship
Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-In-Place	Mass Care capability coordinates with the Citizen Evacuation and Shelter-In-Place Protection capability to ensure mass care services are in place for evacuating populations.
Medical Shelter	Mass Care capability coordinates with jurisdiction authorities providing medical sheltering for provision of mass care services such as feeding and bulk distribution.
Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment	Mass Care capability notifies Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment of sick or injured people in need of transport.
Fatality Management	Mass Care capability notifies Fatality Management of remains.
Animal Health Emergency Support	Mass Care capability coordinates with Animal Health Emergency Support for the care of companion animals exceeding shelter criteria.
Urban Search and Rescue	Mass Care capability coordinates with Urban Search and Rescue for transference of rescued companion animals.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
Volunteer Agency Shelter Management Team	Per NIMS, there are Type I, II, and III Shelter Management Teams
Type 1 Small Animal Sheltering Team	Per NIMS, there are Type I, II, and III Small Animal Sheltering Teams
Small Animal Transportation Team	Per NIMS, there is a Type I Small Animal Transport Team
Animal Incident Response Team	Per NIMS, there is a Type I, II, and III Incident Management Team for Animal Protection
Voluntary agency mobile kitchen Class A, B, and C	Per NIMS, there are Type I, II, III, and IV mobile feeding kitchens (or mobile field kitchens) including personnel.
Voluntary Agency Mobile Kitchen/Canteen	Per NIMS, a mobile kitchen unit provides food for incident personnel
Voluntary Agency Warehouse Team	
Voluntary Agency Drop Trailer Team	
Prepackaged meals	
Voluntary Agency Shelter Childcare Team	
Meals from contractors (e.g., vendors, caterers)	

Planning Assumptions

- Although applicable to several of the 15 National Planning Scenarios, the capability planning factors were developed from an in-depth analysis of the Major Earthquake scenario. Other scenarios were reviewed to identify required adjustment or additions to the planning factors and national targets.
- This capability applies to a wide range of incidents and emergencies, including major hurricanes, improvised explosives, pandemic influenza, and improvised nuclear devices.
- An immediate and sustained need for bulk distribution of relief supplies will be required. Requirements will depend on the nature of the human needs produced by the incident.
- Populations likely to require mass care services include the following: 1) Primary victims (with damaged or destroyed homes; 2) Secondary and tertiary victims (denied access to homes); 3) Transients (visitors and travelers within the affected area); 4) Emergency workers (seeking feeding support, respite shelter(s), and lodging).
- In the initial phase (hours and days) of a catastrophic disaster, organized and spontaneous sheltering will occur simultaneously within and at the periphery of the affected area as people leave the area. Additional congregate sheltering may be required for those evacuating to adjacent population centers.
- Mass care may need to be setup pre-incident for some types of incidents such as a hurricane where evacuations occur prior to landfall. In other instances, the need for mass care may not emerge until after an incident has occurred.

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- Depending on the nature of the incident, additional services such as decontamination may need to be arranged prior to admission into a shelter facility.
- The type of incident will affect when mass care services are required (e.g. hurricane may necessitate mass care services being set-up pre-landfall for evacuees, an earthquake would be post-incident).
- The location of the incident will affect the time needed for arrival on-scene.
- The type of incident affects the time needed to verify shelter availability after evaluating structural factors (e.g. accessibility, structural integrity and level of contamination).
- Companion animal shelter operations will require more support staff if owners are not close enough to feed, walk, and care for their animals.
- The evacuation policy of an affected area will determine the number of companion animals arriving at companion animal shelters.
- Shelter close-down decision will be made for varying reasons. The decision can be dependent on reasons such as re-supply is unable to provide resources needed to operate shelter, there is a need for shelter consolidation, or there are environmental/safety concerns.
- The type of incident will determine the timeliness of establishing feeding operations due to accessibility of affected populations.
- The population density will affect the demand for feeding at centralized sites.
- The type of incident will determine the accessibility of affected populations in need of bulk distribution services, and determine the availability of resources needed to conduct bulk distribution.
- Shelters will likely experience large numbers of elderly with specific medication requirements and other evacuees on critical home medical care maintenance regimens.
- Significant numbers of special needs shelters will likely be required as nursing homes and other similar care facilities are rendered inoperable and are unable to execute their evacuation mutual aid plans and agreements with other local facilities. ARC will coordinate with HHS in these situations.
- Family reunification within the affected area will be an immediate and significant concern as many family members may be separated at the time of the event.
- Populations with the resources to help themselves will be encouraged to take independent action.
- Assume 763,000 people need mass care support: 313,000 will need shelter and feeding (3 meals a day for the 313,000 people would equal 939,000 meals a day for shelters) immediately, and an additional 450,000 people remaining in the affected area will need feeding. Shelter population will vary between low during the day and higher at night.
- More people will initially flee and seek shelter from terrorist attacks involving CBRNE agents that for natural catastrophic disaster events. They will also exhibit a heightened concern for the health-related implications related to the disaster agent.
- Substantial numbers of trained mass care specialists and managers will be required for an extended period of time to augment local responders and to sustain mass care sheltering and feeding activities.
- Timely logistical support to shelters and feeding sites will be essential and required for a sustained period of time. Food supplies from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) positioned at various locations across the country will need to be accessed and transported to the affected area in a timely manner.
- Census data indicate that 20 percent of the population have a disability, 15 percent of people needing mass care support have a physical or cognitive disability that will require some level of special care (i.e. personal care assistance, sign language interpreter, mobility assistance, etc.)
- Twenty-five percent of the self-evacuee population will seek shelter out of the area.
- Approximately 37,000 trained workers will be needed to support the general population (worker to recipient ratio—1:30): 32,500 for shelter operations (30,000 within the affected area, 2,500 outside the area) and 4,500 for other human services.

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- As a result of the incident, many local emergency personnel – paid and volunteer – that normally respond to disasters may be dead, injured, involved with family concerns, or otherwise unable to reach their assigned posts.
- Sixty percent of the affected population will have companion animals.
- Scenarios typically count the number of persons in shelters as the basis for computing the number of companion animals (CAs). In a scenario with many dead and injured people (which varies by type of event), additional sheltering of CAs will be required. Some CAs will have perished in the same event that killed or injured humans. The assumption is made that the number of animals needing shelter will rise by 10 percent because their owners are either dead or injured.
- Assume 14,000 workers (includes some owners and volunteers) will be needed for companion animal care.
- State and local resources will immediately be overwhelmed; thus, Federal assistance will be needed immediately.
- The event will exceed local capacity for trained mass care staff.
- Service delivery to affected populations by voluntary agencies and NGOs will occur in locations deemed safe by appropriate Government officials
- Immediately following major CBRNE events, decontamination facilities may not be readily available in all locations during the early stages of self-directed population evacuations. Unaware contaminated persons therefore may seek entry to shelters. These facilities may, as a result, become contaminated, adversely affecting resident health and general public trust.
- Two primary earthquake areas must be considered—the west coast and the New Madrid fault zone (the central Mississippi Valley in Arkansas, Missouri, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Illinois).
- Propositioned resources are likely to exist based on population and frequency of events; therefore, roughly two-thirds of resources are located east of the Mississippi River. Further, provisions should be made for additional resources beyond the stated needs because of the likelihood of the unavailability of existing resources due to damage and/or other competing events.
- As a result of the incident, a limited number of facilities within the affected area will be suitable for material support; most resources will need to be brought in from outside the affected area.
- The average population per shelter will rise with a catastrophic event (estimate 1,000 residents per shelter, versus 250 residents typically) because fewer facilities will be available than the preplanning estimation.
- Public health and medical care in shelters will be a significant challenge as local emergency medical services (EMS) resources and medical facilities will likely be overwhelmed quickly. The deployment of public health and medical personnel and equipment to support medical needs in shelters will need to be immediate and sustained by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
- Mental health services will be needed by victims and responders in and near the affected area, as well as (on a lesser scale) throughout the Nation.
- Some previously identified structures will not be able to be shelters due to actual or potential damage.
- Significant disruption of the affected area's infrastructure, particularly power, transportation, and communications systems, may occur.
- Timely logistical support to shelters and feeding sites will be essential and required for a sustained period of time.
- Close liaison and coordination with numerous voluntary and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) will be necessary on the Federal, regional, State, and local levels.
- Disaster welfare information may be a priority concern for family members throughout the Nation.
- Transient populations such as tourists, students, and foreign visitors, within the affected areas will require assistance.

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- Companion (small) animal sheltering team requirements assume that the shelters will house only animals. "Pet friendly" shelters (that include owner families with their companion animal) will have a reduced need for staff after the initial setup.
- The population seeking shelter needs to be informed regarding available companion animal care.
- Immediate response activities focusing on meeting urgent mass care needs should be located in safe areas.
- Adjacent communities need to be prepared to deal with significant numbers of evacuating persons from the affected area. (Those host communities will also need significant mass care support.)
- ESF#6 (Mass Care, Housing and Human Services) operational cells will be established at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Regional Response Coordination Centers (RRCC) and FEMA's National Response Coordination Center (NRCC).
- Assessments for resource support to the disaster-affected area will be promptly conducted.
- The receipt of Federal Government support in the form of personnel, material, and equipment will be in accordance with NRP.

Planning Factors from an In-Depth Analysis of a Scenario with Significant Demand for the Capability (Major Earthquake)

Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Voluntary Agency Shelter Management Team	1 Shelter Management Team per average 250 shelter residents (Note: In a catastrophic event, the average number of residents per shelter will rise to an average of 1,000 per shelter, changing target levels.)	313,000 people needing shelter	1,252 Shelter Teams (an average of 250 people in each shelter)
Type 1 Small Animal Sheltering Team	300 companion animals per Shelter Team	193,000 animals displaced	643 Type 1 Small Animal Sheltering Teams
Animal Shelter Management Coordination Team	Manage and coordinate 5-7 Shelter Teams per team	193,000 animals displaced	90-130 Animal Shelter Management Coordination Teams (5-7 Animal Shelter Coordination Teams x 90-130 = 643 Type 1 Small Animal Sheltering Teams)
Small Animal Transportation Team – Not mass care function	2 Small Animal Transportation Teams each per Type 1 Small Animal Sheltering Team	193,000 animals displaced	1,286 Small Animal Transportation Teams

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Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Animal Incident Response team – animal rescue function	4 animal incident response teams per each Type 1 Small Animal Sheltering Team	193,000 animals displaced	2,725 Animal Incident Response Teams
Food Service Delivery Unit	2 drivers and 1 appropriate vehicle capable of distributing 1,500 meals per day in accordance with safe food handling requirements	1.5 million meals delivered per day	1,000 food service/delivery units (1,000 x 1,500 meals = 1,500,000)
Voluntary agency field kitchen Class A	5,000 meals per day, 15 workers, 1 Field Support Unit, plus support equipment	1.5 million meals needed per day	300 voluntary agency field kitchens Class A (300 x 5,000 meals = 1,500,000); 300 Field Support Units
Voluntary agency field kitchen Class B	10,000 meals per day, 20 workers, 2 Field Support Units, plus support equipment	1.5 million meals needed per day	150 voluntary agency field kitchens Class B (150 x 10,000 meals = 1,500,000); 300 Field Support Units
Voluntary agency field kitchen Class C	20,000 meals per day, 30 workers, 1 trailer, plus support equipment	1.5 million meals needed per day	75 voluntary agency mobile Kitchens Class C (75 x 20,000 meals = 1,500,000
Voluntary agency field kitchen Class D	30,000 meals per day, 40 workers, 3 Field Support Units, plus support equipment	1.5 million meals needed per day	50 voluntary agency field kitchens Class D (50 x 30,000 = 1,500,000); 150 Field Support Units
Voluntary agency mobile kitchen	800 meals per day, 3 workers	1.5 million meals needed per day	1,875 voluntary agency mobile kitchens (1,875 x 800 meals = 1,500,000)
Voluntary Agency Warehouse Team	1 warehouse facility plus management	10 voluntary agency warehouse teams	10 Voluntary Agency Warehouse Teams

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Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Voluntary Agency Field Support Unit	1 dry box trailer, 1 refrigerated trailer, 1 tractor, 1 driver, 1 forklift	Maximum of 300 kitchen sites each needing 1 drop trailer for dry goods and 1 drop trailer for refrigerated goods	300 Voluntary Agency Field Support Units (1 dry goods trailer x 300 kitchen sites max plus 1 refrigerated goods trailer x 300 kitchen sites = 600 trailers)
Prepackaged meals	Meal, Ready to Eat (MRE) via mission assignment and other private corporations such as HeaterMeal	1.5 million meals needed per day	1.5 million prepackaged meals
Shelter Childcare Team	1 Shelter Childcare Team per average 250 shelter residents	313,000 people needing shelter	1,252 Shelter Childcare Teams (an average of 250 people in each shelter)
Meals from contractors (e.g., vendors, caterers)	Contracted caterers and vendors	1.5 million meals needed per day	1.5 million meals from contractors

Approaches for Large-Scale Events

- Mass care will involve partnering with the private (commercial) and/or public sectors to ensure quick service delivery.
- Sheltering activities will be initiated on the local level immediately and augmented by resources (e.g., staff, supplies) from regional and national voluntary agency partners for large-scale events.
- Feeding activities will be initiated on the local level immediately and augmented by resources (e.g., staff, supplies) from regional and national voluntary agency partners for large-scale events.
- Companion animal sheltering activities will be initiated on the local level immediately and augmented by resources (e.g., staff, supplies) from regional and national voluntary agency partners for large-scale events.
- In the initial phase (hours and days) of a catastrophic disaster, organized and spontaneous sheltering will occur simultaneously within and at the periphery of the affected area as people leave the area. Additional congregate sheltering may be required for those evacuating to adjacent population centers.

National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	# of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
All agencies engaging in Mass Care working collaboratively	Volunteer Agency Shelter Management Team	NIMS Typed Resource Organization	6	Per Jurisdiction with population ≤ 10K	Activate Mass Care Direct Mass Care Tactical Operations Establish Shelter
			15	Per Jurisdiction with population <10 - 25K	
			30	Per Jurisdiction with	

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	# of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
to satisfy Mass Care need				population <25 - 50K	Establish Feeding Operations Shelter General Population Close Shelter Demobilize
			60	Per Jurisdiction with population <50 -100K	
			150	Per Jurisdiction with population <100-250K	
			300	Per Jurisdiction with population <250-500K	
All agencies engaging in Mass Care working collaboratively to satisfy Mass Care need	Type 1 Small Animal Sheltering Team	NIMS Typed Resource Organization	3	Per jurisdiction with population ≤ 10K	Shelter Companion Animals
			6	Per jurisdiction with population 10K - 25K	
			12	Per jurisdiction with population 25K - 50K	
			23	Per jurisdiction with population <50-100K	
			56	Per jurisdiction with population <100-250K	
			111	Per jurisdiction with population <250-500K	
All agencies engaging in Mass Care working collaboratively to satisfy Mass Care need	Small Animal Transportation Team	NIMS Typed Resource Organization	5	Per jurisdiction with population ≤ 10K	Shelter Companion Animals
			12	Per jurisdiction with population 10K - 25K	
			23	Per jurisdiction with population 25K - 50K	
			45	Per jurisdiction with population <50-100K	
			111	Per jurisdiction with population <100-250K	
			222	Per jurisdiction with population <250-500K	
All agencies engaging in Mass Care working collaboratively to satisfy Mass Care need	Animal Incident Response Team	NIMS Typed Resource Organization	9	Per jurisdiction with population ≤ 10K	Shelter Companion Animals
			23	Per jurisdiction with population 10K - 25K	
			45	Per jurisdiction with population 25K - 50K	
			89	Per jurisdiction with population <50-100K	
			222	Per jurisdiction with population <100-250K	
			444	Per jurisdiction with population <250-500K	
All agencies engaging in Mass Care working collaboratively to satisfy Mass Care need	Voluntary agency mobile kitchen Class A	NIMS Typed Resource Organization	1	Per jurisdiction with population ≤ 10K	Establish Feeding Operations Prepare and Distribute Food
			2	Per jurisdiction with population 10K - 25K	
			3	Per jurisdiction with population 25K - 50K	
			6	Per jurisdiction with population <50-100K	

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	# of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
			16	Per jurisdiction with population <100-250K	
			30	Per jurisdiction with population <250-500K	
All agencies engaging in Mass Care working collaboratively to satisfy Mass Care need	Voluntary agency mobile kitchen Class B	NIMS Typed Resource Organization	1	Per jurisdiction with population <10K - 25K	Establish Feeding Operations Prepare and Distribute Food
			2	Per jurisdiction with population <25K - 50K	
			3	Per jurisdiction with population <50-100K	
			8	Per jurisdiction with population <100-250K	
			15	Per jurisdiction with population <250-500K	
All agencies engaging in Mass Care working collaboratively to satisfy Mass Care need.	Voluntary agency mobile kitchen Class C	NIMS Typed Resource Organization	1	Per jurisdiction with population <25K - 50K	Establish Feeding Operations Prepare and Distribute Food
			2	Per jurisdiction with population <50-100K	
			4	Per jurisdiction with population <100-250K	
			8	Per jurisdiction with population <250-500K	
All agencies engaging in Mass Care working collaboratively to satisfy Mass Care need	Voluntary agency mobile kitchen/ canteen	NIMS Typed Resource Organization	4	Per jurisdiction with population ≤ 10K	Establish Feeding Operations Prepare and Distribute Food
			10	Per jurisdiction with population <10K - 25K	
			20	Per jurisdiction with population <25K - 50K	
			38	Per jurisdiction with population <50-100K	
			100	Per jurisdiction with population <100-250K	
			188	Per jurisdiction with population <250-500K	
All agencies engaging in Mass Care working collaboratively to satisfy Mass Care need	Voluntary Agency Warehouse Team	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	1	Per jurisdiction with population ≤ 10K – 50K	Establish Bulk Distribution Operations Conduct Bulk Distribution Operations
			2	Per jurisdiction with population <50-250K	
			3	Per jurisdiction with population <250-500K	
All agencies engaging in Mass Care working collaboratively to satisfy Mass Care need	Voluntary Agency Drop Trailer Team	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	2	Per jurisdiction with population ≤ 10K	Establish Bulk Distribution Operations Conduct Bulk Distribution Operations
			4	Per jurisdiction with population <10K - 25K	
			8	Per jurisdiction with population <25K - 50K	
			15	Per jurisdiction with population <50-100K	
			38	Per jurisdiction with population <100-250K	
			75	Per jurisdiction with	

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	# of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
				population <250-500K	
All agencies engaging in Mass Care working collaboratively to satisfy Mass Care need	Prepackaged meals	Equipment	3,000	Per jurisdiction with population ≤ 10K	Prepare and Distribute Food
			7,500	Per jurisdiction with population <10K - 25K	
			15,000	Per jurisdiction with population <25K - 50K	
			30,000	Per jurisdiction with population <50-100K	
			75,000	Per jurisdiction with population <100-250K	
			150,000	Per jurisdiction with population <250-500K	
All agencies engaging in Mass Care working collaboratively to satisfy Mass Care need	Voluntary Agency Shelter Childcare Team	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	6	Per jurisdiction with population ≤ 10K	Medical Shelters Shelter General Population
			15	Per jurisdiction with population <10K - 25K	
			30	Per jurisdiction with population <25K - 50K	
			60	Per jurisdiction with population <50-100K	
			150	Per jurisdiction with population <100-250K	
			300	Per jurisdiction with population <250-500K	
All agencies engaging in Mass Care working collaboratively to satisfy Mass Care need	Meals from contractors (e.g., vendors, caterers)	Resource Organization	1.75M	Nationally (1.5 Million plus 250,000 capacity needed to respond to concurrent disasters)	Prepare and Distribute Food

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FATALITY MANAGEMENT

Capability Definition

Fatality Management is the capability to effectively perform scene documentation; the complete collection and recovery of the dead, victim's personal effects, and items of evidence; decontamination of remains and personal effects (if required); transportation, storage, documentation, and recovery of forensic and physical evidence; determination of the nature and extent of injury; identification of the fatalities using scientific means; certification of the cause and manner of death; processing and returning of human remains and personal effects of the victims to the legally authorized person(s) (if possible); and interaction with and provision of legal, customary, compassionate, and culturally competent required services to the families of deceased within the context of the family assistance center. All activities should be sufficiently documented for admissibility in criminal and/or civil courts. Fatality management activities also need to be incorporated in the surveillance and intelligence sharing networks, to identify sentinel cases of bioterrorism and other public health threats. Fatality management operations are conducted through a unified command structure

Outcome

Complete documentation and recovery of human remains, personal effects, and items of evidence is done (except in cases where the health risk posed to personnel outweigh the benefits of recovery of remains and personal effects). Remains receive surface decontamination (if indicated) and, unless catastrophic circumstances dictate otherwise, are examined and identified, and released to the next-of-kin's funeral home with a complete certified death certificate. Reports of missing persons and antemortem data are efficiently collected. Victims' family members receive updated information prior to the media release. All hazardous material regulations are reviewed and any restriction on the transportation and disposition of remains are made clear by those with the authority and responsibility to establish the standards. All personal effects are made safe to return to next-of-kin unless contraindicated by catastrophic circumstances. Law Enforcement agencies are given all the information needed to investigate and prosecute the case successfully. Families are provided incident specific support services.

Relationship to National Response Plan ESF Annex

This capability supports the following Emergency Support Functions (ESFs):

ESF #4: Firefighting
ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services
ESF #9: Urban Search and Rescue
ESF #10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Response
ESF #13: Public Safety and Security

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Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Critical Tasks	
Res.C4a 1.1	Identify entity responsible for developing and maintaining plans, procedures, programs and systems across all hazards.
Res.C4a 1.1.1	Ensure that this entity involves Medical Examiner/Coroner (ME/C), emergency preparedness, public health, hospitals, and funeral directors, at a minimum, in the development of plans and procedures

Preparedness Measures	**Metrics**
Frequency with which the search and recovery plan is updated	Every 2 years
Frequency with which the comprehensive fatality management mission critical list (i.e., facilities, personnel and agencies) is reviewed and updated	Annually
Frequency with which contingency plans with local, State, and private entities regarding final disposition of remains (i.e., contaminated, unclaimed remains) are updated	Every 2 years
Frequency with which contingency plans with local, State, and private entities regarding surge (i.e., pandemic flu, natural disasters, terrorism) are updated	Every 2 years
Frequency with which the collection, storage and management of antemortem data is updated	Every 2 years

Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs	
Critical Tasks	
Res.C4a 2.1	Develop and implement training programs for fatality management
Res.C4a 2.2	Develop and implement exercise programs for fatality management

Preparedness Measures	**Metric**
Frequency of exercising the search and recovery plan	Every 2 years
Frequency with which training is conducted for augmented fatality management personnel (i.e., law enforcement, fire, dental ID team, anthropologists, funeral directors)	Every 2 years
Frequency of exercising contingency plans with local, State, and private entities regarding final disposition of remains (i.e., contaminated, unclaimed remains)	Every 2 years
Frequency of exercising contingency plans with local, State, and private entities regarding surge (i.e., pandemic flu, natural disasters, terrorism)	Every 2 years
Frequency of training on the collection, storage and management of antemortem data	Every 2 years

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Performance Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: ***Direct Fatality Management Tactical Operations***	
Definition: Direct all internal Fatality Management Operations, coordinating with other capabilities as needed.	
Critical Tasks	
Res.C4a 3.1	Coordinate Fatality Management
Res.C4a 3.6.1	Coordinate Federal mortuary/morgue services
Res.C4a 3.6.2	Coordinate with local legal authority in mortuary affairs
Res.C4a 3.4.3	Coordinate State assistance for next-of-kin notification and collection of antemortem information
Res.C4a 3.1.1	Identify medico-legal authority
Res.C4a 3.1.2	Coordinate with medical facility/Department of Public Health/general medical community
Res.C4a 3.2.1	Develop fatality management inputs to an incident action plan (IAP) by evaluating previously developed plans, procedures, protocols, and systems
Res.C4a 3.1.4	Coordinate with public health and regulatory agencies to develop plans, procedures, and protocols to protect fatality management personnel from infectious diseases, environmental, radiological, chemical, and other hazards when handling remains
Res.C4a 3.3.1	Identify key morgue staff
Res.C4a 3.4.1	Identify Medical Examiner/Coroner staff for antemortem data collection in Family Assistance Center
Res.C4a 3.5.1	Coordinate regional and State assistance for victim identification and mortuary services, and the processing, preparation, and disposition of remains

Performance Measures	**Metric**
Surge morgue resources are allocated	Yes/No
Time to locate suitable facilities for fatality management activities	Within 12–18 hours of report of deceased victims

Activity: ***Activate Fatality Management Operations***	
Definition: Notify and mobilize appropriate personnel.	
Critical Tasks	
Res.C4a 4.1	Activate scene operations
Res.C4a 4.2.1	Mobilize medical examiner/coroner
Res.C4a 4.3.1	Deploy portable morgue as appropriate
Res.C4a 4.2	Activate and implement fatality surge plan
Res.C4a 4.3.2	Determine morgue location

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Res.C4a 4.4	Request activation of DMORT as appropriate

Performance Measures	Metric
Appropriate number of physicians are provided medical legal authority based on incident needs	Yes/No
Time to set-up functional morgue facilities (e.g., portable morgue) from arrival on-scene	Within 24 hours of arrival on-scene
Time for surge resources and personnel to be operational	Within 8-12 hours from callout
Time for DMORT to arrive on-scene and set-up	Within 24-72 hrs

Activity: *Conduct On-scene Fatality Management Operations*

Definition: Conduct scene evaluation, document, and remove fatalities from scene.

Critical Tasks	
Res.C4a 5.1	Conduct scene survey for fatality management operations
Res.C4a 5.2	Document scene for fatality management operations
Res.C4a 5.2.2	Document (photograph, measure, obtain witness statements) in a manner consistent with the Medical Examiner/Coroner's incident plan
Res.C4a 5.3.1	Gather forensic evidence for fatality management operations
Res.C4a 5.5	Remove remains to staging
Res.C4a 5.4	Decontaminate remains
Res.C4a 5.5.2	Recover human remains in a dignified manner
Res.C4a 5.5.3	Transport remains to staging

Performance Measures	Metric
Time to complete initial scene survey	Within 2 hours of notification
Time for appropriate refrigerated storage units to arrive on-scene	Within 48 hours

Activity: *Conduct Morgue Operations*

Definition: Store remains temporarily, and conduct multi-specialty forensic analysis of human remains to determine the cause and manner of death.

Critical Tasks	
Res.C4a 6.1	Implement morgue operations
Res.C4a 6.3	Receive remains at morgue
Res.C4a 6.4	Store human remains

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Res.C4a 6.6.2	Package personal effects found with remains for return to next of kin (if possible)
Res.C4a 6.5	Perform autopsies

Performance Measures	Metric
Percentage of remains tracked through morgue	100%
Percentage of personal effects tracked with appropriate set of remains	100%
Percentage of complete and accurate records following quality control procedure	100%

Activity: ***Manage Antemortem Data***

Definition: Initiate plan for the collection and management of antemortem information from family members and other sources.

Critical Tasks	
Res.C4a 7.1	Activate antemortem data collection activities
Res.C4a 7.1.1	Establish antemortem record repository and its housing facility
Res.C4a 7.2	Conduct collection of antemortem information
Res.C4a 7.2.3	Conduct DNA collection of family members
Res.C4a 7.4	Enter data obtained in interviews into library
Res.C4a 7.3	Implement a balanced approach to address the needs of victims versus those families who have lost family members

Performance Measures	Metric
Time to activate a communications system for the general public to report missing persons	Within 1 hour of incident
Time to first public announcement of missing persons reporting	Within 2-4 hours of incident
Time to participation of Jurisdictional Medical Examiner/Coroner (ME/C) in the family assistance center (if one is established)	Within 2 hours of Family Assistance Center establishment
Time to activate and staff the antemortem information collection process	Within 24-48 hours of incident
Time for repository/library to be ready to receive antemortem victims' records from establishment of Family Assistance Center (FAC)	Within 24-48 hours of incident

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Activity: *Conduct Victim Identification*	
Definition: Compile antemortem records of missing individuals and compare those to the repository of postmortem data collected through On-scene and Morgue Operations.	
Critical Tasks	
Res.C4a 8.1	Activate victim identification operations
Res.C4a 8.2.5	Compare data from morgue and Family Assistance Center
Res.C4a 8.2.1	Conduct DNA analysis as indicated
Res.C4a 8.2.2	Conduct fingerprint/palmprint/footprint analysis
Res.C4a 8.2.3	Check with local/State/Federal/international databases
Res.C4a 8.3	Identify remains

Performance Measures	**Metric**
Percentage of recovered remains identified	100%
Time for antemortem and postmortem medical, dental, and fatality management databases to be ready to receive records from establishment of Family Assistance Center (FAC)	Within 24-48 hours of FAC establishment

Activity: *Conduct Final Disposition*	
Definition: Return the human remains and personal effects to the families or designated legal authority (ie, ME/C, Sheriff) for final disposition following recovery, decontamination, determination of the cause and manner of death and positive identification.	
Critical Tasks	
Res.C4a 9.1	Activate final disposition operations
Res.C4a 9.1.1	Issue death certificate
Res.C4a 9.2	Notify next-of-kin
Res.C4a 9.2.1	Release remains to next-of-kin or local authorities if no next-of-kin are identified
Res.C4a 9.2.4	Return affects to next-of-kin

Performance Measures	**Metric**
Death certificate issued	Yes/No

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Activity: *Demobilize Fatality Management Operations* Definition: Return all fatality management assets and resources to pre-incident readiness levels.	
Critical Tasks	
Res.C4a 10.2	Reconstitute fatality management personnel and equipment
Res.C4a 10.2.1	Participate in operational review of fatality management operations
Res.C4a 10.3.1	Identify fatality management staff post-operational needs
Res.C4a 10.3.2	Provide information to fatality management personnel on where and how to obtain medical, psychological, and financial assistance

Performance Measures	Metric
Time to re-order irretrievable resources	Within 24-48 hours of start of demobilization
Fatality management personnel participate in operational review	Yes/No

Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship
On-Site Incident Management	Fatality Management capability management integrates itself into the local Incident Command/Unified Command system. Onsite Incident Management also provides the initial notification of deaths to Fatality Management.
WMD/Hazardous Materials Response and Decontamination	Fatality Management receives deceased victims from HazMat personnel.
Public Safety and Security Response	Fatality Management receives deceased victims from Public Safety and Security Response personnel. This capability also provides perimeter security for Morgue Operations.
Urban Search & Rescue	Fatality Management receives deceased victims from Urban Search & Rescue personnel.
Firefighting	Fatality Management receives deceased victims from Firefighting personnel.
Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment	Fatality Management receives deceased victims from Triage and Pre-Hospital Treatment personnel.
Law Enforcement Investigations and Operations	Fatality Management receives access to law enforcement databases to aid the victim identification.
Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation	Fatality Management coordinates with Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation in determining if a death is the result of an exposure or disease.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team (DMORT) – Type 1	Per NIMS
DMORT - WMD	Per NIMS
DMORT-Family Assistance Center (FAC)	Personnel: Family Assistance Center (FAC) manager, DNA specialist, data entry, administrative, FAC core support elements, scheduler, medical records specialist, interview specialist, language interpreter (all necessary languages), antemortem IT/communications team, notification team, social services rep/Chaplain, ME/C public affairs officer
Deployable Portable Morgue Unit (DPMU)	Per NIMS
Morgue Operations Team	Personnel: Funeral director or embalmer, body tracker (should be funeral directors, medico-legal investigators (MLI) or similar), forensic odontologist team, fingerprint specialist, X-Ray technician or radiologist, postmortem IT manager, post-mortem data entry clerk, forensic anthropologist, DNA specialist, forensic pathology team, PE technician (MLI), evidence technician (LEO), lab technicians, security team, safety officer
Field Investigative Unit per DPMU	Personnel: Medico-Legal Investigator (MLI), Law Enforcement Investigative Unit, Photographer (Photo), Scribe/GPS coordinates (Scribe), Anthropologists, Dental Team

Planning Assumptions

- Although applicable to several of the 15 National Planning Scenarios, the capability planning factors were developed from an in-depth analysis of the Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) scenario. Other scenarios were reviewed to identify required adjustments or additions to the planning factors and national targets.
- This Capability applies to a wide range of incidents and emergencies, accidental or deliberate including disease outbreaks, geological and meteorological disasters, nuclear, hazardous materials (HazMat) or conventional events and all manners of transportation incidents (land, air, marine).
- Family members will mobilize to the incident scene to search for loved ones.
- Families will surge for information on unaccounted family members and share information on unaccounted family members.
- Recovery and identification of remains is expected to continue for multiple years.
- Active duty military will be victims in the event. Therefore, the military's Casualty Assistance Office will be involved.
- Emergency workers, including those necessary for fatality management, may not report to duty due to evacuating their families or because they have been injured or killed.
- Sceneops: After the recovery process begins, a Recovery team (consisting of Field Investigation and Body Handling Units) will process 3 bodies/hour (for a 12-hr shift).

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- Under ideal circumstances (non-contaminated, physically identifiable, and intact remains), the Dover Mortuary – at full resource activation (12 (Medical Examiner/Coroner (ME/C), plus support staff and logistic support) – can handle 100 cases per day.
- Antemortem Data Collection In The Family Assistance Center (FAC) A 2-person interview team in the FAC requires 2 hours/family interview (+ breaks). 5 families can be interviewed over the course of a 12-hour shift by one team. Additional support elements handle the collection and management of specimens (DNA) and records (medical).
- Morgueops: One 35-member Morgue Operations team can process and positively identify 5 bodies/day (based on historical data – see attachment A)
- The National Association of Medical Examiners recommends that a pathologist can adequately perform 250-350 autopsies per year.
- Scene hazards such as structural collapse, explosives and chemical hazards are communicated to the ME/C upon notification and/or arrival.
- Fatality management staffing includes ME/C, funeral service personnel, cemetery and crematorium personnel, dentist, anthropologist, crime lab technician, and any other person whose responsibility involves direct handling of human remains.
- The ME/C is defined as the agency chief and all staff authorized to act on behalf of his/her authority (i.e. Medico Legal Investigators [MLI]).
- Community leaders will support the time requirements to conduct a safe, efficient, methodical, and complete collection of human remains and evidence for the purposes of crime scene investigation for law enforcement (LE) and victim ID for the ME/C.
- As worker safety permits, remains, personal effects and items of evidence will be processed by fatality management personnel in accordance with incident action plan (IAP).
- Deaths will be protracted and require medical treatment facilities to report deaths to ME/C.
- There will be multiple sites for managing fatalities in multiple jurisdictions.
- ME/C may have to institute a unified command with other ME/C.
- ME/C may have to institute a decentralized approach due to lack of communications and geographical distribution.
- Different jurisdictions have different laws about public health emergencies and who has authority.
- Different jurisdictions have different laws pertaining to the issuance of death certificates when there is no scientific evidence of an individual's remains.
- Different jurisdictions may have different standards for processing remains, identifying remains, ruling out atypical cases, those requiring autopsy and establishing cause and manner of death.
- There may be a large discrepancy in the identification and release of bodies among jurisdictions.
- In the event of widely dispersed mass fatalities, significant damage to infrastructure, and/or where the risks posed to Fatality Management personnel outweigh the benefit of conducting scene operations, performance of critical tasks will take longer to accomplish
- IND in a single event located in a major urban area.
- The explosion and electromagnetic pulse have disrupted/destroyed infrastructure, taking out communications, electrical grids, water, transportation, and computers at ground zero. Electrical outages may cascade down the stem causing blackouts on the entire Eastern seaboard.
- There may be simultaneous transportation accidents due to flash blindness or permanent retinal damage in operators.
- The Federal Government would be severely impacted with cascading implications.
- There will be up to 229,270 fatalities.

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- Due to the severity of the explosion, no remains will be found in the crater (30 percent of fatalities = 68,781). However, appropriate legal document will be required to be generated by the medical-legal authority (death certificate by judicial decree).
- Some remains will be in areas of high levels of fallout. (20 percent of fatalities = 45,854). These remains in the hot zone will not begin to be recovered until between 3 and 14 days after incident at which time the radiation level should be approximately 0.1 percent of its initial level following the detonation of the IND.
- The majority of remains available for immediate processing (50 percent of fatalities = 114,635) will be burn victims in areas where radiation is not hazardous.
- The local ME/C is no longer operationally functional due to the effects of the IND. Mutual aid with the adjoining medical examiner system will respond to assist the local medical examiner.
- Decontamination: At present, decontamination assets are at the Federal level and consist of one Department of Defense (DOD) team and one Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team – Weapons of Mass Destruction (DMORT-WMD) team. These resources would take 12 – 24 hours to arrive on-scene after receiving orders and could process up to 25 bodies/hour. This assumption does not include the actual recovery of the contaminated remains.

Planning Factors from an In-Depth Analysis of a Scenario with Significant Demand for the Capability

Resource Organization	Estimated capacity	Scenario Requirement values	Quantity of resources needed
Jurisdictional Medical Examiner/Coroner (ME/C)	1 per jurisdiction	1 per jurisdiction	1 for each jurisdiction affected
ME/C Public Information Officer	1	1	1
Incident Historian	1 team per incident	1 team per incident	1 team
Scene operations personnel/Recovery Team: (per 12 hr shift)			
Medical Support Team			
Field Investigative Unit (Each unit can recover 36 bodies per shift). Each unit consists of 1 of : Medico-Legal Investigator (MLI) Law Enforcement Investigative Unit Photographer (Photo) Scribe/GPS coordinates		15 units per 12 hr shift (5 units suiting, 5 in field and 5 coming out of field)	414 days

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Resource Organization	Estimated capacity	Scenario Requirement values	Quantity of resources needed
(Scribe) Anthropologists Dental Team			
Body Recovery Unit (1 for each Field Investigative Unit)	4 body handlers per team	15 units per 12 hr shift (5 units suiting, 5 in field and 5 coming out of field)	414 days
Scene Logistics Team	1 per incident	1 per incident	414 days
Safety Officer	1 per incident	1 per incident	414 days
Scene Communications Team	1 per incident	1 per incident	414 days
Escort Security Team (provided by ESF 13)	1 per field investigative unit, 1 per body recovery unit	10 teams per 12 hr shift	414 days
FM Staging Security Team	2 teams, one for hot and cold staging areas		414 days
Storage Officer	1 per incident	1 per incident	414 days
Remains Decontamination Team	2 remains per 1 hr per 35 member team	16 teams per day	388 days
Underwater Recovery Team (provided by ESF 9)			
Family Assistance Center (FAC) personnel/Antemortem Data Collection Team: per 12 hr shift (Historical data shows 10 family members will present at the FAC for each victim. If FACs are established for the IND scenario we assume 1,000,000 will present at FACs/FAC.) However, it may well be that antemortem information will be collected telephonically.			
FAC Manager	1 per FAC	1 per FAC	1 per affected jurisdiction = 3
DNA Specialist	20 personnel from law	40 per day for each FAC	120 per day

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Resource Organization	Estimated capacity	Scenario Requirement values	Quantity of resources needed
	enforcement or DNA specialists per shift – each specialist can collect 2 samples per hour		
Data entry	50-60 personnel	120 per day for each FAC	360 per day
Administrative	5 per shift	10 per day	30 per day
Scheduler	2 personnel	4 per day	12 per day
Medical Records Specialist	10 personnel per shift	20 per day	60 per day
Interview Specialist	100 TEAMS OF 2 each per shift – each team can interview 5 families per day	200 per day -	600 per day
Language Interpreter (all necessary languages)	As situation dictates		
Antemortem IT/Communications Team	5 personnel per team per shift	10 per day	30 per day
Notification Team	20 per daytime shift	20 per day	60 per day
Social services representative /chaplain	As determined by social services/chaplain		
Law Enforcement	As determined by law enforcement		
Medical Examiner/Coroner Public Affairs Officer	1 per shift	2 per day	6 per day
Morgue operations personnel: per 12 hr shift per morgue (numbers are averages based on historical data). Time frames are based on 1.5 hrs to perform each autopsy with 112,000 set of remains to autopsy. A morgue ops team this size can process 100 sets of remains per day.			

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Resource Organization	Estimated capacity	Scenario Requirement values	Quantity of resources needed
Embalming Section	4 personnel per station	48 personnel (8 embalmings per shift)	1100 days
Body Tracker (should be Funeral Directors, MLI's or similar)	8 personnel per shift	16 personnel per day	1100 days
Dental Section	5 personnel per station	10 personnel per day	1100 days
Fingerprint Section	2 personnel per station	4 per day	1100 days
Radiology Section (digital equipment)	2 personnel per station	4 per day	1100 days
Postmortem IT Manager	1 = section leader	2 per day	1100 days
Post-Mortem Data Entry Clerk	3 per section	6 per day	1100 days
Anthropology Section	2 personnel per section	4 per day	1100 days
DNA Section	2 personnel per section	4 per day	1100 days
Pathology Section	3 personnel per section	6 per day	1100 days
Personnel Effects and Photography Section	4 personnel per section	8 per day	1100 days
Logistics Section	4 personnel per shift	8 per day	1100 days
Security Team (provided by ESF 13)			
Safety Officer	1 per shift		
Medical Team	1 per morgue		
City Engineers/Inspectors			
State Dental Association (Response Team)			
State ME/C Association (Response Team)			
State Funeral Director Association (Response Team)			
Disaster Mortuary Response			

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Resource Organization	Estimated capacity	Scenario Requirement values	Quantity of resources needed
Team (DMORT) has personnel plus basic load of equipment			
Deployable Portable Morgue Unit (DPMU)	2	2	2
DMORT-WMD			
DMORT Family Assistance Team			
NTSB Family Assistance Team			
DHS National Disaster Medical System's (NDMS) Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT)			
DHS Nuclear Incident Support Teams (NIST)			

Approaches for Large-Scale Events

(Please see introduction to Fatality Management Target Capability document as well as discussion of IND earlier in this document).

PANDEMIC INFLUENZA

- Personnel involved in fatality management should be considered as critical and be given as the same priority group determination as first responders for the distribution of limited antiviral medications and vaccines.
- Because pandemic influenza is a natural disease event, the Medical Examiner/Coroner (ME/C) may or may not have the lead responsibility to manage fatalities. In some areas, local jurisdictional authorities in coordination with hospitals, funeral homes, and EMS and law enforcement responders will likely manage the remains. In some jurisdiction, the Medical Examiner/Coroner's (ME/C) primary role may be to assist in the identification process.
- The influenza pandemic would spread quickly across the United States, affecting most communities virtually simultaneously for purposes of planning. The use of assets at the Federal Government would likely be relatively small related to the local demands for its voluntary DMORT members. Similarly, DOD assets would likely be stretched very thin.
- Among working aged adults, about 20 percent to 25 percent will become ill during the pandemic wave. About 10 percent will be sick or caring for ill family members during the peak of the community outbreak. Rates could be higher in some communities or work settings.

AEROSOL ANTHRAX

- Fatalities would be victims of crime (terrorism)
- Most would die in medical facilities; could be dispersed geographically

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- ME/C in coordination with law enforcement would need to establish what level of evidence would need to be collected from remains (e.g., would 100 percent need autopsies, or some lesser number)
- Fatality Management workers should be treated as first responders are with respect to personal protective equipment (PPE) and medications/vaccinations.
- The need for restrictions on final disposition, if any, e.g. cremation should be addressed in the planning process and implemented in the response.

PNEUMONIC PLAGUE

- Criminal event (terrorism).
- ME/C in coordination with law enforcement would need to establish what level of evidence would need to be collected from remains (e.g., would 100 percent need autopsies, or some lesser number)
- Due to person-to-person transmission, some of the same issues as pandemic influenza.
- The need for restrictions on final disposition (cremation), precautions for transportation of remains, decontamination of transport vehicles, and other issues should be addressed in the planning process and implemented in the response.
- Fatality Management workers should be treated as first responders are with respect to PPE and medications/vaccinations.

BLISTER AGENT

- Criminal event so ME/C would be heavily involved.
- Fatalities would need to be decontaminated unless this had occurred en route to medical treatment.

TOXIC INDUSTRIALCHEMICAL

- Fatalities would need to be decontaminated unless this had occurred en route to medical treatment.
- State, Regional, or Federal assets may be needed depending on the jurisdiction in which it occurs.

NERVE AGENT

- ME/C in coordination with law enforcement would need to establish what level of evidence would need to be collected from remains (e.g., would 100 percent need autopsies, or some lesser number)
- Fatalities would need to be decontaminated unless this had occurred en route to medical treatment.
- Due to the large number of fatalities, all levels of governmental response would likely be activated.

CHLORINE TANK EXPLOSION

- ME/C in coordination with law enforcement would need to establish what level of evidence would need to be collected from remains (e.g., would 100 percent need autopsies, or some lesser number)
- Fatalities would need to be decontaminated unless this had occurred en route to medical treatment.
- Due to the large number of fatalities, all levels of governmental response would likely be activated.

MAJOR EARTHQUAKE

- Urban Search and Rescue would be heavily involved in extracting remains from collapsed structures. The rate of recovery would influence the mortuary workload.
- The severe damage to infrastructure as well as large number of infrastructure makes it likely that a centralized call center outside the region would be established to collect missing persons reports and help reunite families/friends and determine those likely dead. This would also reduce the strain posed by bringing personnel into an area already strapped for shelter, food, etc. Antemortem data could be collected telephonically as needed. These capabilities could be returned to the state as infrastructure is re-established.
- While this is a natural event, ME/C would likely be heavily involved in the identification process of remains.

RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL

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- Due to criminal nature of event, ME/C and law enforcement would work together closely.
- Those who are killed by the explosion would need decontamination. Those dying later in a medical facility should not require this.

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE

- Due to criminal nature of event, ME/C and law enforcement would work together closely.
- Depending on the location, the number of fatalities could require state, regional, and, perhaps, federal assistance to manage the surge.

FOOD CONTAMINATION

- ME/C in coordination with law enforcement would need to establish what level of evidence would need to be collected from remains (e.g., would 100 percent need autopsies, or some lesser number)

National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	# of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
Federal	Department of Defense Mortuary	Federal Resource Organization	1	Nationally	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct Morgue Operations Manage Antemortem Data Conduct Victim Identification Conduct Final Disposition Demobilize
Federal	Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team (DMORT) – Type 1	NIMS Resource Organization		Nationally (DHS FEMA NDMS)	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct On-scene Operations Conduct Morgue Operations

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	# of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
					Demobilize
Federal	DMORT - WMD	NIMS Resource Organization		Nationally (DHS FEMA NDMS)	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct On-scene Operations Demobilize
Federal	DMORT-Family Assistance Center (FAC)	Non-NIMS Resource Organization		Nationally (DHS FEMA NDMS)	Activate Fatality Management Operations Manage Antemortem Data Demobilize
Federal	Deployable Portable Morgue Unit (DPMU)	NIMS Resource Organization	3	Nationally (DHS FEMA NDMS)	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct Morgue Operations Demobilize
State	Deployable Portable Morgue Unit (DPMU)	NIMS Resource Organization	1	Per every 5 States	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct Morgue Operations Demobilize
Federal	Morgue Operations Team	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	1	Per Federal DPMU	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct Morgue Operations

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	# of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
					Demobilize
State	Morgue Operations Team per DPMU	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	1	Per State DPMU	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct Morgue Operations Demobilize
State/Local	Morgue Security Team	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	1	Per Federal or State DPMU	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct Morgue Operations Demobilize
Federal	DOJ/FBI Evidence Response Team Unit	Non-NIMS Resource Organization			Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct On-scene Operations Demobilize
Federal/State	Body Recovery Unit	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	30	Per Federal or State DPMU	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct On-scene Operations Demobilize
Federal/State	Medical Support Team	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	1	Per Federal or State DPMU	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct On-scene Operations

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	# of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
					Demobilize
Federal/State	Field Investigative Unit	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	30	Per Federal or State DPMU	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct On-scene Operations Demobilize
Federal/State	Scene Logistics Unit	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	1	Per Federal or State DPMU	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct On-scene Operations Demobilize
Federal/State	Escort Security Team	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	30	Per Federal or State DPMU	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct On-scene Operations Demobilize
State/Local	Fatality Management Staging Security Team	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	1	Per staging area (26)	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct On-scene Operations Demobilize
State	Incident Historian Team	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	1	Per State	Direct Fatality Management Tactical Operations Activate Fatality Management

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	# of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
					Operations Conduct On-scene Operations Conduct Morgue Operations Manage Antemortem Data Conduct Victim Identification Demobilize
State/Local	Remains Decontamin-ation Team	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	16	Per State DPMU	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct On-scene Operations Conduct Morgue Operations Demobilize
Federal	Dive (underwater) Recovery Team	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	28	Nationally at pre-determined locations	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct On-scene Operations Demobilize
State	Dive (underwater) Recovery Team	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	1	Per State	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct On-scene Operations

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	# of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
					Demobilize
State	Medical Examiner/ Coroner	Personnel	1	Per State	Direct Fatality Management Tactical Operations Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct On-scene Operations Conduct Morgue Operations Conduct Victim Identification Conduct Final Disposition Demobilize
Local	Medical Examiner/ Coroner	Personnel	1	Per jurisdiction	Direct Fatality Management Tactical Operations Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct On-scene Operations Conduct Morgue Operations Conduct Victim Identification Conduct Final Disposition

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	# of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
					Demobilize
Federal	Refrigerated storage (to accommodate 200 remains)	Equipment	1	Nationally	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct Morgue Operations Demobilize
State	Refrigerated storage (to accommodate 100 remains)	Equipment	1	Per State	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct Morgue Operations Demobilize
Local	Refrigerated storage (accommodate remains)	Equipment	1	Per 10% of local population	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct Morgue Operations Demobilize
Federal/ State/ Local	Mortuary Officers (Funeral Directors)	Personnel			Direct Fatality Management Tactical Operations Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct Morgue Operations Conduct Victim Identification Conduct Final Disposition

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	# of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
					Demobilize
Federal	Antemortem Data Collection Team within Family Assistance Center	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	3	Nationally	Activate Fatality Management Operations Manage Antemortem Data Demobilize
State	Antemortem Data Collection Team within Family Assistance Center	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	1	Per State	Activate Fatality Management Operations Manage Antemortem Data Demobilize
Local	Antemortem Data Collection Team within Family Assistance Center	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	1	Per UASI	Activate Fatality Management Operations Manage Antemortem Data Demobilize
Federal/State/ Local/Private	Transportation	Equipment		As needed	Activate Fatality Management Operations Conduct On-scene Operations Conduct Morgue Operations Demobilize

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Recover Mission Area

Target Capabilities

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STRUCTURAL DAMAGE AND MITIGATION ASSESSMENT

Capability Definition

Structural Damage and Mitigation Assessment is the capability to conduct damage and safety assessments of civil, commercial, and residential infrastructure and to perform structural inspections, and mitigation activities. The capability includes being able to provide contractor management, construction management, cost estimating, technical assistance, and other engineering services to support and manage response and recovery operations.

Outcome

Accurate situation needs and damage assessments occur. The full range of engineering, building inspection, and enforcement services are implemented, managed, and coordinated in a way that maximizes the use of resources, aids emergency response, implements recovery operations, and restores the affected area to pre-event conditions. Mitigation projects to lessen the impact of similar future events are identified and prioritized.

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

This capability supports Emergency Support Function (ESF) #3: Public Works and Engineering.

Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Critical Tasks	
Rec.C3b 1.3.4	Develop standards and procedures to identify qualified contractors offering recovery/restoration services
Rec.C3b 1.1.2	Develop damage assessment procedures
Rec.C3b 1.4	Develop mitigation plans and procedures
Rec.C3b 1.4.1	Identify mitigation measures and emergency restoration procedures
Rec.C3b 1.5	Develop qualification and certification standards for paid and volunteer staff
Rec.C3b 1.1.3	Maintain situation and damage assessment plans

Preparedness Measures	**Metrics**
Damage assessment procedures are in place	Yes/No
Mitigation plans and procedures are in place	Yes/No
Mitigation measures and emergency restoration procedures identified	Yes/No
Relevant qualifications and certification standards for paid and volunteer staff are in place	Yes/No

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Situation and damage assessment plans are maintained	Yes/No
Code enforcement activities are conducted	Yes/No
Street maps are available for determining alternate routes	Yes/No
Critical Resource List has been developed	Yes/No

Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs	
Critical Tasks	
Rec.C3b 2.1.2	Conduct training on damage assessment procedures
Rec.C3b 2.1.3	Conduct training on mitigation plans and procedures
Rec.C3b 2.2.1	Exercise damage assessment procedures
Rec.C3b 2.2.2	Exercise mitigation plans and procedures
Preparedness Measures	**Metric**
Damage assessment procedures are exercised	Yes/No
Mitigation plans and procedures are exercised	Yes/No

Performance Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: *Direct Structural Damage and Mitigation Assessment Operations* **Definition: In response to a notification for recovery assets, provide the overall management and coordination of the response, through to demobilization.**	
Critical Tasks	
Rec.C3b 3.1.2	Coordinate resources to conduct building inspections and damage assessment
Rec.C3b 3.7	Support incident response operations according to incident management team (IMT) assignments on the inputs to the incident action plan (IAP) for structural damage and mitigation assessment
Rec.C3b 3.1.3	Recommend prioritization schedule of critical infrastructure services, facilities, and assets restoration based on structural damage and mitigation assessments
Rec.C3b 3.6	Develop standards and procedures to identify qualified contractors offering recovery/restoration services
Rec.C3b 3.7.1	Report and document the incident by completing and submitting required forms, reports, documentation, and follow-up notation for structural damage and mitigation assessment
Rec.C3b 3.5	Integrate appropriate private-sector entities into incident response activities
Performance Measures	**Metric**
Private sector entities are incorporated into recovery efforts	Yes/No

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Time to develop prioritization schedule for critical infrastructure	Within 24 hours of assessment completion
FEMA and non-FEMA mitigation activities are identified and prioritized concurrent to development of individual project worksheets for specific repair/reconstruction projects	Yes/No

Activity: *Activate Structural Damage and Mitigation Assessment*

Definition: Alert assessment staff to the potential need for services and conduct notifications, dispatch, and other staff mobilization activities necessary to begin assessment activities.

Critical Tasks	
Rec.C3b 4.1	Conduct emergency dispatch and notification for structural damage and mitigation assessment personnel
Rec.C3b 4.2	Dispatch secondary structural damage and mitigation assessment agencies

Performance Measures	Metric
Time to mobilize personnel for damage assessment after the observed end of the incident	Within 24 hours of notification

Activity: *Conduct Inspections and Assessments*

Definition: Conduct safety inspections to support the safety of first responders and to assess the habitability of residences. Support assessments of public facilities, lending civil, structural, and mechanical engineering support to affected entities and other assessment staff.

Critical Tasks	
Rec.C3b 5.4.3	Assist in the identification of incident response coordination centers for rebuilding property
Rec.C3b 5	Conduct building inspections and damage assessments of public and private structures
Rec.C3b 5.4.1	Assist with the assessment to determine the need for emergency flood protection and/or emergency erosion control
Rec.C3b 5.2.2	Identify the need for additional engineering and assessment resources from other Federal agencies and issue mission assignments to activate such resources
Rec.C3b 5.4.2	Assist with the assessment to determine the requirement to relocate affected essential services to back-up locations
Rec.C3b 5.3.1	Assess buildings and private structures to determine occupancy eligibility
Rec.C3b 5.3.2	Provide geo-coded status report of community, homes and facilities identified as safe or unsafe to re-enter and re-occupy
Rec.C3b 5.4.4	Determine need for recovery programs

Performance Measures	Metric
Situation assessments are conducted using one of following methods:	
▪ Aerial reconnaissance	Yes/No
▪ Remote sensing	Yes/No

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▪ Computer modeling (e.g., HAZUS) ▪ Rapid field assessments/windshield surveys	Yes/No Yes/No
Results of situation assessments are compared and contrasted to provide best initial estimate	Yes/No
Time to conduct situation assessment and provide results	Within 12–24 hours after the incident
Time to conduct a detailed situation assessment, to include information on buildings that are in imminent danger of collapse and critical resources of infrastructure are threatened	Within 24-48 hours of the conclusion of the disaster
Time to conduct building safety inspections for habitability (green, yellow, and red tags)	Within 4 weeks of the event
Time to conduct an emergency work damage assessment and public works (PW) preparation	Within 6 months of the end of the incident period
Time to conduct a permanent work damage assessment and public works (PW) preparation (FEMA and non-FEMA)	Within 12 months of the end of the incident period

Activity: *Provide Mitigation and Technical Assistance*

Definition: Support recovery personnel as they work to develop scopes of work and costs for restoring public buildings and infrastructure. Participate in the identification of mitigation opportunities that may be factored into repair, restoration, and recovery efforts.

Critical Tasks	
Rec.C3b 6.1.8	Coordinate, fund, and implement contracts for construction management and inspection
Rec.C3b 6.1.5	Assist with the coordination, funding, and implementation of contracts for emergency repair of utilities and other services
Rec.C3b 6.1.6	Assist with the management, monitoring, and/or provision of technical advice on debris management and reestablishment of ground and water routes into the affected area
Rec.C3b 6.1.7	Assist with the implementation and management of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Public Assistance Program (PA) to support the repair and restoration of public property
Rec.C3b 6.1.9	Participate in post-incident assessments of structures, public works and infrastructure to develop cost estimates, complete written project worksheets, determine priority repair/reconstruction projects, and help to prioritize engineering and construction resources

Performance Measures	Metric
Time for jurisdiction to provide technical assistance to responders	Within 24 hours following the end of the disaster
Time to process all FEMA project worksheets and complete eligibility and other reviews	Within 2 weeks of the project worksheet entry
Time to complete 200 applicants' briefings for FEMA's Public Assistance Program applicants	Within 2 months (100,000 category E Projects, at 10 buildings per applicant)

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Activity: *Demobilize Structural Damage and Mitigation Assessment* Definition: Account for all personnel and assets utilized and safely return them to their original location and function.	
Critical Tasks	
Rec.C3b 7.1	Develop a demobilization plan for structural damage and mitigation assessment
Rec.C3b 7.2	Restore structural damage and mitigation assessment personnel and equipment to normal operations
Rec.C3b 7.3	Complete appropriate structural damage and mitigation assessment documentation

Performance Measures	Metric
Personnel and equipment are returned to normal operations	Yes/No
Timely completion of all appropriate documentation	Yes/No

Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship
Emergency Operations Center Management	Structural Damage and Mitigation Assessment and Emergency Operations Center Management provide situation reports to each other.
Restoration of Lifelines	Structural Damage and Mitigation Assessment provides initial lifeline damage assessment to Restoration of Lifelines, while Restoration of Lifelines provides technical expertise to Structural Damage and Mitigation Assessment.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
Public Assistance Teams: buildings	A Public Assistance Team, led by a Public Assistance Coordinator, manages the processing of all of the applicant's recovery projects. The Public Assistance Coordinator is a NIMS-typed resource.
Public Assistance Teams: debris, emergency measures	See above
Public Assistance Teams: other permanent work	See Above
Rapid Needs Assessment Teams	Per NIMS, a team of specialists (e.g., HazMat, medical, mass care, infrastructure) that provides a rapid assessment capability immediately following a major disaster or emergency.
Disaster Assessment Teams	Per NIMS, there are Type I, II, and III Disaster Assessment Teams. NIMS also defines Individual Assistance Disaster Assessment Teams.
Engineering services (to include safety engineers)	
Home and Business Assessment Teams	
DOC NIST National Construction Safety Team	National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) teams that are authorized to investigate building failures.

Planning Assumptions

General

- Although applicable to several of the 15 National Planning Scenarios, the capability planning factors were developed from an in-depth analysis of the major earthquake scenario. Other scenarios were reviewed to identify required adjustments or additions to the planning factors and national targets.
- Federal funding to State and local governments is dependent upon Presidential Disaster Declaration.
- Management of significant debris removal operations, emergency protective measures for the public, and the restoration of transportation routes will take immediate precedence over building and structural assessments.
- Requirement for Federal support will be increased because significant numbers of State, local, and private sector personnel in the impacted area will not be available to support structural damage assessment and mitigation activities.
- Public Assistance Teams, Disaster Assessment Teams, and Engineering Services resources could be based regionally (using 10 standard Federal Regions) or at the national level, given the longer timeline of their missions.
- Initial safety assessments will be required before deploying additional resources to conduct building, structural, and mitigation assessments. The Federal Government can provide assistance to State and local governments with building inspections to protect public health and safety.
- Sufficient resources from Federal agencies and the private sector will be available for assessment and recovery operations.
- Appropriate and trained professional staff could be mobilized within 48 hours from multiple locations, nationwide.

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- All operations would be managed out of a Joint Field Office (JFO) established for the disaster incident.
- Initial meetings with impacted State/local governments would result in the formation of teams to complete:
  - Emergency inspections (health/safety)
  - Repair/reconstruction project worksheets for public structures and mitigation activities.
- Additional teams would be established by the private sector (including the insurance industry) to focus on inspection/recovery for the private sector, to include mitigation activities. Government should coordinate with these entities.

Scenario-Specific

- Of the 1 million buildings moderately damaged, 200,000 were commercial buildings, 100,000 were public buildings, and 700,000 were residences (300,000 red tagged unsafe for habitation). Of these 1,000 were large office buildings that were partially collapsed and where victims were trapped.
- The scenario identifies earthquake damage to more than 1 million buildings. For purposes of quantifying this capability, the indefinite amount above the 1 million was assumed to be statistically insignificant.
- Total number of Public Assistance Projects: 300,000.
- Port facilities in the affected area are significantly damaged, cargo throughput is reduced by 50 percent.
- Transit system is unavailable by 50 percent.
- Rail system cargo throughput is reduced by 50 percent.
- Highest probability U.S. earthquake areas are: Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, and Washington, according to the United States Geological Survey (USGS). There are approximately 64 metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) with populations greater than 100,000 in these States.
- Rapid Needs Assessment Teams would need to be located in close proximity to these 64 MSAs to perform necessary tasks immediately following the incident.
- FEMA's principal responsibility under this capability will be to prepare project worksheets for the 100,000 damaged public buildings in order to implement the Public Assistance Grant Program.
- Assume that damaged building projects represents 33 percent of total number of FEMA eligible projects with other categories as follows:
  - Debris – 15%
  - Emergency measures – 25%
  - Roads/bridges – 12%
  - Flood control - <1%
  - Utilities – 10%
  - Other – 5%
- Rapid Needs Assessment Teams – 30 for this scenario
- Population of affected area in this scenario – 10,000,000
  - Ratio of teams to population 3 teams/1 million people
  - From the Census Bureau's Metropolitan Area Rankings 1997 press release, 69,704,815 people live within the 64 MSA with populations greater than 100,000 that are located in States with the highest earthquake probability.
  - Therefore, the total number of Rapid Needs Assessment Teams is 210.
- Moderately damaged means that the impacted building is less than 50 percent damaged.

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- Normal deployment time for required response personnel increased by 24-48 hours.
- 300,000 project worksheets for approximately 10,000 applicants
- 50 applicants will participate in each applicant's briefing
- 20 of the Rapid Needs Assessment (RNA) Teams will be deployed to the county with the greatest amount of damage, while the other affected counties will require only two RNA teams each.

Planning Factors from an In-Depth Analysis of a Scenario with Significant Demand for the Capability (Major Earthquake)

Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Public Assistance Team: buildings	35 public structures per team, per week	100,000 public structures [(100000 structures 7 days/week)/ (35structures/team/week *365days)]	55 Public Assistance Teams for completion within 365 days
Public Assistance Team: debris, emergency measures	30 PWs per team per week	120,000 projects [(30 PWs/team/week *180 days/7 days)]	155 Public Assistance Teams
Public Assistance Team: other permanent work	30 PWs per team per week	80,000 projects [(80,000 PWs)/(30 PWs/team/day * 365 days/7 days)]	51 Public Assistance teams
Rapid Needs Assessment Team	1.4 teams per counties per day	Six counties impacted; 1,000 buildings partially collapsed	30 Rapid Needs Assessment teams
Disaster Assessment Team	30 structures per day, per team	200,000 private/commercial structures; 700,000 residences [900,000 structures/(30 structures/team/day * 30 days)]	1,000 teams
Engineering Services	30 structures per day, per team	100,000 public buildings with 15,000 destroyed; require inspection to determine safety (e.g., need for "Red Tag"). [100,000 structures/(30 structures/team/day * 30 days)]	112 teams
Home and Business Assessment			3,300 SBA Verifiers

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Approaches for Large-Scale Events

- By extending the time for public building inspections/project worksheets to be completed from one to two years, the workload will be reduced by 50 percent.
- By extending the time for private building inspections to be completed from one month to two or more months, the workload is reduced by at least 50 percent.
- By extending the time for building inspections to be completed from one month to two or more months, the workload is reduced by at least 50 percent.

National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
Federal/State/ Local	Public Assistance Teams: Buildings	NIMS Typed Resource Organization	110	Per incident (with composition apportioned 80% Federal, 20% State/local reps)	Provide Mitigation and Technical Assistance
Federal/State/ Local	Public Assistance Teams: Debris, emergency measures	NIMS Typed Resource Organization	310	Per incident (with composition apportioned 80% Federal, 20% State/local reps)	Provide Mitigation and Technical Assistance
Federal/State/ Local	Public Assistance Teams: Other permanent work	NIMS Typed Resource Organization	102	Per incident (with composition apportioned 80% Federal, 20% State/local reps)	Provide Mitigation and Technical Assistance
Federal/State/ Local	Rapid Needs Assessment Teams	NIMS Typed Resource Organization	210	Per incident (with composition apportioned 33% Federal, 66% State/local reps)	Conduct Inspections and Assessments
State/Local/ Private	Disaster Assessment Teams	NIMS Typed Resource Organization	1,000	Per incident (with composition apportioned 78% State/local, 22% private reps)	Conduct Inspections and Assessments
Federal	Engineering Service Teams	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	112	Per incident	Conduct Inspections and Assessments Provide Mitigation and Technical Assistance
Federal	Home and Business Assessment Staff – SBA Verifiers	Personnel	3,000	Per incident	Provide Mitigation and Technical Assistance
DOC/NIST	National	Federal			Conduct Inspections

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
	Construction Safety Team	Resource Organization			and Assessments

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RESTORATION OF LIFELINES

Capability Definition

Restoration of critical lifelines is the capability to begin clearing and initial restoration activities (e.g., demolition, and repairing). This includes the immediate repair/replacement of critical lifelines for essential fuel, electric, communications, water, wastewater, transportation infrastructure; to include moving debris to establish access.

Outcome

Lifelines to undertake sustainable emergency response and recovery activities are established.

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

This capability supports the following Emergency Support Functions (ESFs):

ESF #1: Transportation
ESF #2: Communication
ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering
ESF #12: Energy

Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Critical Tasks	
Rec.C1a 1.8	Develop restoration prioritization plans
Rec.C1a 1.7.1	Monitor and ensure integration of private-sector planning and operations related to response and recovery/restoration of lifeline-related services.
Rec.C1a 1.9	Develop sector specific emergency operations plans that are in compliance with NIMS
Rec.C1a 1.10	Develop credentialing procedures so repair personnel have access to critical sites following an incident

Preparedness Measures	**Metrics**
Restoration prioritization plans are in place	Yes/No
Key resource needs are identified	Yes/No
Contingent contracts and mutual aid agreements are in place	Yes/No
Restoration activities and activation plans and procedures have been developed	Yes/No

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Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs	
Critical Tasks	
Rec.C1a 2.1.1	Develop a training program based on sector emergency operations plans
Rec.C1a 2.2.1	Develop an exercise program based on emergency operations plan and training
Rec.C1a 2.2.2	Develop an after action program to correct deficiencies/exercise-findings

Preparedness Measures	Metric
Personnel are trained against plans and procedures	Yes/No
Personnel exercise against plans and procedures	Yes/No
After action items from last exercise are addressed/corrected	Yes/No
Staff are trained to perform damage assessment	Yes/No
Staff are trained to perform energy infrastructure damage assessment	Yes/No
Staff are trained to perform transportation infrastructure damage assessment	Yes/No
Staff are trained to perform drinking water infrastructure damage assessment	Yes/No
Staff are trained to perform waste water infrastructure damage assessment	Yes/No
Staff are trained to perform communications infrastructure damage assessment	Yes/No
Staff are trained to perform fuel infrastructure damage assessment	Yes/No

Performance Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: *Direct Restoration of Lifelines Operations* **Definition: Command and control the restoration of lifelines operations, facilitate the prioritization of facilities and placement of personnel and equipment to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of restoration activities, and communicate assessment results and continually update restoration status with the EOC and other impacted capabilities.**	
Critical Tasks	
Rec.C1a 3.1.4	Identify communities, public sectors, and economic entities affected by the loss of infrastructure
Rec.C1a 3.1.10	Identify resources required to manage and restore critical lifeline operations
Rec.C1a 3.1.11	Coordinate dissemination of status and priority information in accordance with NIMS
Rec.C1a 3.1.6	Execute emergency contracting support for life-saving and life-sustaining services
Rec.C1a 3.1.4	Identify staging areas for restoration of lifeline personnel and equipment
Rec.C1a 3.1.5	Coordinate with the EOC on lifeline restoration priorities
Rec.C1a 3.2.5	Provide and coordinate the use of emergency power generation services at critical facilities
Rec.C1a 3.1.8	Provide and coordinate alternate means for proving critical lifeline services
Rec.C1a 3.1.12	Prepare to justify or provide emergency/immediate financial assistance for the restoration of

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	critical lifelines
Rec.C1a 3.1.7	Coordinate housing needs for utility restoration personnel, including facilities for restoration personnel within the impacted area.
Rec.C1a 3.1.9	Execute pre-existing plans to ensure integration of private-sector planning and operations related to the response and recovery/restoration of lifeline-related services

Performance Measures	Metric
Time to establish initial critical lifeline restoration priorities	
Time to identify alternate transportation routes for the restoration of lifelines	Within 2 hours of the event
Time to provide housing and essential services for mobilized personnel	Within 36 hours of disruption
Time to identify required lifeline personnel	Within 6-12 hours of disruption

Activity: *Activate Restoration of Lifelines*

Definition: Initiate the process for getting the appropriate personnel and equipment to the disaster locations.

Critical Tasks	
Rec.C1a 4.1	Notify appropriate lifeline personnel
Rec.C1a 4.2	Confirm estimated time of arrival of notified lifeline restoration personnel
Rec.C1a 4.3	Mobilize appropriate initial personnel based on the type and extent of the damage to lifelines
Rec.C1a 4.4	Mobilize equipment appropriate for the incident

Performance Measures	Metric
Time to notify and confirm arrival of personnel and equipment for the restoration of lifelines	Within 6 hours after the end of the event
Time to mobilize personnel and equipment for the restoration of lifelines	Within 24 hours after the end of the event
Time to stage personnel and equipment for the restoration of lifelines	Within 36-48 hours after the end of the event
Time to establish key transportation avenues/routes.	Within 12 hours of the event

Activity: *Re-Assess and Prioritize*

Definition: Continually re-assess damage and evaluate, using specialized expertise and coordination with local providers, in order to prioritize restoration and deployment of the correct assets to the damaged locations.

Critical Tasks	
Rec.C1a 5.1	Reassess damage to energy infrastructures
Rec.C1a 5.5	Reassess damage to transportation infrastructure
Rec.C1a 5.2	Reassess damage to drinking water infrastructure

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Rec.C1a 5.3	Reassess damage to wastewater infrastructure
Rec.C1a 5.5	Reassess damage to communication infrastructure
Rec.C1a 5.6	Reassess damage to fuel infrastructure
Rec.C1a 5.1.1	Prioritize repairs to energy infrastructures
Rec.C1a 5.5.1	Prioritize repairs to transportation infrastructure
Rec.C1a 5.2.1	Prioritize repairs to drinking water infrastructure
Rec.C1a 5.3.1	Prioritize repairs to wastewater infrastructure
Rec.C1a 5.4.1	Prioritize repairs to communication infrastructure
Rec.C1a 5.6.1	Prioritize repairs to fuel infrastructure
Rec.C1a 5.9	Prioritize lifeline restoration between sectors

Performance Measures	Metric
Damage to essential public systems, facilities, and utilities are re-assessed and prioritized	Yes/No
Experts are accessed to conduct damage assessments	Yes/No
Ability exists to access experts to conduct energy infrastructure damage assessments	Yes/No
Ability exists to access experts to conduct transportation infrastructure damage assessments	Yes/No
Ability exists to access experts to conduct drinking water infrastructure damage assessments	Yes/No
Ability exists to access experts to conduct waste water infrastructure damage assessments	Yes/No
Ability exists to access experts to conduct communications infrastructure damage assessments	Yes/No
Ability exists to access experts to conduct fuel infrastructure damage assessments	Yes/No

Activity: ***Implement Reconstitution Procedures for Critical Facilities***

Definition: Execute the critical restoration effort using established priorities, in a manner that maximizes the efficiency and effectiveness of the response and recovery process.

Critical Tasks	
Rec.C1a 6.4	Gather post-incident assessments information of structures, public works and infrastructure, priority repair/reconstruction projects, and engineering and construction resources to develop cost estimates to complete written project worksheets for immediate needs funding for critical lifeline emergency repairs/replacement
Rec.C1a 6.5.1	Conduct restoration of priority energy infrastructure
Rec.C1a 6.9	Conduct priority transportation restoration operations
Rec.C1a 6.6	Conduct priority drinking water restoration operations
Rec.C1a 6.7	Conduct priority wastewater system restoration operations
Rec.C1a 6.10	Conduct priority communications restoration operations
Rec.C1a 6.11	Conduct priority fuel system restoration operations

Performance Measures	Metric

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Time to commence initial debris clearance	Within the first 24 hours
Time to restore priority (~25%) electrical service	Within 36 hours of disruption
Time to provide an electrical service(restore or alternate) to essential facilities (e.g., hospitals, police, and fire departments)	
Time to restore priority (~25 percent) of fuel service	Within 7 days of the event
Time to restore priority (~25 percent) of water service	Within 14 days of the event
Time to restore priority (~25%) of sewer and waste water treatment service	
Time to restore priority (~25 percent) of communication systems	Within 14 of the event
Time to provide alternate communications to essential facilities (e.g., hospital, police, and fire departments)	

Activity: *Demobilize Restoration of Lifelines Operations*

Definition: Account for all assets utilized and safely return them to their original locations and functions.

Critical Tasks	
Rec.C1a 7.1	Consider need to transition personnel and equipment for permanent repair operations
Rec.C1a 7.2	Develop a demobilization plan for restoration of lifelines.
Rec.C1a 7.3	Restore restoration of lifelines personnel and equipment to normal operations.
Rec.C1a 7.4	Complete appropriate restoration of lifelines documentation.

Performance Measures	Metric
Personnel and equipment are returned to normal operations	Yes/No
All appropriate documentation is completed in timely manner	Yes/No

Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship
Structural Damage and Mitigation Assessment	Restoration of Lifelines provides technical expertise to Structural Damage and Mitigation Assessment, while Structural Damage and Mitigation Assessment provides initial lifeline damage assessment to Restoration of Lifelines.
Emergency Operations Center Management	Restoration of Lifelines and Emergency Operations Center Management both provide situation reports to each other.
Economic and Community Recovery	Restoration of Lifelines provides lifeline infrastructure assessment to Economic and Community Recovery.
Environmental Health	Environmental Health provides information to Restoration of Lifelines regarding the safety considerations for assessment and repair crews in the impacted area
Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution	Critical Resource Logistics and Distribution provides resource support to the Restoration of Lifelines Capability.

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Critical Infrastructure Protection	Critical Infrastructure Protection provides information to assist with the prioritization of restoration activities

Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
Debris Removal Team	
Debris Management Team	Per NIMS, there are Type I, II, and III Debris Management Teams, including personnel and equipment.
Damage Assessment Team: Gas Distribution System	Per NIMS
Damage Assessment Team: Water and Sewer	Per NIMS
Damage Assessment Team: Electric Power	Per NIMS
Damage Assessment Team: Communications System	Per NIMS
Transportation Assessment Team	
Water and Sewer Restoration Team	
Gas Distribution System Restoration Team	
Communications System Restoration Team	
Electric Power Restoration Team	Per NIMS, a team of personnel and equipment to coordinate and support resources of energy producers to quickly restore electrical power to afflicted areas

Planning Assumptions

General

- Although applicable to several of the 15 National Planning Scenarios, the capability factors were developed from an in-depth analysis of the major earthquake scenario. Other scenarios were reviewed to identify required adjustments or additions to the planning factors and national targets.
- Federal funding to State and local governments is dependent upon Presidential Disaster Declaration.
- Responsibility for lifeline repairs will be based on ownership of lifeline facilities (public vs. private sector).
- FEMA's principal responsibility will be to prepare project worksheets for damaged lifelines owned by the public sector in order to implement the Public Assistance Grant program.
- FEMA can provide assistance to State and local governments for debris removal from public property, and to implement emergency measures to protect public health and safety, if public health and safety is threatened by damage to lifelines.
- Normal deployment time for required response personnel increased by 24-48 hours.

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- Reestablishment of utilities will take longer with fewer restoration crews; however, the utility restoration industry has extensive and frequent experience, and can deliver personnel, equipment and materials within certain time perimeters.
- Assessment teams would need to be deployed immediately following the event, particularly for gas, electric, and communication systems in order to provide service to essential institutions and facilities (e.g., police, fire, and hospitals), although many of these facilities already may have contingency plans and backup utilities.
- Debris on private property may be removed to allow access of emergency vehicles.
- Ability to communicate with lifeline personnel and obtain additional resources may be limited.
- There will be a need to rely on MOUs and other agreements to obtain lost resources.
- Due to previous events, the availability of appropriate resources may be limited.
- There are many variables in each of the lifeline systems. Using "average" conditions and estimates may significantly overestimate requirements for easier restorations, and greatly underestimate requirements for complicated restorations.
- These assumptions do not consider how coexisting damage affects speed of repair (e.g. co-located water and gas lines—damage to both will increase repair times.)

Scenario-Specific

- 10,000 water mains are damaged or destroyed.
- 300 miles of electrical and cable lines are damaged affecting 650,000 households and businesses.
- 8,000 gas mains are damaged such that natural gas is emitted in various neighborhoods in the affected area.
- 1,300 square miles of the metropolitan area is affected.
- Telecommunication switch services degraded by 50 percent or higher. Cellular facilities are damaged 50 percent or higher.
- 200 miles of highways/railroads and subways, 100 bridges and tunnels, 2 category 1 runways and 2 category III runways damaged.
- 50 percent of waste water treatment infrastructure is damaged.

Planning Factors from an In-Depth Analysis of a Scenario with Significant Demand for the Capability (Major Earthquake)

Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Debris Removal Team	80 cu. yd. per hour (moved to side of road)	Bridges and major highways down or blocked	80 teams to clear debris from transportation avenues in 72 hours
Damage Assessment Team: Gas Distribution System	.5 square miles per hour	1300 square miles of metropolitan area	25 teams to assess damage within 12 hours
Damage Assessment Team: Water and sewer	1 damaged main per 1.5 hours; 8 per 12 hour shift	10,000 water mains	40 assessment teams to cover 12 hour shifts for 30 days

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Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Damage Assessment Team: Electric Power	1 mile of damaged wire per .5 hour interval; 24 miles per 12 hour shift	300 miles of damaged electrical lines	2 Damage assessment investigators to assess 300 miles of line in 13 days
Damage Assessment Team: Communications System	1 crew to identify 1 line per 12 hr. interval	8,000 fiber optic breaks	400 crews find 8000 breaks within 20 days
Water and Sewer Restoration Crew	1 main repaired per four hour interval; 3 mains repaired per 12 hour shift	10,000 water mains	100 crews per 12 hr. shift 10,000 water mains completed in 17 days
Wastewater Treatment Plant Restoration Crew			
Gas Distribution System Restoration Crew	1 main per day per team	25 percent of 8,000 mains in 14 days	143 teams
Communications System Restoration Crew	1- 3 person team per break, per 12 hr. day	8,000 breaks in fiber optic lines	300 crews to complete 8000 breaks in 26 days
Electric Power Restoration Crew	1 crew restores 95 customers per 12 hour interval	600,000 customers without electricity	1200 crews can restore electrical service in 5.2 days
Transportation Assessment Team	1 team identifying alternate routes	50 percent of transportation avenues unavailable	1 team - 1 day

Approaches for Large-Scale Events

- Water and sewer restoration crews, gas distribution system restoration crews, communications system restoration crews, and electric power restoration crews could double the estimated restoration time by:
  - Utilizing temporary emergency resources (e.g., portable generators)
  - Requesting citizens to take conservation measures
  - Utilizing cross-border resources

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National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
Note: the teams identified below will be generated in response to a specific incident by assembling staff from various locations; they are not dedicated, standing organizations.					
Federal/State/ Local partnership	Debris Management Team	NIMS typed Resource Organization	80	Per affected region	Implement Reconstitution Procedures for Critical Facilities
Local (with private sector partnership)	Damage Assessment Team: Gas Distribution System	NIMS typed Resource Organization	25	Per affected region	Re-Assess and Prioritize
Local (with private sector partnership)	Damage Assessment Team: Water and sewer	NIMS typed Resource Organization	40	Per affected region	Re-Assess and Prioritize
Local (with private sector partnership)	Damage Assessment Team: Electric Power	NIMS typed Resource Organization	2	Per affected region	Re-Assess and Prioritize
Local (with private sector partnership)	Damage Assessment Team: Communications System	NIMS typed Resource Organization	400	Per affected region	Re-Assess and Prioritize
Local (with private sector partnership)	Water and Sewer Restoration Team	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	100	Per affected region	Implement Reconstitution Procedures for Critical Facilities
Local (with private sector partnership)	Gas Distribution System Restoration Team	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	143	Per affected region	Implement Reconstitution Procedures for Critical Facilities
Local (with private sector partnership)	Communications System Restoration Team	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	300	Per affected region	Implement Reconstitution Procedures for Critical Facilities
Local (with private sector partnership)	Electric Power Restoration Team	NIMS Type Resource Organization	1200	Per affected region	Implement Reconstitution Procedures for Critical Facilities
Local (with private sector partnership)	Transportation Assessment Team	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	1	Per affected region	Re-Assess and Prioritize

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ECONOMIC AND COMMUNITY RECOVERY

Capability Definition

Economic and Community Recovery is the capability to implement short- and long-term recovery and mitigation processes after an incident. This will include identifying the extent of damage caused by an incident, conducting thorough post-event assessments and determining and providing the support needed for recovery and restoration activities to minimize future loss from a similar event.

Outcome

Economic impact is estimated, priorities are set for recovery activities, business disruption is minimized and returned to operation, and individuals and families are provided with appropriate levels and types of relief with minimal delay.

Relationship to National Response Plan Emergency Support Function (ESF)/Annex

This capability supports the following Emergency Support Functions (ESFs):

ESF#6: Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services
ESF#14: Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation

Preparedness Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: Develop and Maintain Plans, Procedures, Programs and Systems	
Critical Tasks	
Rec.C3a 1.1.1	Develop resumption, restoration, and recovery plans
Rec.C3a 1.4	Coordinate recovery and mitigation planning

Preparedness Measures	**Metrics**
Resumption, restoration and recovery plans in place	Yes/No
Recovery and mitigation planning efforts are coordinated with existing or ongoing Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP)	Yes/No
Private sector and voluntary agency input are reflected in planning process	Yes/No
Appropriate insurance coverage policies exist	Yes/No
Each functional area has qualified personnel	Yes/No
Protocols are in place for locating and recalling staff during recovery process	Yes/No
Continuity of Operations Plans (COOP) are in place	Yes/No
Debris management priorities have been established, to include improving restoration of key community functions and critical infrastructures	Yes/No

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Activity: Develop and Maintain Training and Exercise Programs	
Critical Tasks	
Rec.C3a 2.1.1	Develop and conduct training in stabilization and recovery
Rec.C3a 2.2.1	Exercise recovery plans

Preparedness Measures	Metric
Personnel are trained in stabilization and recovery plans	Yes/No
Recovery Plans are exercised	Yes/No

Performance Tasks and Measures/Metrics

Activity: *Direct Economic and Community Recovery Operations* **Definition: Command and control economic and community recovery operations, facilitate prioritization of economic assistance for businesses, individuals, and governments, and ensure that both monetary and non-monetary assistance relief is provided to minimize the negative economic effects of the incident.**	
Critical Tasks	
Rec.C3a 3.4	Coordinate regional and State support for community recovery and rehabilitation services
Rec.C3a 3.2	Prioritize recovery sequence for economic and community recovery
Rec.C3a 3.3	Coordinate the request for State/Federal aid
Rec.C3a 3.6	Establish long-term recovery goals
Rec.C3a 3.7	Establish long-term recovery goals for economic and community recovery

Performance Measures	Metric
Time in which a recovery plan is implemented	Less than 48 hours following need to activate plan
Time in which debris management strategies are implemented	Beginning immediately and continuing
Time to assess and implement appropriate changes to codes and code enforcement	Beginning immediately and continuing
Time to coordinate efforts with nonprofit sector and relief NGOs	Within two days following an event and continuing
Time for jurisdiction to estimate the social and economic consequences of an event in the affected area	Less than 7 days
Meetings with private industries and NGOs on long-term community recovery begin within 30 days of incident	Yes/No
Mitigation plan is implemented	Yes/No
Time to refine estimates of social and economic consequences of an event in affected area	0 to 30 days

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Time to implement property damage mitigation initiatives	Beginning within 90 days and continuing
Time to coordinate efforts with other levels of government	1 to 3 years after the event
Time to gauge effectiveness of previous recovery planning and mitigation efforts	1 to 3 years after the event

Activity: *Activate Economic and Community Recovery*

Definition: Alert recovery program staff of need for services, conduct notification, dispatch, and other staff mobilization activities as necessary to begin recovery activities.

Critical Tasks	
Rec.C3a 4.2	Establish community recovery assistance programs
Rec.C3a 4.1	Conduct dispatch and notification for economic and community recovery personnel.
Rec.C3a 4.1.1	Mobilize requests for technical experts to assist in recovery efforts.
Rec.C3a 4.3	Implement Federal assistance programs
Rec.C3a 4.4	Implement State, regional, tribal, and local assistance and recovery plans
Rec.C3a 4.2.3	Implement private-sector recovery, local assistance, and recovery and mitigation plans

Performance Measures	Metric
Percentage of notified personnel who report	100%

Activity: *Assess and Prioritize Recovery Needs*

Definition: Assess economic recession in order to prioritize monetary and non-monetary relief.

Critical Tasks	
Rec.C3a 5.1	Conduct post-event assessment and planning to effect successful long-term recovery, including the mitigation of damages from future disasters
Rec.C3a 5.2	Assess the situation and forecast economic needs for victims

Performance Measures	Metric
Time in which 50 percent of impacted individuals and business will be registered for disaster assistance	Within 60 days of assistance being available

Activity: *Provide Monetary Relief*

Definition: Provide funding to damaged or impacted entities in advance of necessary recovery expenditures or to reimburse entities.

Critical Tasks	
Rec.C3a 6.1	Assess business recovery needs
Rec.C3a 6.1.1	Provide disaster loans for business

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Rec.C3a 6.3.2	Provide disaster loans for individuals
Rec.C3a 6.3	Operate individual assistance programs
Rec.C3a 6.2	Provide economic stabilization, community recovery, and mitigation support and/or financial restitution to key service sectors (e.g., medical, financial, public health and safety)
Rec.C3a 6.4	Notify appropriate authorities of disaster relief reimbursement vehicles
Rec.C3a 6.3.3	Provide financial counseling
Rec.C3a 6.5	Process entity restitution/reimbursement claims

Performance Measures	Metric
Unmet economic needs have been identified	Yes/No
Time to activate process to manage claims	As early as 1 week for individual claims and as long as 1 year plus for government-to-government assistance
Time to provide Federal disaster assistance grants to affected individuals	Within 2 weeks of registration
Time to provide Federal disaster assistance loans to individuals and businesses	Within 30 days of application
Time in which Federal grant funds are obligated for 50 percent of FEMA's Public Assistance applications	Within 1 year
Time in which Federal grant funds are obligated for 75 percent of FEMA's Public Assistance applications	Within 2 years
Time in which Federal grant funds are obligated for 90 percent of FEMA's Public Assistance applications	Within 3 years
Time in which Federal grant funds are obligated for 95 percent of FEMA's Public Assistance applications	Within 4 years
Time in which Federal grant funds are obligated for 100 percent of FEMA's Public Assistance applications	Within 5 years
Time to provide fair market value indemnity to owners of destroyed animals and materials	Within 72 hours of destruction

Activity: *Provide Non-Monetary Relief*

Definition: Provide direct assistance in the form of equipment, facilities, supplies, staff, technical assistance, and other material resource support to meet recovery needs of affected entities.

Critical Tasks	
Rec.C3a 7.2	Participate in and facilitate recovery activities related to public works and engineering
Rec.C3a 7.1	Assess and quantify projected housing needs
Rec.C3a 7.1.1	Develop preliminary temporary housing plan
Res.C3a 7.4	Provide temporary housing
Rec.C3a 7.3	Provide family support services

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Performance Measures	Metric
Unmet social needs have been identified	Yes/No
Time for initiation of non-monetary forms of disaster assistance (e.g., crisis counseling, disaster legal services) to individuals and businesses	Within 7 days
Time in which persons in temporary housing/interim shelters will be relocated to long term housing	Within 30 to 90 days

Activity: *Demobilize Economic and Community Recovery*

Definition: Account for all assets utilized and safely return them to their original locations and functions.

Critical Tasks	
Rec.C3a 8.1	Develop a demobilization plan for economic and community recovery
Rec.C3a 8.2	Restore economic and community recovery personnel and equipment to normal operations
Rec.C3a 8.3	Complete appropriate economic and community recovery documentation

Performance Measures	Metric
Personnel and equipment are returned to normal operations	Yes/No
All appropriate documentation has been completed	Yes/No

Linked Capabilities

Linked Capability	Relationship
Structural Damage and Mitigation Assessment	Structural Damage and Mitigation Assessment provides a damage assessment to Economic and Community Recovery.
Restoration of Lifelines	Restoration of Lifelines provides lifeline infrastructure assessments to Economic and Community Recovery.
Emergency Operations Center Management	Emergency Operations Center Management and Economic and Community Recovery both contribute to situation reports.
Mass Care	Mass Care and Economic and Community Recovery share individual assistance updates.
Volunteer Management and Donations	Volunteer Management and Donations provides cash and material contributions for distribution during the recovery phase of the incident.

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Capability Activity Process Flow



Capability Element Description Details

Capability Elements	Components and Description
Community Planning and Development Officer	Coordinate economic recovery and mitigation plan
Damage Assessment Officer	Assess damages to publicly and privately owned facilities
Loan Officers	Process SBA applications in 60 days
Finance Officer	Compile and administer financial assistance requests and applications
Economic Impact Community Representatives Team	Assess the economic impact to private business; includes business leaders (industry/major employers); Chambers of Commerce and business associations; local trade organizations, and local professional associations.
Essential Service Representatives Team	Assess impact to essential service infrastructure and basic service distribution systems. Comprises 20 members, including representatives from water and wastewater, public health and sanitation, utilities, transportation, hospital, police, fire and EMS, communications, debris removal and disposal
Insurance Community Inspectors	Manage insurance claims processing
Private sector and utility system representatives	Manage repair and reconstruction of disaster damage
Personnel from individual assistance and public assistance programs	Implement disaster assistance programs to include registration of applicants, inspection of disaster damages, and processing applications
Volunteer Organizations Active in Disasters (VOADs)	

Planning Assumptions

General

- Although applicable to several of the 15 National Planning Scenarios, the capability planning factors were developed from an in-depth analysis of the major earthquake scenario. Other scenarios were reviewed to identify required adjustments or additions to the planning factors and national targets.
- Federal funding to State and local governments is dependent upon Presidential Disaster Declaration.
- This capability focuses on the recovery of a particular community (public infrastructure, individual housing, businesses, etc); it does not address recovery of a large economic sector.
- Due to the disruption of local and regional transportation systems, alternative methods of distribution and transportation will need to be identified and/or implemented (based on historical information, shows that for every 1 home destroyed, 10 will be damaged).
- Multiple hazardous materials issues will need to be addressed.
- Assume all displaced families will require some form of government sheltering and housing assistance.
- Level of losses may result in multiple bankruptcies. (Based upon historical data and the severe economic impact scenarios, certain entities will be unable to overcome financial losses. Governments as well as business may face bankruptcy.)
- The resource component is time sensitive since pre-event implementation of effective recovery and mitigation planning efforts will impact response to community needs.

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- The resource package may be called to operate for years after the incident.

Scenario-Specific

- 300,000 homes have been destroyed; there are 1,400 deaths; 18,000 hospitalizations, 150,000 buildings destroyed and 1 million buildings damaged. 250,000 individuals seek shelter in safe areas and over 250,000 people self-evacuate the area.
- The wide dispersal of disaster victims will complicate the Federal Government assistance eligibility and delivery processes for extended temporary housing, tracking, and need for registering the diseased, ill, injured, and exposed
- Of the 1 million buildings moderately damaged, 200,000 were commercial buildings and 100,000 were public buildings. Of these, 1,000 were large office buildings, they were partially collapsed. (Estimates based on trends from previous disasters).

Planning Factors from an In-Depth Analysis of a Scenario with Significant Demand for the Capability (Earthquake)

Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
Community Planning and Development Officer		One per jurisdiction	
Damage Assessment Officer	Average of 5 inspections per day – home/business	3.3 million homes inspected 500,000 businesses inspected	5,000 inspectors to process work over a period of 6 months
Finance Officer	Up to 30,000 electronically processed claims per day. (Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) only, and only those claims that are auto-determined) Small Business Administration (SBA) loan officer can process an average of 5 applications per day	1.85 million applicants in 60 days 1 million applications received in 60 days by SBA	One finance officer (FEMA only- with adequate support staff) completes applications in 60 days 1,000 loan officers to process SBA applications in 60 days
Economic Impact Community Representatives: ▪ Business leaders (industry/major employers) ▪ Chambers of Commerce and business associations. ▪ Local trade	One team can estimate the economic impact of the disaster. Size of team contingent on disaster variables	The number on each team will vary by jurisdiction	Teams will be needed by level of government

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Resource Organization	Estimated Capacity	Scenario Requirement Values	Quantity of Resources Needed
organizations and professional association membership			
Essential services representatives: ▪ Water and wastewater ▪ Public health and sanitation ▪ Utilities ▪ Transportation, and hospital ▪ Police ▪ Fire and Emergency Medical Service (EMS) ▪ Communications ▪ Debris removal and disposal	One team serves to liaison with key community functions in one jurisdiction	Ongoing	One team per jurisdiction
Insurance community	Average of 4 inspections per day – residential and commercial	185,000 (5% of total damaged properties) have earthquake insurance	260 inspectors over 6 months
Volunteer Organizations Active in Disasters (VOADs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)	Elastic – surge capacity to fit specific needs		VOAD Coordinator and coordinated assistance mechanism/system
Private sector, including construction, building supplies, transportation assets	Capacity is contingent on availability of repair and reconstruction contractors and building supplies		
Personnel to implement disaster assistance programs.	Agencies gear up and gear down based on workload requirements		Estimated personnel requirements would roughly equal triple the 2004 hurricane season staff level. (e.g., SBA level was 2800)

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Approaches for Large-Scale Events

- For temporary housing, potential exists to use tents, dorms, ships, train cars, terminals, temporary relocation sites, military facilities, and converted commercial space instead of mobile homes and trailers. Access to essential services (food, transportation, health care, etc) must accompany housing resource.
- Modes of delivery of assistance awards may vary, ranging from new expedited processes to alternative distribution methods.
- For temporary provisions, "Comfort Kits" may need to be instituted as a substitute for immediate award of disaster assistance.
- To foster communication, every neighbor tells a neighbor. Set up centralized information dissemination posts (e.g. at 7/11 stores).

National Targets and Assigned Levels

Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
Note: Many of the staff "pools" identified below will be generated in response to a specific incident by assembling governmental and contract staff from various locations; they are not dedicated, standing organizations.					
All levels	Community Planning and Development Officer	Personnel	1	Per jurisdiction	Assess and Prioritize Recovery Needs
National/ Regional	Damage Assessment Officer	Personnel	5,000	Per incident	Assess and Prioritize Recovery Needs
FEMA	Finance Officer	Personnel	1	Per incident	Provide Monetary Relief Provide Non-Monetary Relief
Federal	Technical support and computer infrastructure	Equipment	1	Per FEMA finance officer	Provide Monetary Relief Provide Non-Monetary Relief
National/ Regional	Loan Officers	Resource Organization	1,000	Per incident	Provide Monetary Relief
Local	Economic Impact Community Representatives		10	Per coordination team	Assess and Prioritize Recovery Needs
Local	Essential Services Representatives Team	Non-NIMS Resource Organization	1	Per jurisdiction	Assess and Prioritize Recovery Needs

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Responsible	Element Resource Unit	Type of Element	Number of Units	Unit Measure (number per x)	Capability Activity supported by Element
Federal/State/ Local	Insurance Community Inspectors	Personnel	260	Per incident	Assess and Prioritize Recovery Needs
Federal/State/ Local	Volunteer Organizations Active in Disasters (VOADs) and Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)	Personnel, Equipment	Elastic – Surge capacity to fit specific needs	Dependent upon incident	Assess and Prioritize Recovery Needs Provide Monetary Relief Provide Non-Monetary Relief
Federal/State/ Local	Private sector, including construction, building supplies, transportation assets	Personnel, Equipment	Capacity is contingent on availability of repair and reconstruction contractors and building supplies	Dependent upon incident	Assess and Prioritize Recovery Needs
National/ Regional	Personnel to implement disaster assistance programs	Personnel	30,000	Per incident	Provide Monetary Relief Provide Non-Monetary Relief

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